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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
 Posted - February 07 2005 : 07:22:52 AM
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To assume that Custer was so callous, egotistical, and vain that he would sacrifice the lives of his comrades and brothers to achieve a minor victory over a group of aboriginals doomed to the reservation life anyway, is difficult to swallow.
Of course Joe this is just so much spectulation.No proof either way.But if you look at Custer's career and his actions that day one can make a case that the management of his command never indicated that anything other than a total comittment to offensive action.
His civil war service was one of competing with other cavalier commanders who showed scant regard for their men's lives.Not sure on this but did he not ride away and leave Elliot to his fate.Same goes for Reno.His own personal life was in rag order.The man was carrying too much personal and emotional baggage to have made clear cut rational decisions. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - February 07 2005 : 09:54:09 AM
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Markland,
Fox's theory as you mention it makes no sense. It was summer, not winter and the circles could be close together since grass wasn't an issue. He could see everything from Weir Point before he did whatever he did to bring him north, and this is way different than the Wa****a.
Supposedly, the crack Sioux Control and Command had been tracking Gibbon and Terry as well. They didn't evacuate, and they lost Custer till he appeared on the 25th because numerous of their own didn't feel the need to mention it in conversation or turn around and warn family and friends of possible impending death.
I don't see much comparison with battles with much smaller numbers in totally different environments in different seasons when the Army outnumbered the Indians. Nor do I see the import of the Indians defending their own while the civvies try to escape. Anyone, any creature does that more or less and it's expected.
That message from Terry in Gray Larsen mentions seems to blow much of assumed theory out of the water, did we notice? If Terry doesn't think that 550 men were remotely capable of the job for the expected Indian number, it's to be doubted he felt 75 more in the 7th would be either, and that the number of Indians expected was indeed large. Ergo, it makes no sense to think that Terry thought the 7th would or should be operating solo against this likely village and could handle it alone, and we are indeed reduced to concluding that Custer was being held to Terry's plan of an attack from two directions, and that Custer acted against Terry's wishes.
It pretty much exonerates Terry and the high command, in any case, and reduces LBH to Custer's sole failure. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - February 07 2005 : 10:06:44 AM
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quote:
It pretty much exonerates Terry and the high command, in any case, and reduces LBH to Custer's sole failure.
I agree wholeheartedly to that point. The rest, I have to wonder about after a conference call where my remaining brain cell will be too overly taxed to multi-task.
Billy |
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prolar
Major
Status: offline |
Posted - February 07 2005 : 2:37:18 PM
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All this concluding and heartfelt agreeing based on one little quote?
In Custer's Last Campaign, Gray quotes Terry's report of June 21st to Sheridan as follows: "No Indians have been met with yet, but traces of a large and recent camp have been discovered 20 0r 30 miles up the Rosebud. Gibbon's column will move this morning on the North side of the Yellowstone for the mouth of the Bighorn, where it will be ferried across by the supply steamer, and whence it will proceed to the mouth of the Little Big Horn and so on. Custer will go up the Rosebud tomorrow with his whole regiment and thence to the headwaters of the Little Big Horn, thence down the Little Big Horn.I only hope that one of the two columns will find the Indians. I go personally with Gibbon."
So how are these two widely seperated columns to join in an attack? |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
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Posted - February 07 2005 : 8:06:26 PM
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Wild, I can not disagree with you when a know fact is thrust before me, if Custer were an automobile he would be equipped with only one gear, forward. This perpensity to rush in where wise men refused to go served him well doing the Civil War. His audacity, extraordinary bravery, and absolute willingness to follow orders regardless of danger created, for him, a celebrity status that promoted him beyond others of equal ability, I think.
The term "Custer's Luck" was something that he, and others, believed in. My interpretation of this term is: skill in martial arts, trainning, and conviction in what you are doing will be augmented by the "faiths" to ensure victory.
I guess you and I are saying the same thing in a way. While he would never willingly sacrifice his comrades and family, his overwhelming belief in his ability to win, regardless of the odds, may have promoted tactical approaches that played into the hands of the warriors. As you said, no one knows. |
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MarcusAurelius
Recruit
Status: offline |
Posted - February 08 2005 : 1:32:32 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by joseph wiggs
Wild, I can not disagree with you when a know fact is thrust before me, if Custer were an automobile he would be equipped with only one gear, forward.
... While he would never willingly sacrifice his comrades and family, his overwhelming belief in his ability to win, regardless of the odds, may have promoted tactical approaches that played into the hands of the warriors. As you said, no one knows.
The time-honored default explanation of Custer's movement beyond MTC is that he was reckless, agressive, ambitious, lucky, overconfident, and so forth. However, the essence of Custer at that time was that he was alive.
it is instructive, IMHO, to consider Custer's response at the Wa****a to the presence of known nearby overwhelming enemy force. The village at the LBH was larger than that. Why, if Custer actually saw the size of the village at the LBH, would he have behaved differently from how he did at the Wa****a? The essence of his tactics suggests that he did not know that he was up against overwhelming force.
There is no proof that Custer ever saw the size of the village before he was beyond the point of no return...no proof that he went either to Weir Point or to the mouth of Medicine Tail Coulee. If one subtracts from his database the information he might have gained from those two vantage points, what remains in his database explains his tactics, IMHO.
Be not careless in deeds, nor confused in words, nor rambling in thought. -- Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, VIII, 51
Look to the essence of a thing, whether it be a point of doctrine, of practice, or of interpretation. -- Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, Meditations, VIII, 22
Search men's governing principles, and consider the wise, what they shun and what they cleave to. -- Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, IV, 38
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Edited by - MarcusAurelius on February 08 2005 1:59:20 PM |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - February 08 2005 : 2:07:38 PM
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| Well, we have Curley and Kanipe and Martin's stories, and we have Reno's guys saying they saw someone on Weir Point, and Custer or his guys did have advantageous vistas from the trail. If he did not take advantage of the high ground (WP) to see his target, either in person or in the form of someone he'd believe, what does that say? |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - February 08 2005 : 4:22:55 PM
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My last post was not intended to imply that General Custer was reckless nor do I hold him accountable, as the singular entity, responsible for the tragic outcome of this battle. He was very confident, not over confident,he was ambitious and aggressive, but not reckless.
Had he been forewarned of Reno's failure to charge, as ordered, and Benteen's tardiness on the trail, he may have altered his tactics. Last but, not least, up until this very battle he was very lucky in war. I think it only natural that he continued to believe in it. |
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
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Posted - February 09 2005 : 12:55:45 AM
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quote:
Originally posted by joseph wiggs
He was very confident, not over confident,he was ambitious and aggressive, but not reckless.
Tailing off from Reno in quest of a ford whose existence and whereabouts he could only guess at sounds overconfident to me. Obviously, he calculated wrong, and this screw-up probably did more to lose the battle than any other screw-up of the day.
quote:
Had he been forewarned of Reno's failure to charge, as ordered, and Benteen's tardiness on the trail, he may have altered his tactics.
I don't see how 140 men could "charge" into a village of 2,000 warriors, and I scoff at the idea that any officer in that situation would have done differently than Reno did. Reno had informed Custer from Ford A (through messengers) that the Indians weren't running, so Custer knew before the battle even started that Reno was going to be resisted. (His original orders to Reno had been given with the stated assumption that the Indians were in flight).
Benteen's alleged tardiness is conjecture; nobody knows the exact route he took, or how many miles his march really encompassed.
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Last but, not least, up until this very battle he was very lucky in war. I think it only natural that he continued to believe in it.
Any gambler knows that luck changes hands.
R. Larsen |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - February 09 2005 : 08:14:33 AM
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Reno did charge as ordered, and like Custer himself on the Yellowstone but with more need, fell into skirmish line and back into timber for protection. Custer in 1873 had been told soldiers would be coming, they did, and he was saved. Reno had been told more soldiers would be coming, they did not, and he had to get out. And he did on his initiative.
The current theory seems to be Custer stamped his foot and waited to be rescued after he thoughtfully placed his soldiers - after a panic retreat - the farthest away from the mission's goal of any unit in the regiment, on ground without cover, where horses were a responsibility and an impediment rather than an advantage, and under circumstances where his dubious rescue would risk remaining units not to mention the mission's point. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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prolar
Major
Status: offline |
Posted - February 09 2005 : 3:06:31 PM
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| Yeah DC, but Custer maintained control of his skirmish line,conserved ammo, and made use of the ammo carried by the horse holders. Reno did none of this. Custer maintained his position for three hours or so, Reno ran in less than 30 minutes. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - February 09 2005 : 3:28:38 PM
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There's no evidence for any of that, Prolar. There's evidence from the Indians and from the officers who saw the field that not much ammo had been fired at all by the soldiers. Archaeology found items in certain places. They cannot prove they arrived there during the battle and so they postualate stories to go with them to add to their import. With no cover except dead horses, it's hard to make the argument that the battle last very long at all. Twenty minutes, according to some Indians. Except for Calhoun, nobody said there looked to have been an organized or well fought defense, and how could there be with not cover and surrounded on an open hill?
Reno, running out of ammo at about the same rate as Custer at the Yellowstone, had no idea who was where or under what conditions. After thirty minutes or whatever, Custer isn't supporting him. Do you wait till the last minute to break out, or do so while you have a chance to do so?
Even if it did, it still speaks to this very strange argument. Why would it behoove the mission or the 7th to bring the remainder of the regiment to the worst position any unit held that day, losing men and horses to break through, and to what purpose? |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
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prolar
Major
Status: offline |
Posted - February 09 2005 : 5:11:42 PM
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| DC: I was comparing(or contrasting}Reno's stand in the timber to Custer's stand by the Yellowstone in 1873.That was your reference before you mixed in the LBH battle. |
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Heavyrunner
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - February 09 2005 : 6:26:22 PM
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Perhaps I'm misinterpreting, but there seems to be a lingering stigma upon Reno for not completing his "assignment" attacking the village. From every account I've ever read, along with viewing the site and the terrain and, most importantly, knowing the size and determination of his enemy, Reno never had a chance. In fact, his assault was stopped dead in its tracks and in a hail of bullets.
History should give the man some credit, rather than suggest he lost his nerve at the death of Bloody Knife. History and others may say what they will, but Reno saved his command when completely surrounded, outnumbered and facing the difficulty of rugged, hostile ground.
Reno kept his wits about him and got to higher ground. He survived. Most of his men survived. Now, that's a site better than Custer's performance. |
Bob Bostwick |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - February 09 2005 : 8:46:48 PM
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Sorry, Prolar, force of increasing habit. I see what you're saying and should have the first time.
On the other hand, Custer's odds in '73 weren't anywhere near as awful, he had his back covered, his enemy couldn't walk back forty feet and have the wife feed him so he could return fed and refreshed, and Custer knew overwhelming force was heading his way and at about what time it would arrive, which provides confidence. The Sioux knew this as well. The very opposite of what Reno was undergoing.
Reno knew he'd been told to attack a huge village that he now knew he had no chance of surviving had he continued, which does not generate confidence in your commander's plan. Nobody there damned Reno for dismounting and going into skirmish line. The commander had promised support, but was recently seen walking on the opposite side of the river, perhaps waving, and there is no nearby crossing visible to Reno for the commander to provide support. There is one hell of a lot of Indians and more coming all the time. You can't know how many. Do you wait to find out if you'll be surrounded by night and help unable to arrive? Is there help?
Here, you're implying that Reno was running out of ammo and imprudent with ammunition. At other times, it's been suggested there was no ammo shortage, as only one box needed to be opened at Reno Hill. You also imply here that horseholders' ammo was not utilized by Reno's men, and therefore there must have been need to.
I'd love to know which group actually reduced more Indians. What do the accounts say?
Three hours with cover and water must have - let's see. A human being could easily shoot ten rounds a minute, and because they're American soldiers utilizing horseholder ammo they must have killed over a thousand Sioux. No doubt about it. Really, an unheralded slaughter of warrior Indians by Custer's well trained men, breaking the back of the Sioux nation before it was broken again on Last Stand Hill three years later. Purported combat vets have told us this in dead seriousness, you understand.....
If Custer had suddenly seen campfire smoke five miles off and concluded his relief had gone into camp or just not given any indication of showing up by night, what do you think he would have done, Prolar? |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - February 09 2005 : 9:17:53 PM
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Bob, I hate to disagree with you but I must. Your statement, "Reno kept his wits about him and got to higher ground" screeches for further clarification. You may have a point when you say that Reno was straddled with more than his share of accusations of malfeasance of duty but, his "charge" has been criticized by every acclaimed investigator of this battle.
His "charge" has not been condemnd so much as the manner in which it was carried out. A military withdrawal from an active engagement must be accompanied by a minimum of two factors; the Trumpeter's "Recall" and, a rear action unit assigned to "cover" the withdrawal. Neither of these two requirements were ordered by Reno. As a result, he lost more men in the "charge" to the rear than his frontal attack which produced a minimum of casualties.
It is a fact, that many of "G" troop were left hehind to fend for themselves. How could this be possible in an orderly and composed withdrawal? Reno was not the only one to forget protocol. Sgt. Lloyd spoke to Captain French and suggested that "we ought to stop and protect the wounded." Capt. French said, "I'll try-I'll try," then rode up the hill!
As reported by Dr. Porter: "The first officer I saw on the bluffs was Lt. Varnum. He had his hat off and said, 'For God's sake, men;don't run. There are a good many officers and men killed and wounded and we have got to go back and get them.'
F.F. Girard: "We stayed there 4 or 5 minutes and fired about seven shots, when somebody gave the order, 'Men, to your horses: the Indians are in our rear.' The timber was here (pointing to the map) and we were facing the brow of the hill. Charlie Reynolds looked at me and I said: 'What damn fool move is this?' Says he: I don't know: we will have to go. We will have to fet out of this.'
Lt. L. R. Hare: "I heard no bugle calls in the timber."
Sgt. Edward Davern: "the only way I knew the command was going to leave was seeing "G" Company men run for their horses: Then I went for my own. They ran through the bush. The bullets were coming thick and fast, and but very few of "G" Company got out mounted."
If all of the above sounds like utter confusion and chaos, it was. Should Reno have remained in the timber in order to support Custer? This point will be argued from now until eternity. Was Reno's "charge" a haphazard rout that resulted in many needless casualties, I think so. The bottom line is this, for a short period of time Reno lost whatever wits he may have possessed. |
Edited by - joseph wiggs on February 09 2005 9:26:02 PM |
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prolar
Major
Status: offline |
Posted - February 09 2005 : 11:15:28 PM
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DC: I don't know what he would have done in such a situation. I believe it is Wild I who claims to be the behavior expert. What Custer did in the actual situation at the Yellowstone is what I have stated.Maintained his position, conserved his ammo and waited for help. I assume that his troopers had about the same amount of ammo per man as Reno's, yet they held off a superior force for three hours.
I have never claimed that Reno should have charged into the village. Leaving the open skirmish line was probably wise though he wasn't pressed. Most people who saw the timber position consider it a strong one, better than his hill position. Of course Benteen did come along to help him, but he had no reason to expect that when he led his panic retreat. He had been told by Cooke and Keogh as well as Custer that he would be supported. Custer's appearance downstream was support. It pulled the Indians off Reno, otherwise his routed force might well have been wiped out before Benteen appeared. |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - February 10 2005 : 03:34:26 AM
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Custer's appearance downstream was support.
"It's support Jim but not as we know it"
Custer's appearance could in no way be considered support.It had consequences in that in giving away his position he doomed the entire command and risked the total annilation of every unit in it including Reno's. |
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lorenzo G.
Captain
Italy
Status: offline |
Posted - February 10 2005 : 04:10:34 AM
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Custer's appearance could in no way be considered support
Maybe, the right statement is: Custer appearence wanted in no way to be considered a support from Reno.
Custer came and toke away all or almost all the indians from the field. This is support. Obviously he was there for this reason as he attacked going towards the village. And this is the last thing we know for sure from the words of Martini.
Reno's charge was at least timid, at the worst I can't say it. However, Reno retreat, that here in the last messages is defended, was called a bison hunting and Reno had great part of his losses there.
I'd love to know which group actually reduced more Indians. What do the accounts say?
I had given the answer to this in another thread. Walter M. Camp did. I quoted his list.
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If it is to be my lot to fall in the service of my country and my country's rights I will have no regrets.
Custer |
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Brent
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - February 10 2005 : 06:59:12 AM
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Warlord: Sorry to disagree but I'm of the opinion that most of the 7th were lousy marksmen in training (what little training there was) and even worse in combat conditions. My guess is that collectively they did no better than Crooks awful marksmanship performance at the Rosebud, and given the panic situation facing much of the 7th, probably even worse.
We'll never be "sure" of any of this, but my limited experience in Vietnam does offer some comparison. I saw many soldiers (who were at least "trained" in marksmanship) shoot thousands upon thousands of M-16 rounds and not hit ANYTHING. And a significant # of men who simply didn't fire their weapons at all. One night our Platoon was simply blasting away at what was deemed an enemy infiltrator. Several men told me where "he" was and how they had surely "gotten him". Come daylight I went out and found the parachute from one of our flares hanging in a small bush--that's what they had been shooting at all night!! And it still resembled a parachute--I guess there weren't more than a couple of dozen holes in it after all that.
So I just can't see the largely untrained men of the 7th killing 1,000 Indians at LBH. |
Edited by - Brent on February 10 2005 07:00:03 AM |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - February 10 2005 : 08:21:14 AM
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Maybe, the right statement is: Custer appearence wanted in no way to be considered a support from Reno.
Of course if you consider offering the Indians 5 troops for 3.An offer they could not refuse.Great tactics. |
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MarcusAurelius
Recruit
Status: offline |
Posted - February 10 2005 : 11:19:13 AM
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quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
we have Curley and Kanipe and Martin... Reno's guys saying they saw someone on Weir Point, ... If he did not take advantage of the high ground (WP) to see his target, ...what does that say?
To change thy mind ... is to be none the less the free agent that thou wast before. --Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, VIII, 16
It is in his last analysis of the stories of Curley that Gray leads us farthest astray. The essence of Gray's last book, don't forget, is a heroic treatment of Mitch Bouyer. How ya gonna do that without some "evidence" of heroic behavior by MB at/beyond WP? HMMMM? and who purported to have had that evidence???? If you have the time, review Gray's earlier thoughts on Curly....
as to Martin...sort of the white Curley, in terms of his continuing elaboration of ambiguity, wasn't he? Gray does a bit better with Martin, he gets the Martin turn-back location correct...but still succumbs to temptation with that purported crazy-a__ climb from Cedar Coulee back up to WP.
To their credit, both Curley and Martin fooled both Camp and Gray. Great story tellers, they must have been. On the other hand, Camp's strong suit was not analysis, nor was he very good at coping with plain old liars. And Camp seemed to recognize his failing: He ignored Goldin, probably realizing that he might believe the sleazy old fart if he interviewed him.
As to Knipe, he would have had no knowledge of the extent of the village or of where Custer went or what he saw; certainly Knipe didn't get much past Reno-Benteen Hill; as you know, or should, you can't see diddly squat from there. Custer didn't get much past that before turning down Cedar Coulee.
The Reno men who saw people on the bluffs did a heroic job of trying to describe what they thought they saw from an incredible distance. However, the interpretation of these descriptions as pinpointing WP is specious and not what they said.
I must return to the essence of Custer's behavior....he was a survivor...not the commander of the Light Brigade, by any means...let me ask if he ever before williingly faced those kind of odds? if so, how did he react? for example, what did Custer do when surrounded at Trevelian Station? he hunkered down....it is one thing to have personal bravery, to expose oneself to crappy marksmen, as long as the forces were not overwhelming...even to dismiss an unseen enemy as powerless...it is another to knowingly take on a verifiable, visible enormous force in a suicidal mission. Wa****a is another whole story, but what it does certainly tell us is that, well, for Custer to have risked the regiment for Reno by becoming some sort of "raw meat in the water to divert the sharks," well that is just plain not in Custer's repertoire.
Au contraire, mes freres, he imagined glory north of Medicine TAil Coulee, Much as I am put off by Fox's (shall I say) chest-puffing, he certainly got the "Custer was on the offense" part right.
And that vision could not have been sustained had he gone to (or received info from) WP.
Each thing is of like form from everlasting and comes round again in its cycle. -- Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, II, 14
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in all things, ask what is the essence of it? |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - February 10 2005 : 11:50:02 AM
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Kanipe was told to get ammo packs because of big Indian camp by TWC, supposedly by GAC. There are various statements by Kanipe, maybe with the command unit, saw the lodges extending for miles, but this is unsure. But someone at the time Kanipe was sent thought it a huge village, and it is difficult to believe Custer hadn't been so informed. It's also hard to believe Custer wouldn't look himself, being so easy to do.
Gray did not make Boyeur out to be a hero; he just gave him a bio. Sitting on Weir Point doesn't impress, somehow. It was his job, and not particularly brave, nor presented as such. He'd been defamed in the past because of his genetics (must have betrayed Custer....). All Gray did was show him to be a good guy to have, extremely competent, well liked, and trusted.
Saying something didn't happen isn't compelling evidence given there are folks who were there who say it did. There's nothing bizarre about the Weir Point climb. Since the road was built, everyone assumes WP is just the western section, but the ridge itself was markedly higher pre road and you could see a lot of the village site from the eastern portion. (If the cows let you.) Why does this strike you as contrived?
Curly had no reason to lie, and I agree with Gray that his translators are most likely at fault. I don't know what Camp's qualifications were to judge translations. I don't see Martin fooling as much as being old and confused himself and subject to being stuck with what he actually said vs. what he thought he'd said in the past. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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Heavyrunner
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - February 10 2005 : 1:07:10 PM
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Joseph,
I have to say I love your line: "Screeches for clarification...." I brought forth the argument, in part, to stimulate some discussion. Your argument is well-presented and well-documented. I realize I'm being generous to Marcus Reno, but I'm also aware of the overwhelming odds he faced. My mind's eye can picture his column stopped dead in its tracks, surrounded in the trees and thrown into a chaotic defense prior to the helter-skelter retreat back across the river.
Where was the bugler? He should have been at Reno's side, or close by. Was he even alive? I'm quite certain that, had Reno remained in that position or on that side of the river, his command would have met the exact same fate as Custer. I can see that Reno may have been a flawed man and a flawed tactician, but I seem to recall that his reputation for bravery was also considerable. I get weary of the endless "what if" scenarios regarding Reno's movements or Custer's weapons or some other scenario that would have created a victory for the 7th, as if we cannot accept the effort, leadership and numbers on the Indian side. I see Reno with two options that day, stay where you are and die or high tail your ass out of there and live, along with what's left of your command.
Reno, at least, opted for the latter in what we should agree was an absolutely impossible situation--and not of his own making. Custer didn't.
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - February 10 2005 : 6:18:10 PM
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Bob, it worked, I certainly got stimulated! (LOL) I'm just as guilty as any one else when it comes to defaming Maj. Reno. Lord knows he had a tragic enough life which ended with his dying of throat cancer, I believe. I also agree that you are correct when you wrote of Reno's choices coming down to two options, stay or get the hell out! In his shoes I'm sure I would have selected the latter.
Sadly, for Reno, history will hold him to a higher standard than what would be normally accountable for people like you and I. The death of his men were not soley his fault but, as commander, he maintains ultimate responsibility for what occurred. Just as Custer does for his role. I read somewhere that the ability to lead entails more courage then the ability to follow. You are also right about the endless "what ifs" concerning his remaining in the timber;he didn't. |
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Benteen's order
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