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El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
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 Posted - October 09 2003 : 02:04:24 AM
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Has anyone noticed the similarities between Little Big Horn and the battle of Isandlwana in Zululand, 1879? And of the similiarities between the 1879 Zulu campaign and the Sioux campaign of 1876? I've read a bit on the subject, and will soon offer up the similarities I've picked up on, but feel free to reply.
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I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
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El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 09 2003 : 05:59:49 AM
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| I'm especially interested in the opinions of the Brits on this board, since that was your version of "Custer's Last Stand"... |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
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Brent
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 09 2003 : 07:07:52 AM
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Interesting subject. I can recommend a now out of print book--WASHING OF THE SPEARS, by Donald Morris. Though it tells the whole story of the rise and fall of the Zulu nation, it has fine chapters on Isandlwana and Rourkes Drift.
Similarities would certainly include trying to fix the blame!!
ISAND. was a battle with much larger #'s of men involved. Mostly an "Infantry" fight..not much manueveing taking place, just a straight all out attack against a fortified (well--maybe not all that fortified!!) camp. Unlike the Indians, the Zulus had few, if any, guns--so this was a battle where one side had "modern" weapons and the other side, virtually none. Also-the Brits received the attack instead of making it. And tho the attck itself probably came as a shock, the camp at ISAND. was generally ready to receive it by the time the battle was "officially" underway. And then there is that famous ammo "problem"--the guys in charge of handing out ammo refusing to give to anyone except those in their own outfit!! And slow to hand it out even then!!
OH--I believe the odds faced by the Brits were greater than those faced by Custer. Not too sure how the Zulu numbers were arrived at (or how correct they are), but my general info suggests 20,000 Zulu troops against about 1,800 brits and their native allies. Odds of about 12-to one. |
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Anonymous Poster2321
Forum Guest
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Posted - October 09 2003 : 08:55:09 AM
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psolla and I discussed this a while back, having to do with the fact that there is little or nothing unique about LBH, except it's ours. It IS an interesting comparison, because Armies tend to react the same way to defeat and put the PR spin teams in high gear long before making amends.
There was much similar and not. There were survivors. There was much confusion about who 'led' the Zulus, similar to the hysterical theories about Sitting Bull, although I don't recall any hypothesis about a Zulu attending British military school.
And the excuses. At the LBH, the Springfield carbine suddenly froze all the time. At Isla, there were 3 difficult screws holding the lid on ammo boxes, clearly subversion by the manufacturer, Ministry looking into it, etc.........
And we have archaeology. Finding cartridges as 'definite' proof of skirmish lines solve 'mysteries' as recondite as how many feet forward the Brits placed their men before the panic. Given that there is hardly any substantial disagreement between the Zulu and the Brits on what happened - a ton of Zulu, overconfident Brits, inability to adapt to close in fighting - it was left to the press to go bananas.
Nothing is funnier than the 'horns of the bull' presentation by the Zulu, which is treated by the press and by history as if it were new, ingenious, unmatched since Alexander. The center attacks, the two wings envelope. Wow. And somewhat easier when you outnumber the opposition as much as ten to one. Done quickly, the 'square' can't react fast enough. Of course, the square couldn't react fast enough to anything.
All the western powers labored under the impression that displays of discipline and martial bearing always panicked savages as much as it swooned teary officers devoted to procedure over point. |
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El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 09 2003 : 3:13:09 PM
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Well, there were survivors from the command, and I would guess this is why books I've read don't seem to have theories, but what actually happened to the redcoats. Here are the similarities I noticed:
There were 3 columns in the field, all intending on converging on the Zulu and making them fight.
There was a coverup and blame was cast on ammunition issues/guns failing.
Chelmsford divided his force, went looking for the Zulu and half his command was destroyed.
The British were overconfident, assured they would not have any problem defeating the Zulu. And, like LBH, they were proven wrong.
Isandlwana was the Zulu Last Stand, as the British were now determined to avenge this defeat. They would only seek peace after defeating the Zulu in battle. And the British government/military made sure their forces were enough to get the job done the 2nd time around.
Division of forces may have been the main factor for the defeat. |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
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benteens brother
Corporal
Australia
Status: offline |
Posted - October 09 2003 : 7:23:23 PM
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Isandlwhana/Rorke's Drift is a great subject for Last Stand buffs!
As Brent noted the Brits had about 1800 men but I'm sure only about half of them were line infantry the rest being irregulars, native allies, mounted police etc. There was also a crisis in command. Colonel Pulleine was a line officer who had been left in command of the camp but he was junior to a Colonel Durnford, an engineer officer who was in command of native horse who had come up to the camp expecting orders from Chelmsford. He went off of his own initiative to protect the flank of Chelmsford's force and many believe he should have stayed and taken command of the camp. A lot of people have unfairly blamed him for the disaster. His sacrificial stand on the right flank prevented the Zulu Horns from closing properly which enabled many to escape. He's an interesting figure played by Burt Lancaster in the movie Zulu Dawn. |
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Brent
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 10 2003 : 07:07:26 AM
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In WASHING OF THE SPEARS (which again I strongly recommend), Morris suggests that had the Brits who remained at the camp compacted themselves into a "super square" and made a stand with their backs to one of the hills, all might have gone well. But instead, they spread themselves "out" too far and too thinly. When the ammo began to give out (due to those darn screws--in fact, there were about 1/2 MILLION rounds on hand in the camp) and the fire slackened, the Zulus poured in and that was that.
Interestingly, the rocket battery the Brits had got off nary a shot, and the artillery was almost equally useless....suppose it would have been the same had Custer had those Gatling guns.
Funny--this was the very sort of battle the Brits wanted--but they seriously underestimated the Zulu numbers and their ability to get so many men so close to the camp w/o actually being discovered.
AS has been noted there were survivors (about 50 or so Europeans out of about 900 survived the battle) so what actually happened during the fight isn't subject to much controversy or speculation. |
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Anonymous Poster2321
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Posted - October 10 2003 : 07:56:29 AM
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And the Brits wish there had been zero survivors, then it could have been manipulated more successfully.
Doesn't all that tactical discussion ring, well, silly?
Especially given the odds? They had guns, the Zulu had nothing beyond spears, they apparently couldn't kill enough Zulu - as they did later at Rourke's - to catch their attention (let's talk enabling drugs...), and they wouldn't admit that what (sorta) worked against Napoleon in the past might, you know, not translate to Africa.
Their fire control must have been terrible, the troops had to have panicked and fallen apart, and the officer corps blames everyone but themselves. It's the old familiar 'give me a white man and a gun and ten wogs are as good as dead' mentality that pointlessly cost white men untold deaths, untold hatred from the aborigines, untold suffering and near genocide in the revenge phase.
And they learned zero from this and nearly repeated it all against the Boers. Until Britain lost 30k dead on the first day of the Marne (600k dead before it was over, what the US lost in the CW with a zillion times more population) did the queries begin: do we actually know what the hell we're doing?
And unbelievably to this day, people throw back their shoulders and say with a straight face 'yes!' If only they'd formed a super square......... |
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benteens brother
Corporal
Australia
Status: offline |
Posted - October 10 2003 : 08:13:06 AM
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Brent--I haven't read Washing of the Spears but I've heard it's very good. I would reccommend anything by Ian Knight, he has written several very good books about the Anglo-Zulu War. Tough war, several very hard fought battles.
2321- One of only five British officers to escape Isandlwhana was a young Lieutenant called Horace Smith-Dorrien. He would later command a British army in the early days of WW1 and I believe was relieved of his command for questioning the futility of frontal assaults against heavily entrenched positions.
I think the biggest similarity with LBH is that in both cases the modern armies involved were both careless and badly handled. Both forces were consequently caught off balnce and annihilated by superior numbers. |
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Anonymous Poster2321
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Posted - October 10 2003 : 10:00:49 AM
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I wish I'd remembered that. Thank you. Good point about Smith-Dorrien.
I also wish I'd remembered it was The Somme, not the Marne, where they lost all those guys and where Smith Dorrien was still under French. Maybe.....maybe my brilliant mind had made the association and I.....I.....mispoke! Yeah, that's the ticket!
Nice try. I screwed up. It's.......it's the coffee's fault. Yeah. |
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Brent
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 10 2003 : 12:34:03 PM
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Coffee can do that to you---
Recall a book (yet another from the old days) called First Day on The Somme.
Horrible casualties.
Contrast to today--a flesh wound to one soldier brings cries of "Enough" And "Let's get out", etc etc.
Times surely do change--. |
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Anonymous Poster2321
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Posted - October 10 2003 : 12:55:20 PM
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| Made worse by the fact that this is an all volunteer army. NO draftees or, bluntly, slaves drugged at pubs and waking up aboard a man of war. |
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benteens brother
Corporal
Australia
Status: offline |
Posted - October 10 2003 : 7:40:39 PM
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| There's a site called Rorkesdriftvc.com that's quite comprehensive if anyone wants to take a look. It has a busy discussion forum with as many mad people on it as post here. |
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El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 10 2003 : 11:27:00 PM
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| Mad as in crazy or is that an OZ term for something else? I'm somewhat up to speed on the Brit-speak, but Aussie talk is a bit new to me. |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
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benteens brother
Corporal
Australia
Status: offline |
Posted - October 10 2003 : 11:45:59 PM
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| Yeah mate, mad as in crazy but with the greatest possible respect. Bear with me, not everyone appreciates our sense of humour! |
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Smcf
Captain
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Posted - November 13 2003 : 09:56:53 AM
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| Apologies again for missing this thread and rabitting on this subject elsewhere. As regards the ammo boxes, I saw a TV programme about Isandlwana where an expert on the scene demonstrated how soldiers used their rifle buts to break open these boxes. He demonstrated how easily this was done using a box constructed to the same spec. He also showed a mishpen ammobox screw picked up as an artifact from the scene as a further piece of evidence, all to counter the "couldn't get at the ammo" theory. What this programme also asserted, was the theory that the Martini-Henry rifles were prone to failure under heavy prolonged use and that may have been the cause of the wilting fire, rather than the ammo running out. Is a moot point. Durnford, caught in the open, sent for fresh ammo - but they couldn't locate Durnford's suppply wagon. Apparently, each unit had its own supplies and they weren't shared. This was going on when the outer defences were streaming back to camp and the main thrust of the Zulu advance was taking place, so maybe the ammo theory applies to him. |
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benteens brother
Corporal
Australia
Status: offline |
Posted - November 13 2003 : 6:20:04 PM
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I think the ammo theory has been largely discredited by most historians. It was probably a good way to explain away an embarrassing defeat at the time. Most British officers of the day were well educated 'gentlemen' and were prolific letter writers and were very capable of deflecting blame from themselves through correspondence to powerful friends back in the UK.
I think the camp commander Pulleine and Colonel Durnford probably didn't appreciate the seriousness of the situation until it was too late. The Zulu assault came in on a very wide front and the Imperial companies in front of the camp possibly thought they were engaging the main Zulu force when in fact it was only the right wing. Durnford's mounted men were engaging the left wing with the main force still shielded by the Nyoni ridge. There was a big gap between the Imperial companies on the left and Durnford's unit on the right.
I have read theories that perhaps Pulleine didn't want to pull his companies in tight thus leaving Durnford unsupported and I suppose there is some merit in that.
When the main Zulu force came over the Nyoni ridge the Imperial companies on the left realised that they were about to be outflanked and began to pull back. This seems to be when the line collapsed.
I think it was a case of bad intelligence, overconfidence, lack of respect for the enemy and bad staffwork. I don't think it had much to do with being unable to open ammunition boxes. |
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El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 13 2003 : 9:07:20 PM
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| And that's exactly what I meant when I began this thread. The actual reasons for defeat are very similar, as are the "explanations" for defeat that came from the armies top brass regarding rifle/ammunition failure theories. Custer's regiment had carbines that jammed due to faulty cartridges, crap on the cartridges, etc. The Redcoats supposedly lost due to the Martini rifles failing after firing many shots, faulty ammo box design and/or poor distribution methods. And those myths still rear their ugly heads in discussions of both battles, even though both have been discredited. |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
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El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 13 2003 : 9:12:27 PM
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| And that's exactly what I meant when I began this thread. The actual reasons for defeat are very similar, as are the "explanations" for defeat that came from the armies top brass regarding rifle/ammunition failure theories. Custer's regiment had carbines that jammed due to faulty cartridges, crap on the cartridges, etc. The Redcoats supposedly lost due to the Martini rifles failing after firing many shots, faulty ammo box design and/or poor distribution methods. And those myths still rear their ugly heads in discussions of both battles, even though both have been discredited. |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
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Smcf
Captain
Status: offline |
Posted - November 14 2003 : 12:05:33 PM
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| Not trying to be picky here, but I believe the reason for the carbine/ammo theories coming up again and again(at least for the Zulu battle), was that both are still considered factors rather than reasons. Durnford's lack of ammo and his inability to resupply is considered a factor in not holding back the so-called left horn. Perhaps the meaning of this has become bastardized over time, with "not being able to get at their ammo" being replaced by "not being able to open the ammo". Just a theory, and please feel free to dismiss it out-of hand - I'm no expert. As for carbines overheating, by all accounts their was a great deal of heavy duty rifle action from the valley, so maybe there's still something in that too. As I say, factors rather than main reasons. Whether they are major or minor factors is debatable. |
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Brent
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 15 2003 : 07:01:34 AM
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Lots of "factors" to be sure--.
The one I like to hold onto is the suggestion in "Washing of the Spears" that the Brits defended too much "un-necessary" territory. The men were several yards apart and the lines were ragged, with gaps, and somewhat uneven. You can get a sense of just how thin the lines were from the movie Zulu Dawn.
A more compact "mass" backed up near the mountain, may well have stood a better chance. |
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benteens brother
Corporal
Australia
Status: offline |
Posted - November 15 2003 : 10:48:37 PM
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Yeah , from what you read it does seem the British were drawn up too far from the camp. British tactics when fighting native enemies in the open seem to have included 'forming square'. The British won the last battle of the war outside the Zulu capital of Ulundi by advancing in a 'super square'that the Zulu army couldn't break.
Ian Knight in his book 'ZULU' quotes Zulu accounts when he states that the 24th regiment was still putting down a heavy rate of fire when bugles sounded and the entire British line ceased firing and retired on the camp. This was when the line seems to have collapsed.
Whether they were trying get closer to the camp to make ammo resupply easier or whether Colonel Pulleine decided too late to form square with Isandlawana protecting his back will I guess never be known.
Durnford's men did run low on ammo but the collapse occured at the other end of the line. I think the fact that a 20 000 man Zulu army managed to get within a few miles of the camp without detection reflects badly on the British commanders or conversly says a lot for the Zulus. Even then I think it was a failure to read the enemies strength and intentions, much like at the LBH that helped make it a catastrophe. |
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El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 16 2003 : 12:31:50 AM
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The sentries saw them from a high knoll, and raced back to camp on horseback. The Zulu were quite quick in their movements on foot, and weren't far behind.
DC has several times made a comment about how ridiculous the concept of forming a "super square" is as possibly staving off a disaster. The square tactics worked just as well on open ground against Zulus as it did against French cavalry. It would have been better than what they really did.
Really, the blame can be affixed to the commanders for not digging in or forming a laager with the wagons the night before. Both were usually SOP, yet neither were done because the camp was not permanent and I believe they formed it late in the previous evening. |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
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Brent
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 04 2003 : 06:57:02 AM
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I suspect a "super square" might have stood a better chance, but the numbers were pretty overwhelming--
And another factor was the complete unreliability of the British Native "allies". Once they even thought the Zulu's would get the upper hand, it seemd to be every man for himelf. |
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Rich
Commander-in-Chief
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 04 2003 : 08:37:19 AM
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| I feel a tight square, with artillery, would have done the trick ... Pulleine attempted to cover too much ground, plain and simple. Look what happened at Rourke's Drift. At the final battle of Ulundi, Chelmsford employed a square very successfully ... against 20,000 Zulus, not a one came within 30 yards in the initial assaults! |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 04 2003 : 11:19:21 AM
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What distinguishes industrial nations from hunter/gatherers is the ability to wage sustained war. Just like native Americans or Australian aborigines or Scottish Highlanders, it doesn't matter who wins the initial battles because, in the end, the crops have to be planted and/or the fish need to be caught and there was never any stockpile of food or weaponry or soldiers to draw from and the net result of sustained warfare was the same on the population win or lose.
You guys credit the victory to the square? I credit it to emotionally exhausted and perplexed Zulu who fought wars in season against people like themselves who had to retreat and heal after either massive losses or huge victories. From their point of view, they had one eye on the krall, which couldn't move, and absent instant victory had to get their families to safety.
It wasn't the tactics, it was 'here they are yet again.' |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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Isandlwana/Isandlwhana Similiarities
