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movingrobewoman
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
 Posted - May 28 2005 : 11:25:41 AM
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Last night, I got a chance to read the newest CBHMA's "Greasy Grass," and found the article by Ron Nichols very interesting. He briefly goes over the battalion divisions/assignments of the Seventh for 1876 and makes the argument that had GAC not changed the battalion alignment on June 25th and instead, gave Reno another company, if not two, for the initial press into the Indian village, the LBH might have turned out differently. Would the Indians have run/scattered if they saw more men on Reno's lines? From what I understand, Nichols is pro-Reno, so he may be putting a little more faith in Reno's ability than is deserved.
What do you all think?
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movingrobe |
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BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - May 28 2005 : 1:27:57 PM
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MRW, even with my little knowledge of LBH, I have always wondered why GAC sent three troops of cavalry on the scout to the left when a small detachment could have accomplished just as much and, in my opinion, done it quicker. If Reno had been reinforced with two troops and accompanied by Benteen, I really suspect that the initial charge would have been followed up more vigorously than when it was led only by Reno.
And then, Paul's cries about the missing sabers would not be so amusing.
Billy |
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Heavyrunner
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - May 28 2005 : 2:57:47 PM
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Maybe, just maybe Custer's immediate command could have had survivors. There is no way, shape or form in which he could have won that battle. Frankly, I wish people would quit speculating with the "what ifs" of this event. Had more men (Custer's) been with Reno, more would have survived because they would have made it back to Reno Hill.
It puzzles me that folks would think the Indians were going to scatter and run away. Would all those men have run away, leaving their village, their families, ect. to the mercy of the 7th? Is an entire village of 7-10,000 going to uproot itself and scatter or disappear at high speed?
No and no. They're going to fight. Custer never had a chance. The Indians were superior in numbers, to be sure. They were also immensely superior in attitude for battle. |
Bob Bostwick |
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Benteen
Lt. Colonel
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Posted - June 03 2005 : 7:04:30 PM
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BJ - "I have always wondered why GAC sent three troops of cavalry on the scout to the left when a small detachment could have accomplished just as much and, in my opinion, done it quicker."
I think one misconception is the word "scout" for Benteen's mission. Sure, 'see what you can find' is one thing, but 'see what you can find, and attack it' is quite another! Benteen's mission was to do exactly that find it, attack it! One has to wonder what he would have found had he indeed crossed the river, instead of turning back, which he did, even before the arrival of Custer's orders? The History Hogs show did have some merit when it came to this same conclusion.
Most people think Benteen moved too slow in his return. The question should be, did he move to slow in his advance? Perhaps exact orders regarding Benteen's movement would shed light upon this. However I am quite sure that like other so called "orders" these too will be abused into something that they are not.
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Edited by - Benteen on June 03 2005 7:05:22 PM |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - June 03 2005 : 11:31:47 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by BJMarkland
MRW, even with my little knowledge of LBH, I have always wondered why GAC sent three troops of cavalry on the scout to the left when a small detachment could have accomplished just as much and, in my opinion, done it quicker.
Billy
I,too, am limited in my knowledge of this battle. There is so much information to gather, consume, digest,then regurgitate into a facsimile of what occurred that the task is often overwhelming. I agree, that a small detachment of men would have achieved a "scout" to the left and gather intelligence as quickly, if not quicker, than three troops of calvary. So the question is why did Custer send three troops instead of a Indian scout or two?
Is it possible that Benteen's trek was more than merely a scout. Could it not have been a Recognizance-in-Force. A military unit capable of gathering much needed intelligence while maintaining the capability to defend itself should it come under attack. Prior to Benteen's assignment, the latest, previous attempt at intelligence gathering took place at the "Crow's Nest." From that pinnacle, an approximate location for the village was ascertained. The size and disposition of the village was still unknown when Custer sent Benteen to the left.
Custer may have believed that Terry's approaching position, Reno's encroachment, and his ability to follow Reno or approach from the right flank (which he eventually did)combined with Benteen's troops formed a circle capable of enclosing the village. We know now that there simply were not enough troops to formulate and maintain this "vise" of control. At the time in question, however, Custer would not have know this. How do we know such a thing? To have attacked overwhelmingly, superior numbers willing to "stand" would have been an act of insanity. The mindset of the troopers was that of superiority over mere savages who were incapable of organized combat.
If, as I suspect, Custer was convinced that the Indians would run at the approach of his command, an encompassing, circle of troops, would be needed to herd and/or corral the hostiles into subjugation.
I believe Benteen's mission to be more than just a "Scout", it was part and parcel of a military effort to locate, confine, and subjugate a large group of individuals who possessed the inherent ability to disperse quickly and efficiently at a moment's notice.
This ability of the hostiles to flee was the only fear of the troopers who attacked on June 25. When they did not do so, all hell broke loose. |
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whistlingboy
Lieutenant
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - June 07 2005 : 4:46:35 PM
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| Does anyone know what is the most widely accepted timeline on how much time had passed from the moment Reno mounted his charge until he settled at the top of the bluffs? |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - June 07 2005 : 5:25:39 PM
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You really need the Gray book Custer's Last Campaign. The time lines are, so far, valid and it provides the common frame of reference.
Gray, Table 7 page 290: the charge begins at 1503 and surge up Reno Hill at 1610. So, say 1615 the first guys atop Reno Hill in number, almost immediately joined by Benteen. In Table 14, Gray says at 1608 Custer's guys START down MTC, engaging at 1618 around the ford after dismounting and tightening saddles. This is what some claim as "support" for Reno's attack in the form of a feint 1.25 hours later. I don't think it unreasonable to suppose that whatever Reno expected Custer to do, he and anyone would think it would happen way sooner than 1.25 hours later.
I didn't see the HH show, but I'm curious where Benteen was to have crossed the river or why he would, having fullfilled his mission, he shouldn't rejoin the command as he was told, absent other developments to alter those plans. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
Edited by - Dark Cloud on June 07 2005 5:29:17 PM |
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Benteen
Lt. Colonel
Status: offline |
Posted - June 08 2005 : 3:06:31 PM
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"I didn't see the HH show, but I'm curious where Benteen was to have crossed the river or why he would, having fullfilled his mission, he shouldn't rejoin the command as he was told, absent other developments to alter those plans." ~ Dark Cloud
According to Benteen, he was to "move to the left to a line of bluffs about 2 miles away. Sending out an officer and a few men as advance guard, [and] to 'pitch in' to anything [he] came across, and to notify him at once... While en route... [he] recieved two other orders from [Custer], and these through the Chief Trumpeter and the Sergeant Major of the regiment: The first to the effect, that, should I not find anything at the first line of bluffs, then, to go on to the second line of bluffs, to pitch in, and notify him at once... The Sergt. Major recieved 15 or 20 minutes later, was, 'if nothing could be seen from the second line of bluffs, then, to go on until i came to a valley, to 'pitch in,' and to notify him at once... The second showed no valley, - only bluffs and bluffs - so, another of my 'Prees,' came; and said, old man, that crown ahead is going to strike a snag: indians have too much sense to travel over such country as you have been going unless they are terribly pushed, so, you'd better get back to that trail, and you will find work;... Right Oblique..." Rest of story...
Now as far as I can tell from Benteen's own words, he was ordered to find "the valley" and keep going until he did. Surely had he have kept on going he would have found "the valley" atop all of those bluffs he kept encountering. Yet he didn't do either. And upon the words of 'Pree's' whoever or whatere that is he turned back. Now orders to me are orders. Find the valley and you find Reno charging towards Reno Hill. His orders then would have been to, ie. cross the river and 'pitch in' to the battle.
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Edited by - Benteen on June 08 2005 3:07:59 PM |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - June 08 2005 : 3:25:06 PM
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Find the valley and you find Reno charging towards Reno Hill. His orders then would have been to, ie. cross the river and 'pitch in' to the battle.
Was it some sort of game?guess where Reno is? |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - June 08 2005 : 4:31:47 PM
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That's not accurate, BT.
You're quoting a private letter to his wife, not a formal recap and certainly not his orders, and not something he expected to have to defend in detail.
His orders were to find the LBH valley and see if any Indians were in it to the south of the supposed main camp. He was to pitch into anything he found enroute or in the valley, meaning Indians. Having found no Indians, and his advance Gibson having obtained the info Custer desired - no Indians in the LBH valley - he ceased the pointless slog into an empty valley and headed to rejoin the command. If, as you suggest, he was to continue by his route 'into the valley' he'd have arrived in the valley with exhausted if not injured horses with no handy crossing miles below where the action, if any, would be.
In any case, Custer by his couriers clearly didn't expect him on the west bank. Try to meld that with the packtrain request. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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whistlingboy
Lieutenant
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - June 08 2005 : 6:18:41 PM
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| DC: I briefly browsed through that book some time back but didn't buy it and read it. I don't remember the table but will try to find a copy of the book in town. I thought I had read something the other day where Reno had mentioned that after continuing on their scouts around 8a.m. on the morning of the 25th that he didn't see Benteen again until around 2:30pm and yet I was under the assumption that, like the table points out, it was after the 4 o'clock hour upon meeting him shortly after ascending the LBH bluffs. I suppose I should cut Reno more slack but his and Benteen's 'wishy-washy' testimonies concerning Custer's whereabouts and/or demise that day, after the fact, come and go. One moment they both said they felt that distant gunfire was probably that of Custer's and then later claim to have heard nothing while claiming not to have known anything about his fate. And yet, soldiers in his command reportedly claimed seeing Indians dressed in bluecoats carrying guidons from the 7th. One saw an indian wearing a buckskin jacket similar to one Tom Custer wore. And one could speculate that the commanders were informed of such sightings but.... I think Reno thought Custer would flank the Indians but once he (Reno)encountered the mass numbers and saw the odds that forced him to choose another path, I'm not sure he gave much more thought to Custer coming to save his hide since he must have figured that Custer must have had run into the same screaming hordes. At any rate, 1.25 hr would have been too long of an expectation. Thanks for the data source. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - June 08 2005 : 7:34:29 PM
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I don't think that's true, WB. Reno and Benteen said they didn't hear "volleys." They didn't say they didn't hear firing. In fact, they both said they heard firing. This was an issue because the volleys were supposed signals of distress (which are distinguished from a volley of slaughter by.....?), but the soldiers and scouts had various opinions on all that. They may have lied, but they weren't alone in their conclusions.
Gray also settles the clock issues pretty well.
Assuming Gray is more or less correct, by 1625 the 'feint' or 'utter rout' is on its way north under Yates while Keogh is parallel along the hogback sometimes providing covering fire. I suppose it possible someone saw an Indian in a buckskin jacket. And the Indians certainly did march around and scare their people with guidons and uniforms. The issue is when the soldiers saw this, and what of it? Some contended an Indian blew actual military bugle calls during the night. Hands. That would be how likely? Even Herendeen imagined - or is quoted as saying - that Sitting Bull was signalling and marshalling his forces by colored lance flags. News to the Sioux. This was massive trauma, and people fell apart, and they made stuff up intentionally or not.
I've previously inquired when the mission of the 7th cavalry should have become Saving General Custer at All Costs By Risking The Entire Regiment simply because they don't know what's going on and he's not there or where he said he'd be. The know Terry's coming. Isn't their mission to act with Terry?
It's not just Reno's dead and wounded men, it's his lack of horses. A significant portion of his men are horseless even if they're not wounded. How many? We don't really know, actually. In any case, this assumption seven companies could have ridden to Custer is silly and wrong. Reno's troops were shot for offense.
Further, what is the imagined scenario if any portion of the seven companies reached Custer at this point? Custer lost a ton of horses pretty quick (safe bet:no cover, on high ground, surrounded, dismounted, but "still on the offensive...." and nobody thought he would slow down for his enlisted wounded), whatever the casualties among the troopers. So: Benteen has his three, plus the company with the pack train, inching in, Reno's wounded and horseless and Custer under attack some miles away or, having been repulsed, riding north to Terry. From Benteen's point of view - or anyone's - he doesn't have seven offensive companies. Given the pack train and wounded (and dead) have to be defended on decent ground within a stone's throw of an annoyed large, perhaps huge, village, plus the horseless, he probably has less than Custer did, mounted and ready to go. And whatever happened, Custer hasn't seemed to have quelled the Indians at all, given they're watching a wave approaching from Weir Point.
And how's the 7th doing so far? Reno's troopers are shot. The village is big and not moving. Custer didn't support Reno at all to their knowledge which suggests he was repulsed. And what would an experienced soldier like Benteen think of the attractions of the 7th being surrounded in line and depending upon its highly dubious marksmanship from horseback? He has an inert contingent now to protect, Custer would have another. Being caught between would provide a third.
Terrible choices, but rescuing Custer - not having him killed with their actual friends - would be a huge attraction to Benteen or Reno, because it would humiliate Custer in front of his regiment and emblazon the rescuers' names in the Pantheon of Heroes as well as being simply cool and heroic. Custer dead with everyone, which nobody really imagined at first, would have shaken out in their minds not much different than it did: ugly, and unpleasant, and not desired at all.
I really think much of the conspiracy and motivations for betrayal are bogus on their face, Benteen and Reno did okay under terrible circumstances overall, and although it was clear to everyone much later that Reno prevented them for heroically riding with reins in their teeth to save Custer. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
Edited by - Dark Cloud on June 08 2005 7:39:36 PM |
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Benteen
Lt. Colonel
Status: offline |
Posted - June 10 2005 : 1:11:19 PM
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Wild 1, first of all you have to take the words that Benteen is saying as honest interpretations of his orders. The question is; did those orders hang him? Taking into consideration the amount of time Benteen had to do his mission, about 4 hours in all, during that time Custer kept encouraging him by courier to search further, keep going and "find the valley, and "pitch in... to anything you come across! At a little after 3 in the afternoon, Reno made his "charge" of the village, a full hour before Benteen is seen atop Reno Hill. The question really is then what was Benteen doing for the past 3 hours? It is anyone's guess, but if at some point, someone in Benteen's battalion was sent to the edge of the bluffs overlooking the river, they would have indeed discovered the valley! If at some point prior to, during or even after Reno's 'charge' this had been done, Benteen would have in all likihood have tryed in earnest to find a ford and have crossed the river to "pitch in." Especially and more-so if he and his men had indeed seen Reno and the indians fighting.
DC ~ "His orders were to find the LBH valley and see if any Indians were in it to the south of the supposed main camp. He was to pitch into anything he found enroute or in the valley, meaning Indians." Exactly, especially and more-so as Custer's orders strongly implied, "in the valley"!
DC ~ "In any case, Custer by his couriers clearly didn't expect him on the west bank. Try to meld that with the packtrain request." Okay, I will. How do you know that Custer didn't expect Benteen on the west bank? In fact you don't. You see; if Benteen had found indians encamped across the river, which he should have, had any of his scouting missions so competently have been carried out, then Benteen by order would have been obliged to find a ford and cross to attack them. And by the time Benteen had recieved his new orders to return, he, Benteen had already turned away from his first stated mission to find the valley, and pitch in. To anyone it is clear that by that time, Benteen didn't have any other orders than to keep going, and "find the valley, and "pitch in." Did Benteen disobey that order? Others often blame Benteen for disobeying the pack train order, but in reality, which did he disobey? We may never know for sure what would have happened had Benteen gone on. But the next questions does answer that.
Concerning Benteen's stated first mission, whose responsibility was it that he was there at all? And then try to answer ~ What advantage was Custer tying to gain? Where were they [Benteen's battalion] supposed to be going, and why? Eveyone see's Benteen's mission as a loosing proposition, but evidently Custer didn't, why? One has to ask the difficult questions about this aspect in order to understand it, not just gloss over it, and say that it was senseless, Custer certainly didn't think so, and he didn't think that way for almost 4 hours or more! In fact according to Gray, he [Custer] should we say, 'hesitated' in recalling Benteen for almost an hour and a half while hunkered down behind Weir point. Did Benteen's mission have something to do with that? Why wait when that long when he gave his word to Reno that he would support him. That was support? Clearly Custer's reasons for staying so long behind Weir point wasn't because of Reno. If it wasn't because of Reno, then, what was it because of Benteen and his mission? And do remember that Custer did stay in the vicinity of Weir point for approximatly 1 hour and 25 or so minutes, waiting... for what? Reno's destruction? Or Benteen's ~ success?
It has been said by Merington and other authors that Custer would not have charged into anything without knowing in advance of what was there. Others accuse him of wrecklessness and doing just the opposite, the fact is Custer was for the most part very thorough with his scouting mission of the battlefield. And unlike most, I do think that he had very knowledgeable guides and indian scouts familiar with the LBH area. The question remains then ~ If the indian scouts/guides knew of something in that area, why not send some scouts with Benteen, to guide him there? ie. ford or otherwise? Reports state that Custer and Reno conferred for some time before Custer issued his orders to Benteen. Throughout all of the rest of the afternoon, for approximatley 4 hours or so those orders stood. Though Reno's charge and retreat. Through Custer's own words that he would support Reno, and then observing Reno's charge and retreat, whether through his own or scout observations. Observations that lasted over an hour! Through 1 hour and 25 minutes or so after Custer's arrival at or near Weir point, Custer's order to Benteen stood. Through all of those time and events those orders stood, Why?
The why's lay now dormant in the hallowed halls of valhalla. And all the valkyries have left for us is the bones. It doesn't take a rocket scientist to know what happened. And it doesn't take a professor of books to theorize on what happened. Custer knew something about that area where Benteen was going. He ordered him there on orders that stood through the test of blood and battle, through countless precious moments... Moments of time that Custer could ill afford to waste, and he knew that, but he didn't recall Benteen at any time. Only at a moment in time did he do so, and that moment was just before he left, not waiting for Benteen to arrive, and then and only then did he give orders for Benteen's re~call, and then and only then did he then ride off, and time didn't permit him to wait any longer, why?
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - June 11 2005 : 2:12:42 PM
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The question really is then what was Benteen doing for the past 3 hours?
It took Custer/Reno 2 hours to reach the lone Tepee.It took Benteen 3 hours to reach the lone tepee.So the question is what was Benteen doing for that extra hour and if you have a half decent map of the units' movements it will show you what he was doing. |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - June 11 2005 : 10:56:01 PM
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When we peruse the volumes of data that derive from the intense investigations of this battle by hundreds of investigators(both professional and amateurish) we are overwhelmed by one central theme;no one agrees-in Toto- with another. Now this is understandable as we are bereft of eyewitnesses who possess a critical criterion that would make them acceptable as legitimate witnesses; credibility. Now the "Red" men who actually fought this battle, witnessed the death throes of the last trooper to die,stripped dead bodies of their uniforms, and lived to tell about it are not deemed, by many, to be credible in their reports. The intelligent "White" soldiers who were capable of intelligent reporting were slain, along with Custer, thus the dilemma. Who to believe?
Ironically, I managed to find one single thread of uniformity in this entire opus wherein everyone unanimously agrees upon; the actions of Reno! Without exception,commentators confirm that Reno's "charge" to the bluffs was a hasty decision that contributed to many casualties in his command. I will not belabor the forum with an unnecessary description of this strange military "tactic." That he momentarily lost his head is obvious. Should he, therefore, be condemned for eternity? No! Nor should his actions be forgotten.
At this point, some will chime in that the Reno Inquiry absolved him of any fault whatsoever, they did. Some have also called the Inquiry a "whitewash." If it were so, Col. Merritt's (Inquiry Board member)statement on the last day of the trial may shed some light here. "It is a pity that this thing was brought on now. It will hurt the Army badly. It ought not to have been allowed to come out." Page 329,Custer Myth, Graham.
In summation, I believe Benteen did an exceptional job under the circumstances he faced. Sadly, the same can not be said for Reno. He did not do "O.K" at all. He performed poorly as history will attest to. |
Edited by - joseph wiggs on June 11 2005 11:00:39 PM |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - June 12 2005 : 1:13:37 PM
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I don't know Joe,I could make a case for panic.I mean a rearguard was out of the question[ok who wants to stay behind?we'll write your folks]and it was not exactly a parade ground for forming up on.There was little wrong with Reno's flight it is just that panic is not recognized as an acceptable military response.
Here's a question.If Benteen had not arrived in time to save Reno it is possible that the Indians would have hung about to finish him off thus giving Custer another 30 minutes.Would that have altered the outcome? |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - June 12 2005 : 9:01:18 PM
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I finally received the opportunity to read the article authored by Ron Nichols in the latest edition of the Greasy grass. His writing style is readable and comprehensive. His research, obviously,is thorough. The first paragraph of his article refers to "Special Order No. 8(issued by Custer) which defined the 7th's command structure for the upcoming Sioux campaign." He then writes that the plan was "abruptly" countermanded on June 22 (three days before the battle.) Does not the term "abruptly" inherently imply a sense of impetuousness in the thinking process of the commander who made the change? The fact that the sudden change was made three days prior to the fatal battle tends to lend credence and support to the first segment of the statement.
In actuality, as the author later admits,it was more often than not extremely difficult to standardize any regiments' organizational structure in the field. Since the majority of regimental companies came together in the field (training) for brief periods only,it was standard protocol for commanders to enjoy a "Carte Blanche" to adjust regimental structure when necessary. Would it not be reasonable to assume that General Custer ascertained military intelligence which prompted his decision on June 22?
The author then describes a second decision by Custer as follows: "At a meeting that evening with his officers,Custer unexpectedly announced that the wing and battalion organization would be abandoned." Again with the negativity, unexpectedly, abandoned? How about this, Custer simply made decisions based upon information as he received it. Thus,I find the "Red Flag" adjectives disconcerting at least. Like battle, combat plans are fluid and ever changing as circumstances dictate. The author offers a plausible reason for this latest change; his displeasure with Reno's disobedience of Terry's orders. How could this be? In a letter believed to be written by Custer,he chastised Reno for not pursuing the Indians further as he would have done. This was probably the only act that Reno performed that caught the admiration of one so bold as Custer.
The author then informs us that when Custer split his command on June 25, "he followed the similar four-battalion organization that he (Custer) established at Fort Lincoln. Thus, we have arrived back to square one where we started. All of the preceding discussion regarding abrupt,unexpected,and abandoned decisions,somehow,seem pointless now.
Now, let us examine the author's proposed choses.
Choice #1 - Reno's original three-battalion, four-company per battalion organization- (author)Probably no difference. I agree.
Choice #2 - Custer's two wings, two battalions per wing, three-company battalions- (author)Possibly a difference. I disagree.
When Reno disregarded his orders to charge the village and, instead, went into skirmish, he had yet to suffer a single casualty. His battle front was unhampered by a minimum of warriors as his assault caught the village completely off guard. Only when he ordered his troops to stop and stand to skirmish, did the reeling and shocked warriors regain their resolve and became empowered. Only then were the scouts, extended to the left to capture the herds, chased away by Sioux warriors. Then, truly, the warriors did make a physical charge that, heretofore, was only in the mind of Reno. Dr. Porter, and other civilians involved in this portion of the battle, gave interesting testimony to this effect as they were unencumbered by the embarrassment of the Army. Reno lacked the intestinal fortitude to command a charge that the author describes.
Choice #3 - Custer's four-battalion, no wings (using Wa****a tragedy.) (aauthor)No change in outcome, I certainly have to agree with that. However, the author sees this as the worst option, an easy selection to make knowing the final outcome. Each unit was in supportive position. For their personal reasons,the two commanders placed their commands out of support. Isn't it ironic that I can't find a single author to say that these same tactics which were used at the Wa****a was the "worst" possible selection. That's because it worked that time.
Choice #4 Custer's four battalions, no wings (maintaining regimental strength.) (author)probably a significant difference. I disagree. Maintaining regimental strength would have meant nothing when facing thousands of warriors bent on protecting their families. The entire regiment was to weak in numbers to achieve the objective. That is why they lost! In fact, had Reno and Benteen not taking the action that they did, every man,jack of the 7th. would have died that day. Further: "Those attempting to escape to the north would have run into the approaching Terry/Gibbon column." Not hardly, Indians don't run in straight lines like a train. They disperse in all directions, breaking down into smaller and smaller groups as they flee making capture almost impossible. Custer realized this if Mr. Nichols didn't.
I see this article as just another attempt to establish the presumption that the command decisions of General Custer were erratic, fundamental unsound, and the root factor in the demise of the 7th. Calvary. It is far more complex than that. Custer's command would have met defeat regardless of its command structure,to argue otherwise is moot.
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Edited by - joseph wiggs on June 12 2005 9:35:50 PM |
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movingrobewoman
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - June 13 2005 : 10:33:24 AM
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While we're kind of on the subject of Reno and all, could there have been the slightest possibility that the men who were cut down on the way to Deep Ravine and those trapped there were attempting, rather than 'just seeking cover,' to meet up with Reno who was now the regimental commander? Of course, this theory is only good if you believe any remaining soldiers FROM LSH made that bolt, and were not hit on the way TO LSH.
Hoka hey! |
movingrobe |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - June 13 2005 : 3:00:43 PM
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When Reno disregarded his orders to charge the village and, instead, went into skirmish, he had yet to suffer a single casualty. His battle front was unhampered by a minimum of warriors as his assault caught the village completely off guard. Only when he ordered his troops to stop and stand to skirmish, did the reeling and shocked warriors regain their resolve and became empowered.Those orders were dependAnt on the support of Custer and the entire outfit.It never materialized.What did materialize was an enormous village.To have proceeded would have been criminal.Sustaining casualties is not the only reason for changing tactics.
An attack by approx 175 men on a village of that size would soon have run out of momentum ,become fragmented and have been just gobbled up.
By ordering Benteen to "pitch in " with his 3 troops,by ordering Reno to charge with 3 troops it is obvious that Custer thought that any number of Indians could be defeated by just 3 unsupported troops.How wrong he was.
Further Reno's manuoeuvres did not jeopardize Custer's position because he was fully aware of the situation developing in the valley and he took absolutely no action in response.
While we're kind of on the subject of Reno and all, could there have been the slightest possibility that the men who were cut down on the way to Deep Ravine and those trapped there were attempting, rather than 'just seeking cover,' to meet up with Reno who was now the regimental commander?
Ok lads I'v got this daring pl......... |
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movingrobewoman
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - June 13 2005 : 3:06:47 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by Warlord
MRW:
Once again a very interesting question!
Did the troopers see Custer cut down and having heard the firing further down the valley think a last chance might be to make a dash toward Reno or attacking the village they might move toward him and he would possibly furnish some assistance?
What from our viewpoint would appear to be a desperate, no chance maneuver, might appear to them a last chance to link up with still alive troopers of Reno's command.
Deep Ravine has always bothered me. Granted it's deep and all, but it's not the first thing I'd run to after the command collapses on LSH; nor is it (from what I understand) a place to ford the river. If we can believe that Bouyer is still alive at this time (assuming his marker is correct) and accompanying that rush--wouldn't the scout know and perhaps advise them of its unsuitablity?
On the screamfest board, one poster was arguing the presence of those mythological absolutes of military protocol--even in a situation as dire as Custer's battalion was seeing on LSH. For example, Custer dies, command of the men magically transfers to the next senior officer (even if the guy's so busy fighting off some Indian he--or anybody else--doesn't notice)and so on--and that the commander of the battalion at that point (who, after LSH, is probably some poor sergeant, assuming all commissioned officers are dead) was then under orders to notify/report to Reno, who doesn't know that he is now the de-facto regimental commander .... Maybe that's where these Deep Ravine trail guys were going--and just maybe it accounts for the reason both Harry Reed and Boston Custer were not found on the immediate hillock--but rather on the way to ... somewhere south.
This is why I'm starting to look at DR in a different light.
Hoka hey! |
movingrobe |
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movingrobewoman
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - June 13 2005 : 6:37:55 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by wILD I
While we're kind of on the subject of Reno and all, could there have been the slightest possibility that the men who were cut down on the way to Deep Ravine and those trapped there were attempting, rather than 'just seeking cover,' to meet up with Reno who was now the regimental commander?
Ok lads I've got this daring pl.........
Actually, Wild, it wouldn't be a "daring plan." It would have, according to certain "experts," followed established military procedure--though I'm not sure what kind of shape "procedure" was in by that time in the battle scenario. My guess is that it was pretty f---ed up. 
Regards, |
movingrobe |
Edited by - movingrobewoman on June 13 2005 6:39:04 PM |
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KerKommisar
Recruit
Status: offline |
Posted - June 13 2005 : 8:15:30 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by movingrobewoman
On the screamfest board, one poster was arguing the presence of those mythological absolutes of military protocol--even in a situation as dire as Custer's battalion was seeing on LSH.
If you are referring to the Delphi forums, how would you know this? I thought you were run out of town over there. I remember you saying you would never visit there again. Not true? |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - June 14 2005 : 03:37:05 AM
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Actually, Wild, it wouldn't be a "daring plan." It would have, according to certain "experts," followed established military procedure--though I'm not sure what kind of shape "procedure" was in by that time in the battle scenario. My guess is that it was pretty f---ed up.
And you would be dead right.The only thing those troopers had control over was their bowels and I'd even have my doubts about that.
As regards DR my guess has always been that Custer descended MTC was checked and forced along the east bank as far as DR up which he was driven towards LSH.The dead found here were from the rearward troop. |
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whistlingboy
Lieutenant
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - June 14 2005 : 4:06:54 PM
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I'm not sure how the numbers of tallies 'for' or 'against' Custer's actions at MTC are running per se, as there is a lot to be read yet, but when the first army scouts reported the fleeing Indians and it was hence believed that they had been 'found out,' and, given that the Indian numbers have been estimated from being 2000 to 10,000 strong by the various writers, well, with an attack force of thousands of warriors, why did the Indians not take the battle away from their families, kids and relatives and take it to the advancing army if, in fact, they did know about it? Why were they not able to 'organize' to take the battle to the approaching enemy. Even Hollywood movies get that point right usually--what social group wants to wait to battle close to where their loved ones are living? Maybe a few warriors may have known about the oncoming soldiers but either the right Indians didn't find out or there was a power struggle preventing organization, all the while valuable time was fleeting.
When the Indians saw the Reno charge did every last warrior set out to repel them? Did they then suspect soldiers would be coming down the hill at them all along the LBH river? Thus, did some warriors stay back and finish their morning cup of coffee before going after the Reno charge too?
If they weren't surprised, they would have been up on the east ridges already, would have met Custer forces probably before Weir Point, would have hid in those coulees and would have swept down the eastern embankments to finish Reno and trap him from the east besides just meeting his frontal assault down on the flat flood plain. I can honor their numbers for winning the battle but not for being overly intelligent.
But if in fact they were surprised then I find it at least likely that Custer could have breached MTC even though he couldn't maintain that course but for a few minutes as he quickly 'about faced' or was forced along and up the embankment toward the higher ground of battle ridge.
I've taken many pictures sitting up on the ridges gazing down at the LBH river and the flat plain where Reno led his initial charge and unless a contingency of Indians were just waiting at the MTC area, the majority of warriors would have probably been out in that flat plain area whooping it up.
If they are not surprised, why don't they have at the very least guards atop the ridges on the otherside of the river guarding the community in the valley? It makes no sense. |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - June 15 2005 : 10:16:09 AM
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WB
If they are not surprised, why don't they have at the very least guards atop the ridges on the otherside of the river guarding the community in the valley? It makes no sense.
Because they do not think tactically they just react.[at least in a situation where they are surprised].Their reaction was really one of panic only unfortunately for Custer it was aggressive panic.
Warlord
I would go so far as to guess your guess about MTC is accurate and is supported by indians who were there. Custer apparently could not turn the column around to the south,
Yes agreed.I have never been to the LBH but looking at the maps there was just no way he could double back.It is possible that the command broke in two here with Keogh being forced up Deep Coulee towards Calhoun Hill with 2 troops while Custer with 3 troops continued on towards LSH via Deep Ravine. |
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BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - June 19 2005 : 03:19:12 AM
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"Some are simply pulled off their horses and beaten to death! Jammed or empty carbine, Colt empty, And NO SABER!"
Didn't Bingham try the same, escaping with flying saber, after getting so excited he threw away pistols once empy in Dec., 1866? The saber in this case did not help. Supposedly in Grummond's case, it did make a difference, he losing only one of four people.
At LBH, my opinion is that it would not have made a significant difference whether with Reno's or Custer's battalions.
Billy
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Edited by - BJMarkland on June 19 2005 03:21:21 AM |
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Topic |
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Custer's Command Decisions
