| Author |
 Topic  |
|
Wrangler
Lieutenant
Status: offline |
 Posted - October 17 2003 : 9:06:51 PM
|
Hello All,
It is Friday, February 7, 1879. It is the twenty-third day of the Reno Court of Inquiry. Major Reno’s testimony continues...
"...I moved forward in accordance with the orders received from Lieutenant Cooke to the head of the column. Soon after that Lieutenant Cooke came to me and said, "General Custer directs you to take as rapid a gait as you think prudent and charge the village afterwards, and you will be supported by the whole outfit". [Nichols RCOI, 561]
This order, recollected by Major Reno and Lt. Wallace in their testimony, has been the source of much debate. Much of it centers on what was meant by the word "supported". In modern US Army interpretations of the word, he was not supported. But what did the word mean back then? Research continues, but here is an interim report.
At the following link you will find the document from which I have extracted what follows:
http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/lectures/Craig.pdf
This document is a lecture on Cavalry in the Offense given by a Captain Craig, 10USC at the Infantry and Cavalry School at Fort Leavenworth in November 1904. I will start this exploration with a question I extracted from Craig's Question Sheet he intended for his students. I have attempted to extract the answer from his lecture text.
4. Why is a support necessary for an attacking line, and where is it posted with respect to that line under various conditions?
In order then, to prevent a charging body from being defeated by a fresh hostile force held in hand for the purpose, during the moments of disorder due to success, as well as to guard against a counter charge, it is necessary to have a support close at hand. As the flanks are dangerously weak points in cavalry, this support must be so posted that it can be readily thrown forward to protect its own attacking line, or diverted to attack the enemy’ s flank if opportunity offers. It is therefore usually echeloned on the outer, or more exposed flank, from which position it is more readily launched against the flank of the hostile cavalry.
If in rear of the attacking line, the intervals are necessary to prevent its being run down by troopers who in ease of a retreat generally break straight to the rear in disorder.
The support is as a rule drawn into the melee for one reason or another, hence an reserve is necessary to decide the victory and conduct the pursuit, or cover the retreat in ease of defeat.
The reserve is usually echeloned on the flank opposite to that of the support. In general, the support and the reserve relieve the forces in front of them of all anxiety about the flanks.
In a cavalry combat, that force which is last able to bring a formed reserve into action, is as a rule victorious.
Where the force is small, the duties of the support and the reserve are generally combined in a single body, part being kept well in hand and unbroken, while the remainder is launched into the fight.
As a general rule, however, cavalry attacks in three bodies, -an attacking line, -a support –and a reserve…
Organizations should always if possible be preserved intact, though in small bodies the same troops may furnish the reserve and the support. Distances between subdivisions of the attacking force vary with its size, and depend to a great extent on the natural cover afforded by the terrain.
In the case of a troop [company in 1876], the distance from the attacking line to the support is about 80 to 90 yards, from the latter to the reserve from 150 to 175 yards-in the case of a Brigade or a Division, the former distance is from 275 to 300 yards, the latter from 175 to 225 yards.
In case the flank of the attacking line is seriously threatened, the support may be closed to not less than 100 yards. When the support is echeloned on the flank, its inner flank should be from 75 to 100 yards beyond the outer flank of the attacking line; the reserve in such a case is similarly posted with respect to the flank on which it is placed.
From this extract, it would appear by the 1904 definition of the word "supported"--Major Reno's command was not supported. Research continues for pre-LBH definitions and I will report the findings.
v/r
Wrangler
|
|
|
frankboddn
Major
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 18 2003 : 02:56:12 AM
|
 Wrangler, let me start this by saying I'm not a military man or know anything about procedures like you described. That's an awful lot to digest. I'm just going to keep it simple here. Did Custer fail in supporting Reno? Yes and No. Yes, in that when he sent Yates and Smith with E&F down MTC, whether it was his plan or not, he did draw an awful lot of the Indians from the valley, from Reno, thus giving Reno a fighting chance by evening the odds so he could make it to the heights across the river. Gray asserts that's what he did: He sent them down as a feint to draw some of the warriors away from Reno. He did, they did, and apparently it worked. Imagine if Custer had not done that and all those warriors that then diverted themselves from the valley to confront this threat to the northern or center of their village had stayed where they were, Reno would've been wiped out. Now, did Custer fail to support Reno? Yes. But did he fail due to negligence, cowardice, botched it? No. He failed because there were too many damned Indians to make it across the river and charge from the north or to capture hostages in order to make the Indians back off, as was sometimes done. Custer was doomed from the time he left MTC. Even Bouyer knew they were doomed when he, from Weir Point, saw Reno retreating from the valley, into the timber and across the river. Bouyer knew they were all dead then. So, yeah, Custer supported Reno as much as he could; and, no, he didn't support him because he had no ability to do so.  |
  |
|
|
Brent
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 18 2003 : 07:35:28 AM
|
Well--I'm Reno and I'm just a very ordinary Cavalry commander. I have 130 men. I get Cookes message, and so I "charge" the village. Now I've just been told I'll be supported by the "whole outfit", but then I recall the Benteen has been sent off in a different direction entirely. Not much I can expect from him. Then I see Custer riding off as well, but at least it's in the generel direction of the Village. Now I'm a Major and so I figure that he's going to charge the village from a different direction--thats OK, but he'd better do it SOON as I see this is a big village and the Indians are starting to increase in #'s in front of me.
Now there are LOTS of Indians in front of me, so before I get sucked in entirely (no sign of any Custer support yet) I stop and form the skirmish line. At this point, I'm now on the defensive and all momentum is gone.
OK--I'm back to being Brent now. I suppose that if Reno had not then lost total control and led the rout back to the bluffs, things might have turned out a bit better--maybe Benteen could have "come up" and instead of finding Reno cowering on the bluffs, he may have been able to at least attempt some offense type movement. But it didn't work out that way, unfortunately. But for me the "bottom line" is that Reno probably had that word "support" fixed in his mind, and when it was not forthcoming in a timely manner, his "charge" lost effective momentum and things began to unravel. Had the support from Custer come quickly (and had Benteens command been added to Reno's at the start), we may have had a far different LBH battle.
All of which is just my own opinion, of course!!! |
|
|
|
Brent
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 18 2003 : 07:47:26 AM
|
Should have addd that his inability to effectively support Reno in a timely manner was Custer's fault. Any sort of pincer attack movement requires a lot of coordination and timing. The fact seems to be that Custer, while probably wanting to help Reno in a timely fashion, had no real idea of the terrain and no real idea of exactly how he was going to accomplish that "support". In that time, Reno's charge lost whatever it had gained in initial tactical suprise.
Now I think Custer's later attempt to draw off Indians and so "help" Reno was commendable, it wasn't support in the sense Reno was thinking about the word. It was then too little and too late. |
|
|
|
Wrangler
Lieutenant
Status: offline |
Posted - October 18 2003 : 10:16:30 AM
|
Frank,
For not being a military man, your analysis of the situation is quite good.  My central point in this posting is to explore the semantics of "supported" when used in conjunction with the word "charge".
quote:
Originally posted by frankboddn
Did Custer fail in supporting Reno? Yes and No.
That's well put and in concert with your answers to these questions:
quote:
Originally posted by frankboddn
Now, did Custer fail to support Reno? Yes. But did he fail due to negligence, cowardice, botched it? No.
I agree fully with your answers. I would, however, reword your first question as follows:
Did Custer support Reno's charge?
I anticipate the conversation will take at least two paths; essentially following the trails logically posed by your questions above.
First, the expectations and manifestations of "support" for a "charge" relative to and as seen by Reno and his battalion.
Second, Custer's intentions over time for his entire command in conducting this attack which probably changed or was modified as he became more aware of the situation (the terrain, composition & disposition of the Indians, and his perception of the disposition of his own forces, i.e. Reno, Benteen and McDougal). Keep in mind there are several separate threads dealing with this issue. Perhaps, we discuss Custer's larger intentions in these threads to maintain continuity.
Thanks for your input.
v/r
Wrangler |
|
|
|
Wrangler
Lieutenant
Status: offline |
Posted - October 18 2003 : 10:38:13 AM
|
quote:
Originally posted by Brent
But for me the "bottom line" is that Reno probably had that word "support" fixed in his mind, and when it was not forthcoming in a timely manner, his "charge" lost effective momentum and things began to unravel. Had the support from Custer come quickly (and had Benteens command been added to Reno's at the start), we may have had a far different LBH battle. All of which is just my own opinion, of course!!!
Brent,
Just stop it! You're taking all the suspense out of this!
But seriously, I agree with your assessment of what Major Reno might have been thinking. Support of a charge had a specific meaning (the expectations) and when the expectations of what that would look like did not appear (the manifestations), he prolly started to think he might just be in the hurt locker. So he started thinking on his own and...well...the rest is history.
v/r
Wrangler |
|
|
|
Wrangler
Lieutenant
Status: offline |
Posted - October 18 2003 : 11:53:23 AM
|
quote:
Originally posted by Wrangler
In the case of a troop [company in 1876], the distance from the attacking line to the support is about 80 to 90 yards, from the latter to the reserve from 150 to 175 yards-in the case of a Brigade or a Division, the former distance is from 275 to 300 yards, the latter from 175 to 225 yards.
To help visualize what this looks like, see below:
__________
Reno
(Attacking Line)
^
|
275 yds
|
___
___
___
___
___
Custer
(Support)
^
|
175 yds
|
___
___
___
Benteen
(Reserve)
Note: Custer and Benteen's battalion would be dispersed laterally 75-100 yards to the left or right rear of Reno's battalion. The expectation might have been Custer on the right and Benteen on the left. The distances I used for depth were the low ends for those described for a brigade or division (the 7th being a regiment which is smaller than and a subcomponent of the brigade).
v/r
Wrangler
|
|
|
|
Wrangler
Lieutenant
Status: offline |
Posted - October 18 2003 : 1:00:37 PM
|
quote:
Originally posted by Wrangler
This document is a lecture on Cavalry in the Offense given by a Captain Craig, 10USC at the Infantry and Cavalry School at Fort Leavenworth in November 1904.
A little trivia for you that I discovered today with regards to the author of this lecture--Captain Malin Craig. I wanted to make an assessment of his credibility. Here's what I found:
From Heitman’s Historical Register, published 1903, pg. 333:
Cadet, U.S. Military Academy. Admitted 30 June 1894; graduated number 33 in his class.
Commissioned Second Lieutenant, 4th U.S. Infantry Regiment on 26 Apr 1898.
Transferred to the 4th U.S. Cavalry Regiment on 23 June 1898
Transferred to the 6th U.S. Cavalry Regiment 31 December 1898.
Promoted to First Lieutenant, 6th U.S. Cavalry Regiment 2 February 1901.
From 1903 until this lecture was prepared, I surmised:
Transferred to the 10th U.S. Cavalry Regiment (Date unknown—c. 1903-04)
Promoted to Captain, 10th U.S. Cavalry Regiment (Date unknown—c. 1903-04)
Assigned as Tactics Instructor, Infantry and Cavalry School, Fort Leavenworth, KS (Date unknown—c.1903-1904). Was still an instructor there in 1905.
This was interesting but unconvincing. So I punched his name into google and here's what I found:
http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/malincra.htm
Highlights from this link:
Fought in France in World War I as:
Chief-of-Staff, 41st Infantry Division
Chief-of-Staff, I Corps
Promoted to Brigadier General
Post World War I:
Chief-of-Staff of the 3rd Army.
Assigned to Army War College.
Chief of Cavalry.
Commander, Panama Canal Zone and IX Corps.
Chief of Staff of the United States Army in 1935, succeeding General Douglas MacArthur.
Relinquished the position to General George C. Marshall on his retirement in 1939.
As you can see, he was just an average Joe. 
v/r
Wrangler
|
|
|
|
inwit
Corporal
Status: offline |
Posted - October 18 2003 : 1:45:23 PM
|
Don't forget that Reno is the only witness as to what his understanding was. Others might have overheard some conversations or parts thereof, but the record is not conclusive that nothing more was said (or understood).
Terry didn't want the Indians to escape. A frontal assualt, if stopped by the huge warrior force, leaves ample room for the women and children to escape.
Note how nobody ever mentions whether the sightings of Custer on the bluffs are ever reported to Reno. My recollection is that Reno was never even asked in the Court of Inquiry if those sightings were reported to him. Custer waiving his hat could be a clear message that he is helping from another flank. |
|
|
|
frankboddn
Major
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 18 2003 : 2:47:13 PM
|
Wrangler, your visual with the attack line, support, reserves with the yardage, etc., was interesting, but I think the terrain involved here was also a huge factor. Maybe if the entire fight took place in the valley, your visual could've applied. I think one of the main reason Custer could not support Reno, as well as one of the maor causes of his defeat, was his lack of reconnaisance, knowledge of the terrain, even though he had the scouts who supposedly knew the terrain so well, and being up on the bluffs at all times and not being able to find a place to ford, he "plan" consisted of winging it as he went and as the terrain permitted. While I believe he had an originally solid plan, it went to hell because he wasn't physically able to get down to support Reno. I feel like I'm talking in circles here, but that's my fault, as my mind's racing as I read all of y'all's posts and trying to digest it all. I think Custer's inability to support Reno was due to his own negligence in not doing proper recon and knowing what he was going to face, both in the size of the village, the number of warriors, and the lay of the land. I know he would've supported Reno if he could, but he just couldn't get down there. Not to get off topic, but I wonder what would've happened if Custer could've gotten across the river into the village, and if Reno had held out in the timber, and with Custer's attack drawing a large number of warriors off of Reno, could Reno have then left the timber and come to Custer's support? I'm just brainstorming here. Or maybe brainfarting. I better go get some lunch and come back later and see your comments. |
|
|
|
vet777a
Sargent
Status: offline |
Posted - October 18 2003 : 6:02:59 PM
|
quote:
Originally posted by frankboddn
I think Custer's inability to support Reno was due to his own negligence in not doing proper recon and knowing what he was going to face, both in the size of the village, the number of warriors, and the lay of the land..
frankboddn: I totally agree with you on this aspect. If we look back to the Wa****a his recon was also quite lacking. He struck Black Kettles camp of about 52 lodges. When just over the hills were about 2000 more Lodges of Kiowa, Arapaho, Commanche and even some Apache.
A couple of scouts told him that Black Kettles village did not have that many warriors in it and that this was not the village to attack. He totally ignored them and struck. Then the surrounding Hills filled with braves and Custer split. This was his only significant victory from 1868 till his defeat in '76'. He really was not a great Indian Fighter at all. He ignored adequate recon. I think if he made it into the village he still would of been squashed. And, I do not believe that Reno could of regrouped or that he had the nerve to do so. I do not think Calvary tactics of support would of helped at all. Especially since Custer did not even know how he was going to 'support'. |
|
|
|
Wrangler
Lieutenant
Status: offline |
Posted - October 18 2003 : 6:09:55 PM
|
quote:
Originally posted by inwit
Don't forget that Reno is the only witness as to what his understanding was. Others might have overheard some conversations or parts thereof, but the record is not conclusive that nothing more was said (or understood).
Inwit,
Excellent point and one requiring a direction on how to proceed in gaining an understanding of the words "charge" and "support". One of the following premises should apply:
1) Major Reno received no orders from Lt. Col. Custer.
2) Major Reno recieved orders from Lt. Col. Custer but these orders excluded the words "charge" and "supported".
3) Major Reno received orders from Lt. Col. Custer to "charge" but no promise of "you will be supported...".
4) Major Reno received or alleged the receipt of orders from Lt. Col. Custer to "...charge the village afterwards, and you will be supported by the whole outfit."
If we go with premises 1, 2, or 3 then this whole thread relative to "charge" and "support" is moot. Sorry to have wasted your time. If we go with premise four, we accomplish two things depending on what you seek to gain from the discussion.
1) An understanding of the underpinnings relevant to the alibi constructed by Major Reno for the ears of military men.
or
2) An understanding of the underpinnings relevant to an order such as this, "General Custer directs you to take as rapid a gait as you think prudent and charge the village afterwards, and you will be supported by the whole outfit".
I vote for premise four. But I don't count cuz I started this. 
v/r
Wrangler
|
|
|
|
Wrangler
Lieutenant
Status: offline |
Posted - October 18 2003 : 7:42:57 PM
|
Frank,
You are batting 1000 again...and getting ahead of my ability to think and 'splain. My apology in advance for the length of this missive.
My first step was to gain an understanding of the spatial requirements involved with the term "support". To close that out, let me start with the "reserve"--Benteen's battalion. Positioned on either the left or right rear of Reno's skirimish line by the distances I illustrated, Benteen is in the vicinity of 450 yards behind Reno (or 1 minute, 31 seconds at the gallop).
Custer's battalion "in support" on the left or right rear of Reno's skirimish line by the distances I illustrated is in the vicinity of 275 yards behind Reno (56 seconds at the gallop).
In general, the support and the reserve relieve the forces in front of them of all anxiety about the flanks.--Captain Craig
OK, let's see how we have done in relieving that "anxiety about the flanks". Allegedly, the Rees disappear from the left flank. Indians allegedly start to take advantage of this and start/continue circling to the left flank and rear of Reno's skirmish line.
Is a support/reserve in position (56/91 seconds away) to deal with this? According to Craig, no.
Allegedly, Major Reno goes to the timber, allegedly assesses a potential threat to the right flank and the horses, and allegedly, tries to orchestrate a defense of the right flank with members of G Co.
Is a support/reserve in position (56/91 seconds away) to deal with this? According to Craig, no.
Allegedly there are Indians to Reno's rear.
Is a support/reserve in position (56/91 seconds away) to deal with this? According to Craig, no.
Allegedly, there is not a force in position to cover a withdrawal from the timber to the river and on to Reno Hill.
Is a support/reserve in position (56/91 seconds away) to provide this? According to Craig, no.
Benteen arrives vicinity Reno Hill after the retreat from the timber across the river to Reno Hill. Custer does not arrive at all nor does his movement to the right relieve Reno's right flank of "all anxiety".
There are tactical and operational considerations/reasons for this. In my view, they are:
a. The terrain and the discovery of its true nature over time during the battle.
b. The actual composition and dispositions of the Indians.
c. Custer's perceptions of the composition and dispositions of the Indians.
d. The actual disposition of his own forces (i.e. Reno, Benteen and McDougal)
e. Custer's perceptions of the disposition of his own forces.
f. Indian intentions to fight, and Army perceptions that they would not.
All these were intentionally avoided in my discussion to get at, what does "you will be supported" mean. My thought process is this. First, isolate what "supported" means. Second, compare what happened to that "supported" model (expectations). Third, if the model shows something different (manifestations), determine a set of reasons for those differences--which would then bring into play the tactical and operational considerations. Some of these, you and others have mentioned.
I'm not sure this is a sound methodology but there ain't nobody else ta talk to about this 'cept the good folks on this forum. The wife's not interested and the cat ain't listenin'. 
In summary, regardless of what I have stated, this is merely an interim report. I can't hang my hat on a lecture given in 1904 by an instructor born the year before the battle. I continue my search into what "supported" meant in 1876. And as promised, I will report the findings.
v/r
Wrangler |
|
|
|
frankboddn
Major
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 18 2003 : 11:12:27 PM
|
| Wrangler, your last posting was too deep for me. I think I'll just step back and watch this one. Good luck. |
|
|
|
Wrangler
Lieutenant
Status: offline |
Posted - October 18 2003 : 11:23:12 PM
|
quote:
Originally posted by frankboddn
Wrangler, your last posting was too deep for me. I think I'll just step back and watch this one. Good luck.
OK Frank. Thanks fer listenin'. Sorry for the brain surgery via internet.  v/r Wrangler |
|
|
|
Brent
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 19 2003 : 07:29:13 AM
|
Inwit:
Waving his hat etc was a nice touch and I'm sure Custer wanted to help. But even if Reno hadn't seen (or known of) that gesture, I suspect he was aware that Custer was attempting to give that promised suport. But I don't think that an "attempt" was what Reno was after. I think he had that word "support" ( and also maybe the "whole outfit") fixed in his mind and when it wasn't forthcoming (in a real sense) in a rather immediate fashion, he slowed then stopped the charge.
More proper instructions to Reno might have gone like this:
"Marcus--you are going to make this charge by yourself. I've sent Benteen away so don't look for him to help anytime soon. You're going to need to give me about 1/2 hour or so to figure out where exactly I'm going to attack from my end. I really don't know what shape this vIllage takes, or exactly where I can attack it. So I'm going to need you and those 130 guys to sort of carry things until I can work all this out. Good luck!!"
Or something like that---. But still asking too much of THAT man and 130 men. |
|
|
|
alfuso
Corporal
Status: offline |
Posted - October 19 2003 : 11:25:52 AM
|
But was the hat-waver even Custer? Why stand on a bluff and wave to your command while the "hostiles" were watching? A "bluff" perhaps?
Someone did a photo study placing a person on that bluff and taking pictures from about where Reno was. Granted the photog should have put the guy on a horse... But given there were several officers in buckskins that day, why is it a given that the hat-waver is Custer?
Benteen wasn't necessarily "sent away" - he just might have been told to come in from the left.
This goes to the school of thought that Reno and Benteen had more orders but weren't letting on later on.
|
Deny Everything
Prepare to Panic |
|
|
|
inwit
Corporal
Status: offline |
Posted - October 20 2003 : 12:13:53 PM
|
I agree that there are problems regarding the hat waiving incident.
Girard testified that he thought he recognized Custer by the blue shirt and buckskin pants, but definitely recognized Cooke by the long beard.
Some have said the hat waiver was Bouyer as Curly spoke of him in a hat waiving incident to Reno's men. this makes more sense as Custer must have been at or near MTC at the time.
As to support from Reno's backside, this allows an escape of the women and children if the warriors can hold the line (although they feared cavalry charges). |
|
|
|
frankboddn
Major
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 20 2003 : 2:10:37 PM
|
 inwit, I didn't notice who said they could recognize Cooke because of his long beard when Custer was waving, but if you're standing on the valley floor, I think even with binoculars you'd be hardpressed to see if a person had a beard. |
|
|
|
inwit
Corporal
Status: offline |
Posted - October 20 2003 : 2:52:25 PM
|
frankboddn,
Yes, Girard testified that the waiver was about 1,000 yards away.
Why doesn't somebody go to the Reno woods and take some photos of the bluff locations? I don't think I have ever seen such an attempt. (Or at least an experiment with someone with a long beard).
Nothing is ever clear about this battle. |
|
|
|
Halmyers
Private
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 20 2003 : 3:41:55 PM
|
In Wit,
The subject of seeing Custer on the buff's from Reno's
position has always been of interest. First of all you
are looking upwards for three-quarters of a mile. Secondly
you are in the heat of battle, and it lasted 35 minutes.
And I do not believe Custer would be exposing himself to
the indians. I have been in combat, there is a great amount
of confustion going on. Smoke, dust, in coming fire, half
the time I did not know who was along side me let alone
three-quarters of a mile away. Your trying to stay alive,
and trying to do what ever you can to get the job done, there
was no time to be looking for anybody except the enemy
Hal |
Thanks
Hal Myers |
|
|
|
inwit
Corporal
Status: offline |
Posted - October 20 2003 : 5:00:47 PM
|
Halmyers,
Yes, there is somthing a little too "theatric" regarding the scene of Custer waiving. On the other hand, men in Reno's woods were lokking for signs of Custer helping. If such a thing happened, it would have to have occurred before Custer's battle began.
In regard to your experiences (Vietnam - Gulf ?), I recall a humorous version of the Little Big Horn from Stephan Ambrose's book Crazy Horse and Custer, to the effect that "there must have been a moment when these two great warriors saw each other during the battle and gazed at each other in mutual appreciation" or something extremely corny like that. As you say, that is scarcely possible. |
|
|
|
Wrangler
Lieutenant
Status: offline |
Posted - October 21 2003 : 01:37:07 AM
|
quote:
Originally posted by Halmyers
I have been in combat
Hal,
Lest we forget. Thank-you for your service and sacrifice.
v/r
Wrangler |
|
|
|
Halmyers
Private
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 21 2003 : 1:08:50 PM
|
Hi Wrangler,
Thank you, It was a great honor for me to serve this
Great country and the American people for 25 years.
Hal |
Thanks
Hal Myers |
|
|
|
frankboddn
Major
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 21 2003 : 8:29:17 PM
|
| inwit: When I was on the valley floor, Reno Woods, Reno Crossing in 1999, I used my camcorder and videod everything. I can't remember if I zoomed in, but I probably did. I can tell you that if you're standing right smack dab at Reno Crossing, right at the river, and looking up at Reno Hill, you wouldn't be able to make out beards or distinguishing features. Colors, of course, and clothing. But details like that, I don't think so. And the woods is probably another quarter to half a mile from Reno Crossing. I'll have to review my tape and see what I can see. I'm also looking at some still prints of pictures I took at Reno Crossing looking up at Reno Hill, and with the naked eye you can't even tell makes of cars, etc. Using it in the reverse, if you have any pictures taken from Reno Hill looking down at Reno Crossing, see if you think any distinguishing features could be made out of someone standing down at the river. Again, the timber, etc., is even further away. With binoculars, I still doubt you could make out beards, etc. Just my thoughts. |
|
|
|
El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 23 2003 : 05:15:05 AM
|
| Its possible to make out a person by their mannerisms and stature. I've been several hundred yards from someone and been able to tell its them by certain characteristics that I recognize. Its very possible that Custer was recognized by his manner of dress and/or his horse. Others wore buckskins, similar clothing, etc., but did anyone wear white trousers with a blue/gray pullover, big black boots, a big hat with the brow turned up and a red tie? About how far was the person on the bluffs from when the person(s) who spotted the figure? What's the approximate minimum and maximum distance? And who said it? I remember reading several persons stating it was Custer that they saw on the ridge. Maybe they were able to verify this after Kanipe or Martin returned to the Reno/Benteen force? Its feasible they saw a rider, then were educated on Custer's having traveled to the bluffs by someone who left the battalion before it was destroyed... |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
|
|
|
Topic |
|
|
|
"Supported by the Whole Outfit"
