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BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
 Posted - April 08 2005 : 09:39:23 AM
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Dave, re: Scott's evidence. I suspect that he went mainly by Indian narrative. Whichever company it was, it seems to make sense. If you have a extended skirmish line and the bad guys are getting too close, it makes sense to me that a counter-attack would gain some of your advantage in weapon's range back.
Billy |
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BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - April 08 2005 : 09:47:43 AM
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I found this, to me, fascinating report in Ordnance Notes for 1879 but since it deals with LBH matters and the Army vs. Indian arms question, I still consider it relevant. The same Ordnance Notes also goes into detail about other weapons captured from or turned in by Sioux and Cheyenne which I will deal with later.
Billy
[Transcriber's Note: All italics were in the original.]
Ordnance Notes No. 115
October 1, 1879
American Executive Papers W3411-4.5.115 p. 171-172
Combat Arms Research Library
Ft. Leavenworth, KS
Headquarters Department of Dakota
Office Chief Ordnance Officer
St. Paul, Minn., January 22, 1879.
To the Adjutant General, Department of Dakota.
Sir: I have the honor to submit, for the consideration of the Department Commander, the following report, in connection with eight guns received from the District of the Yellowstone, under the following instructions:
“Ordnance Office
“War Department
“Washington, October 10, 1878.
“The Chief Ordnance Officer, Military Division of the Missouri, Chicago, Illinois.
“Sir: At various times during the last few years, complaints have been made that the service carbine was inferior in range and accuracy to the arms commonly used by the hostile Indians, and within the last few days the fact has been stated, that, such an opinion was prevalent in the cavalry troops now operating in the Departments of the Missouri and Platte. The Chief of Ordnance wishes to examine thoroughly into this subject, and to that end requests you to procure a sample of the best arms the Indians are known to use, if possible one that has been used by them, and a small quantity of ammunition.
“If you succeed in getting an arm that you are satisfied can be considered a fair sample of the best in use, of course excluding any of the United States service arms that may be in their possession, taken from our troops or otherwise procured, he desires you to send it to this office for examination and comparison.
“Respectfully, your obedient servant,
“S. C. Lyford,
“Major of Ordnance.
[first endorsement excluded]
”Copy to Colonel Miles, October 17, 1878, (from Headquarters Department of Dakota,) who will send to the Chief Ordnance officer at these headquarters all arms captured from the Bannocks, and samples of the ammunition that may be in his possession, which have been captured from Indians, which in his opinion are deemed fair samples of the best in use by the Indians.
“Referred to Chief Ordnance Officer, Department of Dakota, December 16, 1878.
CLASSIFICATION OF THESE ARMS
1. A muzzle-loading squirrel rifle, octagonal barrel, made in Columbus, Ohio, by Seibert; caliber .44.
2. A Sharp’s rifle, percussion lock; short barrel; ante bellum model
3. A Sharp’s carbine, altered lock; caliber .50
4. A Joslyn carbine, caliber .50.
5. A Spencer carbine, model of 1861.
6. A Sharp’s rifle, Government model; caliber .50.
7. A Sharp’s rifle, short octagonal barrel; caliber .44.
8. A Sharp’s rifle, long octagonal barrel; caliber .44.
Nos. 6, 7, and 8 are the only pieces deserving of further mention.
The Sharp’s rifle, caliber .50, was fairly tried in the field in comparison with the Springfield musket, caliber .50, and could not hold its own.
Nos. 7 and 8 are Sharp’s rifles of a well-known type, with set triggers, originally furnished with peep-sights, and judging from the numbers, were manufactured about the same time.
I am of the opinion that the barrel of No. 7, which is lighter than that of No. 8, has been shortened.
The fine sights of these guns, upon which their shooting at long range is supposed to depend, have been removed: very coarse front sights, and old model carbine rear sights, altered to buck-horn, have been substituted in an unworkmanlike manner.
These arms are forwarded by General Miles, as a representative of the armament of Indians, and I presume must be accepted as such, with two limitations, - the absence of Springfield arms, excluded under the order, and of Henry (Winchester) rifles, both of which are used whenever they can be obtained.
In connection with his Nez Percès engagement, speaking of it and his adversaries, General Miles says: “They have all the enterprise and cunning of wild Indians, and many of the arts of civilized warfare. They are the best marksmen I have ever met, and understand the use of improved sights and the measurements of distances; they were principally armed with Sharp’s, Springfield, and Henry rifles, and used explosive bullets.”
The sample Nez Percès Sharp’s rifle (No. 2) has a set trigger, percussion lock, and peep sight without scale. It certainly cannot be claimed that this gun is comparable with the present Government arm, and it is an accepted fact that our standard caliber outranges the repeating gun. It follows, therefore, from General Miles’ report, that the best gun of the best Indian marksmen he ever met, so far as range is concerned, was the Springfield rifle.
During my tour of service in this Department I have never met an officer, either in the field or at posts, and of course as an Ordnance officer I took especial pains to inform myself, who claimed that the Indians, as a class, had longer ranging guns than our own troops.
As General Miles states of the Nez Percès, the use of fine sights and the measurement of distances is the result of civilization. The typical Indian is a point-blank marksman. The use of bright muzzle and buckhorn sights proves this. He steals upon his quarry and fires at it. Hence they prefer arms with long dangerous spaces, an attribute that overcomes the difficulty attending fine sighting and the accurate estimation of distances.
The scouts at Fort Keogh were armed with Sharp’s guns, caliber .50, but for this very reason, as I believe, without knowing it, they asked for the Springfield, caliber .45.
It seems to me that there is a periodicity in the claims and rumors concerning the arms of Indians.
In 1876, after the battle of the Little Big Horn, the newspapers were filled with descriptions of the “pumping” guns of the Indians, and requisitions were made for repeating rifles – arms that certainly could not compete with our caliber .45 Springfield rifle or carbine.
An officer of the Seventh Cavalry has informed me that he saw Indians on the banks of the Little Big Horn “pump” shots into our troops, struggling up the opposite bank, at a range of fifty yards.
Concerning the two close fights that have taken place in this department since – the Big Hole and Snake River – I have never heard it claimed that the Indians had longer range guns than our own troops.
Now, when there have been no close engagements, a lieutenant-colonel of cavalry writes to a United States Senator: “The Indian tribes on our frontiers have excellent arms, and many of our officers and soldiers believe their range is greater than the arms used by us.”
Thoughtful and experienced captains of infantry have recommended that one leaf-sight be abolished and the buckhorn substituted, for the reason that our soldiers as a class were not reliable marksmen beyond point-blank range.
In the hands of good shots our gun has always proved satisfactory. I have seen Captain D. W. Benham, of the Seventh Infantry, now on the Equipment Board in Washington, hit a tree-stump three times in five shots, standing and firing from the shoulder without muzzle rest, at a distance of 1,000 yards, with caliber .45 Springfield rifle taken at haphazard from his company rack. On the Yellowstone, in 1876, General Terry, at a range of 400 yards, with a similar arm outshot both the Sharp’s Creedmore and Winchester guns. General Crook carried a Springfield caliber .45 rifle in the campaign of 1876, and General Gibbon always uses one, hunting and fighting, with buckhorn sight and set trigger, modifications that may affect the accuracy but not the range of the weapon. Reynolds, the guide, who was killed on the Little Big Horn, the best shot in Dakota, carried a Government gun. Captain Ball, of the Second, and Captain Benteen, of the Seventh Cavalry, certainly representative company commanders, have both very recently officially reported that they were satisfied with the standard carbine. The same lieutenant-colonel already referred to, in an official communication of about the same date as his letter to the Senator, writes as follows of the rifle:
“The rifle, owing to its length and weight, cannot be used by a man mounted. Then, again, its length and weight make it too cumbrous and inconvenient. It cannot be carried attached to a sling-belt slung across the back; it is inaccessible, and causes delay in mounting, dismounting, and getting into action. Again, if slung on the pommel of the saddle, it being badly balanced, would soon give the animals sore withers and backs, besides spreading the column greatly.”
So far as this officer’s opinion is concerned, the plan of arming cavalry with rifles is effectually disposed of.
Our carbines can safely use our 70-grain cartridge, and no carbine of equal weight could use a heavier charge without great danger and intolerable recoil. Complaints have already been made in regard to the severity of the recoil of our present arms using the standard cartridge. What, then would be the result were we to increase the charge without augmenting the weight?
The longest-ranging Indian arm I have seen is the octagonal barreled Sharp’s rifle, a piece manifestly too heavy to be used as a military gun. If weight is not objected to, an arm can be made at the National Armory that will outrange any gun yet tried. Our rifle at 1,650 yards, using the service ammunition, will penetrate two inches of pine and therefore kill. Is not this enough for all military purposes? If we attempt to accomplish more than this without increasing the weight of the piece the recoil becomes impracticable. Our arms can now kill an enemy as soon as he becomes distinctly visible to the eye, provided he is hit. And it is just in this inability to hit that the true source of all dissatisfaction with our standard arms as military weapons is to be found. Our soldiers as a class are not skillful marksmen.
The disjointed system we call “target practice,” so far as my observation goes, does very little good in improving our men. I know of one regiment of cavalry where no so-called “target practice” has taken place for a year past. I do not mean to be understood that this was owing to any neglect; it was probably due to the varied duties the men were called upon to perform. Still, the fact remains that while the companies were in garrison nothing was done to improve individual marksmanship.
Where target practice does occur, men fire at known ranges of 100 and 200 yards. This is really an aiming and firing drill, a relic of the military epoch where heavy line firing at known intervals was the custom.
Our fighting now is extended skirmishing, and men should be taught what I deem the most important attribute of a military marksman, the just estimation of distances. This, our present practice, founded, I believe, upon the Wimbledon system, does not do.
Wimbledon, or our Creedmore, produces fine dilettanti shots, men who at extraordinary known ranges, by assuming positions impracticable, from a military standpoint, can make any number of successive bull’s-eyes. This, however, is not military practice. Our soldiers should be taught to shoot as Captain Benham does, - to estimate correctly the distance of the object, and to hit it by fair shooting from the shoulder.
As I have repeatedly recommended, we need a thorough system of target practice. Men should be taught the relative sizes of objects , apt to be seen in the field, at varying distances: the Le Boulenge field and musket telemeters, and no simpler distance measurer can be desired, should be generally introduced.
If this be done, and the target allowance be honestly expended in target practice, our men will become good shots, and these periodically recurring animadversions upon the “shooting” qualities of our arms will cease.
I include a communication from Lieut. J. W. Pope, 5th Infantry, Acting Ordnance Officer in charge of the Tongue River Depot, upon the subject of Indian armament, to which I invite especial attention.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
O. E. Michaelis
Captain of Ordnance
Chief Ordnance Officer
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Edited by - BJMarkland on April 08 2005 09:49:26 AM |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - April 08 2005 : 10:52:33 AM
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Pretty well wraps it up, I'd say. Our soldiers were crappy shots, ill drilled if at all, there is no mention of Springfield failure, or any fear of it. They could use the 70 grain load safely.
It is therefore highly unlikely the 7th killed many Sioux at LBH - given utter absence of evidence they did - or that the problems with the Springfield, utterly unmentioned here, played a major role outside of Custerland.
Surely, other units would have discovered these mass failures. Yet they did not. This remark "...and the target allowance be honestly expended in target practice" seems pregnant with accusation.
Surely an Ordinance officer would have been privy to complaints about the safety and efficiency of a weapon that didn't work.
I am suspicious that he keeps harping on range above anything else, but nothing negative about the Springfield. Again, nothing outside the survivors of a fiasco seem to claim it. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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dave
Captain
Australia
Status: offline |
Posted - April 08 2005 : 12:02:56 PM
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The observations of Captain Michaelis are extremely interesting to me, and within the limits of what he said, I would regard his comments as being accurate. But I can't help but feel that he had a certain vested interest in protecting the reputation of the Springfield.
During 1886 when the US army (Ordnance Department) was trialling various repeating rifles, they obtained the following results
"Comparing the magazine guns and the Springfield for *all* uses, the preference is:
For the Lee 10
Chaffee-Reece 3
Hotchkiss 4
the Springfield 46"
All except the Springfield were repeaters, and whilst the Chaffee-Reece and the Winchester Hotchkiss arguably had problems, the Lee (later to become the famous Lee-Metford/Enfield of British army fame) was vastly superior to the Springfield.
If the Ordnance department couldn't recognise a much better rifle when they trialled it a mere 7 years after this article was written, then that is why I have little confidence Captain Michaelis was telling the entire truth about the Springfield. |
Edited by - dave on April 08 2005 12:04:35 PM |
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BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - April 08 2005 : 12:13:04 PM
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quote:
I am suspicious that he keeps harping on range above anything else, but nothing negative about the Springfield.
Sorry, I thought I had put the context of which he was writing the report: the accusations/rumors that the Indians had weapons of greater range and accuracy than the cavalry.
Dave, nice observation, as his department definitely had a vested interest in the weapon's reputation.
Time to go to the archives, I have to work again tonight, so I will use the time to research deeper into the cholera epidemics of 1866 and 1867.
Billy |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - April 08 2005 : 12:23:09 PM
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Has "trial" become a verb?
Are you basing the opinion of the Lee on its metamorphed form, the Lee-Enfield, or on the Lee as it was then? And are you basing this on the opinions of those who had vested interest in that gun as you claim the Army had a vested interest in the Springfield?
Argh. Now I'm doing it. It doesn't matter. The issue is whether the Springfield carbine had significnat failures at the LBH and affected the battle beyond Brazilian butterfly mode. There is no evidence of any sort it did, only tales from a poorly trained outfit that got walloped.
Again: the weapons don't matter if the soldier isn't trained. And evidence accumulates the Cavalry of the late 1800's just stunk as riflemen. Give them a faster firing weapon - forgetting that weapon's own issues - and their inexperience and lack of dexterity with the weapon, any weapon, will produce much the same along with more wasted ammo, all else being equal like practice rounds and training in general. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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dave
Captain
Australia
Status: offline |
Posted - April 08 2005 : 12:39:57 PM
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My comments are based on the Remington Lee, circa 1885, black powder, 5 rounds of .45-70. It was a much better weapon than a Springfield, a totally different generation really.
Maybe the Lee might have been a little buggy, most guns are at the start of their service lives, but they should have seen the massive potential of the weapon. The fact that 46 voted for retaining the Springfield and only 10 for the Lee doesn't inspire much confidence in me that they were really doing their job competently.
Anyway the article really doesn't help or contradict either of our arguments, seeing as its primarily about range and accuracy, neither of which I have any disagreement about.
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BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - April 08 2005 : 12:58:40 PM
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quote:
Captain Ball, of the Second, and Captain Benteen, of the Seventh Cavalry, certainly representative company commanders, have both very recently officially reported that they were satisfied with the standard carbine.
Actually, I thought that sentence was fairly interesting. It, of course, would have been significant if Benteen had reported that he was satisifed with the standard carbine immediately after LBH rather than, if memory doesn't fail me, the Nez Perces war.
Actually Dave, I think DC's stance was substantiated to a degree by Michaelis's comments about the deplorable system of target practice.
Again, this report was dated 1879 and the earliest relevant instructions dealing with target practice I have seen was dated 1862. The next thing after that was 1878, I think.
Gotta go or I will be looking in my pile of stuff for more quotes, etc.
Billy |
Edited by - BJMarkland on April 08 2005 12:59:23 PM |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - April 08 2005 : 5:21:01 PM
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The problem with posting something like this falls into the same class as hitting indians at 1600 yards, it practically cannot be done!
Adobe Walls ????? |
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BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - April 09 2005 : 2:19:02 PM
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I got tired of the questions I and everyone else had regarding target practice and went looking it up on the web to see if I could find something pertinent. This one was extremely detailed as far as post LBH was but you can decide for yourself.
http://www.jouster.com/EIC/distinguished_company.htm
A transcript of a British journal article dealing with teaching British Army recruits how to use the Enfield rifle. I wonder if Michaelis had a British counterpart who also was a political hack?
http://www.researchpress.co.uk/targets/pickets.htm
An example of Civil War era target practice dated 1862.
http://members.aol.com/Mass10th/10target.html
Interesting though only relevant in showing how stubborn the bureacracy can be is this site.
http://www.tsra.com/NRA_WWI.htm
Still looking but gotta do some yard work and then start working on the *expletive deleted* tax returns.
Billy |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - April 09 2005 : 6:47:51 PM
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Of note is the disdain with which officers considered the abilities of the soldiers. I thought I'd mentioned that some time ago, because it isn't just money, or money at all, as much as a sincere belief the soldiers couldn't master complicated weapons. Class warfare, of sorts, and true into WWI. Also, the many Southern officers (and Northern, probably) of the US weren't thrilled about black troops with repeaters, much less machine guns (or with anything) and that was an issue as well. Brit General Haig thought one machine gun per regiment was fine and cavalry was the real thing, and he thought that past 1918. The amount of waste spent on horses and their care and feeding was itself a scandal, given they were useless. Lotta ships sunk and people died to keep the cavalry ready to 'exploit the break in the enemy line.' Just like it said in those ever so amusing military manuals. Like the ones trotted out as evidence the 7th practiced....
The self congratulation of the NRA might be taken with a grain of salt, because newer stats don't agree with his city boys concept of the Union Army until later in the war and the Union had the draft and all the advantage in the world. Further, the tale about Little Round Top and the "sharpshooters" was probably news to Joshua Chamberlain and his Maine guys.
Yet more evidence (and first hand evidence....)from Markland that the US Cavalry of 1876 stunk at their job. They couldn't hit anything, they didn't practice, they didn't seem to think it important. Further, what training they did do seems to be for firing into advancing bunched infantry, hardly informative for Indian warfare. It was never less than ridiculous, but anyone who claims that it was, somehow, the Springfield which played a key role in Custer's fiasco at LBH is utterly wrong. Even by the remarkably low standards of the time, the 7th seems to have been worse than, say, Crook's units, who had evidently trained enough to know their weapon when they needed them eight days before Custer and his guys spent some meaningful and apparently almost introductory time with theirs. Again, Reno and his men "very soon" discovered a loosening.....
Giant straw dog, like the dance manuevers 'proven' by eight cartridges and alleged Indian testimony that Custer was "on the offensive...." and placing his tiny units sequentially here and there in a brilliant display of generalship that, somehow, still resulted in his annihilation. Custerphiles burden their hero with crap which, if believed, makes him look not only foolish and delusional but totally unlike the Custer of his past. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - April 10 2005 : 03:07:46 AM
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quote:
The issue of 1876 Army target practice has been settled by MY findings on the official adoption and issuance of Emory Upton's Official Army Tactics Manual on August 1, 1867. It is irrefutable and not a valid arguable point.
Just as an arguing point, it is worthwhile to remember that Custer had wanted the job as commanding officer at West Point for which Upton was selected. As a counter-argument, we have to remember that GAC of all the Union cavalry generals had learned to utilize the rapid rate of fire of the Spencer carbine to offset tactical numerical deficiencies. We also have to remember that GAC was not at Fort Abraham Lincoln for the entire winter and a portion of the fall - someone more versed in GAC can supply the dates he was in Washington for the Congressional hearings. My own belief, unsubstantiated at this point, is that if GAC had been at Ft. A. L. and HAD the ammunition to use, target practice would have been held, if not religiously, but enough to give the recruits and the less experienced troops "shoulder" time with the weapons.
Yes, there were issues with the ammunition, as well as the firing pin having a tendency to break; but, I still do not believe that either of these were the primary reasons GAC and, more importantly, his troops were killed.
Paul, in reference to Crook's autobiography, on that one page, how much of it was spent in blaming the firearms? That is a serious question as I don't have the book.
As far as the sites I referenced, I never said that they were anything but web pages. Sometimes, despite your abhorrence to "vanity" publishing and obviously web sites, you must learn to read critically and be able to determine that others beyond you may know what they are talking about.
As I find relevant information, whether it pleases one side or the other, I will continue to post it unless told not to by the site admin.
Best of wishes,
Billy
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Edited by - BJMarkland on April 10 2005 03:19:43 AM |
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dave
Captain
Australia
Status: offline |
Posted - April 10 2005 : 11:12:22 AM
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Billy,
First of all, thanks for your hard work in digging all these documents up. I just hope you're not wasting your valuable time and doing it purely for the benefit of the various critturs (myself included) who can be found lurking around the corners of this forum.
Regarding the training issue, I tend to agree with your observation that DC's position seems to have been validated to at least some extent. But as you have just noted, we really don't know if that observation is applicable to the 7th, pre-LBH or not.
Whatever Custer's faults may have been I doubt if he would have skimped target practise. Thats purely a personnel opinion. On the other hand with something like 25% of the recruits hailing from Europe where accessibility to firearms was generally restricted to the upper classes and the military I would be surprised if the average trooper was particularly proficient with a gun.
I guess I sort of see the 7th consisting of a core of sergeants, corporals and officers with CW experience who were probably pretty good shots on average, with a group of younger officers who were pretty good as well (judging from the amount of ammo young Godfrey chewed through depopulating the country side of game) and then quite a number of ordinary troopers who were probably fairly indifferent shots on average - aside from the few who were cowboys or farm boys.
Still thats just all guessing on my part.
By the way, I got a real chuckle from reading that NRA link
"Enlisted men are stupid, but very cunning and deceitful and bear considerable watching," an 1894 officers’ manual instructed.
I've read it before, I sure it was a British officers manual. I also remember reading an anecdote about one exam supervisor dictating the answers to a hopefull, but thoroughly stupid officer candidate. Ah, those were the days. |
Edited by - dave on April 10 2005 11:17:36 AM |
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movingrobewoman
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - April 10 2005 : 10:41:06 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by Warlord
BJ: It has been my understanding that Custer turned down the position offered at West Point, could be wrong though. Do you have a cite?
Paul--
It is my belief that GAC was NOT offered the job at West Point (in 1871, I believe). From what I understand, GAC was applying for a post that might be similar to a "house mother's" position at the Academy. Although he was quite interested in obtaining the job and interviewed for it, his application was turned down (by the powers that were) because of his shoddy record--both of demerits and scholarship--whilst he was in attendence there. GAC was not regarded as a good role model for the students--at least in the head honchos' POV.
I believe there are cites in Wert and Barnett--definately in Barnett--though my mother-in-law has her hands on it currently ... lemme check Monaghan and Merington to see if I can come up with others.
From what I understand, Custer spent a considerable amount of time in 1871 looking for employment outside of the Seventh, mostly in New York City--but nothing came to fruition.
Okay ... back to the fun--oh, I mean, guns!
hoka hey! |
movingrobe |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - April 12 2005 : 1:57:32 PM
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7. And finally, I would appreciate more serious research into the weapon and ammunition and the problems they caused Custer and Crook than the silly inane use of this messageboard to promote egos here!
Ah what a pity.Pride comes before a fall
As a matter of plain practical combat, the Spencer rifle stopped Pickett's charge and in the long run actually turned the war for the Union.
I hate to dent that lovely ego Paul but whatever stopped Pickett it was not the Spencer.Very few of these weapons were available to Union infantry during the civil war and none were in the hands of infantry regiments facing Pickett.
If you post an error such as the above it kinda undermines that magnificent post of yours on facts research and accuracy
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - April 13 2005 : 03:42:17 AM
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However, bring facts!
Your "facts and pearl" that the Spencer stopped Pickett's charge is in error.
Pickett's charge was a pivotal point in the greatest battle in American history.It was a turning point in world history.You may not be a student of the conflict but you purpurt to be a firearms enthusiast and as such should have known that Union infantry were armed with the Springfield and Enfield rifles.
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - April 13 2005 : 1:01:20 PM
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As a matter of plain practical combat, the Spencer rifle stopped Pickett's charge
The above which you posted is untrue.
First you told me there were no Spencers at Gettysburg.
Wrong again.I said that Pickett was not stopped by the Spencer.
Face the facts, and suck it up, old sport
The fact is you have posted a colossal historical error on a subject you lecture the board on.Now it is really no big deal we can all fire off something without first researching it but to persist with the error is just silly.
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BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - April 14 2005 : 09:16:07 AM
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"As a matter of plain practical combat, the Spencer rifle stopped Pickett's charge and in the long run actually turned the war for the Union."
Wrong. Custer was on a distant flank with his Wolverines, Pickett's (I prefer Pettigrew's) Charge was against the Union center which was on Cemetery Ridge not Cress's Ridge as I think you stated. There may have been some cavalry there, but the bulk of the Union troops there were infantry, and as Wild said, armed with Enfields and Springfields. Soldiers being soldiers, I strongly suspect, without any proof, that some of the more senior / better scavengers may have had Spencers.
I will get to the rest of your comments after I too finish the bloody taxes.
Why have a last minute if you aren't going to use it?
Billy
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - April 14 2005 : 4:38:32 PM
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Paul when you are in a hole for God's sake stop digging.
Stuart would not reach the Union rear in time to salvage the doomed attack against Meade's center
Stuart order's were to take advantage of a break through by Pickett's troops and as this never happened his action against Custer and Co amounted to nothing more than an anecdote [3 miles away].Further the encounter was a classic cavalry action of charges with sabre.So not even here did the Spencer win the day. |
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BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - April 14 2005 : 9:21:12 PM
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"Stop confusing infantry with cavalry you guys!"
Paul, no, you are doing the confusing of branches. Pickett's (Pettigrew's) Charge was an all infantry deal.
Granted that the Union cavalry played a pivotal part in preventing Stuart's forces from breaking through; but no how, no way were they intertwined.
Gotta go and flip the food on the grill!
Billy
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - April 15 2005 : 09:20:20 AM
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The one thing I agree about is "Why have a last minute if you arn't going to use it." So back to the damn taxes. It looks like I am doing everybodies now!
Hope you are better at your taxes than you are at your American history. |
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Heavyrunner
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - April 15 2005 : 2:22:02 PM
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I don't know, but there may have been Spencers at Gettysburg-- a few dozen.
I've been fortunate enough to visit the site a couple times, including the armory and a close view of the ordnance---rifled muskets, .52-.62 calibre for the most part. If a Spencer was even on display, I didn't see it.
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Bob Bostwick |
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Heavyrunner
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - April 15 2005 : 4:07:25 PM
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Actually, I was being sarcastic regarding the number of Springfields. However, I think the historical facts have already been established. Union infantry, holding the high ground and armed with rifled muskets, held precariously for those three days against Confederate attack. Had they had Springfield Carbines, I'd give odds that the rebs could've won. One mini ball can kill three and four deep, if my history serves me.
Muskets and a few tons of grapeshot doomed Picket (Pettigrew, if you will) at the Angle. |
Bob Bostwick |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - April 15 2005 : 4:07:40 PM
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Numerous sources document the Spencer's and other repeaters significant role at Gettysburg. Start researching wild! Your opinion on American Arms and their effectiveness has not been significant so far. Bring verifiable facts! Thats how meaningful discussion is held.
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As a matter of plain practical combat, the Spencer rifle stopped Pickett's charge
The Spencer did not stop Pickett's charge and not one of your countrymen will back you up.I imagine that they are feeling rather embarrised by your erroneous historical posts
The Army hiearchy including and lead by the ordance Department fought tooth and toenail against procuring these weapons.
Sure because they had a few million Springfields on order.They got the Spencer for the cavalry because there was no problem loading it on horseback.
I will cover the arms and ammunition in depth per historical documentation and then reach tactical use in the civil and plains indian wars by authors that have at least some documentation.
Can I recommend Arms and Equipment of the Union by the editors of Time Life books to start you on you way. |
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Heavyrunner
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - April 15 2005 : 4:16:42 PM
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| Pardon me..I was being sarcastic regarding the number of SPENCERS. I tend to think there were more soldiers at Gettysburg named Spencer than there were rifles. |
Bob Bostwick |
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Springfield Cartridge ID
