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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
 Posted - August 12 2004 : 2:13:54 PM
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Agreed except that it nullifies virtually everything I've posted, you rearrange chronology for Custer to get the note after arriving at Reno Hill, and you draw a conclusion I do not: that the note demands a report to Custer. Rather, it says: come to the large village, make sure the packs come, and hurry.
He did. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - August 12 2004 : 6:30:52 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by wILD I
Oh yeh 69.And Custer is just a mile up the way,knowing Reno is holding his own.He has his unit formed for attack at a passable ford and is awaiting Benteen to reinforce him.And what does our hero do?Ignores his orders and blunders into the Reno position leaving Custer to miss his opportunity, to be forced from an attack formation to a defensive one,to be caught manouevering and destroyed.
You know what assumptions do 69--makes an ass of u and me
Exactly what "orders" would he be ignoring? The note directs him to come on to the village. It says nothing about bypassing Reno and linking up with Yates and Keogh; in fact, it gives no direction at all, other than go to the village. Your assumptions far outweigh mine.
R. Larsen
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - August 12 2004 : 6:36:03 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by Brent
But for Benteen to ignore the come quick note when Reno would have been in the timber, not thoroughly whipped, nor ""pleading for help"--that would be a stretch.
I don't see how joining Reno in attacking the village would be ignoring the note. I read the note and don't see how it says, "Come only to me, Custer, Autie, Iron Butt. Me!" It says get to the village, and it's a big one. You speak of a "plan" that Benteen would have disregarded if he'd gone to Reno in the timber --- what plan was that?
R. Larsen
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prolar
Major
Status: offline |
Posted - August 12 2004 : 8:01:47 PM
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If Reno had still been in the timber, Benteen might well have believed that he was obeying his order by joining him. After all he would have no way of knowing who was there.However he knew Custer was not on Reno hill. He may have been justified in stopping, but he was not obeying his order.It takes quite a stretch to believe that after receiving two messages to "come on", he thought he was to do anything but come to his CO who had sent the messages.
Being "at the village" is another stretch. He was on the bluff, above the village, and miles from it by any practical route that would get him off the bluff and across the river. I believe Dark Cloud has stated that Reno was no threat once he retreated to his hill. |
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - August 12 2004 : 9:58:35 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by prolar
It takes quite a stretch to believe that after receiving two messages to "come on", he thought he was to do anything but come to his CO who had sent the messages.
I'm not getting what this second message is you're talking about. He had the Cooke note from Martin, and that's it, as far as I can see. He spoke briefly with Kanipe who had orders for the train.
I think it's more a stretch to believe that the note was ordering Benteen to come directly to Custer --- not to the village, not to engage any Indians who might be there, but rather to go straight to Custer, who's off somewhere north. That's overinterpreting it. Taken at face value --- and that's all the note deserves to be taken at --- all it's saying is: get your men to the village. Custer's name is never mentioned, and there is not a word said of linking up with any particular command --- be it Reno, Keogh, Yates, or Custer himself.
When people say the note is ordering Benteen to bypass Reno and link up with Custer I don't think they're reading it through June 25th eyes. They're doing it through June 27.
R. Larsen
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - August 13 2004 : 04:04:22 AM
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The note directs him to come on to the village
69 It does no such thing.It merely states that there is a big village.It could have just as easely stated thousands of Indians
Look at the message from a military point of view.Benteen and the train probably number 220 troops plus the reserve ammo.They are in fact the tactical reserve.It is for the CO to deploy that reserve as he sees fit.It is not for Benteen to usurp this function no matter how compelling the situation may appear to him.
The order came from HQ and that is where Benteen should have taken himself and his troops.
By halting his unit to support Reno,Benteen presumed he had a better grasp of the situation than Custer.
What Benteen did was compassionate but not militarily correct.
However let me just add this.If the 7th is a totally dysfunctional regiment which adhers to neither military principles or systems,with a CO who expects his subunit commanders to have the ability to read his mind,then I have no problem with Benteen's actions.
Regards |
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Smcf
Captain
Status: offline |
Posted - August 13 2004 : 05:34:13 AM
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If Benteen had arrived on Reno hill and seen a rear-guard action by troops in the valley, rather than the sorry state of Reno's command? - I reckon he'd continue north, rather than take his troops down a difficult descent or back-track and come in from the flat. Where would the pack train have ended up if he had gone down there?
Poor Reno, after being promised support from the "whole outfit" he gets none from Custer (apart from a cheery wave) and then has to beg support from Benteen.
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - August 13 2004 : 06:19:54 AM
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Where would the pack train have ended up if he had gone down there?
As far as Benteen was concerned he could not have cared less where the pack train ended up.
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Brent
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - August 13 2004 : 07:19:22 AM
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Larsen:
Whatever "plan" the general may have had for using the Captain and the troops. Dosen't really matter..and we'll never know exactly what Custer had in mind. Benteen dosen't need to know exactly what will happen--that comes later. All he really needs to know is that he's to come quick--and to my way of thinking, it's to the guy who wrote the note. Once there, what he will do next is pretty well up to the General. This is a basic General- to- Captain military situation in an on going "battle" where the general is relying on the experienced Captain to understand what is actually a very simple written note--come quick!!
ANd- I'm still in the camp that says the note meant come quick--to Custer. Again--absent any compelling reason not to. Reno on the hill WAS a compelling reason to stop and help. I"ve never argued against that. Hard to see what else he could have done under those circumstances However, Reno in the timber would not have been "compelling"
Seems from what I've read that what CUSTER intended was for Benteen to come to HIM. Several books have Custer "marking time" waiting for Benteen to show up. Benteen knew who this note was from and should have known that in a general way, it WAS an order. I don't believe that he thought it was merely an aside--sort of a polite request to hurry along and when you reach the "village", just go ahead and do what you feel like. Help Reno? That's OK. Go to Custer??-Splendid!! Maybe launch a third attack?? Great. Stand around and wait for other orders?? Fine!!
No--it meant come to me (Custer) and I'll tell you what to do. |
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Smcf
Captain
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Posted - August 13 2004 : 08:21:35 AM
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As far as Benteen was concerned he could not have cared less where the pack train ended up.
With respect, I think that's a bit unfair. He had a written instruction to be quick and bring the packs. How could he do both? He knew the pack train was coming and a messenger on his way to it. It was Benteen's own initiative that found him and his troops back on the trail to receive the message anyway. If he'd kept to Custer's original instruction, he'd have probably met up with Crook. (j/k)
Nice Laurel and Hardy reference - touche, I asked for that. |
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Brent
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - August 13 2004 : 08:39:01 AM
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Sometimes I tend to ramble and my posts may not always convene exactly what I mean.
So pretending I'm captain Fred Benteen and I receive this note:
First off, I'm probably miffed that my advice to keep the regiment together hasn't been followed. And now me (and all 143 men) know there are no Indians in-or escaping from-this part of the Valley.
I get the note. IT's not on official stationary and it dosen't say "You are ORDERED", etc BUT--It's signed by Cooke, from HQ"s. This means Custer. And it's in writing. So It's an "order" as far as this military operation is concerned. General's get to order-Captains get to obey.
BENTEEN (that's me sure enough). COME ON. BIG VILLAGE (no kidding).
BE QUICK .Bring Pacs. PS Bring Pacs.
OK. I don't think He wants me to just come TO the Village, because when I arrive, then what?? He obviously wants me to come to him BECAUSE it's a big village. And quick. Not to dawdle, but quick. What I'll do when I get to Custer is unknown, but I'll be told then what to do next. And pacs is mentioned TWICE--I guess I'd better attend to that as best I can. I understand the Indians may be running and the note does not suggest any particular "danger". But quick means quick.
So off I go not really knowing what's next, but expecting when I meet up with Custer I'll be told.
So-not a perfect situation by any means, but I really think Custer would expect Benteen to understand what was intended. And I think Benteen DID understand, until the fiasco at Reno bluff stared him in the face. Absent that, I think he would have made his way toward Custer. If he actually made it, and what would have happened next--who knows?? |
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Smcf
Captain
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Posted - August 13 2004 : 09:59:54 AM
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Was Benteen part of the attack plan at all? If he saw his role as that of head of a "reserve", then he'd be called on to fight only in an emergency. No sense of emergency was conveyed to him, and "be quick" can be read as "quick as you can". On reaching Reno, he recognized the emergency situation in front of him and acted accordingly. No?
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - August 13 2004 : 11:33:03 AM
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With respect, I think that's a bit unfair. He had a written instruction to be quick and bring the packs. How could he do both?
By both units moving as fast as each could.Benteen himself did not interpret the order as meaning that both units should move together.
If he saw his role as that of head of a "reserve",
I did not mean to infer that his troops were an officalreserve but that circumstances placed him in the position of being the one unit that was not yet engaged.
On reaching Reno, he recognized the emergency
Was that the only emergency or could the goings on at LSH also come under that heading?
Regards |
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Brent
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - August 13 2004 : 12:38:58 PM
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Smcf:
No matter what Benteen thought his role was, when a note like the one he got says "quick", it means just that. Breakneck speed--maybe not, but certainly not take your time, either.
And I have no problem with him stopping with the Reno "emergency" situation. That was the sort of situation that made the written note difficult to follow and gave him a compelling reason to stop and aid Reno.
But finding Reno in a "non-emergency" sitution is a different matter entirely. Just coming upon Reno fighting in the timber would not (in my opinion) have been sufficient cause for him to stop and not continue toward Custer.. as I believe that note ordered him to do. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - August 13 2004 : 1:13:53 PM
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Saying Reno was 'fighting in the timber' has the connotation he was 'entertainining in the library.' Rather busy, no big deal.
In fact, he was surrounded, and if still there when Benteen arrived, by a ton of Sioux. He didn't have enough men to keep the Indians from penetrating the timber with horseholders at work. If the horses were stampeded for any reason, excusable or not, the three companies were dead meat. This would all be pretty apparent from a high place vantage point like, oh, Reno Hill or certainly Weir Point.
All this talk about 'riding north' has the same sort of afternoon excursion motif about it. It would be a bad officer and certainly a stupid one to ride his command between Sharpshooter and Weir Point without scouting it out first. The view from either, whether or not it included Custer, would give pause to any cavalryman. Benteen, if blind or in his deep dislike for Reno willing to let him and all his command die, would walk north while sending out riders to high points, Sharpshooter first. What would they see?
Well, indications of a mobile Detroit across the river, for one. Custer's trail, for two. Custer, maybe, three. The godawful cavalry land between river and eastern back ridges. And likely a ton of annoyed Indians. Behind them, the pack train. Let's use some visualization technique here.
Not being an idiot of the first water, Benteen would - along with his officers - have to reach a decision about sending someone to Custer or all of them going to Custer, and consider how to protect the train and with what. They would know Reno was not long for the world in the trees. This would have taken time, because everyone believed that a rebuffed Custer would simply go on to Terry if he couldn't return, their duty would be to the besieged below with any eye to all six companies fighting to Custer or, at least, saving themselves.
In other words, I don't think such a scenario would change much of what happened, certainly not for the better.
Again, the fact that a century and a half later the inferiority of his orders (in that they can be reasonably interpreted several different ways) ought to emphasize how both frustrating and annoying it must have been to serve under Custer, and how unjust it is to blame anyone for a wrong conclusion. It is the obligation of the commander to write pithy and accurate orders. Custer's are general exhortations, and nowhere else - with no other general - is the excuse of 'they should have known' been offered up as a damnation of subordinants. Custer's command from noon on is deficient. I previously offered up Buford and Reynolds under certainly as taut a situation as a comparison. Their orders were informative and helpful and loaded with detail. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - August 13 2004 : 4:23:39 PM
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Their orders were informative and helpful and loaded with detail.
I think a certain person shot me down in flames for suggesting Cooke should have had an order book.
exhortations, and pleadingsSounds like they were an order of monks.
Let's call it DC.The 7th was a dysfunctional shambles.When the pressure came on it fell asunder.Except for the miracle on Reno Hill. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - August 14 2004 : 03:29:00 AM
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quote:
Originally posted by wILD I
The note directs him to come on to the village
69 It does no such thing.It merely states that there is a big village.It could have just as easely stated thousands of Indians
It says "Benteen. Come on. Big village. Bring packs." If I were him at the time, I would interpret this to mean "Benteen should come on to the big village and bring packs". Other people here don't. That's fine; it's reflective of the poor, vaguely written quality of the note itself. I say it means Benteen should go to the village because, you know, that's what they're all supposed to be attacking; but you think it means he merely should report to Headquarters (wherever that may be) for further instructions. It's not something I would have done were I in Benteen's place, but I can see how others would have --- this, again, shows what a piece of toilet paper Cooke's note was. It confused people. It did then --- Edgerly speaks of this --- and it does now. For a military order, that's damning.
You accuse Benteen of "usurping" Custer's authority by responding to a situation directly in front of him, even alleging that his actions were not "militarily correct," whatever that means. Is there a rule in some military handbook you can point to which Benteen violated?
All things considered, Benteen probably DID have a better grasp of the situation than Custer when he stopped to help Reno. He knew the attack had failed and that, to keep order and to save lives, they had to keep everybody together. Custer, for some reason, after ineffectually striking at the ford, peeled away, and instead of falling back to the support of the other companies, went in the opposite direction to the ridges. We can judge the wisdom of each by their results.
quote:
However let me just add this.If the 7th is a totally dysfunctional regiment which adhers to neither military principles or systems,with a CO who expects his subunit commanders to have the ability to read his mind,then I have no problem with Benteen's actions.
Isn't that the whole story of the 7th?
R. Larsen
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - August 14 2004 : 04:06:37 AM
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Brent-
"Come quick" isn't enough. Come quick to where? A problem, since 130 years later, none of us can even agree on that simple issue in this "simply worded" note.
It obviously would have helped a lot if Benteen knew what the plan was. And if Custer had one, I don't see any good reason not to let Benteen in on it. Seems the responsible course of action too. If Custer took a bullet from some 12 year old boy while riding over Weir Point, who would be giving the orders then? Commanding officers have to prepare for that. It seems clear, now, that Custer had in mind some sort of divided flank attack like he used at the Wa****a, but it doesn't look like anybody else in the regiment was aware of that. Reno thought Custer's support would be coming behind him.
It would have helped his regiment's chance of success, under whoever's leadership, if everybody had at least a basic idea of what they were all supposed to be doing.
quote:
Several books have Custer "marking time" waiting for Benteen to show up.
(1) None of them know what they're talking about, since our knowledge of Custer's approach to the village is virtually nil;
(2) That's unbelievable, since Reno had already attacked, and what was there to gain by holding off your own attack to wait for Benteen, who could be who-knows-how-long behind?
R. Larsen
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Brent
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - August 14 2004 : 10:38:23 AM
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I agree--the whole affair has sort of a "lets decide what to do as we go along" sound to it. It seems no one had a clear idea of what Custer relly intended to do--in fact, Custer himself may not have know exactly either. This spells trouble when the command is split three ways, that's for sure. When 600 men are trying to do what may have been impossible to begin with--.
AS for Reno--at first I'm sure he expected support from the rear. But once GAC rides off in quite another direction, seems to me he must then realize then that this "support" will be some sort of "flank" attack. Of course we know this was a lot easier said than done and left poor Reno in the lurch. Not that his attack was anything to write home about--it had a "powder-puff" quality to it from the beginning. But being promised support, he got none--.
Now it's true Benteen has been sent off to what turns out to be a side-show and until he gets back, has no real idea where Reno and Custer even are. But I still think an exprienced Captain would grasp the fact the regiment has been split, one part is fighting in the woods, Custer (who sent the note) is somehwere in the hills beyond. So absent any extenuating circumstances, he should head for Custer.
Don't mistake that I'm defending Custer or his "plans"--I'm not. I'm just defending his right to have a subordinate come to him when sent for--which I still think what was intended.
But you know that old saying:
"Were IF'S and BUTS candy and nuts, we'd all have a wonderful Christmas"!! |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - August 15 2004 : 2:03:41 PM
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It says "Benteen. Come on. Big village. Bring packs." If I were him at the time, I would interpret this to mean "Benteen should come on to the big village and bring packs"
69 What is the point of directing the packs to a big village?
The term big village was used to inform the rear units that they had found the village of the hostiles they were searching for.
The first message from Custer directs the packs to make all speed and to cut across country.At the time this was written, Reno was on the other side of the river and a cross country route would bypass the Reno position and lead directly to Custer.Now Benteen was aware of this.
The second message arrives stating much the same but directs Benteen to bring the Packs.He Knows the first message calls for the packs to join Custer and the second message does not state that the packs are required anywhere else but with Custer.
It is just stupid to suggest that when Benteen started forward in response to Custer's message it was not his intention to join Custer.
He is now presented with the Reno crisis.What to do.He inquires from Reno the where abouts of Custer.Reno is not sure.He shows Reno the order from Custer.Reno makes no reply.The pack train is an hour behind.Indecision takes over.Benteen does not set up a defensive position.He does not go to support Custer.He does not send back any messenger to the train.Benteen next move is triggered by a runaway troop.Now he involves himself in that shambles at Weir Point.
Benteen is guilty of indecision and wasting precious time. |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - August 15 2004 : 11:13:32 PM
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The order to "Come Quick" has been classified, by some, as a vague statement that could mean just about anything. "Come to me." "Come to the Village." "Come to my house for a game of cards", etc., etc., etc. If each column were operating in a vacuum, completely devoid of any intelligence regarding their counterparts whereabouts, that perspective would have some merit.
However, we know that to a certain degree, each column possessed a general indication as to the whereabouts of the other units. How can we know this. Remember that the first message, sent by Tom Custer, was addressed to McDougall, "Bring the pack train straight across to high ground-if packs get loose don't stop to fix them, cut them off. Come quick. Big Indian camp." (Graham,p.249)
We know that Sgt. Kanipe delivered that message. How did he know in which direction to go?. If the units were separated beyond all knowledge of each other's actual location, how did Kanipe complete his mission?
It gets more interesting. Sgt. Kanipe received his message on Reno's bluff. From there, Custer's command continued on a trot. According to Gray, Kanipe's courier ride began at 3:15. He met Benteen's battalion at 3:42. In the meantime, the command traveled an additional three miles arriving at Cedar Coulee. There a second message is dispatched. This message is, of course, carried by Martini who, again according to Gray, leaves Cedar Coulee at 3:34. He meets Benteen's column at 3:58. In less than 43 minutes, Benteen receives two instances of military intelligence regarding Custer's position. Also, there is a significant variation between the first note(oral) and the second one(written). The first message was addressed to McDougall, the second one was addressed to Benteen. Why? What event occurred that caused the General to re-direct his order from McDougall to Benteen?Custer reached and, ascended Weir's Point at 3:28. Is it possible, that from that high ground he observed dust being kicked up by the pact train, as well as, Benteen's troops. So much dust that he realized that both units were travelling in near proximity. Could he have assumed that Benteen's delay was the result of his joining, and safeguarding the much slower moving packtrain? If so, that would explain the order that was dispatched 6 minutes after ascending Weir's Point. "Come On"(I need you and your men, and the ammunition now!)
"Big Village" (They are all here, not strung out along the Big Horn.)
"Be quick" (if we don't hurry they will escape)
"Bring Packs(just as Tom stated in his oral message to Kanipe,not to stop for packs, cut them loose if need be.)
In summation, we have two messengers who delivered critical, column location data to Benteen and, a possible sighting of Benteen and the packtrain by Custer at Weir's Point.
Thus, each unit had some idea as to the location of the others. Why then did Benteen not respond in a fashion commensurate with the order to, "Be quick."
Perhaps Kanipes' yahooing and shouting, "we got them on the run!" and, Martini's exclamation, "they are skedaddling", lulled Benteen into a false sense of security. There was no need to rush, ole "iron Pants" was grabbing the glory as usual.
We must also make mention of the fact that several of Reno's men spotted Custer's column on the ridge above the valley as they formed skirmish. In other words, information regarding the whereabouts of the separate commands existed. Precise, detailed information would have been more desirable, but is often not available during combat.
Capt. Weir, a member of the Custer Clan, made no comment when Benteen showed him the Note. This is significant because neither man, at that point, realized the importance of the message. However, when the volley firing was heard on Reno's bluff, Weir became sorely agitated and, rushed forward. What did he know that Benteen did not? |
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - August 16 2004 : 02:08:57 AM
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quote:
Originally posted by wILD I
69 What is the point of directing the packs to a big village?
Because that's where the troops are, or are soon going to be?
quote:
The term big village was used to inform the rear units that they had found the village of the hostiles they were searching for.
The village sighted from the Crow's Nest? They weren't "searching" for the village; they were trying to strike it before the Indians, presumably alerted to their presence, broke up and scattered.
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The first message from Custer directs the packs to make all speed and to cut across country.At the time this was written, Reno was on the other side of the river and a cross country route would bypass the Reno position and lead directly to Custer.Now Benteen was aware of this.
Dark Cloud has pointed out that if that was indeed Kanipe's message, then McDougall did not carry it out, which seems to demand an explanation that is nowhere offered in the stuff we have. Kanipe is the only source for the story that the packs were supposed to be taken cross-country; but when he said this, he was decades removed from the battle, so it's possible he was misremembering the order. The oldest description of Kanipe's message, which comes from Benteen a week after the battle, says it instructed McDougall to move the packs up with "as great rapidity as was possible".
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It is just stupid to suggest that when Benteen started forward in response to Custer's message it was not his intention to join Custer.
I don't think it is, unless you have evidence to the contrary. The note, being so vague, would require a lot of interpretation, so you may be right about what Benteen thought at the time.
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He is now presented with the Reno crisis.What to do.He inquires from Reno the where abouts of Custer.Reno is not sure.He shows Reno the order from Custer.Reno makes no reply.The pack train is an hour behind.Indecision takes over.Benteen does not set up a defensive position.He does not go to support Custer.He does not send back any messenger to the train.Benteen next move is triggered by a runaway troop.Now he involves himself in that shambles at Weir Point.
Benteen is guilty of indecision and wasting precious time.
Short of mutiny, there wasn't much he could do. Weir did mutiny, sort of --- he did act decisively --- but not to much purpose.
I don't see much purpose in your criticism of Benteen either. He's not in charge. It was a heady situation, with people still straggling in from the valley, Weir jaunting off towards Custer, while at the other end you had a mile-long string of pack mules staggering in from the back-trail, with a nice collection of wounded screaming and bleeding on the hill. Short of executing Reno, finishing off the wounded, flipping the bird to the train, and dashing off madly with the four fresh troops to Custer's aid, what was he to do?
R. Larsen
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Edited by - Anonymous Poster8169 on August 16 2004 02:50:35 AM |
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - August 16 2004 : 02:42:11 AM
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quote:
Originally posted by joseph wiggs
The order to "Come Quick" has been classified, by some, as a vague statement that could mean just about anything. "Come to me." "Come to the Village." "Come to my house for a game of cards", etc., etc., etc. If each column were operating in a vacuum, completely devoid of any intelligence regarding their counterparts whereabouts, that perspective would have some merit.
To be frank, there's no way to get around it, because sensible people then and now have interpreted it in many different ways. After 130 years I think it has to be realized that this is a flaw of the note itself.
quote:
However, we know that to a certain degree, each column possessed a general indication as to the whereabouts of the other units.
Even if they did--- so what? How would this help in settling how to interpret the note? "Come quick" to Custer, or "come quick" to the big village?
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We know that Sgt. Kanipe delivered that message. How did he know in which direction to go?. If the units were separated beyond all knowledge of each other's actual location, how did Kanipe complete his mission?
Uh, by going back on the trail?
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It gets more interesting. Sgt. Kanipe received his message on Reno's bluff. From there, Custer's command continued on a trot. According to Gray, Kanipe's courier ride began at 3:15. He met Benteen's battalion at 3:42. In the meantime, the command traveled an additional three miles arriving at Cedar Coulee. There a second message is dispatched. This message is, of course, carried by Martini who, again according to Gray, leaves Cedar Coulee at 3:34. He meets Benteen's column at 3:58. In less than 43 minutes, Benteen receives two instances of military intelligence regarding Custer's position.
Exactly what "intelligence" did he get about Custer's position?
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Also, there is a significant variation between the first note(oral) and the second one(written). The first message was addressed to McDougall, the second one was addressed to Benteen. Why? What event occurred that caused the General to re-direct his order from McDougall to Benteen?
What basis is there to say that this order was "redirected"?
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Could he have assumed that Benteen's delay was the result of his joining, and safeguarding the much slower moving packtrain?
Why would he assume that?
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If so, that would explain the order that was dispatched 6 minutes after ascending Weir's Point. "Come On"(I need you and your men, and the ammunition now!)
Why no mention of ammunition?
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"Bring Packs(just as Tom stated in his oral message to Kanipe,not to stop for packs, cut them loose if need be.)
How is that "just as Tom stated"?
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In summation, we have two messengers who delivered critical, column location data to Benteen and, a possible sighting of Benteen and the packtrain by Custer at Weir's Point.
They didn't deliver "column location data" to Benteen. Martin was unintelligible, and Kanipe apparently just passed through hemming and hawing about what Indian-killing studs they were.
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Thus, each unit had some idea as to the location of the others. Why then did Benteen not respond in a fashion commensurate with the order to, "Be quick."
Why do you say he didn't?
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Perhaps Kanipes' yahooing and shouting, "we got them on the run!" and, Martini's exclamation, "they are skedaddling", lulled Benteen into a false sense of security. There was no need to rush, ole "iron Pants" was grabbing the glory as usual.
Godfrey's diary is interesting about this. Getting Kanipe's and Martin's messages left him depressed. He figured that by the time they got to the village, they'd have nothing left to do except help burn tepees and buffalo hides. "I thought it all was over & that it could only have been a small village to be over so soon."
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We must also make mention of the fact that several of Reno's men spotted Custer's column on the ridge above the valley as they formed skirmish. In other words, information regarding the whereabouts of the separate commands existed.
What relevance does this have to Benteen and the Cooke note?
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Capt. Weir, a member of the Custer Clan, made no comment when Benteen showed him the Note. This is significant because neither man, at that point, realized the importance of the message. However, when the volley firing was heard on Reno's bluff, Weir became sorely agitated and, rushed forward. What did he know that Benteen did not?
He didn't know anything. He just rushed off without orders. That kind of stuff gets people killed, and they were lucky it was only Charley. For all anyone knows, somebody with Custer could have pulled a Weir, and that may have been what cost everyone their lives.
R. Larsen
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
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Posted - August 16 2004 : 1:20:35 PM
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Reno's troops spotting Custer's regiment on the bluffs, heading north, provides Reno with two sound sources of intelligence.
One, Custer is no longer following in his wake (Obviously);
two, Custer's last known, movement was towards the northern portion of the village. When Benteen asked Reno, "where is Custer?" he simultaneously showed him the "last order received from the Adjutant of Regt., Reno replied that he did not know."
Perhaps, if Reno had relayed the above information to Benteen at the time he received Martini's (relevancy?) note, the new circumstances may have resulted in a different cause and effect.
I don't believe that Benteen responded to the order in an appropiate manner because "Be quick" has certain inherent inferences, such as:
a. get here before it's to late;
b. while the situation may not be currently critical, it may be if you don't get here soon;
c. means the opposite of "Be slow" which is the result of arriving after the sender has been killed.
The first order was given by Tom, to Kanipe, at the behest of Custer. Tom certainly would not have taken the responsibility of such an order on his own. As circumstances changed, the second message was addressed to Benteen(re-directed),again at the command of General Custer.
Tom's statement to cut the packs loose, if necessary, re-affirms the urgency detected in Cooke's request to bring the packs wherein he repeats the same request. Why else, in such a short note, was this line replicated in his post scrip. Is it possible that Cooke utilized the P.S. to add the word"ammunition" to his final request to
bring the packs but,in his haste, again forgot to do so?
I don't believe that the note indicated anything but an urgency for Benteen to arrive before the Indians escaped.
The fact that two of the columns were in such near concert that it enabled portions of the unit to "go back on the trail" decries the notion that they were hopelessly separated. Granted, Custer was much further away from the other two battalions, however, his general location could be surmised. |
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Benteen's order
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