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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
 Posted - May 02 2005 : 10:09:20 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by Warlord
Joe: On that day at LBH there were no cowards anywhere on that field, on either side. Although there were some really bad decisions made.
I am starting to read about other Indian battles from The Rosebud to the Battle of Milk Creek. I have found as in crime investigation, on this messageboard the only research you can depend on, is your own. Some of the interesting things I find are most of these battles with the Plains Indians including LBJ, have great similarities.
Paul, I believe that you are the first member of this board to make comment regarding a critical element of this battle that is often relegated to the back burner of reality. First, as you pointed out, no coward fell upon the field of battle that day, Red or White.
Secondly, as you also succinctly brought to our attention, Indian battles were a result of a consistent comedy of errors augmented by a mutual unwillingness to learn and forgive. As a result, a record of deplorable and profane injustices committed by each race is the only legacy handed down to history.
Warlord
This occurs so many times it is predictable!
This statement exemplifies the essence of the insanity of the Indian wars. Every action was so predictable yet, no one did anything to change it. What a sad commentary of, "Man's Inhumanity To Man!"
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aj
Recruit
United Kingdom
Status: offline |
Posted - May 20 2005 : 08:27:11 AM
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| The reason I do not think he violated the order, is because of the fact that I think that Custer wanted the packs more than the men as he mentions them twice in his order. So Benteen did the right thing when he waited for the packs. |
A.J.Holliday |
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Benteen
Lt. Colonel
Status: offline |
Posted - May 20 2005 : 2:31:56 PM
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I am using this account by Benteen because it is a primary source, not influenced by people or events after the fact. It is a factual statement without regard for any and all conderations after the fact, and in anyone's opinion should be judged as stand alone evidence of first person witness to the events of that time. And should only be refuted by those who within the same time frame would have written or recorded in some manner a record indicating otherwise. To my knowledge, no known record exists within the same time frame that can refute these statements
In a letter dated July 4th 1876, Benteen wrote to his wife, only 9 days after the battle. In this letter are many revealing things of that battle, and appear to be candid remarks that bear the stamp of truth. That Sherman, Sheridan, Grant or others were influencing his writing is out of the question as they themselves didn't learn of it until this very day. It is therefore a prime source of evidence that is in and of itself irrefutable by later corrupted influences.
"I was ordered with my Battn. to go over the immense hills to the left, in search of the valley, which was supposed to be very near by and to pitch into anything I came across - and to inform Custer at once if I found anything worthy of same. Well, I suppose I went up and down those hills for 10 miles - and still no valley anywhere in sight, the horses were fast giving out from steady climbing - and as my orders had been fulfilled I struck diagonally for the trail the command had marched on, getting to it just before the Pack train to there - or on the trail just ahead of it. I then marched rapidly and after about 6 or 7 miles came upon a burning tepee... The ground from this to the valley was descending but very rough. I kept up my trot and when I reached a point very near the ford which was crossed by Reno's Battn. I got my first sight of the Valley and river - and Reno's command in full flight for the bluffs... of course I joined them at once... Custer with his five Co's instead of crossing the ford went to the right around some high bluffs - with the intention - it is supposed - of striking the rear of the village... and I can tell you 'twas an immense one. From that point Cooke sent the note to to me by Martin..."
"This note {Cooke's bring pac's}, was brought back to me by Trumpeter Martin of my Co. (which fact saved his life.) When I recieved it I was five or six miles from the village, perhaps more, and the packs at least that distance in my rear. I did not go back for the packs but kept on a stiff trot for the village."
"...When I found Reno's command. We halted for the packs to come up - and then moved along the line of bluffs towards the direction Custer was supposed to have gone in. Weir's Company was sent out to communicate with Custer, but it was driven back. We then showed our full force on the hills with Guidons flying, that Custer might see us - but we could see nothing of him, couldn't hear much firing, but could see immense body of Indians coming to attack us from both sides of the river. We withdrew..."
Benteen then enlightens us to the fact that there were two fords. And that these two fords are on or near the battlefield where Custer's battalion was, because of the mention of Custer's companies within proximity of those fords. This fact is brought out because this ford (D), wasn't even considered until very recently to have been a factor at all in the battle, here Benteen candidly admitted as much.
"Whether the indians allowed Custer's column to cross at all... but were driven out immediatly - flying in great disorder and crossing by two instead of one ford by which they entered. "E" Co. going by the left and "F,I, and L," by the same one they crossed..." The curious statement is now clearly the identification that there were two fords involved with Custer's approach to the village, ie. "...flying in great disorder and crossing by two instead of one ford..." Here he makes the statement that they came into the village on one ford, then E company exited ford D and the rest back through ford B. An acknowledgment that two fords were involved. His statement is curious because it mentions that they apparently were in "great flight" and retreating from these fords, and that the only one successfully crossed was ford B. He goes on further to say that this is a "moot point" as to whether or not they successfully crossed the river.
The question posed is: Did Benteen disobey any orders? Several factors emerge from this letter and it's content. The distance traveled overall that day by Benteens battalion was in the neighborhood of at least 22 to 23 miles and this only to the "lone tepee". If we factor in the remaining 2 miles or so to Reno Hill, we get at least 24 to 25 miles travelled "over the immense hills to the left, in search of the valley," and back through the same, "the horses were fast giving out from steady climbing," and concerning Cooke's message he "recieved it I was five or six miles from the village, perhaps more, and the packs at least that distance in my rear. I did not go back for the packs but kept on a stiff trot for the village." Then admitting, " The ground from this to the valley was descending but very rough. I kept up my trot and when I reached a point very near the ford which was crossed by Reno's Battn. I got my first sight of the Valley and river - and Reno's command in full flight for the bluffs... of course I joined them at once..." Once there he admits, "When I found Reno's command. We halted for the packs to come up - and then moved along the line of bluffs towards the direction Custer was supposed to have gone in. Weir's Company was sent out to communicate with Custer, but it was driven back..."
According to Gray, Benteen and battn. started their ascent into the "immense hills to the left" at 12:12, and marched on an apex of 10 miles, that would put them, at the very least on an axis, 6 to 7 miles distant from a point 6 to 7 miles east of the "lone tepee." He admitted that upon his decision to return to the trail, about 10 miles out, that the ground back to the trail was, " descending but very rough." All in all, a trip from departure to that point over difficult "immense hills" and terrain that covered in all at least 16 to 17 miles. From that point he and his battn. march rapidly the 6 to 7 miles to the "lone tepee," leaving the packs which were at that time 6 to 7 miles yet behind him, and favoring instead to press on the remaining "descending but very rough" 8 to 9 miles where he found Reno and his battn atop Reno Hill. That the horses would have been very over-exerted and tired and thirsty after such a march is without question. That it was a very hot and calm day also has been stated. That this march, as claimed by Gray took only 4 hours is in and of itself one in which some may question, because it gives them a total speed of about 6 miles per hour. Either Benteen did as he said he did and "trotted" his horses most of the time and even then said that he, "then marched rapidly and after about 6 or 7 miles came upon a burning tepee... The ground from this to the valley was descending but very rough. I kept up my trot and when I reached a point very near the ford which was crossed by Reno's Battn." Which indicates that his average time would for the most part be based upon a "trot".
Many have blamed Benteen for moving too slow, but as we can easily see from this letter it would not have been an easy march, nor for that matter the length and time considered to be out of line. In fact, quite the opposite. Not only was his marching time an extraordinary 6 mph covering about 24-25 miles over 4 hours! He covered ground that in an average day's journey would have taken twice that long, if not longer. Many have berated him for the delay at Reno Hill, but he said in his letter the reason for the delay was in compliance with Custer's "bring packs" order, stating that, "When I found Reno's command. We halted for the packs to come up - and then moved along the line of bluffs towards the direction Custer was supposed to have gone in. Weir's Company was sent out to communicate with Custer, but it was driven back..."
No matter what was written or said after July 4th, 1876, unless it conformed to these statements by Benteen, it's seems highly unlikely that they would or could be used as any basis of fact. |
Edited by - Benteen on May 20 2005 3:09:32 PM |
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BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - May 21 2005 : 01:29:07 AM
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"I recently was watching the history channel, I know, I know their problems. But they had Phil Spangenberger on, a real expert in older weapons. He mentioned all of Custer's troopers carried a pocket knive to dig out broken cartridge cases from their 1873 carbines!"
My opinion is that most cavalrymen carried pocket knifes simply to dig out stones from the hoofs of their mounts. Sorry to burst any bubbles but I believe that you are making more of it than it was.
"Finnaly, for the more uneducated peanut gallery, I did not say a Gatling Gun stopped any charges by either Sitting Bull or Red Cloud!!!"
Good, you are finally making sense. Too bad you could not have done the same earlier.
Later all,
Billy
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BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - May 21 2005 : 01:41:49 AM
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Benteen, in the paragraphs my Benteen you quoted, I saw this phrase, or something similar, multiple times:
"Weir's Company was sent out to communicate with Custer, but it was driven back..." "
My question is, what changed? Everything I have read states that Weir went out on his own ind for all manner and purposes, disobeyed orders by Reno to stay put.
Best of wishes,
Billy. |
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BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - May 21 2005 : 3:10:26 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by Warlord
The quote, whether you want to accept it or not, was in the context of case seperations in the 1873 Springfield as issued to Custer's troops. How anyone could make more or less of it I really do not know. Of course an excellent researcher could easily make inquiry to the History Channel or Mr. Spangenberger who is a contributor to Guns & Ammo Magazine! Then you would not have to worry about burst bubbles raining on your parade!
Of course, had Gatling Guns been present it would have been a slaughter. This was never a fair fight from the begining (Prairie Indian Wars). Custer was merely overzealous and made a bunch of mistakes in his overconfidence.
"I am making sense"! I wish I could say the same about you, your condition persists and could easily be solved with a little real research.
RE: Capt. Weir; In the army I knew, captains did not run off from majors without specific orders or against their orders. It was called courtmartial time. I think Weir acting on his own may be just a good story! Of course people who have served in the military know about these things. People who have not, tend to support wild and unlikely tales.
For once I have taken your advice and written Mr. Spangenberger to clarify whether he meant, as you state, that the sole reason the troops carried pocketknives was to dig out cartridge cases or whether it was used incidentally for that purpose as needs dictate.
People who have read about the battle know that there are sources who state that Weir took off on his own. Godfrey mentions it in regards to the trail from the morass to the river.
If Gatling guns had been present, I fail to see what good they would have done. Remember, you had basically a fixed gun which fired straight ahead. If a massacre occurred, it would have been to the crews of the guns who had to stand upright without protection from close fire from both firearms and bows and arrows.
Later,
Billy |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - May 21 2005 : 10:26:38 PM
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[quote]Originally posted by Warlord
I have read a number of accounts about Capt. Weir's actions including Godfrey! That does not mean I agree with them. Most of them seem to be colored with some emotion for some reason I am unaware of. What I am telling you, and you should understand, is soldiers follow orders including captains! If they don't, that would be very strange and dangerous behavior. I do understand this was a very stressful situation. I merely debate as to what actually happened, as this is something I do not completely understand.
Windolph states " I remember that Captain Weir rode off to the north alone, and a minute later, Lt. Edgerly, second in command of "D" followed with the whole troop. I believe it must have been around 5 o'clock when Reno and Benteen ordered the whole outfit to move northward, in the general direction Captain Weir and his "D" Troop had taken a good half hour before"!
E.A Brininstool quotes Capt. Benteen as saying "About this time I saw one of our troops of my battalion proceeding to the front, mounted. It was Capt. Weir, who sallied out in that direction in a fit of bravado, I think, without orders."
There obviously are a lot of unsaid things going on here! Does Weir believe Reno is so rattled he cannot command? Was Reno's response so nebulous as to include a possible advance guard? We really don't know. It is one of the fascinating moments in this fight!
Paul, you have touched upon one of the enigma's of this battle that has befuddled me for years because of the finite perplexity Weir's action (unauthorized movement) has produced.How does one satisfactorily explain such rampant insubordination that could have very well resulted in the complete destruction of Custer's entire command. It is, of course,impossible to know the truth. What we may do is speculate upon reasonable possibilities that may have fostered the circumstances that enabled Weir to do what he did.
First of all, I believe that he did move forward, alone, towards what he believed to be, Custer's position. I believe this because of the substantial amount of witnesses who allege that he did.
Secondly, I believe he initiated this movement alone and, without orders from Reno or Benteen. Reno, in charge, forbade him to do so but, was ignored. Benteen deemed it foolish to trek into the unknown under the circumstances that confronted them.
Third, upon ascertaining the reality of the situation, Weir lost his composure and hasten back towards perceived sanctuary post haste!
How could this be? As you so truthfully stated Paul, "soldiers follow orders,including Captains." How could a subordinate disobey a direct order from his superior officer and get away with it?
Abnormal, unanticipated, and totally shocking circumstances may produce abnormal, unanticipated, and totally shocking responses. Contemporaneous studies regarding the mental debilitation of soldiers during the stress of combat allow us to venture into a scenario where chaos, fear, fatigue, shock, and utter mental debilitation created an atmosphere wherein "orders" could be disobeyed. The "exception" to every rule now comes into the picture. Weir, a member of the "Custer Clan" had the intestinal fortitude to move forward when others stumbled about in confusion. Edgarly followed, others eventually followed. The salient point here is that no one was actually in command. Reno was addle and Benteen had not yet usurped his command.
Only later, when Weir and the other troops came screeching back to the Reno conclave with hundreds of embolden, furious warriors in hot pursuit did Benteen step up to the plate and take over.
When all was said and done, the military wished to keep these odious circumstances under wraps and, for the good of the Army, others agreed to do so.
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - May 21 2005 : 11:28:16 PM
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Paul, like you, I realize that no fact, philosophy, nor event will convince the hierarchy of any institution to graciously allow embarrassing factors to come to light. They will fight such disclosure to the bitter end. We have but to look at the Catholic Church and the way it has dealt with its dilemma regarding sexual abuse by its Priests as an example.
The reality of Reno's discomposure is a fact, not an attempt to "damn poor Reno." Benteen, a realist, hesitated to usurp Reno's command until the inauspicious moment when Weir returned in a cloud of sweat and tears. It was then that the salvation of all was in jeopardy and "leadership" of any kind was mandatory.
Benteen's original impression of discomfort during his initial contact with Reno's defeated, leaderless, and weeping troopers urged him to take charge and return these men to a "combat ready" condition to prevent a total collapse. |
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Benteen
Lt. Colonel
Status: offline |
Posted - May 21 2005 : 11:40:59 PM
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What these discussions tend to do is become drowned in the cachophany of verbage of one well defined source over another. While these esteemed sources seem perfectly right to one, another esteemed source can and does refute the others claim to fame. In the end we are left holding this bag of half-truths that are in fact just someone's respected opinion or theory on what was. The only credable evidence is what was stated prior to this battle, or those statments that were made by the participants themselves, that were made within days of this battles conclusion. Statements that were not warped by time, thought, or recourse about what was being said.
What is interesting is the statements before the battle by some of the supreme commanders, and upon hearing of Custer's demise their immediate reactions to haveing found out about the loss of his command. A case in point is a statement by Sheridan that was made prior to the battle. "Sheridan was livid...correctly surmised that... old animosities played a role in their defeat. (saying), "There were too many giving orders," he complained..." The affair is shamefully disgraceful." Of Sherman after the battle, it was said, "Sheridan was plunged into gloom when the story came out and called the slaughter an unneccessary sacrifice, "due to misapprehension and superabundance of courage, the latter being extraordinarily developed in Custer."
What we have then are in the words of Custer's superiors a very well developed source of blame. Custer's own superiors knew of the "old animosities" between the officers of Custer's command, and as had previously happened when confronted by this anomolous entity, defeat ensued, And because of this factor, too many tried going it alone and, because "too many giving orders... There was too great a desire to recieve orders, there was too great a desire to be supported when there was no necessity for support." Unity of command and contol as top priority is undefined and defeat is inevitable. His superiors also knew that Custer would use no apprehension what-so-ever, and possessed an over abundance of courage in carrying out what he considered to be his orders. That the two didn't mix well and the defeat of Custer's men is now seen in a light more true than anything here to fore.
What we also are confronted with after the fact, is that Sherman, "did not want the sudden public enthusiasm for Indian blood to get beyond control and result in a grand, final, and disorganized Indian hunt in Sioux country." Of what cause then, would it have been right to defame Custer and/or even Reno or Benteen? The answer to that one is easily seen. No one had the right, perhaps not even a court of inquiry? Or for that matter any other defamation of their character or conduct in the matter as it would have infuriatied and inflamed the public more, and would have in all probability have created just the opposite of what Sherman wanted, citizen milita.
Imagine what you will, but the fact is that the Indians soon after the battle were censored from making any remarks that would defame or place blame on any cavalry commader who participated in the battle. In other words, "shut up or else!" Or else what? Or else you will not only have the American Army to contend with, you will have every settler from here to timbucktoo joining militia's to come after your sorry hides! Concerning militia's by the way: It is very doubtfull that the govenment would have had any control over, nor for that matter could have, or should have, exerted any control over them. As for Sherman and the government, whether for the right reasons or wrong, they made their decision. What we are sadly left with are the perpetuated myths from those decisions.
When it comes to placing blame, for me it's a matter of logic over repeated myths. Using what we have learned from the above, several factors emerge. 1)"Too many were giveing orders." And "everyone wanted orders, and support." A lack of command and control primarily because of the "old animosities." 2) Custer would not seek any refuge or comfort in "apprehension" over anything that he saw or heard, and would in all probability have not influenced his actions that day over his "super~courage." 3) We can't rely totally upon canted views that will in and of themselves be rejected outright by anothers canted view that was caused by the decisions made after the battle, specifically about July 4th, 1876. (4) If you really study Sheridan, and Sherman's words, not merely read them, one can discern a pattern, one that was and is true about this battle, even to this day.
So can questions like this ever be answered? As long as secondary evidence is presented, and by that I mean anything over a week or two after the battle was stated, written or reflected upon, probably not. That kind of secondary evidence may be used to support an origional participants statments within that 1 to 2 week time frame, but it should not be used as a primary source of evidence to support any ideas, notions or theorys.
In a letter dated July 4th 1876, Benteen wrote to his wife, only 9 days after the battle. In this letter are many revealing things of that battle, and appear to be candid remarks that bear the stamp of truth. That Sherman, Sheridan, Grant or others were influencing his writing is out of the question as they themselves didn't learn of it until this very day. It is therefore a prime source of evidence that is in and of itself irrefutable.
He said of this incident barely 9 days after the battle, "Weir's Company was sent out to communicate with Custer, but it was driven back. We then showed our full force on the hills with Guidons flying, that Custer might see us - but we could see nothing of him, couldn't hear much firing, but could see immense body of Indians coming to attack us from both sides of the river. We withdrew..."
Clearly the indication is that someone, "sent" him and his Company "out to communicate with Custer." I see no logical reason why Benteen should lie about this to his wife. If he wanted to puff himself up here, he certainly could have done so, saying that, he, Benteen, sent Weir and his company out, but he didn't. Benteen in this same letter maintained a calm reserve and respect in regards to Custer. He didn't berate his commander to his wife, as one would have perhaps expected him to do. The only thing said was perhaps the reason for Custer's demise, and in this he more or less layed the matter to rest directly where it should have been layed, with Custer. |
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movingrobewoman
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - May 22 2005 : 10:37:07 AM
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Benteen--
Interesting post! The phobe in me is nodding along, just as happy as a clam. But to play the devil's advocate, before the time Custer had bit it on LSH, both Sheridan and Sherman were hardly Custer supporters. So could an already well-developed negative opinion of Custer have influenced their post-LBH writings and surmisals? Was it a case of CYA for a badly coordinated summer operation?
Just a thought .... |
movingrobe |
Edited by - movingrobewoman on May 22 2005 11:00:39 AM |
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alfuso
Corporal
Status: offline |
Posted - May 22 2005 : 10:52:53 AM
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Not that simple. Those easily shifted guns weighed about 1600 lbs. First you had to get them to the top of a hill. Then set them up. Three men had to stand up to move the gun to sweep a field. The 1872 model was "fixed" in that regard. Ammo was carried on separate mules because it could not be shared with any other weapon in the regiment. Gatling crews had little to no target practice because it was so expensive to fire one for even a minute. Now, tell those guys to stand up under fire, sweep the gun, pointing downhill yet, and hit something besides the dirt or overheads. The Indians would have stood off and lt them waste ammo.
IF the damn guns could have even gotten there. I believe the gatlings would have been best used by Reno.
"Had these .50 caliber Gatlings been firing at you charging up a hill you would understand instantly what good they would have been! The Gatling was designed precisely for a situation like this! Gatlings were not fixed guns and were rather easily shifted about. However, firing from a fixed defensive posion at charging enemies is what it is all about isn't it? Had Gatlings been present rather than losing scores(?)of warriors (No, I still do not believe they only lost 30 warriors!) the indian casualties likely would have been staggering."
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - May 22 2005 : 9:35:43 PM
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[quote]Originally posted by Benteen
What these discussions tend to do is become drowned in the cachophany of verbage of one well defined source over another. While these esteemed sources seem perfectly right to one, another esteemed source can and does refute the others claim to fame. In the end we are left holding this bag of half-truths that are in fact just someone's respected opinion or theory on what was. The only credible evidence is what was stated prior to this battle, or those statements that were made by the participants themselves, that were made within days of this battles conclusion. Statements that were not warped by time, thought, or recourse about what was being said.
Benteen, you have written an extraordinarily unbiased and, informative thread regarding the diverse opinions, facts, semi-facts, allegations, fabrications, truth, and unmitigated nonsense that will invariably confront any who attempt to "discover" what actually occurred. If one is driven by an insatiable need to know the whys, wherefores, and chronological sequence of events as they unfolded to a "T" then, my friend, frustration shall be your only reward. That frustration is the essence of the inexplicable fascination for this battle by thousands of individuals like you and I. Imagine if we knew all the answers. How immensely boring and totally unprofitable would any discussion regarding this battle be. Hence the books, magazine articles, periodicals, and heated debates that have continued for over a hundred years.
Quote by Benteen:
Imagine what you will, but the fact is that the Indians soon after the battle were censored from making any remarks that would defame or place blame on any cavalry commander who participated in the battle. In other words, "shut up or else!"
Many Indians were censored. Many refused to make comment about the battle for fear of retribution from any angry white, military or civilian. Many did "shut up or else!" But not all! There were men such as Mason Camp whom many Indians trusted emphatically and, as a result, told the truth as they knew it. This truth, however, greatly contradicted the White "truth" and was, therefore, ignored for decades.
Quote by Benteen:
So can questions like this ever be answered? As long as secondary evidence is presented, and by that I mean anything over a week or two after the battle was stated, written or reflected upon, probably not.
You are absolutely correct; probably not. Fortunately, secondary evidence is all we have. Imagine a scenario wherein a survivor of the battle staggers into Terry's camp hours after the battle. Perhaps he is an articulate, honest, and devout officer who, despite the many feathered arrows bristling from his chest and the horror of experiencing the slaughter of his comrades manages to whisper a faint "Dying Declaration" (accepted as Primi Facie evidence in the Judicial System),before sadly succumbing to his grievous wounds. Having declared all that occurred, from the beginning of the battle to the end. Such first hand evidence would have deprived us all of the enjoyment we obviously derive from discussing such matters as we do today and I would have missed out on an enjoyable opportunity to meet you and other members of this forum.
Last, but certainly not least, your reference to a letter written by Benteen to his wife regarding Weir's actions must be addressed. it has been my experience that all written and oral statements giving by witnesses are influenced by personal involvement and personal perspective. If the statement giver is involved in a given situation, it is only humane to portray his participation in the matter in as favorable light as possible. Weir's excursion was an embarrassment to Reno, Benteen, and the military. It exemplified the reality that for a moment, on Reno Hill, no one was in charge. During the Reno Inquiry ( after years of unfavorable and undeserved criticism) Benteen testified, under oath, the Weir set out against orders in a "fit of Bravado."
Personal perspective is a totality of circumstance that can influence an individual his/her entire life regarding how a situation is personally perceived. If you believe an individual to be an unadulterated jerk, any action taken by that person(in you perspective) will have a taint of idiocy. Your written/oral statement will be influenced by this mentality regardless of your intent and desire to be honest.
Again, ain't it great that we will never know what happened? Instead, we will spend many enjoyable hours wondering, debating, and opining from here to eternity. |
Edited by - joseph wiggs on May 22 2005 9:55:44 PM |
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alfuso
Corporal
Status: offline |
Posted - May 23 2005 : 11:48:06 AM
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I've been on this board for several years -- lost my password and had to reregister so it says I'm "new."
You are assuming beyond your grrasp.
Of course, everyone knew Terry was arriving the next day with gatlings in tow. Uh huh. But he was a day late. So, how many times on the rest of that campaign were the gatlings used against Indians?
The 1872 gatlings could only sweep by physically moving the gun. Ok. And the ammo would have been on separate mules which still wouldn't have been near Custer or Reno. And the crew had had no target practice 'cause it cost too much to fire the damn things.
For instance: what do you mean by the following?
"Alfuso: You should realize Gen. Terry arriving the next day at LBH had a battery of Gatling Guns with him! You say Reno could have best used the Gatling Guns yet Custer was the one wiped out! This is hypothetical! Gatling Guns firing from the bluffs would likely have allowed Reno to make a better showing, possibly turning the tide of battle for him. But Custer was the one who really needed more firepower?"
"Then we get into the theoretical. Why did he not require all his men to buy 1873 Winchester's? Also they should have had Smith and Wesson revolvers which reloaded much faster than the Colts."
This was entirely out of Custer's control. Enlisted grunts certainly couldn't have afforded Winchesters.
It's all well and good to say what they should have had. They had what the Gub'mint allowed them. Usually only the officers could afford to buy personal arms and the ammo for them.
I put precisely into my postings what I meant. Yours is full of switch-backs.
You do not look intelligent in imperious.
quote:
Originally posted by Warlord
alfuso: Sorry but it is that simple!
First at the basic level try to understand this is a Crew Served Weapon! It of course, is not particularly light in begining models. The guns typically swung theough about a 65 degree area of frontal fire. Enough to sweep a battlefield in front of them! Early models did not all have swing provisions and the crew swung the rear of the weapon. Stenuous but practicable. If more than that was needed the several man crew shifted the gun evenmore. .50 and one inch guns were quite long ranged and it did not matter whether the crew stood or climbed poles , the enemy was usually engaged at rather long range. The indians were hardly standing off, they were charging the troops!
"IF the damn guns could have even gotten there. I believe the gatlings would have been best used by Reno."
This is the problem about new people coming to the board! They don't read the previous threads or books and simple facts have to be re-stated.
Alfuso: You should realize Gen. Terry arriving the next day at LBH had a battery of Gatling Guns with him! You say Reno could have best used the Gatling Guns yet Custer was the one wiped out! This is hypothetical! Gatling Guns firing from the bluffs would likely have allowed Reno to make a better showing, possibly turning the tide of battle for him. But Custer was the one who really needed more firepower?
What you are really doing is attempting to argue against incremental firepower increases that would tip the battle (known as the crossover point in the military) towards the soldiers winning. You can actually start that game with Custer turning down two additional companies of infantry offered to him. Then he turned down the Gatling Gun Battery. Then he left his Sabers home. Then he pushed his horses and troops to exhaustion to beat Terry's column to the enemy. He could have taken some artillery with him. Then we get into the theoretical. Why did he not require all his men to buy 1873 Winchester's? Also they should have had Smith and Wesson revolvers which reloaded much faster than the Colts!
All hypothetical baloney!
Put more thought into your posting's alfuso!
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dave
Captain
Australia
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Posted - May 23 2005 : 12:07:56 PM
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If anything I think a small artillery piece, such as a howitzer with cannister shot would have been more useful than a gatling gun. Still its all academic, could they have even dragged such a piece along the trail beside the river? I suppose they might have since the Sioux and their allies must have been pulling travois along there a few days previous. Would have been a struggle to get them up the hill and down Ceder coulee though. That even if the guns would have survived grueling pace Custer had set on the days prior.
I think its a bit harsh to criticise Custer on his decision to leave the gatling behind (or the sabres), he must have been acting on his previous experience, surely. |
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BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - May 23 2005 : 12:34:46 PM
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Hi Dave, good to see you back!
As far as your statement:
"I think its a bit harsh to criticise Custer on his decision to leave the gatling behind (or the sabres), he must have been acting on his previous experience, surely."
I think, someone correct me if I am wrong, but a major factor in not taking the Gatling guns was the experiences Reno had with them on his scout. I recall that the guns had actually been left behind at least once due to difficulties traversing the coulees and ravines. I think that it was mentioned in Godfrey's article in Century magazine.
The sabers? Heck, LSH was one of the few times that horse cavalry got close enough to the plains Indians to engage in hand to hand combat. I don't know if they would have made any difference to Custer, as he was fighting dismounted, but perhaps if Reno had continued his charge they would have been very useful.
Best of wishes,
Billy |
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BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - May 23 2005 : 12:44:44 PM
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Paul, not trying to one-up you regarding the pocketknives but simply for clarification. Anyway, got a return from Phil today and he states:
"With regard to your query. Obviously, as with many outdoorsmen, a pocket knife was indeed useful for a multitude of purposes. However, the stuck and/or broken copper cartridge cases was a real problem and the pocket knife was handy in helping extract same."
Alphuso, Paul or anyone. Does anyone know what model Gatling was on the expedition? That would make a difference in whether the trail arm was used for traversing or not. The model 1874 was the first model to be equipped with a frame mounted traverse mechanism. The model 1875 made some improvements to the 1874 series.
More than you ever wanted to know about Gatling guns is at this site:
http://tri.army.mil/LC/CS/csa/aagatlin.htm#1862
Later,
Billy
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BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - May 23 2005 : 12:55:29 PM
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Dave, I, personally agree with your statement:
"If anything I think a small artillery piece, such as a howitzer with cannister shot would have been more useful than a gatling gun."
The Army had mountain howitzers which could be disassembled and carried on a mule. Imagine if after Reno's retreat and Weir's expedition to the point, that one had been set up to fire at the Indians at Calhoun Hill. That may have distracted them long enough for the survivors of LSH to have consolidated and perhaps broken out. If nothing else, a few rounds thrown into the village would definitely gotten the Indian's attention.
But, as you said, it is all speculation.
Best of wishes,
Billy |
Edited by - BJMarkland on May 23 2005 12:56:47 PM |
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BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - May 23 2005 : 1:20:21 PM
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Off-topic a wee bit but while doing some side-research, I ran into this regarding John Bourke and thought it interesting enough to share.
http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/jgbourke.htm
Never knew he had won the Medal of Honor.
Best of wishes,
Billy |
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movingrobewoman
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - May 23 2005 : 2:32:30 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by BJMarkland
Hi Dave, good to see you back!
As far as your statement:
"I think its a bit harsh to criticise Custer on his decision to leave the gatling behind (or the sabres), he must have been acting on his previous experience, surely."
I think, someone correct me if I am wrong, but a major factor in not taking the Gatling guns was the experiences Reno had with them on his scout. I recall that the guns had actually been left behind at least once due to difficulties traversing the coulees and ravines. I think that it was mentioned in Godfrey's article in Century magazine.
The sabers? Heck, LSH was one of the few times that horse cavalry got close enough to the plains Indians to engage in hand to hand combat. I don't know if they would have made any difference to Custer, as he was fighting dismounted, but perhaps if Reno had continued his charge they would have been very useful.
Best of wishes,
Billy
Billy--
I believe you are completely correct when it comes to Custer's reasoning behind leaving the Gatlings with Terry et., al.,. Reno apparently had all kinds of difficulty transporting them during his scouting mission.
But y'all make good points regarding the fact that the battle became so close, sabres might have helped ... a bit.
Hoka hey! |
movingrobe |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
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dave
Captain
Australia
Status: offline |
Posted - May 24 2005 : 08:11:33 AM
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Paul,
The Gatlings were Model 1872's, if you look at the URL provided by Billy you will see a modification of the M1871 listed (under the entry for 1871). This modification involved the substitution of a drum magazine in place of the curved gravity fed magazine previously employed.
Stats are given as 10 barrels, 400 round Broadwell drum, weighing in at 1600 lbs (725 kg) and chambered in .50-70. The gun seems to have lacked any traversing mechanism, which apparently wasn't introduced until the Model 1874.
On the Great Sioux war campaign, the Gatling's were drawn using condemned horses. Problems were encountered with the carriages tipping over while crossing ravines.
This information was compiled from the following links
http://tri.army.mil/LC/CS/csa/aagatlin.htm#1862
http://groups-beta.google.com/group/alt.military.retired/browse_frm/
thread/a15c1d3d8cc56456/b5b754db2ba78d46?q=GATLING+GUN+yellowstone
&rnum=10&hl=en#b5b754db2ba78d46
(The URL wouldn't wrap, so you will have to cut & paste each line seperately is you want to look at it).
I'd also recommend looking at the following URL which has some pictures of a Gatling along with the associated ammunition carriage (not to mention some pictures of light artillery used during the late Indian wars period).
http://www.fieldsofthunder.com/artillery.html
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Edited by - dave on May 24 2005 08:17:34 AM |
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alfuso
Corporal
Status: offline |
Posted - May 24 2005 : 10:58:49 AM
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well known here you may be.
But you do not know well.
Read this:
Gatling Gun : 19th Century Machine Gun To 21st Century Vulcan
by Joseph Berk "Richard Jordan Gatling was born to Jordan and Mary Gatling on the family plantation in North Carolina on 12 September 1818..." (more)
SIPs: preloaded chambers, guns versus missiles, headspace adjustment, muzzle clamp, conveyor elements (more)
One chapter is devoted to the LBH.
Then answer my question:
how many times were gatlings used against the Indians during the rest of the summer Campaign?
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alfuso
Corporal
Status: offline |
Posted - May 24 2005 : 12:36:41 PM
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Yawn.
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alfuso
Corporal
Status: offline |
Posted - May 24 2005 : 2:19:43 PM
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You got it in one. Model 1872, .50 caliber so the ammo could not be shared with any other weapon in the regiment.
They tended to tip easily, often injuring. This tipping also tended to break the tree, which then had to be splinted. The rig had to be unlimbered to be taken across steep ravines, wheels removed. Then put back together. Gatlings were always the last in and the last out.
If Custer had taken the gatlings along, any ammo being carried in wagons would have to have been transferred to (still more) mules. Custer was travelling light and fast, with no wagons.
Don't be misled by the term "condemned horses." That merely means that the animals were deemed unfit to *carry* a rider but they could still pull. In fact, horses aren't meant to carry -- they are designed to *run* and carrying any weight interferes with the back and haunch muscles. Even a 15.2h 1200lb horse is strained by 200 lbs of rider and gear. (a curious tale of Argincourt comes under that heading...)
The Army's "problem" with gatlings is that they were seen as strictly a defensive weapon (although MacKenzie used them against Arapaho in 1874) One of the first uses for gatlings on the plains was to stop buffalo stampedes -- lotsa meat, fast. And one of the first to use them that way was -- the 7th Cavalry in Kansas.
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alfuso
Corporal
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Posted - May 24 2005 : 2:23:51 PM
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Practice quoting a little more.
I wrote: "You are assuming beyond your grasp."
didn't remedial paper cutting teach you anything?
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Benteen's order
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