| Author |
 Topic  |
|
Heavyrunner
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
 Posted - March 28 2005 : 6:20:25 PM
|
The 7th didn't last long enough to kill hundreds, much less a thousand. I'm no mathematician, but 200 men, all dead in 30-40 minutes are simply not going to take out those kinds of numbers. As far as Roark's Drift is concerned, how many Zulus would have died had the Brits been overrun on the first wave? Not many.
That fight lasted for days and the fire power came from a strong defensive position--against spears (meant only for face-to-face combat) and shields. Please, let's not compare such apples and oranges. |
Bob Bostwick |
  |
|
|
dave
Captain
Australia
Status: offline |
Posted - March 29 2005 : 06:35:25 AM
|
quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
"A study of .45-55 cases found at the battle concludes that extractor failure amounted to less than 0.35% of some 1,751 cases tested. Paul L. Hedren, “Carbine Extraction Failure at the Little Big Horn: A New Examination,” Military Collector and Historian (Summer, 1973): pp 66-68; Douglas D. Scott and Richard A. Fox, Jr., Archaeological Insights into the Custer Battle (Norman, 1987)." http://www.westernerspublications.ltd.uk/CAGB%20Guns%20at%20the%20LBH.htm.
One third of one percent. Crucial.
Curiously, on this forum some threads back, we have a thread titled "Argh! Forensics! ARGHH!!" authored by one Dark Cloud. And strangely enough, the topic concerns the limitations of forensic science.
And yet here we have you DC trumpeting "One third of one percent. Crucial"
Glad to see that you've seen the light finally DC, I never thought I would see the day that you would be championing the cause of forensic archaeology on a, umm, virgin battlefield at that.
Hope that wasn't a hint of hypocrisy creeping, was it?
Of course I look forward to your authoritive monograph titled "Tool Marks Created by Model 1873 Springfield Carbines on .45-55 Government Issue Ammunition - the LBH Explained".
Yes, I'm being nasty, and sarcastic. And no it doesn't do me any credit. But be consistent, forensic archaeology at the LBH battlefield is a reliable interpretative tool, or it isn't. If you don't believe the archaeologists are right about .45-70 ammunition not being used at the battle, then don't try quoting "One third of one percent. Crucial". You can't have it both ways. |
Edited by - dave on March 29 2005 06:37:50 AM |
|
|
|
BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 29 2005 : 07:43:44 AM
|
Something had been needling me for a while (not you Paul) and it just hit me reading Dave's masterpiece (Bravo, Dave!).
It was the sentence featuring "virgin battlefield" that did it. If Paul is correct about mass replacement of the copper-cased Springfield cartridges, and we have little reason to doubt it, that gives us a differentiator for Springfield cartridge cases found by Scott & Fox during the archaeological work at LBH. Simply put, copper Springfield cases equal the LBH fight era and others do not.
Seems like Paul has, by accident, validated their work.
Best of wishes,
Billy |
|
|
|
Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 29 2005 : 11:06:25 AM
|
No, David, I was being sarcastic. My low regard for the various conclusions drawn from LBH archaeology and how they're used remain. And my point about the 7th remains.
The copper cartridge issue is another straw dog to detract attention from the utter unimportance of the weapons and their mild problems to the battle result. There are a bunch here trying to excuse the slaughter of Custer by implying the weaponry played a bigger role than the evidence suggests. Others want to say Custer killed zillions and broke the back of the Sioux and therefore was a double Hero, for which they wish to be petted and thanked by my more impressive Custerphiles.
I don't doubt that weapons and ammo failed, and that once in a rare while a gun was rendered useless. Whether the result of a panic driven soldier or crappy gun or both, I can't say. Neither can anyone. My point - again - is that any military outfit that actually only discovers these problems in battle after having had the same weapon (their primary) for two years obviously hasn't practiced very much, and Reno's remark about a "loosening" appearing very soon into the fight is clear evidence the soldiers were not trained or experienced with the weapon to any sufficient degree. Given the unique plusses and minuses of any weapon, it doesn't matter if you aren't trained remotely well enough in its use and only discover this in battle. Point One.
Point Two, that copper cartridges mark the LBH era isn't disputed, and never was, and I'm startled this is viewed as a revelation. The archaeology, insofar as we're assuming that Indians, civilians, and everybody turned in copper cartridges after the battle as the military was ordered, still cannot prove that what was unearthed was part of the battle. The military in 1876 was quite sure that ammo from 1871 and before was still out there. That doesn't indicate a belief in frequent practice and diminished stores. A copper cartridge could have easily appeared on a field after being fired in 1895. I don't see how this alters anything at all.
Point three, we apparently cannot tell in all or many cases if found cartridges were a carbine or rifle load. We also don't know (and our War Hero/Gun Authorities are notably silent....) if the heavier load created issues unique to the carbine and not the rifle. We don't know, and there seem to be no contemporary remarks about it.
We have two large Indian battles in 1876 using the same weapons. One half of one battle resulted in disaster. The survivors of the other half, humiliated, suddenly discover problems in the weapons. Eh, six plus others hit by bullets. The officers of the other battle seemingly have no comment about problems, probably because there are always a certain amount of weapon problems and big deal. Archaeology on the Rosebud produces a ridiculously low figure of suggested failures, and that from a spot where Indian scouts fired and not soldiers. At the LBH, the found failure rate of ammo is even lower. At the LBH the assumption is that all the defective ammo and knife blades were harvested before archaeology. But at the Rosebud, it's assumed 99% washed away. But nature doesn't select washaway by type. Any proportion of the surviving cartridge to washed away cartridge must be about the same. Odd it isn't much different between the Rosebud and LBH.
That being the case, weapon failure couldn't have played any role worthy of mention at either the Rosebud or LBH. The soldiers got walloped. The Indian losses embarrassingly low. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
|
|
|
wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - March 29 2005 : 12:28:23 PM
|
That fight lasted for days and the fire power came from a strong defensive position--against spears (meant only for face-to-face combat) and shields. Please, let's not compare such apples and oranges.
Hi heavyrunner
I don't know but maybe you miss the point I'm trying to make.
British regulars [the best]fighting behind fortifications against massed poorly armed Zulu expended 40 rounds per Zulu casualty.Warlord contends that Custer's men knocked over 2 to 3 Indians each.Custer's troops were scattered over a mile with no cover using a defective weapon against a concealed better armed enemy yet in 40 minutes inflicted as many casualties as the Brits did in a day.If you apply the Rourkes drift scenario to the LBH it just does not add up. |
|
|
|
Heavyrunner
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 29 2005 : 12:49:22 PM
|
Paul,
I was referring only to the Custer column, not the seige at Reno Hill. And, no, I don't think Indian casualties could have been very high in the short time it took to wipe out Custer. Nor do I ever recall either side claiming hundreds, much less a thousand, Indian dead.
I'm willing to be educated if anyone can show me where mass charges took place up Reno Hill. Now, had they been Samurai..... |
Bob Bostwick |
|
|
|
dave
Captain
Australia
Status: offline |
Posted - March 30 2005 : 09:40:06 AM
|
Yes, I'm quite aware you were sarcastic DC, that is why I chose to reply in kind.
quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
The copper cartridge issue is another straw dog to detract attention from the utter unimportance of the weapons and their mild problems to the battle result.
And the reason the US army changed to brass cartridges was?
quote:
Point three, we apparently cannot tell in all or many cases if found cartridges were a carbine or rifle load. We also don't know (and our War Hero/Gun Authorities are notably silent....) if the heavier load created issues unique to the carbine and not the rifle. We don't know, and there seem to be no contemporary remarks about it.
I'm sure that I have remarked that the carbine is merely a cut down rifle, minus bayonet, ramrod and possibly with a different sling. So why would a .45-70 load create a problem for an action which was designed for that specific loading - unless of course the action is problematic regardless of whether its in a carbine or a full length rifle.
I'm sure its going to hurt your shoulder more, and the muzzle of the carbine will be thrown higher skywards, but why you feel it should have some effect on the mechanism of the gun itself is beyond me. Maybe you might like to explain your logic? |
|
|
|
Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 30 2005 : 2:02:56 PM
|
Warlord!
The reason you haven't read that these "common" devices weren't found on either battlefield is because 1877 is a year after 1876! On the other hand, what page in Poyer and Riesch is that on about the extractor?
Dave,
You're confusing two issues. No argument that brass made a better cartridge. The question is, were the problems of the copper cartridge as bad as claimed, enough to affect the battle? No, it wasn't. But the fact nobody knew of these alleged loosenings or extraction problems when the barrel heated up under certain circumstances - which, I believe, happens when weapons are used under circumstances for their purpose - means the 7th didn't practice enough to be effective with any weapons given the same amount of training time and practice ammo with them. That's why it's a straw dog. Imagine how they'd do with more intricate mechanisms like the Winchester which, I believe, has been pointed out to have its own issues. We read they amount of practice ammo was somewhat less than one (1) magazine load. Further, first hand evidence by officers of the 7th suggest there wasn't much firing on Custer's part anyway except with Calhoun's guys. Are the alleged broken knife blades spoken of about Calhoun's men? No, only at LSH, I recall. Odd.
"And the reason the US army changed to brass cartridges was?" Because it was two months after a humilating defeat, and the Army responds to rumor that could affect morale in an Army in need of it as quickly as anyone, and brass does make a sturdier cartridge. Or sturdier anything. I'm not saying there weren't failures, but the utter lack of evidence at either LBH or Rosebud for even statistical mention of this as an "issue" is remote bordering on non-existent. It's only the surviving elements of the 7th that claimed these problems, and only after the LBH.
You did point out the carbine was merely a cutdown rifle, I'm not claiming otherwise, only that we don't know what the loads were from the weapons that fouled, do we? And in the smaller load there's wadding that might/could/have-no-clue-myself provide gunk to clog the barrel over time if not burned off completely. Or something. I don't know that it was an issue anyway, but if those who claim it as such can't even say which load was used, why the shells showing signs of fouling are in such ridiculously low percentages from two battlefields and the only unit that complained needed as much excuse as circumstance would allow. Again, nobody in Crook's unit complained or seems to have noticed this supposed horror that blemishes the reputation of Custer As Hero. Have you read otherwise that Crook did? |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
|
|
|
BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 30 2005 : 2:47:33 PM
|
"Rather strange, I have not seen any of these common tools found on either battlefield that I know of! Perhaps I missed it. I will have to go back and look."
Paul, you didn't miss it as they were not issued on a per man basis at the time of the LBH. I ran across pretty much the same thing last night at Ft. Leavenworth while reading through Ordnance Notes for 1876. Miles, on July 9, 1876, raised holy hell to get all of his men equipped with one. I will have to wander upstairs and get that documentation to accurately quote it.
However, from what I did read, two things did jump out. First, based upon firing some 319,770 rounds between Jan. 1, 1874 to June 30, 1876 while proofing new weapons at Springfield, the failure rate for cartridges with the hardened "head" has a really low failure rate. All rounds used were the .45/70 even when proofing carbines (which I will get to next). There were two types of defects discovered with cartridges. One, the flange head would crack, letting gas escape and reducing the muzzle velocity but the cartridge case could be extracted. The other defect was the head of the cartridge shearing off which left the case "...in the chamber, more or less driven forward." "Of this latter difficulty [head shearing], but five instances have occurred in the whole 320,000 [sic] fired under all circumstances and in 80,000 different guns. Four of these were in cartridges fabricated February 20 and 21, 1874, and one in the fabrication of December 23, 1873." Ordnance Notes, 1876, number 57, U.S. Executive Documents, W3411-2.57.
The second noticeable thing I found were comments regarding the formation of verdigras when shells were carried in the leather cases and not diligently cleaned on a regular basis. One armorer stated that the current headless cartridge extractor would not remove those. The had be extracted by other means which he did not go into. Cancel that, another document had the preferred means which is as follows:
"Should the head of a cartridge come off in the act of firing, the best mode of extracting the shell is to take out a ball from a cartridge and reduce it with a knife or by [unreadable], so that it can be inserted into the muzzle of the barrel. Ram the ball hard with the ramrod when the breech-lock is closed, this will [upset?] the ball and hit the headless shell. Open the breech-block and the ball and shell can be easily pushed out with the ramrod..." There is another method but it is unreadable (they did not have a larger lens for the microfiche viewer!). Ordnance Notes 60, November 18, 1876.
That same Ordnance Note had this other interesting information. The Rock Island Armory had 344 carbines received as being defective from 1874, 1875 and up to August 30, 1876. Nine-tenths of those damaged carbines had broken stocks, 37 did not and had some other type of damage (not specified).
The arms were returned by the following regiments:
16th U.S. Infantry 1
19th U.S. Infantry 27
2d U.S. Cavalry 33
3d U.S. Cavalry 64
4th U.S. Cavalry 34
5th U.S. Cavalry 24
6th U.S. Cavalry 60
7th U.S. Cavalry 16
10th U.S. Cavalry 55
----
314
Note, while the above numbers were hard to read, I don't think I missed 30 so I suspect a typo somewhere in the typesetting or on the original report. Or they included the carbine count from the 9th Cav. but forgot to itemize them which likely is the problem.
Regarding the use of rifle ammunition in carbines, that is now officially put to rest. Per Ordnance Notes 55, August 4, 1876, it is referenced that "...the only reason for not issuing the rifle cartridge for the carbine was the very general complaint from line officers of the severity of the recoil. As there seems to be a change of opinion on this subject, I hope it may lead to the adoption of the rifle cartridge for both rifle and carbine." That was written by Lt. Col. J. G. Benton, commander of the National Armory in Springfield.
Time to go back to work,
Billy
|
|
|
|
BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 30 2005 : 3:25:24 PM
|
Great minds think alike as I thought of that after I turned away and only now have time to mention the same.
The weapons were new, the cartridges were clean and the weapons were cleaned between firings and as Paul points out, they were slow shots testing the rifle's accuracy and functionality, not attempting to test the cartridges.
Gotta go now, an international problem just arose (or was deposited in my lap).
Billy |
|
|
|
wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - March 31 2005 : 02:48:57 AM
|
The defect was not in the ammo it was in the operation of the extractor mechanism also fouling had nothing to do with the jamming.
Springfield made the mistake of rifling the entire barrell including the chamber.Now when the round was fired [heavy or light load]the case as well as the round expanded and filled the grooves of the rifling.Unfortunately the extractor was not designed to compensate for this twist that now existed in the casing.The extractor drew the case directely to the rear rather like a screw being fulled [rather than twisted]out of wood.Something has gotta give,and in the unequal struggle it was always the case resulting in the jamming.
The chamber generally remained free of fouling because the discharge was forward from the case with the case expanding to fill the chamber.Fouling became a problem because it blocked the grooves turning the carbine into a smooth bore.
That's my "guess" |
|
|
|
Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 31 2005 : 12:11:31 PM
|
The failure rates of the Springfield, for whatever reasons, seems to be very small and getting smaller with each researched revelation, Warlord. Your statements of hysterical extrapolation that they must have been huge enough to have affected the outcome aren't evidenced and nowhere verified. It's wishful thinking on your part. And again, nobody except the 7th survivors, and hardly a majority of those, not even a majority of officers, contend the carbine/ammo was an issue at all. Varnum contends that the best weapons the Indians had were the ones taken from Custer, not the supposed horde of Winchesters, a supposed weapon superiority Crook didn't notice or wasn't impressed by. And, we learn they had problems and failure rates as well. And, of course and most damaging, Crook has no complaints about the Springfields. His adjutant praised the weapons then and after. You can't shine that on; you have to explain that.
If Custer is elevated to deity in your notional universe of mass failure of the carbines somehow combined with a kill rate of Indians far above anyone else's in the history of Indian warfare, than Crook - who was attacked, held his ground, had minimal casualties against the same Indians - must be Valhalla bound. What was Crook's return rate of fouled/unusuable weapons after firing off 25k rounds or so? Reno had six, I recall.
This is Gun Nut Trivia risen high. The problems described of the Springfields - the verdegris fouling, extractor failure and loosening - are failures of the training and user as much or more than the weapon. To discover these as issues only on the battlefield 'very soon' is proof positive the 7th wasn't remotely trained well if they hadn't discovered the plusses and potential minuses of their weapons in the two years before the LBH. This, whatever particular insignificant failure percentage you choose to believe. Keep your powder dry, keep your cartridges clean, keep your weapon cleaned and ready to go. Seems pretty basic.
Let's review. Archaeology not only doesn't buttress your case, it guts it. Agreed, archaeology isn't God, but it's evidence of sorts, and you guys tend to worship it when it supports your preconceptions. Testimony for you is only provided by certain officers of the 7th who weren't coldly objective and recently humiliated. Of the problems they had with the weapons with Reno, much if not all could be due to human error. Of the supposed mass failures on Custer field, it's speculation. Of course, there were failures. There always are. Indians had them as well.
But only the 7th, somehow. And only after LBH. Huh. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
|
|
|
wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - March 31 2005 : 1:23:40 PM
|
It's wishful thinking on your part. And again, nobody except the 7th survivors, and hardly a majority of those, not even a majority of officers, contend the carbine/ammo was an issue at all.
Conditions on LSH were somewhat more urgent than at Reno hill.I imagine the firing on LSH was rapid snap shots while that on Reno Hill was slower aimed shots.The rate of fire might have made the difference. |
|
|
|
BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 31 2005 : 5:05:06 PM
|
DC, gun nuts? Bosh!
Paul, I believe you are over dramatizing Fox's account of the Winchester/Henry. According to the book by Scott, Fox & Harmon, Archaeological Insights... cartridge cases fired from 60 different Winchester/Henry rifles were found in 1984. Nothing near a third of the Indians were so armed, unless you are now stating that there were only 180 or so Indians. 
Going only by memory, I believe Fox's contention is that the way they were used, especially during the counter-attack he states C company attempted, which led to the beginning of the disintergration of the Calhoun line, was the key point. Actually, I seem to recall you may have made a similar point regarding Spencer rifles and their ability to put a lot of rounds out fast against an rapidly approaching enemy.
While over at the library the other night, I discovered that there was another problem reported on the Springfield carbine, the firing pin had a tendency to break after a few rounds. I will have to get that copy out to fully quote it. BTW DC, that problem was reported by a field officer of a serving regiment.
I have no documentation to prove this but somehow I feel that Reno was in the loop on all reported deficiencies found with the Springfield carbine. After all, he was on the board which selected it, so he had the connections. By the way, everyone knew that Gen. Alfred Terry was the senior officer on the same board did they not? Incidentally, Terry voted for the trowel-bayonet as did Reno.
Gotta go and stomp out one more fire and then I am free for the weekend!
Best of wishes,
Billy
|
Edited by - BJMarkland on March 31 2005 5:06:33 PM |
|
|
|
prolar
Major
Status: offline |
Posted - March 31 2005 : 6:59:45 PM
|
| Billy: In his book, Archaeology, History, and Custer's Last Battle, Fox claims that firing pin signatures identify 7 model 1873 Winchesters and 62 Henrys. (Fox doesn't distinguish between Henrys and Winchester 66's.}He says sampling techniques indicate that these represent one third of the actual weapons, so he projects 21 Winchesters and 186 Henrys used by the Indians in the Custer sector of the battle. |
|
|
|
Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 31 2005 : 8:41:04 PM
|
Markland,
What failure could you find - what combination of specific issues - that helps the cause the weapons were at fault for the defeat? If there were problems, somehow the 7th didn't discover them in the two years elements within the regiment had the Springfields. That cannot but mean they didn't practice enough or at all. Or they were remarkably unobservant. If they didn't practice firing for prolonged periods where the weapons got hot - which is to say like in a battle, their job for which to prepare - it takes nerve to blame the weapon after a defeat and two years. But what statistics exist don't remotely support the contention, anyway.
But how can it be that Crook's guys fire off 25k-ish rounds and don't report these issues? How is that possible unless the procedures of the Seventh and Crook's units were very different OR the alleged problems of the 7th were exaggerated for effect? Not only is there, as yet, no archaelogy to support it from the Rosebud or LBH - for whatever good that does - there's no produced testimony to support it absent that after the LBH when they needed cover. That's not to say in the heat of battle, things didn't fail, or poorly trained soldiers didn't panic in justification. For whatever that proves....
This isn't like sending off the Navy with the utterly bogus torpedoes we did in WWII, or the crappy planes that carried them. This is providing soldiers with weapons that statistically could fail under certain conditions....maybe. What was the failure rate of the Winchesters again? I read that in battle, some soldiers didn't take the time to fill the magazines of the Winchesters, and used it as a single shot. Wasn't one of the advantages of the Springfield it's comparable reliability to the other options?
This is a giant straw dog. In the unlikely event the guns were massively defective, the regiment should have known and confronted it. But nobody discovered it. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
Edited by - Dark Cloud on March 31 2005 8:42:46 PM |
|
|
|
BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 31 2005 : 9:12:53 PM
|
DC, thank you so kindly for "asking" my opinion. I was afraid you would attribute my thoughts of the disaster as representative of interesting items I research for the hell of it.
First, while there were undoubtedly misfires/extraction failures, my honest opinion is that it had minimal impact to the outcome of the battle.
Let me explain, between BBQ'g chicken, what I mean. This is off the cuff but here it is. Tactical integrity would have ensured more success, i.e., kills, than anything short of Uzis or MG-42s. Yes, there were scattered malfunctions but, except for the unfortunate trooper involved, it was not catastrophic. The troops were scattered...an attack, specifically C troop, ran into a bunch of Indians, whether they were "Dead-Eye Dicks" or not, who put an awful lot of rounds in their general direction, enough to make them fall back rather hurredly, which would only inflame the spirit of the Indians attacking.
With that counter-attack by the Indians they rolled C company (a very nondescript term for men dying) and with momentum attacked L which, fortuitously, was being harassed from "Henryville."
That is my thoughts of the matter. If the troops had maintained tactical integrity, i.e., mutual support, there may have been a chance. Otherwise, phhhhhhtttttttt.
Billy |
|
|
|
BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - April 01 2005 : 06:03:16 AM
|
quote:
Originally posted by prolar
Billy: In his book, Archaeology, History, and Custer's Last Battle, Fox claims that firing pin signatures identify 7 model 1873 Winchesters and 62 Henrys. (Fox doesn't distinguish between Henrys and Winchester 66's.}He says sampling techniques indicate that these represent one third of the actual weapons, so he projects 21 Winchesters and 186 Henrys used by the Indians in the Custer sector of the battle.
Prolar, thanks. I was simply looking at the number of recovered .44 Henry/Winchester cartridges and didn't read any of the text. Looking through the text, I see that the reason the NE State Patrol could not differentiate between the Winchester 66 and Henry is that they both used the same type of double firing pin (Fox, Scott, Harmon:70)
Paul, I like that idea. Finally, a sense of humor is evolving!
Talk with you all later.
Billy |
|
|
|
dave
Captain
Australia
Status: offline |
Posted - April 01 2005 : 07:17:05 AM
|
quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
You're confusing two issues. No argument that brass made a better cartridge. The question is, were the problems of the copper cartridge as bad as claimed, enough to affect the battle? No, it wasn't.
First of all, maybe you should be sure of what I claim, instead of just assuming. I've never said that extractor failure, or gun problems in general were the single overriding cause of defeat. Its somewhat pompous for me to quote (or paraphrase) myself but some weeks or months ago I said that there is nothing about this battle which cannot be explained by a large number of well armed and determined Indians. Or at least I wrote words to that effect, and I still stand by that statement.
All I have ever claimed is that Springfield, specifically the early model Springfields suffered extraction problems, above what would have been considered an acceptable level of failure, and almost certainly a number of Springfields suffered failures of varying degrees during the battle.
quote:
But the fact nobody knew of these alleged loosenings or extraction problems when the barrel heated up under certain circumstances - which, I believe, happens when weapons are used under circumstances for their purpose - means the 7th didn't practice enough to be effective with any weapons given the same amount of training time and practice ammo with them.
I would just point out, it wasn't for the 7th to find the failures. That was that job of the board who recommended the rifle to determine
quote:
That's why it's a straw dog. Imagine how they'd do with more intricate mechanisms like the Winchester which, I believe, has been pointed out to have its own issues.
Yes, I fully admit that the Winchester 73 did have its own set of issues, which is why it was never adopted. However most things in life are trade-offs, want a Ford Mustang?, well don't expect to cart 5 adults and a tonne of hay in the back. Want a Ford 350? don't expect to do 0 - 60 in 5 seconds.
The trade-off in this instance would have been that the troopers would have gotten a rifle with a higher rate of fire, and while the magazine was loaded - greater ease of use and it could be easily fired from the back of a horse. The cons were indifferent (but adequate) ballistic performance, a magazine which takes a long time to reload, and an action which is more complex and difficult to service than the Springfields.
quote:
Further, first hand evidence by officers of the 7th suggest there wasn't much firing on Custer's part anyway except with Calhoun's guys. Are the alleged broken knife blades spoken of about Calhoun's men? No, only at LSH, I recall. Odd.
I think you're totally wrong.
The Reno quote produced by Larsen mentions an Indian scout, who I can only presume was Curley, and who saw troopers working on their guns. I somewhat doubt that Curley was close enough to the action to see what the men on LSH hill did, therefore, it must refer to either Calhoun's stand, or an incident shortly before or after.
quote:
"And the reason the US army changed to brass cartridges was?" Because it was two months after a humilating defeat, and the Army responds to rumor that could affect morale in an Army in need of it
To add a ramrod as they did to the 1877 Springfield, is a quick and easy fix. The ramrod is an accessory and does not affect the working of the mechanism. To change to brass cartridges would require extensive testing as the cartridge casing is an essential part of the operation of the gun. So its more than likely that the brass cartridge was already under consideration.
In any event I doubt whether they got many, or any brass cartridges out to the troopers, so I'm not sure how that was supposed to improve morale.
quote:
only that we don't know what the loads were from the weapons that fouled, do we? And in the smaller load there's wadding that might/could/have-no-clue-myself provide gunk to clog the barrel over time if not burned off completely. Or something.
I doubt very much if the cardboard wadding would burn inside the barrel. It would almost certainly be blown clear before it ignited, assuming that it would burn at all, if my experience with explosives in an open cut mine is anything to go by.
quote:
I don't know that it was an issue anyway, but if those who claim it as such can't even say which load was used, why the shells showing signs of fouling are in such ridiculously low percentages from two battlefields
Oh, those rediculously low percentages tell us much more than just that. It tells us that the troops at both battles were superbly trained to have so few failures. But of course that was never in doubt.
quote:
and the only unit that complained needed as much excuse as circumstance would allow. Again, nobody in Crook's unit complained or seems to have noticed this supposed horror that blemishes the reputation of Custer As Hero. Have you read otherwise that Crook did?
I'm really not aware that Crook said much about the battle at all. I'm sure he did, but I've yet to read it, so I can't comment. |
|
|
|
dave
Captain
Australia
Status: offline |
Posted - April 01 2005 : 10:55:21 AM
|
quote:
Originally posted by BJMarkland
DC, gun nuts? Bosh!
Billy,
On reviewing DC's past posts I've come to the conclusion that this is DC's 158th gun related posting. I believe the threshold number of posts required to enter the GTN (Gun Trivia Nuts) club is 100, and thus DC is entitled to enter our exclusive little group.
I'll sure that Paul Cross, our honorary president will join us in welcoming DC as a fully fledged member of the GTN club.
Ok :), on a slightly more serious note. What evidence does Fox have to support a charge by C company? Does he rely purely on Indian oral testimonies or was there some archaeological evidence?
Thanks for the information about the Terry board. I was aware that Terry headed the board, but I was un-aware that they have both voted for the trowel bayonet (which I only just learnt about the other day courtesy of Larsen). Reno has gone up in my estimation from the little I've read of him of late. He might have stuffed up the retreat to the Bluff's, but when it came to equipment he seems to displayed a good deal of common sense. |
|
|
|
Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - April 01 2005 : 1:11:34 PM
|
My club quota is filled. I've never claimed expertise, in firearms or anything, and my participation is limited to savaging the application of trivia to larger issues to draw great truths. Worse, Dave is now doing a Larsen with quotes and replies, so I'm back with numerals and paragraphs.
1. "I've never said that extractor failure, or gun problems in general were the single overriding cause of defeat." Never claimed you did, and you've been consistent on that. The two issues referenced are brass replacing copper as proof in and of itself of copper's culpabilities in this battle, and were copper's failings in any case as awful as presented. "All I have ever claimed is that <the> Springfield, specifically the early model Springfields suffered extraction problems, above what would have been considered an acceptable level of failure, and almost certainly a number of Springfields suffered failures of varying degrees during the battle." What would be an acceptable level percentage for failure? How do you distinguish a machine failure from misuse or mishandling by a soldier unfamiiar with the weapon's quirks? Further, what models did the 7th have again?
2. "I would just point out, it wasn't for the 7th to find the failures. That was that job of the board who recommended the rifle to determine..." Right. Not my chob, man. Of course that's ludicrous. In 1874, the 7th was given several different weapons to take on the Black Hills jaunt. Ryan's company got the Springfield. This was a field test of the weapons, the Springfield was chosen by the GunLords, and the 7th was fully equipped with them. If trained to any acceptable degree, the weapons miraculously failed to fail either at all or above that dicey acceptable level of failure during their lives before LBH. In any case, if they had practiced for battle, or observed in their other fights, that quick loosening would have appeared, no? So it either appeared and they didn't deal with it or - Reno's story - they didn't know until LBH. Two years they had it.
3."Yes, I fully admit that the Winchester 73 did have its own set of issues, which is why it was never adopted. However most things in life are trade-offs, want a Ford Mustang?, well don't expect to cart 5 adults and a tonne of hay in the back. Want a Ford 350? don't expect to do 0 - 60 in 5 seconds." Of course, if you don't learn to drive in traffic and only polish the paint and rev the engine for adoration, it matters not your chosen vehicle. Once in traffic you and others will die.
4. The officers I read - Benteen, Godfrey, Edgerly, and Bradley - don't mention many shells except under and around Calhoun's guys and some clumps on LSH. Five shells under Custer's body is offered as proof of something. The Indians found large amounts of ammo and guns that worked and had few casualties relative to the soldiers. Curly may or may not have seen anything like that anywhere. He was, by Gray's map, 1.5 miles from the monument and a mile to Calhoun, and there were, supposedly, all these Sioux and all that dust between them.
5. The Army, like any bureacracy, likes to pretend it's doing something rather than not, and the scapegoating and blurring of issues and responsibility is a way of life. A ramrod is a quick fix. But I thought you, or someone, said there was a shared ramrod for this potential issue (like the condom shared by the Scottish regiment...and they voted to repair it rather than replace it) at the time of the LBH. How was that handled? Who had it? What was the procedure....
But if you don't even know of the issue after two years, the attitudes reflected in that do not console.
6."I doubt very much if the cardboard wadding would burn inside the barrel. It would almost certainly be blown clear before it ignited, assuming that it would burn at all, if my experience with explosives in an open cut mine is anything to go by." I don't know. The problem is, nobody knows, do they? And it doesn't have to burn, just provide gunk to accumulate.
7."Oh, those rediculously low percentages tell us much more than just that. It tells us that the troops at both battles were superbly trained to have so few failures. But of course that was never in doubt." Okay, pick up the raw burger and stop baiting me. If this is an admission of ridiculously few failures(on which we agree), hoorah, but it doesn't follow that the troops were superbly trained. Numbers of Custer's guys seem to have been shot out of the saddle without engaging, and the first hand info from officers two days later don't suggest they put up much of a fight in aggregate.
8. "I'm really not aware that Crook said much about the battle at all. I'm sure he did, but I've yet to read it, so I can't comment." Crook didn't say much about anything, and his autobiography stops in his hand, others finished, before the battle, but none of his officers or men mention these same problems. It's only 8 days before the same tribes hit Custer, and the distinctions are that Crook's guys are not impressed by the Sioux shooting or make much mention of their repeater weapons, and don't seem to have much in the way of extraction problems. Of course, they had cover, good command, infantry, and civvies who could shoot, but they were also surprised and on the defensive. They fire off 25k of these guilty rounds and .....nothing. How come? Setting aside the unremarkable periodic issues, how come only the sustained whine from the 7th, and only after humiliation?
Also, Reno is no idiot, he's ambitious, bitter, and a social clod, but his reports read well and accurately and often enough are deeply true. What he got blasted for on his scout isn't different than what Custer did, except he had the caution not to risk his command or the mission. None of the things feared he'd done in disobeying orders were true. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
|
|
|
prolar
Major
Status: offline |
Posted - April 01 2005 : 1:44:18 PM
|
Dave, you make some excellent points. Dark Cloud deserves to be at least an honorary gun nut for persistance if not knowledge.
Whatever the faults of Winchester repeaters, they were not slow to reload. Unlike the Henry they were loaded through a port at the side. Any number of cartidges up to capacity could be replaced quickly.In my opinion the government didn't accept them because they were expensive, complicated, and not produced by a government arsenal.
Frontier demand made Oliver Winchester a rich man. How much demand do you suppose there would have been for Springfield single shots, other than by the Army? |
|
|
|
BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - April 01 2005 : 8:44:17 PM
|
Errr, DC, hope your foot is not made of copper because the extractor may sever it as it, while being withdrawn, encounters an obstacle, say your tonsils.
One of the Ordnance documents I retrieved the other night specifically mentioned testing with "lined vs wadded cartridges" and no issues were found, even when extra wadding was stuck in the barrel.
Give me a day to dig through the documents and I will scan them for you so you do not have only my word to go on.
Best of wishes,
Billy
|
|
|
|
Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - April 01 2005 : 9:38:16 PM
|
I certainly take your word. If that's with with .45/55, the Springfield carbine pre-1876? And, since no failure in their investigation, then we can take their word on all else as well. Thanks. Glad that's over.
You're implying I said there were problems with the wadding, and I only asked if we knew. Now we do. I screw up enough without padding the number.
Mumble......... |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
|
|
|
Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - April 04 2005 : 10:12:42 PM
|
quote:
Originally posted by dave
on a slightly more serious note. What evidence does Fox have to support a charge by C company? Does he rely purely on Indian oral testimonies or was there some archaeological evidence?
There's no archaeological evidence, and to be honest, I'm really not sure what kind of evidence Scott & Fox could dig up that would lead to that conclusion. The oral "testimony" he relies on for a charge comes from Thomas Marquis, which is a bad thing since few now would doubt that Marquis doctored much of the material given him. Even if you think that Marquis did manage to record all this information about the "charge" accurately, you still have to deal with the fact that Marquis thought this movement happened in the northern part of the field, the South Skirmish Line/Deep Ravine area. That's an opinion with weight, since Marquis is supposed to have conducted all these interviews on the scene. Fox concedes this, but rather lamely dismisses Marquis's views as just an "interpretation". However, if you grant Marquis the authority that Fox does, that "interpretation" of his is much more likely to be accurate than what Fox comes up with.
Sifting through what else we've got, Curley does say that the markers in Calhoun Coulee got there as a result of a "charge", which is probably the best evidence of all; but if you go from him to the hostiles you hit a brick wall. He Dog thought they were all escapees from LSH, and another Indian (whose name escapes me) said that the last man of all was killed on Finley Ridge (presumably one of those escapees). Two Eagles said that while Calhoun's position was breaking up and its men fleeing towards Keogh a group of "10 or 12" men veered off into Calhoun Coulee, scattering as they went down. Runs the Enemy also says that some men while making a "retreat" went "down the ravine toward the river" (Calhoun Coulee?), several of whom were killed, and his account fits pretty nicely with Two Eagles'. What I think is significant is that all these men, barring some massive interpretation screw-up, agree that the people killed in Calhoun Coulee were fleeing from some other position. None of them identifies anything that took place there with a "charge" of any kind, which would seem odd if we are talking about an event which then set off the whole battle, as Fox makes it out to be.
My own opinion is that no charge took place in Calhoun Coulee, and that the markers scattered throughout there come from fleers, probably (as He Dog and Two Eagles suggest) from different times and different places of the battle. I just think that fits the evidence a whole lot better. Apparently lots of others disagree with me, judging by how quickly and approvingly "Harrington's Charge" has entered into the books.
R. Larsen |
|
|
|
Topic |
|
|
|
Springfield Cartridge ID
