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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
 Posted - March 24 2005 : 2:38:32 PM
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Whether 49.47% or 2.6% of the weapons were faulty isn't relevant.
Oh yeh! Like telling the 82nd not to worry only 2% of their chutes are faulty.Lives depend on equipment being 100% serviceable |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 24 2005 : 3:40:57 PM
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I read the report, and it does not follow, and the proof is that not all the weapons jammed or fouled. The parts were tooled, but I'd imagine the guns were hand assembled for the most part, given Henry Ford was 13. A total of six are mentioned, and the others that didn't work were hit by bullets. He says mechanisms loosened in a very short period but didn't invalidate the weapon. If they ALL were a problem, he might - or someone - would have mentioned that.
In any case, if the weapons had defects so blatant that so quickly appeared, the 7th obviously hadn't trained with them or hadn't reported them to any degree necessary to their calling. The percentages aren't relevant if you aren't familiar enough with the weapons to have discovered that. Forget the frozen casing, just vector in on the loosened mechanisms. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - March 24 2005 : 4:58:15 PM
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I read the report, and it does not follow, and the proof is that not all the weapons jammed or fouled.
Last word on this b****y subject,
All the carbines were identical even if the parts were assembled by hand.These carbines are systems.If 6 of these systems fail under a set of 6 different circumstances it follows that all of them will fail given any of the those circumstances.
A 2% failure rate for equipment on which your life depends is to say the least morale destroying. |
Edited by - wILD I on March 24 2005 4:59:55 PM |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 24 2005 : 5:37:30 PM
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Calling them "systems" is neither true nor helpful to your cause.
Given that alleged "experts" suggest a human error rate of up to 5% in any endeavor, the 2% doesn't terrify. Secondly, if you don't know about it, won't hurt morale. Third, if you practiced enough you'd know things loosened. If you haven't practiced enough to discover that your weapon fails very quickly, you haven't practiced enough anyway.
If everything stated to now is true (and it ain't), there is nothing that troopers experienced with the weapons couldn't handle and prepare for. Since that was the point of a professional army, if they weren't properly trained with their primary weapon, a low to moderately low failure rate was the least of their issues and problems. But even that isn't proven by this gunk. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - March 24 2005 : 7:33:13 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by dave
After firing 4 or 5 shots rapidly, the extractor would not operate because the shells would stick in the chamber. The black powder used would cause his shells to stick
Is this Vaughn a reputable author? because the above statement seems astounding. I've made no effort to conceal my opinion of what I perceive as the Springfields shortcomings, but by no means did I think the gun could be that bad. Many guns suffer from teething problems during their early years. Its entirely reasonable for us to expect that the Springfield would suffer a certain amount of problems on one of its first major outings, but Vaughn's statement goes far beyond what you would normally expect from a firearm which is still maturing.
Do you know of any independent corroboration regarding this problem?
Reputable? Sure; his books are some of the best ever written in the field. He could still be wrong though.
He doesn't cite a source for the statement, though on page 194, note 13, Vaughn says that "All technical data relating to firearms and ammunition in the battle have been furnished by Philip Jay Medicus, 18 Fletcher Street, New York 7, New York, a recognized authority on the subject. All shells and bullets found on the field and referred to herein have been examined by Mr. Medicus who has furnished written opinions on them."
So, I assume Medicus is Vaughn's source for that information. I don't know anything about Medicus, what his reputation was, or if Vaughn was right to defer to him on these matters. Godfrey says [Graham, pg. 147] that the shells would stick when the cartridges got dirty, but doesn't say that firing "4 or 5" of them rapidly had anything to do with it, and I can't think of anyone else likely to be a source for this. Since this is an issue that has very little prominence in the surviving documents, interviews, letters, etc., there really aren't many possible sources. So I draw a blank on what (I presume) Medicus's grounds for stating that to Vaughn were.
R. Larsen |
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - March 24 2005 : 8:12:00 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by Warlord
larsen: if you have had this book for so long why have you not brought up this subject of the defective carbine???
Mainly because I haven't read it in a while, and three bunged shells didn't stick in my mind. Whether or not it ever happened was not the issue anyway, but whether it happened enough to really interfere with the soldiers' fighting ability. A 1% rate of failure isn't extraordinary, and to my knowledge (and yours, and everybody else's) nobody at the Rosebud ever thought it worth complaining about, even unjustifiably. I've introduced Reno's letter to Benet to the board, plus all other bits of info about defective carbines that I know of, whether they bolster my opinion or not. There's no advantage to be gained by suppressing or mis-stating evidence, as you did with Vaughn's sample size, knowingly or not, since there's nothing that can be "won" here by doing so.
R. Larsen
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Edited by - Anonymous Poster8169 on March 24 2005 8:20:10 PM |
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dave
Captain
Australia
Status: offline |
Posted - March 24 2005 : 8:45:05 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
Calling them "systems" is neither true nor helpful to your cause.
Actually Wild is correct. Today the US army refers to its guns as weapons systems - and as far as the meaning of the word system applies, its a completely accurate description. Seems a little pompous to me personally, but who am I to argue.
quote:
Given that alleged "experts" suggest a human error rate of up to 5% in any endeavor, the 2% doesn't terrify. Secondly, if you don't know about it, won't hurt morale. Third, if you practiced enough you'd know things loosened. If you haven't practiced enough to discover that your weapon fails very quickly, you haven't practiced enough anyway.
Well, we have no idea how many guns suffered from temporary stoppages during the fight. All we know is that 6 were unservicable by the end of it.
In his letter, Reno fails to mention that Captain French was employed um-jamming carbines at one point. And while its possible that Reno might have been unaware of French's actions, I would have little confidence that Reno would mention any troopers who had to un-jam their weapons. Because if he didn't mention French, then he evidently didn't interview his officers about problems they or their men experienced with the carbines.
Its that or else he didn't include these details because he thought he had provided enough details to justify his complaint, or maybe he just wanted to keep his letter short.
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If everything stated to now is true (and it ain't), there is nothing that troopers experienced with the weapons couldn't handle and prepare for.
Thats debatable. Presumably you mean they should have built their own ramrods just in case they did have a serious jam?
But it any case its not that point I've argued, or the point that Wild or Warlord have argued either. Our point is that the gun or the ammunition, or a combination of both was defective.
We have information to the end that the gun was less than perfect in itself or they wouldn't have bothered to add a ramrod (1877), redesign the receiver (1879), redesign the receiver yet again (1884) and redesign the breech block (1884). |
Edited by - dave on March 24 2005 8:49:43 PM |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 24 2005 : 9:16:26 PM
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They do call them "systems" today, because it's integrated construction of the sort unimaginable then. If you call the Springfield carbine a "system", then so's an slingshot, with little hyperbole. They weren't actually identical, and not machine assembled with torque applied to each screw or bolt known and maintained. So, yeah, it's as silly to call it a "system", just as it was to call K rations "food."
Or, French was busy with the six carbines. Or, he wasn't at the activity long. Or Reno is trying to deflect attention, being the highest ranking officer to survive a debacle. It doesn't matter to me, because my point is that there is no excuse for the 7th to have entered combat with weapons as bad as some contend, having had them since '74 in at least one company. If they did, they had problems WAY beyond faulty weapons to doom them.
Dave, how do you rate a regiment discovering that rapid fire in their primary weapon loosens up the mechanisms right off plus other issues only in a battle two years after issue? As for else, a ramrod is probably something that could have been fashioned at Abe Lincoln. Setting aside the truth or prevalence of these alleged horrors, they are in any case easily solveable problems. But apparently they were so ill trained, nobody knew they existed. So we're to believe.
The issue was never whether there were defects. Of course there were defects. It was 1876. The issue was were it of such importance that it affected Custer's part of LBH more than the Brazilian butterfly would have.
The defect at Pearl Harbor wasn't the low climb rate, among other issues, of the P-40's, and the fact that Chennault had warned us for a year about the Zero doesn't mean the Army covered up, and the fact that they later improved tactics and possibly the machine itself (I don't know) doesn't mean anything to the fiasco that was December 7. The defect at LBH wasn't these supposed mass problems with the Springfield carbine or its ammo. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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dave
Captain
Australia
Status: offline |
Posted - March 24 2005 : 9:45:34 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
They do call them "systems" today, because it's integrated construction of the sort unimaginable then.
Well I would certainly hope that they are integrated constructions.
(sorry thats a bit of humour)
quote:
If you call the Springfield carbine a "system", then so's an slingshot, with little hyperbole.
As I said, I don't like the term myself. But if a M4 carbine can be called a weapons system today, then so can an 1873 Springfield, albiet on more primitive level. You can argue that an M4 can be optioned up with optic sights, grenade launchers and so forth, making it a system, but the same is true for trapdoor Springfields. Except it was Buffington sights instead of telescopic sights, bayonets instead of grenade launchers, pistol grips instead of whatever. No difference really.
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Or, French was busy with the six carbines. Or, he wasn't at the activity long. Or Reno is trying to deflect attention, being the highest ranking officer to survive a debacle. It doesn't matter to me, because my point is that there is no excuse for the 7th to have entered combat with weapons as bad as some contend, having had them since '74 in at least one company. If they did, they had problems WAY beyond faulty weapons to doom them.
I really have no idea to how badly or how well the 7th was trained. Its not an area I have any knowledge in, so its totally pointless me making either agree-able or disagree-able noises. But lack of, or poor training is not an excuse for a defective weapon.
quote:
Dave, how do you rate a regiment discovering that rapid fire in their primary weapon loosens up the mechanisms right off plus other issues only in a battle two years after issue?
Not well.
I do have to admit that I find Reno's comments about the hinges loosening up odd to say the least. It certainly seems to imply that weapons training may have been inadequate.
On the subject of the hinge, why did it loosen? is the hinge retained by nut. Or is it pinned? Because if it was pinned - then remember what you said to me a couple of weeks ago when I mentioned metal fatigue as being a possible point of failure?
In any event, loose breech blocks don't do much to restore my faith that the 1873 model was a well designed weapon. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 25 2005 : 12:07:26 AM
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Okay. I can't say if the Springfield was or was not well designed. No clue. Lasted thirty years, so it couldn't have been that bad. Well regarded officers spoke highly of it. I understand that the repeaters had as many or more significant failure problems than the single shot. Don't know if true, but that's what I've read here and elsewhere. If you want to call it a "system" I think it a false and misleading elevation in terms. An ax can be viewed as a system, I guess.
However, this all started because significant blame was being placed on the Springfield as a major factor in Custer's fiasco, along with ancillary contentions that the 7th broke the Sioux back and surely killed a ridiculous amount of the enemy. My point is and has been that you could have given the 7th virtually any weapon available at the time and the results wouldn't have been different given the same training time and amount of practice ammo. I say this because zero evidence has appeared suggesting necessary chronic practice at much of anything by the 7th. The only evidence of training I've seen was Merritt or someone complimenting the 7th on how they fanned out by company on arrival and as indicative of the sort of stuff Custer considered important. This, apparently, more than target practice.
I really do think Reno's comments reveal how ill prepared they were. He was second in command and he's surprised about how his regiment's primary weapons actually work under stress after some companies having had it for two years? And only after the team gets mangled do these things seem important enough to note.
My annoyance at the metal fatigue issue is - and remains - not that it didn't happen but - again, no clue - that it was being suggested as a design failure of the weapon which was the cause, or a significant cause, of Custer's defeat. To me, and I cannot believe not to you, having no knowledge of such a potentially significant flaw (if true) is illustrative of a regiment so clearly untrained with or even familiar with their primary weapon that this is in itself evidence of a poor military unit that could not have been trained well. A poor workman blames his tools, and is even less convincing if he's had experience with those tools (or should have had) for two years.
I guess the closest analogy I can offer is the Battle of Surigao Strait. Two (2) WWI era Japanese battleships and escorts attacked, more or less knowingly, a huge US fleet of eight or so battleships (with a large amount of everything down to PT boats as escorts) and thereby got slaughtered*. Reading about the Springfield as a meaningful cause of Custer's defeat would be like Japanese Navy nuts today suggesting that if their turrets could have angled higher (evidence of poor design) or had the barrels not softened after five salvos (defective construction and they never knew till this battle...) things might have been different. They still might not have won, but they could surely have sunk a lot of our ships. Of course, there was animosity between the Japanese captains and they engaged our ships separately.....
*Note: I realize it was a knowing sacrifice of the IJN and that these failures are made up. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
Edited by - Dark Cloud on March 25 2005 12:26:09 AM |
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - March 25 2005 : 12:10:22 AM
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quote:
Originally posted by Warlord
Larsen: You are the liar claiming that Vaughn thought these casings were indian ammunition. He clearly states they were soldier ammunition.
He says they were military ammunition, which the evidence leads him to suspect was being used by Indian auxiliaries. Anybody who doubts this is advised to read the book, pgs. 106-107. It's pointless to deny it.
quote:
There is no way you can prove a piddling 1% failure rate. The failure rate was more like 100% and I have shown that. IT IS A HISTORICAL FACT!
I've never claimed to prove a 1% failure rate. I've said that of the casings Vaughn found, about 1% --- 3 --- showed problems. Anybody who thinks the failure rate at Rosebud was greater needs to provide the evidence.
quote:
What is going on here, in actuality is if the catastrophic failure of the carbine is brought out, it will make Custer into a bigger hero. There are those here who are extremely scared of that. In fact one of their main purposes in being on this board is to discredit American heroes. These turds are engaging in this in almost every posting, RECOGNIZE THEM FOR WHAT THEY ARE! Major historical revisionists trying to destroy American history and heroes.
I will say it again. Custer was a great hero. Had he been armed with proper modern arms like the Winchester 1873, he and his men would have walked away alive!
Maybe so, but he went into battle knowing what he was armed with, and if he thought the Springfield was such an inferior weapon it was foolish of him to retreat to the ground he did, divide himself from the rest of his regiment, abandon all mobility, and force his men to rely on it.
R. Larsen |
Edited by - Anonymous Poster8169 on March 25 2005 12:24:05 AM |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - March 25 2005 : 03:46:43 AM
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Warlord
My thanks for that very instructive explanation of the extractor system.
DC
"System" the manner in which parts of something function together.I used the word because the issue here is the relationship between a number of elements each dependent on the other to achive a predetermined effect.
Because Custer allowed his command to become strung out over what a mile?This ment that at various points his troops were outnumbered by maybe as much as 20 to 1.His command was in effect rolled up.No weapon will compensate for that kind of desasterious leadership.However if he had managed to mass his troops in a defensive position that carbine was dodgy enough to have led to the same result. |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - March 25 2005 : 04:15:47 AM
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This is taken from a report on the Martini-Henry rifle
A rate of fire of 20 rounds in 48 seconds has been obtained with it. Turning to the barrel, we find that the Henry defeated all the other barrels which entered against it, including the Westley-Richards, Whitworth, Rigby, Lancaster, and the .5-in. bore, as well as the Service .577-in. bore. It was superior to these in accuracy at all the four ranges of 300, 500, 800, and 1,000 yards, giving figures of .47ft., .90ft., 1.85ft., and 2.59ft., at these distances respectively. In flatness of trajectory it was "practically equal to any of the other rifles of .45-in. calibre," and superior to the larger bores. With the Henry bullet and the beeswax wad, the arm proved free from fouling in continued firing
Question.Was the purpose of this beeswax wad to clear possible fouling and if so did the ammo for Custers carbines have it. |
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - March 25 2005 : 06:34:29 AM
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quote:
Originally posted by Warlord
Stoolie Boy: P.106 Says "From the type of shells I found here I believe it was occupied by friendly indians." The reference is not to hostiles as you try to allude. And of course the army did arm the Crows, Araphoes and some other "scouts". Your statements are deliberately misleading unless you simply do not understand, some law student, Hah.
I never alluded to any hostiles, but your surrender is noted. I wasn't aware there were any Arapahoes with Crook's men either --- you sure you read the book? Some Arapahoes helped kill Custer and the others.
R. Larsen
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - March 25 2005 : 2:35:42 PM
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wIldI you should seriously consider this per your discussions with DC! You try to discuss things seriously and he talks down to you and is insulting!
I could easily be draw into this mutual colonic irrigation engaged in by some but to what purpose?My interest is in the subject and its themes and the intellectual challanges afforded by the more serious contributers.[including yourself on your good days]  |
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movingrobewoman
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 25 2005 : 2:36:06 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by Anonymous Poster8169
quote:
Originally posted by Warlord
Stoolie Boy: P.106 Says "From the type of shells I found here I believe it was occupied by friendly indians." The reference is not to hostiles as you try to allude. And of course the army did arm the Crows, Araphoes and some other "scouts". Your statements are deliberately misleading unless you simply do not understand, some law student, Hah.
I never alluded to any hostiles, but your surrender is noted. I wasn't aware there were any Arapahoes with Crook's men either --- you sure you read the book? Some Arapahoes helped kill Custer and the others.
R. Larsen
Some? How about two Arapahoes: Left Hand and Waterman.
Regards, |
movingrobe |
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - March 26 2005 : 02:38:53 AM
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quote:
Originally posted by Warlord
larsen Stoolie Boy: There is not surrender on my part or Custer's! Your problem aside from being an anally retentive member of the Lavender Boy gang is your continual twisting of the facts to try to suit your own perverted version of the truth! You were trying to claim all the indians were the same and the casings found belonged to indians, the inference being hostiles. That of course is completely wrong. I notice when you come out from under your rock or toilet that DC disappears! Why is that?
I never claimed all Indians were the same; in fact, quoted several times Vaughn's own distinction, "friendly Indians". Only a dunce could infer that to mean Sioux or Cheyenne. In saying that Vaughn thought all three casings came from the soldiers' handiwork you were not accurate. That's all there is to it.
R. Larsen |
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - March 26 2005 : 02:45:01 AM
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quote:
Originally posted by movingrobewoman
Some? How about two Arapahoes: Left Hand and Waterman.
Regards,
I was thinking five: Left Hand, Waterman, Yellow Eagle, Yellow Fly, and Well-Knowing One. The source is Graham, of course.
R. Larsen |
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - March 26 2005 : 3:39:36 PM
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You don't know what anybody is saying, and if you've read the book (as opposed to looking at the pictures and confusing bullets with casings) it is not apparent. Tell us more about the Arapahoe scouts at the Rosebud. You know, the ones you read about in Vaughn's book....
R. Larsen |
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BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 27 2005 : 10:00:16 AM
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On the spur of the moment, I went over to the Independence Library yesterday and looked through their U.S. Executive Papers of the War Dept. series indices. I found several interesting things, not the least reports from the Surgeon General regarding the cholera epidemic of 1866 & 1867. I copied the 1866 and next time will get the 1867. But, I also looked through references for "rifles" and managed to locate some nice things, most of which were not copied due to time constraints. One is the complete report of the Board selecting the breech-system for rifles & carbines. I have copied the first 20 or so pages of that but since it is 6 fiche long with about 30 pages per fiche, it will be a while to copy.
I also found a tidbit from the Department of the Pacific, dated August 12, 1876 which states:
"On the recommendation of the Senior Ordnance Officer of the Pacific Coast, Benicia Arsenal, the use of the metallic ammunition made prior to June 17, 1871, is hereby forbidden in this Division, as it is of inferior quality.
Any of this ammunition in the hands of troops, or at posts, in the Division, will at once be turned over to the Quartermaster's Department for shipment to Vancouver or Benicia Arsenal.
By Command of Major General McDowell:
J. C. Kelton
Assistant Adjutant General"
That and one more which is essentially the same except for a different theater and arsenal are the only things I find regarding recall of metallic ammunition. There are a few other documents I want to check though.
I found no reports specifically dealing with target practice with the rifle dating before 1878. However, there is one report dated 1862 entitled "System of Target Practice" that I will look through.
There is another report which I will completely copy, "Use of Rifle Ammunition in the breech-loading Carbine" dated 8/1/76.
Best of wishes,
Billy
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Edited by - BJMarkland on March 27 2005 10:02:50 AM |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
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BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 27 2005 : 12:37:26 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
So......five years or more after issue, the ammo is discovered to be inferior? Inferior to what? Does that mean defective at birth or by decay?
I am speculating but I will assume that it is for the reasons stated by Paul earlier, i.e., copper casings are softer and have a greater liklihood of creating extractor failure in a weapon which has begun to foul up.
Someone mentioned ramrods earlier. I recall reading somewhere in either a post by Dave or a period article that ramrods for the Springfield carbine were initially issued one per squad.
Billy
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 28 2005 : 10:25:15 AM
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Well, in regards to whether guns or ammo had any adverse affect upon Custer's troopers (and no others, we're to believe....), any negative results from using copper can be assumed to have been discovered by someone by 1870 if new (brass?)casings were out in 1871. All five years and more before the battle. The Springfields arrived in the 7th to at least one company in 1874. Yet not with new brass ammo? Or do we know?
To summarize what isn't known about the 7th's carbines on June 25, 1876.
1. What percentage of the 7th with Custer used the rifle load, if any other than Varnum and Godfrey...
2. did the rifle load negatively affect the carbine, although hitherto described as the rifle with a shorter barrel...
3. did the carbine load negatively affect the carbine.....
4. why such negative affects would surprise the 7th if they actually practiced with the guns enough to become good shots and expose these problems in the years immediately previous....
5. given the excessive ammo found with Custer's men, why is it still supposed they fired enough for any of this to matter even if true....
6. how come nobody else - like Crook firing off 25k shots - noticed this problem, especially when Crook's men piled clumps of ammo on the ground and loaded from there....
7. was the 7th typical or did other units practice more?
8. did any of these problems, if actual or relevant, append only to Custer's men?
9. if any of these theories are true, what evidence exists of these defective weapons known before LBH, and why officers dependent upon the weapons did not report it, and continued to suggest it as reliable and a good weapon.
Again: the issue is not whether some guns jammed, fouled, proved actually defective, or were unable to fire. The issue is if, during these occurences, it happened enough to affect the battle (beyond the Brazilian Butturfly effect...), it was due to the weapon or the soldier, and what proportion was likely. Thus far, there's hardly any evidence it happened much at all from either field, so the proportions aren't important yet. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - March 28 2005 : 3:00:42 PM
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First anyone who thinks these soldiers did not kill two or three indians apiece in this fight is a fool!
It is estimated that at Rourke's drift the defenders firing into the massed ranks of the Zulu expended 40 rounds per dead Zulu.Now I do not doubt your estimates of dead Indians but if one applies the above figures to Custer's command who armed with defective rifles and firing at a concealed enemy one can only conclude that many of the troopers must have fired in the region of 200 rounds each[which they did not have].Just imagine what they could have done with fully serviceable carbines. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 28 2005 : 3:31:43 PM
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"A study of .45-55 cases found at the battle concludes that extractor failure amounted to less than 0.35% of some 1,751 cases tested. Paul L. Hedren, “Carbine Extraction Failure at the Little Big Horn: A New Examination,” Military Collector and Historian (Summer, 1973): pp 66-68; Douglas D. Scott and Richard A. Fox, Jr., Archaeological Insights into the Custer Battle (Norman, 1987)." http://www.westernerspublications.ltd.uk/CAGB%20Guns%20at%20the%20LBH.htm.
One third of one percent. Crucial. Of course, military manuals are as God, and soldiers hardly ever laugh at them and believe them utterly. If manuals require drills, then we may be sure they were done. Custer especially was known for adherence.
We await hearing from the Burmese mules on this troubling issue. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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Springfield Cartridge ID
