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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
 Posted - June 06 2004 : 3:01:38 PM
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Ivan who? Ivanhoe? Ivan the Terrible? Ivan Calderon, a former Chicago White Sox outfielder?
Ivan an idea it was 8 million Russians |
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El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - June 06 2004 : 7:07:18 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by wILD I
Ivan who? Ivanhoe? Ivan the Terrible? Ivan Calderon, a former Chicago White Sox outfielder?
Ivan an idea it was 8 million Russians
Oh, I gotcha. But remember, if Hitler hadn't broken his agreement with Russia and invaded... |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - June 07 2004 : 4:26:19 PM
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Custer also "knew" that a village would scatter if it discovered the presence of soldiers
How fast could they scatter encumbered with women/children/old.How long could they run for and still live off the land?
If they had scattered Custer could have picked them off tribe by tribe.No this was show time for Custer.There is no glory in playing the sheep dog
Cheers |
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El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - June 07 2004 : 9:13:05 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by wILD I
Custer also "knew" that a village would scatter if it discovered the presence of soldiers
How fast could they scatter encumbered with women/children/old.How long could they run for and still live off the land?
If they had scattered Custer could have picked them off tribe by tribe.No this was show time for Custer.There is no glory in playing the sheep dog
Cheers
You may see it that way, but its pretty clear that Custer and the rest of the Montana column's officers feared the Indians would scatter before they could be reached.
Besides, the logistics of 12 understrength companies of cavalry trying to round up, say 5,000 villagers split up in many smaller groups, protected by, say, 1,500 warriors is not exactly an easy thing to do, even if the 7th had unlimited rations and fresh horses. The goal was to find a large camp, intact, and keep the Indians from scattering. Hence the multi-prong plan. To close all avenues of escape and tighten the noose. Why? Because they believed the Sioux and Cheyenne would scatter. |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - June 08 2004 : 03:18:59 AM
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but its pretty clear that Custer and the rest of the Montana column's officers feared the Indians would scatter before they could be reached.
Interesting use of the word reached.Why use the word reached rather than attacked?
I thought Custer had no idea about the size of the encampment until the last minute.Thus saying he had a plan which all the 7th's officers knew about is perhaps not quiet correct.
Slan |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - June 08 2004 : 07:56:16 AM
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Crab:
You say "The goal was to find a large camp, intact, and keep the Indians from scattering. Hence the multi-prong plan. To close all avenues of escape and tighten the noose. Why? Because they believed the Sioux and Cheyenne would scatter."
First, are you seriously saying that the goal was simply to surround a huge camp and keep the Indians there?
How does a "multi-prong" attack keep them there? Are two prongs 'multi'?
How does an attack from two directions close off all avenues of escape or tighten the noose? Three directions?
Why did the Army think they would scatter? In the one (1) other battle with a large village that seriously outnumbered the Army, they not only did not scatter, they attacked the Army, which had artillery.
Why did Custer think they would scatter? In his one (1) experience attacking a village he did so outnumbering the enemy village, in winter, at dawn, in a surprise attack. At LBH he attacked an alerted enemy in the summer, at midafternoon, at great numerical disadvantage.
Even so, it was well known and true that warriors would fight to protect their families, being human beings and all. The larger the village, the slower it reacts and gets organized. Would the Oglala and Hunkpapa NOT attack and fight an inferior force and surrender if Custer held Cheyenne and Sans Arc women and children hostage? What is the basis for that assumption, and where did such a thing ever occur? |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - June 08 2004 : 08:37:45 AM
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I'm generalizing from what I've read, so I'll cover each one specifically:
quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
You say "The goal was to find a large camp, intact, and keep the Indians from scattering. Hence the multi-prong plan. To close all avenues of escape and tighten the noose. Why? Because they believed the Sioux and Cheyenne would scatter."
Again, this is what I've read the purpose of Terry/Custer from the east, Gibbon from the northwest and Crook from the south. To keep the Sioux and Cheyenne in a smaller area where they could be cornered and either defeated or captured.
quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
First, are you seriously saying that the goal was simply to surround a huge camp and keep the Indians there?
No, I'm not saying that. But Custer's orders were to constantly feel to his left when he was cut loose, as to keep the Sioux from escaping in that direction. Custer was to come from the south, and the Terry/Gibbon would come down the Little Big Horn from the north, catching the village between them. If the goal wasn't to come at the Sioux and Cheyenne from multiple angles, then why have three columns? Why not combine them into one?
quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
How does a "multi-prong" attack keep them there? Are two prongs 'multi'?
I really don't know how to answer this, I'm just generalizing. Are you arguing semantics? There were three columns, each leaving from a different fort with the same goal in mind. To herd the Sioux and Cheyenne into a small space, and either capture the Indians or destroy them in battle. Or both.
quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
How does an attack from two directions close off all avenues of escape or tighten the noose? Three directions?
There were three directions, Terry/Custer, Gibbon and Crook. Then Custer was cut loose, and Terry and Gibbon were coming from the same direction instead. I've read that they believed the Sioux would not try to escape to the west, as it was Crow country, and the east would be blocked by Terry and Custer, the Yellowstone(north) by Gibbon, the south by Crook. In fact, Gibbon was in charge of keeping the Sioux south of the Yellowstone for quite awhile before Terry and Custer left Fort Abraham Lincoln.
quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
Why did the Army think they would scatter? In the one (1) other battle with a large village that seriously outnumbered the Army, they not only did not scatter, they attacked the Army, which had artillery.
What battle are you speaking of? The Rosebud? If so, the warriors came out and attacked Crook many miles from the village, to protect the village from his forces. While the village was large, they still seemed to prefer fighting far enough away from their families than trying to stop the soldiers at their doorstep.
I'd guess the Army figured they would scatter because they usually did? You'd have to ask Sherman or Sheridan or Terry or whomever why they believed this to be likely. It might be scatter is again for lack of a better word. If they were aware of a large village, they wanted to find it BEFORE it broke up into smaller ones. It seemed to be well-known that the Indians could not remain all in one large camp for too long. Perhaps the goal was to find them before they broke up into smaller bands again?
quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
Why did Custer think they would scatter? In his one (1) experience attacking a village he did so outnumbering the enemy village, in winter, at dawn, in a surprise attack. At LBH he attacked an alerted enemy in the summer, at midafternoon, at great numerical disadvantage.
Because he was told they probably would? Again, I don't know specifically why. I want to say Custer had enough experience chasing Indians to know they split up when confronted by soldiers. It could all be nonsense. But its mentioned in many a source as a fear among those commanding forces in the 1876 campaign. Whether it was scattering due to pressure by the Army or because such a large village could not remain cohesive for an indefinite amount of time, I don't really know offhand.
quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
Even so, it was well known and true that warriors would fight to protect their families, being human beings and all. The larger the village, the slower it reacts and gets organized. Would the Oglala and Hunkpapa NOT attack and fight an inferior force and surrender if Custer held Cheyenne and Sans Arc women and children hostage? What is the basis for that assumption, and where did such a thing ever occur?
Again, you'd have to ask the Sioux and Cheyenne that one. But I would guess hostages are always better to have than not, when confronting a large force of Indians. If a large amount of non-combatants were captured, its possible the warriors would not attack out of fear for the women and children in captivity. Who knows. I believe battles on the frontier have been averted this way, but I really can't say for sure. Maybe Custer felt the presence of 50 or so hostages aided his escape from the Wa****a River, when pressured by neighboring warriors. But in this case, Custer didn't get hostages, so we don't know if that was his goal. And I couldn't tell you if the Cheyenne would not fight if confronted with a battalion of cavalry which captured a group of Sioux villagers.
Perhaps Custer, upon seeing Reno's battalion retreating, thought the only possibility of winning a fight would be by capturing non-combatants and using them as hostages, the exchange being the Sioux and Cheyenne return peacefully to the reservation. But of course, that can only be conjecture.
It was stated that, if the Sioux did not return to the reservations by January of 1876, they would be deemed hostile and would face military action. Or something very close to that. |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - June 08 2004 : 10:02:11 AM
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But Crab, you've just negated an awful lot of your claims (and many others' claims) over the last year in this posting.
The battle I'm referencing is Kildeer Mt. in Minnesota in 1864. Michno, that font of consistency and objectivity, says that 8K Indians were in the village in winter. They were there for a while, conflicting with the explanations at LBH for movement, diet, hygiene, etc. for large villages. Same tribes, many of the same war leaders, he says. The village did break up under attack but after much time of contact with the Army. They intended to fight and they did. Puzzling this isn't the model the Army considered when expecting a big village.
I don't think the three main units were reasonably or even sanely expected to arrive at the same camp at the same time. I assumed we were referencing Custer's attack 'plan' if that is the term with its multi-pronged attack. Wouldn't an attack of the sort he is more or less credited with making ("flank attack") accomplish the very scattering they supposedly were trying to avoid?
In other words, given the village size, wasn't Custer acting alone in one sense a contravention of his instructions from Terry and antithical to this vaguely conceived and badly expressed point to the campaign? He didn't have enough men to keep the camp from scattering, there was no logical or historic basis to assume that captives of one tribe would influence another, or even be known in time, or even stop that tribe's warriors, since they could see the numerical differences right off, given the camp's sole purpose was to stick it to the white men. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - June 08 2004 : 10:25:03 AM
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Surely if it was not possible to capture/defeat the Indians the next best thing was to scatter them?
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - June 08 2004 : 10:44:41 AM
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quote:
Originally posted by wILD I
Custer also "knew" that a village would scatter if it discovered the presence of soldiers
How fast could they scatter encumbered with women/children/old.How long could they run for and still live off the land?
If they had scattered Custer could have picked them off tribe by tribe.No this was show time for Custer.There is no glory in playing the sheep dog
Cheers
I don't think you realize how difficult such a project would be. The village did break up and scatter after the Little Bighorn, and it took several regiments of the Army a FULL YEAR to bring in the last of them, assuming we pay no attention to those (including Sitting Bull) who escaped to Canada.
Just look at the Nez Perce, and how long they were able to keep on the run encumbered with their old geezers, etc. And they largely hung together, unlike the Sioux and Cheyenne, who broke up soon after Custer's loss. It's a hard job to chase Indians when they know you're around.
R. Larsen
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - June 08 2004 : 11:07:39 AM
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I don't think there was much fear that the Indians would scatter **once they were attacked**. Rather, there was worry that if the Indians learned soldiers were nearby, they would pack up and leave in all directions to avoid such an attack. Rosebud and Killdeer Mountain are anomalies, though I'd guess the army was as anxious to avoid that as they were a scattering. You can't strike a decisive blow against the Indians if you can't burn their lodges, grab their horses, and take their women, which Crook never had a chance to achieve at his battle, and Sully may not have had either had he not had four howitzers, which ended up doing most of the damage.
R. Larsen
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - June 08 2004 : 11:25:00 AM
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| Well, my point was that in the one case in memory where they attacked a large village, what the same Indians did then was almost 180 degrees different than the supposed common wisdom in 1876. They went out and attacked the army and didn't pull up stakes until the shells (something outside their common experience) hit the village. Custer's situation was a lot closer to this than to anything else, and without artillery or anywhere near the manpower, he attempted the same thing as Sully did, except rather than attack as a unit like Sully, he divided and divided again. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - June 09 2004 : 5:18:13 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
Well, my point was that in the one case in memory where they attacked a large village, what the same Indians did then was almost 180 degrees different than the supposed common wisdom in 1876. They went out and attacked the army and didn't pull up stakes until the shells (something outside their common experience) hit the village. Custer's situation was a lot closer to this than to anything else, and without artillery or anywhere near the manpower, he attempted the same thing as Sully did, except rather than attack as a unit like Sully, he divided and divided again.
I guess I'm a little unclear what the "supposed common wisdom" we're talking about is. Some here seem to think it's the idea that the Indians would all run for their lives once attacked. I had always understood the fear of "scattering" as being the fear that the Indians would discover the troops' presence, and then run away before anybody could get to them.
Of course, as you say, that didn't happen at Killdeer Mountain or the Rosebud --- the warriors in each case left their village and met the troops some distance out. However, the Killdeer/Rosebud scenario didn't happen at Little Bighorn either. The 7th was on the village before the warriors really had a clue what was going on. Had Custer actually succeeded in co-ordinating his attack, he may even have earned a victory, for all we know.
Yes, they were both big villages, but I don't think the Army was under any illusion about what the dangers were in attacking a large one. Maybe Custer was, but that's something different. There's a letter Terry wrote to Sheridan, dated Feb. 16, 1876, which seems prophetic in light of later events. It's a request that Custer's three Southern companies be added to the rest of the regiment, and part of it reads:
"The orders which have been given recently render indispensably necessary a larger mounted force than the nine companies of the 7th now in this Department. These nine companies comprise about 620 men all told, and of these 550 could be put in the field for active operations. This number is not sufficient for the end in view. For if the Indians who pass the winter in the Yellowstone and Powder River Country should be found in one camp (and they usually are so gathered) they could not be attacked by that number without great risk of defeat". (My emphasis)
Custer had somewhat more than 600 men when he attacked on the Little Bighorn.
The most interesting phrase in that letter may be the one within Terry's parentheses. From a lot of later writings, we get the idea that the size and composition of the Little Bighorn village was totally unique and one-of-a-kind, of a size that no one could ever reasonably anticipate facing, but Terry seems to believe that if there are a lot of Indians around, they will "usually" mass together into one camp.
R. Larsen
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - June 09 2004 : 6:37:49 PM
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Well, as I understand it - and why I inserted 'supposed' - and others here have said, the Army 'knew' the Indians would scatter at the cavalry's approach if discovered necessitating, if not a surprise attack, one where speed was essential. This is the sole reason nearly always given for Custer abandoning his suggested route up the Rosebud before crossing, for his rush from the Crow's Nest, for his decision to send in Reno and recall Benteen the way he did: that the Indians had seen him and would alert the village which would immediately scatter. Hurry, hurry.
Since the 7th did everything short of buying radio time and singing Tastes Great/Less Filling commercials during the night previous, augmented by the mules' melodious songs supporting an officers' Sing Out session and cooking gear slamming away, since Custer himself allowed cooking and bugle calls the last morning, since their dust clouds had to have been noticed heading for the village, it's somewhat against scenario that the village reacted like a drugged pachyderm to the news till the shooting started. It reacted like any complacent mob without central command.
Under similar circumstances of a large village, they hadn't scattered before. Quite the opposite. So why wasn't THAT the predicated scenario? If Custer had followed Terry's suggested route, he'd be on cavalry land in a day or so heading north with Terry hitting about the same time with a village consumed by rumor but happy to sit tight for a bit. They had before, anyway. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - June 11 2004 : 09:10:56 AM
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the Army 'knew' the Indians would scatter at the cavalry's approach
What's this scatter business? To say "the Army 'knew' the Indians would scatter" presupposes that they knew that the various tribes were in fact united in one village.
Look at Cooke's message "Big village" ,this indicates surprise. My reading of the situation is that the Custer thought that the tribes were already scattered. His division of his command would indicate that he expected to be faced by no more than one or two tribes. Easy meat for any one of his units on their own.
So fear of scattering the tribes was not his motive for rushing to attack. I believe that he saw the LBH as the only game in town. One last throw of the dice, one last chance for glory. What stood between him and this one last chance? The other commands, and they were not going to deny him. He was going to get there first, and unaided grab the glory. |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - June 12 2004 : 9:04:27 PM
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| Historically, Indian villages routinely dispersed upon the encroachment of the military. Unlike the media portrayal of warriors foolishly charging fortified positions, they were much to wise for such a silly tactic. We have been mesmerized by this incorrect dipiction for decades. Unlike America, the Indians had no standing army that consisted of single men and bachelors who volunteered to fight merely for pay. Every Indian was a father, brother, or son who was needed to provide for the family. As a result, the Army did not know that the Indians would scatter, they were AFRAID that the Indians would scatter. They feared a lost oppurtunity to punish the Indians. |
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El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - June 12 2004 : 11:27:33 PM
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| While it seems to have been known that a large camp could exist, they still could have populated a camp even larger than expected. There were probably assumptions on how large of a camp they'd find, based on Indian populations at the agencies. And as SOMS states, after the battle, they actually counted the Indians at the agencies, and it was realized there were far fewer than the agents reported. |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - June 23 2004 : 9:41:13 PM
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We have often heard or, read that Reno could not respond to Custer's position as his own troopers were in desperate need of ammo. They, having expended their alloted rounds on the skirmish line in a frenzy of controlled fire power against the onslaught of the encroaching warriors. Thus, through necessity, the retreat to the bluffs to await the arrival of the ammunition packs.
In Recorder Lee's answer to this suppositon, the following statement is of great interest:"Two pack mules were sent for, each carrying 2000 rounds of ammunition, and none was issued. Lt. Wallace testifies that he saw one box opened and men helping themselves. So it appears that Maj. Reno's command was not so badly in need of ammunition after all."
Secondly, Lt. Lee had this to say: Major Reno took the responsibility of disobeying Gen. Custer's order. He left the timber not on account of the losses that had occurred, but of what might occur. The ammunition was not half gone. His casualties did not occur in charging towards the village but in going away from it."
Depending upon your stance on this issue, it is convenient to exclaim that Lt. Lee was a "Custerphile", thus a liar. Or you may peruse the evidence and make your own decision. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - June 23 2004 : 10:47:37 PM
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Its the job of an officer to contemplate what might occur, and act accordingly. What 'order'are you or Lee talking about that Reno disobeyed? There was no visible relief coming as promised.
Stuck in the timber, no relief, eventually no ammo. Then what? Try to break out then? Before the train came, didn't Reno's men pillage the dead for ammo? I think they did! And didn't Benteen's men share when they arrived, well before the train? And, in any case, what Lt. Wallace saw is only what Lt. Wallace saw, and what Lee wanted to conclude is what Lee wanted to conclude.
Lee was a Custerphile, a word you think pejorative but is, of course, not. And no Wiggs, nobody - least of all me - has ever claimed Custerphiles were liars. And in fact, you yourself are the only one so accused. All alone. You.
In any case, what is a "frenzy of controlled fire power?" That's an oxymoron if there ever was one. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - June 24 2004 : 12:28:54 AM
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quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
Stuck in the timber, no relief, eventually no ammo. Then what? Try to break out then? Before the train came, didn't Reno's men pillage the dead for ammo? I think they did!
How'd they manage this? Did they stop along the way, check the corpse for ammo, mount back up, and continue towards the bluffs?
Reno's battalion left the timber with minimal dead. Maybe five in total. That's maybe a couple rounds per person to distribute. The majority of the troopers killed were killed on the way to the bluffs, either in the valley or at the river crossing. Many dead cavalrymen were left in the valley. The majority of the dead to were well out of reach.
quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
And didn't Benteen's men share when they arrived, well before the train?
What does this prove? That Reno's men had fired some of their allotted ammunition and Benteen's men did not? Well, duh. So some of the soldiers with Benteen's battalion gave some ammo to some of Reno's troopers. It makes sense to do that no matter how many rounds Reno's troops fired.
Reno's troops probably weren't too low on ammunition, since Reno didn't order Lt. Hare back to the packtrain to bring ammo mules up until AFTER looking for Lt. Hodgson's body. |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - June 24 2004 : 10:53:36 AM
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None of it proves anything, Crab. But we were talking about the arrival of packs on the hill after the timber episode and how Wallace said, or Lee said he said, that nobody needed ammo. Everyone needed ammo, and I can't imagine any combat situation where people have opportunity to load up and don't. And in fact, I recall reading that once on Reno Hill, people did seek out available dead for ammo and that Benteen shared on arrival till the trains came up. Which is to say, this supposed bombshell revelation is not. If it proves anything is that Lee ignored other evidence in order to condemn Reno.
Whether they were low on ammo when they pulled out of the timber isn't the point: they were going to be, and had to move while they had plenty to escape. It was a mess of a manuever for which Reno deserves condemnation but not for the goal or timing of it. For all Reno knew, Benteen was in combat down south, the packs pillaged, and who knows where Custer is? He'd been in combat about an hour and nobody - not a body - appears to help or at all as promised. That doesn't suggest things are going well.
This business of Reno failing to exercise tight fire control is rather odd given that we have ample evidence nobody gave the 7th troopers remotely sufficient instruction with it, certainly not with live ammo, and to pretend it can be imparted during combat without that training is nonsense.
Further, you again fail to acknowledge that at the Yellowstone in 73, Custer did the same thing Reno did when confronted with larger numbers of Indians than he could fight in the open, and hit the timber to await rescue he'd been told was coming. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - June 24 2004 : 4:40:18 PM
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Waiting for rescue is one thing. Hiding in the timber because you need to be rescued, when you're told you'll be supported by the whole command is another. Reno seemed to me to have wanted to be rescued from the opening of the fight.
They sought out available dead? Again, this proves nothing as to the ammo levels. Even if they had every round they started with, they'd still look for dead to search for weapons and ammo. Not just to augment their supply but to keep it from the Indians. But how many bodies were near enough to search? Couldn't have been many. So if the need for ammo was there, and the bodies were not plentiful enough, why didn't Reno send for more mules and at an earlier point?
I agree that it was the "mess of the maneuver for which Reno deserves condemnation", but possibly for the goal of it as well. What was the goal? Soldiers didn't seem to know the bluffs, a particular landform or a general area, were the goal. A lot of them tried to just kept on going. The goal seemed to be anywhere but the timber, and after that, who knows.
If you fight in a battle, you're going to expend ammunition. So maybe they shouldn't have fought at all, as if they keep shooting, they'll run out.
Custer's order, if it was indeed "you'll be supported by the whole command" doesn't specify where the support will come from. Reno was told to lead out, and it very well could have been said to make sure he knew he was opening the fight but the other battalions would be thrown in soon. And we don't know what Custer or Cooke or any messenger actually said to Reno, only what Reno said they did. And we don't know what messages Reno sent to Custer, as those men died with him. |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
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lorenzo G.
Captain
Italy
Status: offline |
Posted - June 25 2004 : 1:12:41 PM
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From Barnett Book: Reno denied at the investigating committee to have felt any shootings to attracting his attention, although in his report Reno he asserted to have heard shootings in direction of the village and that " we knew could not be others that Custer " (Reno report 1,30)
The legend of no support, and that he retreated for this reason, was just an excuse. here Reno said clear the reality.
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If it is to be my lot to fall in the service of my country and my country's rights I will have no regrets.
Custer |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - June 25 2004 : 10:47:33 PM
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If my recollection serves me, of all of the men positioned upon Reno's bluff, only two individuals denied hearing the sound of shooting coming from the direction of Custer's command, Benteen and Reno.
Reno Inquiry: "The only firing I heard that I did not see, and which came from the direction Custer had gone was the 15 or 20 shots that seemed to come from about the central part of the village, about at the ford "B". the village was in 2 divisions. I have heard officers disputing about hearing volleys. I heard no volleys."
BENTEEN
"I heard no firing from down the river till after we moved out in that direction and then only a few scattering shots."
Reno
The following individuals heard volleys:
B.F. Churchill
Sgt. F. A. Culbertson
Sgt. Edward Davern
Lt. DeRudio
Lt. Edgerly
F. F. Girard
E.S. Godfrey
Lt. L. R. Hare
Scout Herendeen
Capt. Thomas MacDougall
Capt. Moylan
Lt. Charles Varnum
etc.
Yes Lorenzo, they both lied. One must ask, if they lied about this, what else did they lie about?
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - June 26 2004 : 11:15:19 AM
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Wiggs and Lorenzo apparently don't know the difference between "shots" and "volleys". Both Reno and Benteen said they heard shots, said so, and yet Wiggs, you fabricate this: "only two individuals denied hearing the sound of shooting coming from the direction of Custer's command, Benteen and Reno." The very quotes you provide deny it and say the opposite of your conclusion. That's either remarkably sloppy or an intent to frame someone with false evidence.
Both Reno and Benteen denied hearing "volleys," not firing from up north. Are you absolutely sure the individuals you list stated "volleys" and not "shots" or "firing?" And of the ones who say "volleys" how would they know it just wasn't a bunch of shots heard simultaneously? How do you?
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Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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Aftermath Question
