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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
 Posted - February 03 2005 : 7:44:15 PM
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"There was an old man, who lived by the sea,
of whom I will speak, posthumously.
Arrogant and proud, he spoke for a living;
his opines and thoughts were quite unforgiving.
When crossed he would shriek at a powerful pace;
Shouts of accusations across cyber-space.
Safe in the confines of his lair and den;
He feared no retribution nor answering.
He tippled his glass in the wee hours of night;
His blood shot eyes were such a fright.
He mutterred and grumbled, and screamed like a pig;
When anyone mentioned that "liar" Wiggs.
One day I visited his abode by the sea;
To ask his thoughts concerning me.
Much to my shock and utter wonder;
A muffled sound came from down under.
Before me was a pair of cowboy boots;
With a ten-gallon hat for a roof.
A wee voice mangaged to groan and shout;
Its me, Its me with all the B*** S**t kicked out!.
This poem may only used by the author who plagiarized it from the great, Soupy Sales. |
Edited by - joseph wiggs on February 03 2005 8:00:43 PM |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - February 03 2005 : 8:39:02 PM
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Larsen, much of what has come down to us regarding the division of Custer's troops has been "seasoned" by the opines of the survivors. Understandably so. These men were faced with the universal question asked of all survivors; how come you made it and "they" did not. When faced with perceived accusations of culpability in a diaster, one becomes hostile at the mere suggestion that "your" survival resulted from your failure to do the right thing. Thus, the resulting conclusion that Custer's actions were that of a lunatic should be taken with a grain of salt.
The three prong attack utilized in this war (Crook, Terry, and Gibbons) was not the creation of General Custer. It was devised by Terry and others, and I would assume, agreed upon by his superiors. Yet, the subsequent, repeated division by Custer garthers all the ridicule.
You can not be more correct when you say that getting all of your men killed is a huge bummer. It is for that very reason that it has become almost fashionable to condemn him.
I don't wish to make a saint of Custer, or anyone else, for that matter. I do not wish to demonize any singular individual for the outcome bof this battle. My perspective is bacic, there are to many individuals involved in this battle to single out any one individual. I do not antiscipate that you will agree with me, and that's O.K. I do appreciate your response which helps to keep me on my toes and, in a sphere of reality; I hope. |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - February 03 2005 : 8:41:51 PM
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| By the way D.c., you spelled observed incorrectly. He who cast stones.... |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - February 04 2005 : 2:20:22 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by joseph wiggs
Larsen, much of what has come down to us regarding the division of Custer's troops has been "seasoned" by the opines of the survivors. Understandably so. These men were faced with the universal question asked of all survivors; how come you made it and "they" did not. When faced with perceived accusations of culpability in a diaster, one becomes hostile at the mere suggestion that "your" survival resulted from your failure to do the right thing. Thus, the resulting conclusion that Custer's actions were that of a lunatic should be taken with a grain of salt.
No one said that Custer was a lunatic. What's being said is that he made mistakes, and 200 dead soldiers are ample proof of that. It's just silly to suggest that he did everything right that day, when it's obvious that he didn't. Disaster is an outcome of blunders, not "making the right moves".
quote:
The three prong attack utilized in this war (Crook, Terry, and Gibbons) was not the creation of General Custer. It was devised by Terry and others, and I would assume, agreed upon by his superiors. Yet, the subsequent, repeated division by Custer garthers all the ridicule.
Criticism, not ridicule --- and the criticism is entirely fair, since it's that division which resulted in each squad being defeated in detail. That was what Benteen focused his criticism on, by the way. I don't know why you defend Custer against the charge that Terry's plan was created by him --- who ever said that it was?
quote:
You can not be more correct when you say that getting all of your men killed is a huge bummer. It is for that very reason that it has become almost fashionable to condemn him.
Actually, I think it's the opposite that's in fashion now. My impression is that the books published in the last 10 years which are objectively pro-Custer easily outnumber those anti. Even those which are not really pro-Custer, such as Fox, seek to rationalize his actions by introducing absurdities, such as that his retreat from the village was an "offensive" act, or that capturing the women and children was a real goal which outweighed subduing the warriors, torching the village, or grabbing hold of the herd.
quote:
I don't wish to make a saint of Custer, or anyone else, for that matter. I do not wish to demonize any singular individual for the outcome bof this battle. My perspective is bacic, there are to many individuals involved in this battle to single out any one individual. I do not antiscipate that you will agree with me, and that's O.K. I do appreciate your response which helps to keep me on my toes and, in a sphere of reality; I hope.
I never said you were trying to make a saint of Custer. What you said was that most 19th century soldiers would have done the same as Custer, and that though soldiers today would consider Custer's moves foolish, they were "correct" at the time. I don't accept that, at all.
R. Larsen |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - February 05 2005 : 2:47:04 PM
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Evaluation always must be done in light of the then current dogmas and tactical acceptance of what is taught at the War College or equivalent.
I doubt what Custer did would be taught at any war college.An army unit is a system and is trained to act in a specific way.Everone knows what to expect and everyone knows what everyone else is doing.Deviate from that as Custer did and you sow confusion. |
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - February 05 2005 : 3:19:14 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by Warlord
Evaluation always must be done in light of the then current dogmas and tactical acceptance of what is taught at the War College or equivalent.
Custer doesn't come out pretty either way. If that move that took him to Battle Ridge on ground he could not defend and away from all support was "dogma" at the time, then it shows a pretty pathetic lack of imagination on his part. Not being able to adjust to situations which aren't unfolding as the textbooks outline is condemning, in itself.
If it wasn't (and no one here has presented any evidence that it was) then all you need to do, as Grant, Sturgis, and Benteen did, is look at the results, which speak with extreme clarity.
R. Larsen |
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prolar
Major
Status: offline |
Posted - February 05 2005 : 4:05:52 PM
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| He took a position on high ground, overlooking his objective, where his support could have and should have joined him. What is so wrong with that? |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - February 05 2005 : 6:44:34 PM
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| I think you miss the point Prolar.It was Custer who was in fact the support.As for the position he took he was scattered all over the place. |
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prolar
Major
Status: offline |
Posted - February 05 2005 : 8:35:32 PM
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| Wild I: It was Custer who was fighting. The other seven troops are supposed to take the day off? |
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BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - February 05 2005 : 9:03:45 PM
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quote:
dog·ma n. pl. dog·mas or dog·ma·ta (-m-t)
1. A doctrine or a corpus of doctrines relating to matters such as morality and faith, set forth in an authoritative manner by a church.
2. An authoritative principle, belief, or statement of ideas or opinion, especially one considered to be absolutely true. See Synonyms at doctrine.
3. A principle or belief or a group of them: “The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present” (Abraham Lincoln).
The belief of the U.S. soldiers at the time was that the Indians would scatter with an attack upon their village. Custer was operating on normal situational tactics (AKA, Standard Operating Procedure) at the time of his division of the regiment into four groups. At this point I will confess that Fox, upon second reading, is beginning to make as much sense for me of the entire cluster f*** as anyone else has.
My thoughts, at this time, are that GAC understood that attacking and capturing the village would give him a symbolic victory but that the warriors would then be on his troops like white upon rice...thus, he had to find a way to neutralize the warriors and capturing the dependents seemed like the most effective means to get their attention.
For what it is worth, I seriously believe that GAC had a plan and did not charge into this large force of Indians, which he knew of, like a Grattan.
"For what we are about recieve, we thank you Lord",
Billy |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - February 06 2005 : 06:57:06 AM
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Wild I: It was Custer who was fighting. The other seven troops are supposed to take the day off?
Prolar you will recall that Custer in his order to Reno said that he would support him with the whole outfit. |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - February 06 2005 : 08:43:49 AM
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[i]An example of military dogma in 1876 was the indians cannot stand up against troops in a face to face fight. Another was single shot rifles are adequate against repeaters if fire discipline is maintained. Another was a few hundred troops can handle a few thousand indians. All completely erroneous.[/i
Warlord
Let us for the sake of arguement assume that Custer was following military dogma as described above and that he thought the Indians would scatter.What was the point in sending in a fraction of his forces to wake the enemy up and announce his presence?What was the point in keeping two major obstacles [river and bluffs]between him and the probably scattering Indians?What was the point in compounding his error by ordering Benteen to do the same?
There is no possible military situation that would justify such crazy tactics.
The attack should have been made from the West trapping the enemy against the river and bluffs. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - February 06 2005 : 11:51:17 AM
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Markland,
When Fox begins to make sense, fix a refreshing beverage and sit down. Fox's goal is to append plausible meaning to the archaeological findings without establishing whether the findings are relevant or tolerating much discussion of that point. To call it a house of cards is to exaggerate the construction.
By your point paragraphs, starting with "The belief of the U.S. soldiers at the time...":
1. Whatever the belief of the U.S. soldiers were, their syllogistic error and apparent inability to think hurt them. If a clump of twenty lodges and a hundred odd people is a 'village,' what is a gathering of 8000 people? Still a 'village' in military parlance? What works for one "village" by anectdote will work for another? That's where words lazily used affect our thinking in a bad way, because these gatherings are different in kind, response time, power.
Again: the only previous encounter with a large village of the sort at the LBH produced exactly the opposite reaction of this 'dogma.' That at Kildeer Mt. against many of the same Sioux at LBH later. The Sioux did not run, they attacked the advancing troops despite artillery, they didn't leave till the end and they got away. Also, the casualties were not huge on either side. Except for Custer's fate, the LBH village reacted the same way: badly, slowly, and defiantly.
2. Again, if this theory of hostages is correct, then why the effort to fool the encircling Indians at the Wa****a? Custer had hostages, so they weren't going to attack, right? Because they'd be scared the soldiers would kill their families? But the other tribes that gathered wouldn't care, would they? And neither would they care at the LBH.
And again, capturing a bunch of primarily Cheyenne civvies would prevent Gall, who'd just lost his wife and kids, and other Hunkpapa from doing what? Stop or I'll kill someone who means nothing to you? In a small actual village of 100 people, this sort of thing might work. In a mobile city of 8k of different tribes and allegiances and strangers? Pretty desperate and stupid, I'd think, to apply anectdotal story of a how a small village might react to how a huge city would.
3. He doesn't know the size, shape, extent of the village or enemy numbers (we don't know the size of the village or the enemy numbers...), he doesn't know the land. He doesn't know where half his forces are. He committed 25% of his force to act EXACTLY like Grattan and attack an hour previous, and he is unable to support it because of his utter and complete ignorance of the terrain. If this reflects a plan, what conditions would have to exist to suggest he had no plan for you to agree? Now, past Weir Point, he does something or other and ends up further away from his target than Reno or Benteen, or ground utterly unsuitable for defense because his plan is to wait for support (Custer? Custer planned to wait for support?). Once cavalry stops without cover, you take casualties in men AND horses, and it is highly unlikely that even if rescued his unit would have the mounts to escape, much less take the offensive again.
I'm sorry, I see no plan. If this scenario was suggested for anyone else except Custer, nobody would buy it whatsoever. (I once suggested if you exchange Custer for Reno with the same results, Reno would STILL be shredded for doing what Custer did....) If you stand on Weir Point and look north to where he ended up, and the village is to your immediate left with an entrance just down the way, I cannot fathom anyone saying "that's the ticket" looking at that ground to LSH. Whatever Custer's faults, abject stupidity was not one, and I cannot see him willingly going north as part of a plan. I think something was bolluxed at MTC and they were driven north against their will, and Keogh's guys provided covering fire on the way as best they could without a real clue what was going on. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
Edited by - Dark Cloud on February 06 2005 1:34:49 PM |
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - February 06 2005 : 2:14:12 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by BJMarkland
The belief of the U.S. soldiers at the time was that the Indians would scatter with an attack upon their village.
I have to question how much of a belief this really was. In "Centennial Campaign" Gray quotes a letter from Terry dated 2/16/76, in which Terry says in part:
"The orders which have been given recently render indispensably necessary a larger mounted force than the nine companies of the 7th now in this Department. These nine companies comprise about 620 men all told, and of these 550 could be put in the field for active operations. This number is not sufficient for the end in view. For if the Indians who pass the winter in the Yellowstone and Powder River country should be found in one camp (and they usually are so gathered) they could not be attacked by that number without great risk of defeat." Pg. 38, italics mine.
I suspect that people have been exaggerating how strong this belief "that they would scatter" was at the time in order to shield Custer from the onus of his errors. Obviously, if they were gathered together in one big camp, as at Killdeer, as at LBH, Terry expected that they would fight --- and do so formidably, if he thought that 600 soldiers would be at "great risk of defeat" in attacking them.
quote:
Custer was operating on normal situational tactics (AKA, Standard Operating Procedure) at the time of his division of the regiment into four groups.
True enough, but when this was done (at Wa****a, Summit Springs, etc.) it was all against much smaller villages, say under 200 lodges, and often far less. At Killdeer Mountain, Sully kept all his men together and rammed them head on, pounding them with artillery. He still had a tough time taking it. LBH shows all the risks inherent in the other approach.
R. Larsen |
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - February 06 2005 : 2:30:00 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
Whatever the belief of the U.S. soldiers were, their syllogistic error and apparent inability to think hurt them. If a clump of twenty lodges and a hundred odd people is a 'village,' what is a gathering of 8000 people? Still a 'village' in military parlance? What works for one "village" by anectdote will work for another? That's where words lazily used affect our thinking in a bad way, because these gatherings are different in kind, response time, power.
I don't think many people realize that the village Custer attacked at Wa****a only numbered 51 lodges. At least, those who try to justify his tactics at Little Bighorn by analogy to Wa****a never seem to take notice of that rather important detail.
R. Larsen |
Edited by - Anonymous Poster8169 on February 06 2005 2:32:29 PM |
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prolar
Major
Status: offline |
Posted - February 06 2005 : 3:06:15 PM
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| Wild I: By showing his force on the high ridges and his approach to MTF, Custer did support him. If Reno had maintained his position in the timber, he would have played his part. Reno's retreat to his hill resulted in most of his causualties and allowed the Indians to concentrate on Custer. |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - February 06 2005 : 3:14:48 PM
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"Fox's goal is to append plausible meaning to archaeological findings whether the findings are relevant or tolerating much discussion of that point."
This "heady" statement calls for an assumption that I, for one, am not prepared to make: Dr. Fox confided his innermost thoughts regarding the inception of his book, to the author of the statement.
Dr. Fox fully comprehends the aspects of battle that appears to have eluded some of us when discussing this event, the complexity of combat! It is an ever changing, evolving, and transforming series of events from the beginning to the last.
So critical is this compexity that to ignore it is to be incapable of truly comprehending the segments of "action" which produce the final winner, "effect." Instead, we can only know that the victor won without knowing why. For example, take a battle wherein fifty survivors (from each side) are subsequently interviewed in an effort to ascertain what occurred.
A. You would get 100 different versions;
b. 50% of the interviewed statements will be influenced by heroic rationale justifying the win;
C. 50% of the interviewed statements will be influenced by the justification of why they lost.
Fox understands the physical and mental elements of battle that directly influence how a battle is fought and won. His research in Contemporaneous Military Tactics, Tactical Stability, Disintegration, and Proximity of the Enemy is vital in laying down a foundation of comprehension as to what actual occurred.
He then follows up his investigation with Firearm Identification Analysis which is a science, not speculation or conjecture. This science is being utilized by the F.B.I., C.I.A., and every police Department in this Country.
To suggest that this body of work should be relegated to a sphere of fantasy is incomprehensible. Fox does not have all of the answers, no one does. However, his contribution to the Battle of the Little Big Horn is appreciated by many. |
Edited by - joseph wiggs on February 06 2005 3:38:42 PM |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - February 06 2005 : 5:40:18 PM
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Yet again, Wiggs, you can't quote correctly. Even your fake quote does not call for an assumption (why would it?). Nobody here slaps their forehead at the thought combat is complex. Neither Dr. Fox nor anyone "fully comprehends" any aspect of battle. How could anyone think that?
I've read "the" book, although he's had several circulating. We've grasped the science behind firearm analysis, et al. The problem he has, and you have, is that he cannot prove that anything obtained from the battlefield was left untouched since the battle. If the Indians had zero guns, and killed all the soldiers with arrows, but walked around and shot up their bodies after the battle that day and for the following year those "buried" bodies were covered with dust (and Sioux nearly always desecrated enemy bodies), and they used their own or the soldiers' guns in that task, nothing in Fox's evidence contradicts it. Nothing.
Nobody has ever suggested relegating Fox's book to fantasy. Who? It's evidence for what bullet came from what gun. It's evidence for the precise location an item was found. It cannot prove the gun was used by certain people at certain times against certain others. Given that, what can it possibly be evidence for? Just assumptions to fit the found items, is all. Not much, push comes to shove. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - February 06 2005 : 6:16:32 PM
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| I'm sorry, I guess I misunderstood the meaning of your quote," When Fox begins to make sense, fix a refreshing beverage and sit down." |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - February 06 2005 : 7:14:11 PM
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Prolar
Wild I: By showing his force on the high ridges and his approach to MTF, Custer did support him.
Well if you like to put it that way I suppose that by getting his force slaughtered he tied up the enemy forces for a good hour.
If Reno had maintained his position in the timber, he would have played his part. Reno's retreat to his hill resulted in most of his causualties and allowed the Indians to concentrate on Custer.Reno had no information or knowledge of Custer's intentions other than the expected support never arrived and he was now on his own facing overwhelming forces.
Warlord
I'm inclined to think that there was a vital moment when Custer realized he was in serious dodo but pride and stuborness prevented him from taking the necessary defensive action to save his command.
There was a window of opportunity to go on the defensive but he wanted to win.There was no way he was going to allow himself to be a saved by Benteen or Terry.
It is suggested that the same thing happened to Scott on his return journey from his failed attempt to reach the South pole.Two of his companions are thought to have been fit enought to have reached safety.But there was no glory in being rescued,What glory remained was found in a "gallant" death. |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - February 06 2005 : 7:29:43 PM
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| To assume that Custer was so callous, egotistical, and vain that he would sacrifice the lives of his comrades and brothers to achieve a minor victory over a group of aboriginals doomed to the reservation life anyway, is difficult to swallow. Human nature being what it is, I would speculate that moments prior to the end of the world, he would have prayed to see anyone arrive and pull him and his comrades out of the fire. Fortunately, I have yet to experience my own death so I can not speak with authority. However, I can not help but believe that Custer did not want to die; just like you and I. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - February 06 2005 : 8:05:14 PM
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Me: "Fox's goal is to append plausible meaning to the archaeological findings without establishing whether the findings are relevant or tolerating much discussion of that point."
You 'quoting' me: "Fox's goal is to append plausible meaning to archaeological findings whether the findings are relevant or tolerating much discussion of that point."
You left out two words which change emphasis and meaning. See? You don't quote accurately.
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Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - February 06 2005 : 8:09:50 PM
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| You are correct sir, I admit my mistake. However, you forgot to address your statement that caused me to go astray in the first place,"When Fox begins to make sense, fix a refreshing beverage and sit down." Did I quote that one correctly? |
Edited by - joseph wiggs on February 06 2005 8:16:32 PM |
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BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - February 06 2005 : 11:39:41 PM
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quote:
I don't think many people realize that the village Custer attacked at Wa****a only numbered 51 lodges. At least, those who try to justify his tactics at Little Bighorn by analogy to Wa****a never seem to take notice of that rather important detail.
Fox's contention is that GAC was making an assumption that the Indians at LBH where in separate villages as at Wa****a. That was a fatal assumption in my opinion.
OK, going to the standard tactics.
Whetstone Mtn. doesn't count. The Indians were tracking Sully's movements for days and had time to evacuate their dependents.
Somehow you forget to mention Palo Duro Canyon. Historically, at Palo Duro, Summit Springs [sp?], Reynold's fight, Wa****a, and yes, Sand Creek...the Indians attempted to put a defensive line in front of the soldiers to buy time for their dependents to escape.
The difference in how the Indians reacted seems to have been in the fore-knowledge of the attack.
That is documented folks, and, if I was not in post Super Bowl mode, I could find more examples.
Best of wishes,
Billy |
Edited by - BJMarkland on February 06 2005 11:44:14 PM |
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Benteen's order
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