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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
 Posted - October 16 2004 : 9:27:07 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by joseph wiggs
Contrary to the strigent perspective of Larsen, my conviction that an "order" was disobeyed is perfectly reasonable and does not fall into the realm of fantasy. I do not insist that I am right, I simply believe that such a possibility exist.
It's fantasy when you can't produce any law Benteen broke, and then try to palm off garbage like it being "a basic premise of military law known by all members of the Armed Forces (to include veterans) and, most civilians". None of these millions of people dared to speak on your behalf, probably because (like me) they don't know of any law Benteen was guilty of breaking either.
If you want to have real discussions, then you need to base yourself on real evidence and real facts. Otherwise we're left sucking gas. The kind of claim you're trying to make would be like me having the "conviction" that you're a murderer. Granted, I don't know of anybody you could have killed, but then I'm not insisting that I'm right; I simply believe that such a possibility exists.
Don't you see how dumb and worthless such discussions are? Find a body, find a law. Get some sort of foundation for this stuff.
As for your "humor", a better response to the (accurate) charge that you are a liar would be to simply apologize.
R. Larsen |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - October 16 2004 : 9:36:02 PM
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I miss you too! Guess what! Oklahoma beat Kansas State today, isn't that wonderful? I realize that this has absolutely nothing to do with this forum, but sense it never seems to bother you, what the hey!!!
Your friend,
Joey    |
Edited by - joseph wiggs on October 16 2004 9:38:16 PM |
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bhist
Lt. Colonel
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - October 17 2004 : 11:45:19 AM
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Wiggs was trying to argue that Benteen broke a law in stopping to help Reno after receiving the note from Cooke; not in putting an end to the scout. In any case, Benteen was almost certainly exaggerating when he claimed years later to have violated his orders about "valley hunting ad infinitum" --- such orders wouldn't make much sense, and his remembrance of them in 1879 are not consistent with the versions given independently by himself and Lt. Gibson in private letters to their wives soon after the battle. That Cooke sent off Martin with orders to keep to the trail pretty much shoots down the "valley hunting ad infinitum" idea anyway; he must have expected Benteen to have returned by then.
Still no law has been produced.
R. Larsen
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 17 2004 : 12:40:21 PM
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It isn't just the initial logic of dividing the command, it is the manner in which it was done. Since Custer was somehow unable to say "Go sequentially to each rise following your advance team to discover if the land to my left as well as the LBH valley to the south is devoid of or hosts villages and warrior assemblages. Notify me asap when that information is obtained, and either attack if prudent or follow my trail to rejoin me for a regimental attack when the command reassembles." We are left with these bizarred series of orders in a most inefficient manner as if to a child.
It is apparently now given that when Gibson's advance could see the LBH valley, and that it was empty, Benteen had completed his mission. I suspect Benteen's annoyance with all this is the same one that annoys me and others: what was Custer's point in keeping Benteen on such a short leash in such a clumsy way that was of no advantage regardless of what Benteen's OR Custer's mission was? Why not, as many have wondered, keep the command together and send scouts to discover that which Benteen was told to do? Would be faster. And really, why send three messengers to say 'now one more?' every fifteen minutes? |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - October 17 2004 : 2:56:42 PM
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The only thing I can think of is that Custer did think there was a good chance Indians were fleeing up the valley, and that the likelihood was strong enough that it made sense to send some troops along with Gibson's scouting party. If he didn't, and the scouts did find Indians, he would either have to let them go, or send somebody to head them off and lose more time than if he had just sent them off in the first place. He was rolling the dice and assuming the Indians were more on their toes than they actually were.
Custer only started the attack at noon on the 25th rather than at dawn the next morning because he thought the Indians had been alerted to his presence and were cutting out. It wasn't his preference at all, and I think his actions reflect that it was a makeshift plan continually revolving in his head as he got closer to the village. Sending out Voss and Sharrow to Benteen with his afterthoughts, for example, and the mixed messages to Reno. Reno thought Custer would follow behind his rear, and since Cooke and Keogh both went as far as the crossing and chatted unrevealingly to a few people, maybe that was originally the intention. Who can say?
Custer's orders throughout the day all seem half thought-out. The Cooke note doesn't make much sense, and reads as though it was written to two different people but got somehow slurred in the dictation. There wasn't really any way Benteen could "bring packs," for example. The experienced packers were already with the train, and Benteen couldn't do much to speed it up by escorting it, except slow himself down. And he had already been told to "come quick," although not to what. The officers with him were understandably confused why Custer was telling him to do a thing that McDougall had been told to take charge of.
Bottom line, the only way you can try to comply with the order is to read into it something that is not there. This is why we always have people saying complacently that Cooke meant to write "ammunition pacs," but just forgot to. Might be true, but it's a rather dangerous way to fight a battle if your subordinates have to guess what you want them to do. Since Cooke repeated the word "packs," though, without adding ammo, I doubt that what's Custer had in mind. It's like Custer had already decided in his head to shift Benteen to command of the pack train but had forgotten to tell anybody.
R. Larsen
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 17 2004 : 4:00:01 PM
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Going back to the theory the Sioux were running and would always run from large formations, the Army was basing an awful lot on common knowledge that wasn't true. The clear lesson of Kildeer Mountain - with some of the same Indians - ran opposite to the assumptions going into the 1876 campaign.
It's as if that battle, that campaign, had not happened, and it's the only one against a number like they expected during the 1876 campaign. But Custer, Crooke, and Terry still prepare as if for the Wa****a and on the assumption that Indians don't learn from the past either. I'd bet it occured to many Sioux veterans of Kildeer that, hmmmm, if we had done this or that, things would have been a lot different. Should a similar situation arise in the future......
I have to say that my theory for some years, unoriginal, that Custer's actions that day previous to MTC made sense and had logic even if coincidentally wrong has faded as this basic examination of how Benteen's scout was handled are factored in. Which is to say, I guess I now agree with you that virtually all Custer's orders this day seem, well, really weakly conceived and of the sort that wouldn't instill belief your commander had a real clue what to do or what was happening.
The sure evidence are those unnecessary and silly repetitive orders to Benteen which, when factored on to his misleading if not bogus assurance to Reno about support, sort of fleshes out the statements from some officers, including Reno and Benteen, they had no deep faith in Custer's command ability outside of leading charges.
I still hang on to the possibility that Kanipe and Martin had orders originating from different people, though. Kanipe may have been sent off based on a reasonable assumption by TWC, but the half-assed nature of those two orders is, I have to admit, fully in keeping with how Custer tried to micromanage Benteen. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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Brent
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 18 2004 : 07:50:32 AM
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Larsen:
I suppose Custer may well have thought there was a "good chance" the Indians were fleeing up the Valley. Not an "un-natural" supposition, but not seemingly based on any facts, clues, signs, etc. A "possibility" that needed to be checked. And of course he already knew the "big village" was in the general area where it actually was, and that it must contain plenty of fighting men. In sending Benteen off, he was casting a very big net before he knew were all the fish were...and depriving himself of troops he could well use in the main area.
I guess his desire to "bag" every last Indian consumed him and he really had no idea that it may have been too much for 600 men to handle.
And I continue to wonder what may have happened if Benteen HAD found Indians. What then?? He may have gotten "Pitched into" himself, maybe even SENDING a "Come quick" note to Custer!!
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - October 18 2004 : 6:16:04 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by Warlord
Larsen: You could not recognize a law if someone forced you to eat a penal code. You simply have no cogent logic. I am not making fun of you. I am simply pointing out the obvious!
I'm always willing to be educated, Warlord, since I'm ignorant in many things and would prefer not to be. I've also learned to be skeptical of people's assertions which is why I think facts and evidence are important. Often, I've found, people don't always know what they claim they know. I don't exclude myself from that since I think this is a trap we all fall into at one time or another. The honest admit it and try to amend, the liars and those protecting fragile egos try to plaster that gap between knowledge and evidence over with nonsense.
Thus far, whenever you've tried to insert yourself into discussions based on facts and evidence you've gone down faster than one of Jim McGreevey's rentboys. Your meltdown on the "Responsibility" thread is a classic of its kind. Not being able to stand your ground with anything but an ad hominem you strike me (and probably everyone else) as a big crybaby, and while I may not be able to recognize a law, I think I can see that for what it is.
When you're willing to back up your claims about those whopping Indian casualties and all those military manuals, get back to me. Nobody really has time for all the bawling you've done since.
R. Larsen
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - October 19 2004 : 4:10:01 PM
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Warlord-
I may be the mayor of Cleveland for all you know, or a Guatemalan tech specialist. Who cares. I don't believe you're really a soldier, and you don't need to believe anything about me either. It doesn't matter a damn. The claims we make about history do matter, however, and it alone is where our credibility comes from here. You said you had military manuals which gave the firing figures that you tossed out onto the board. What are they? We can't discuss citations seriously if you're too scared to put them out on the line.
R. Larsen
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 20 2004 : 9:09:08 PM
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Their shades lust for your respect, Warlord. Yet you say "had." How did they lose it?
You subscribe to Soldier of Fortune, don't you?
The myth of Thermopolae reflects the numerological fantasies of the ancients. They used grand, round numbers to indicate 'a lot.' Second, Greek writers noted actual Spartans but not the relatively large numbers of their slaves, called helots, who also reluctantly fought. Being slave/serfs they were beneath notice. Bet the Persians noted them. And third, it's only 300 Spartans, which I don't believe either.
Of course, this is all pulled out of the air to inflate Spartan heroism, much like your efforts to increase the numbers of Indian dead at LBH. Given that one of the favorite maxims quoted here is "logistics, logistics, logistics!" imagine what it took for the Persians to send hundreds of thousands across Asia Minor. Had to have been that many if losses of 20k didn't slow them down. The Persians continued their slaughter down into Greece, sacked Athens and more, and retired in relatively good order after their navy lost at Salamis.
The ancient world had absolutely no method to control so many people, or organize them, or feed them. Or train them. Few modern nations can today. Certainly Greece couldn't support them all of a sudden. Those are ridiculous figures. Go look at the pictures of Thermopolae. It's pretty tiny.
There is no logical way to figure what amount of fired CW ammo resulted in what casualty rate, and the (again) remarkably round numbers attest to this. Obviously, no study was done except, maybe, anectdotal assumptions committed to paper.
How do you compare, and to what purpose do you compare, volley fire during daylight by rifled musket into tightly bunched men with phalanx warfare in the past or dispersed rapid fire weapons in Vietnam and elsewhere to fire at the LBH? Aren't the circumstances so entirely different that it doesn't rise to the values of apples and oranges? More logically, how do the casualty rates compare with other actions in Indian warfare? Reno/Benteen's fight seems within consistent parameters, although there were few large actions for real comparisons. Custer's fight is the big exception.
And the figures we have might actually be too high. The one actual comparison we have of Sioux counting reliability is the figure of Army dead they said they found after the LBH battle. It was over 400, I recall. So, if they overcounted by nearly a factor of two, perhaps they did the same with their dead as well. It's a fairly useless contention, but probably as relevant as phalanx warfare or ammo rates always ending in two zeros. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - October 20 2004 : 9:46:56 PM
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Warlord-
I'd be hesitant to use Vietnam War figures (different weapons, different environment, different training) but the 1% rate from your Civil War book sounds plausible enough, and I don't dispute it. Not sure what your source means by "casualty" --- for some reason, people habitually confuse the word with "fatality," so I'm always in doubt what a person actually means when they use the word. I cited earlier Crook expending 20,000 rounds to hit 30 Indians, and while I think that reflects a broad truth about Indian warfare --- by a huge margin, most shots fail to reach their target --- I would grant that it's not a perfect fit for the Little Bighorn. Except for one or two small incidents, close fighting didn't really happen at the Rosebud, while at LBH the fighting was so intense that even the Indians were killing each other in places. It seems from the evidence we have that about 30 Indians were killed directly on Custer's field, and though we don't know the number of wounded, 120 would be about right. I think the ratio of 4 to 1 is the standard rule of thumb, anyway. (Others can correct me if I am wrong). Bringing down 150 warriors ain't bad for a group of soldiers outnumbered by huge odds and fighting on ground so bad for defense. The only time Indians are known to have suffered heavier casualties during the Plains Wars are in a few attacks on their villages, when noncombatants of course stacked up the body count. I've no doubt Custer's soldiers did their best, considering what a luckless situation they found themselves in. But it was an awful one.
I'd take those ancient casualty figures with a grain of salt. The historians of that period (Herodotus, Xenophon, etc.) have an annoying habit of being outlandish, especially when it comes to counting foreign corpses and mauled foreign armies. I've read some of them claiming that each army threw a million men into such & such battle, and other less implausible but still implausible figures. We don't know how many Persians the Greeks killed at Thermopylae, though a lot it seems.
I think the reason why the Indians didn't overrun the men on Reno Hill is because that's just not the way Indians fought. I mean, you'll never find any battle where the Indians attacked somebody in an entrenchment and racked up casualties like the British did at Bunker Hill & New Orleans, or the Mexicans at the Alamo. You need "group-think" to do that; somebody in charge to order that to happen, and a hierarchy that the underlings respect and will willingly follow. The Indians lacked that kind of organization. They fought more like raiding parties than real armies; a group of Indians on the warpath were closer akin to the Jesse James gang than any sort of military.
R. Larsen |
Edited by - Anonymous Poster8169 on October 20 2004 9:54:58 PM |
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BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 21 2004 : 12:52:16 PM
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Regarding the "order" to the pack train and the "order" to Benteen, I am wondering if G.A.C. or Cooke had simply forgotten that Benteen was no longer in charge of the pack train? Benteen had, if I skimmed his narrative correctly, been in charge of it the entire march up to the day of the battle, when his company was first in being prepared to move out. Also, Benteen states he lost two night's sleep previous to the battle and I feel fairly sure that G.A.C. did not get much sleep so fatigue may have also played a part in not remembering who was in charge of the pack train.
Just a surmise but it is simple enough to have happened.
Best of wishes,
Billy
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 21 2004 : 9:49:22 PM
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I think Kanipe's orders distinguished between Benteen and the train, which would suggest whoever gave that order recalled who was in charge of it. It still strikes me that the two orders, so close together, suggest the second order was given by someone unaware of the first.
Martin didn't recall Kanipe leaving, I don't think, and leaves the impression he was directly with Custer during the period Custer would have given Kanipe's order, which Kanipe never exactly claims. This suggests to me that Kanipe was separate, with TWC riding between and perhaps, I think again, anticipating his brother and sending Kanipe on his own call.
Certainly an exhausted command would make exactly this sort of mistake sooner than later. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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Brent
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 22 2004 : 07:04:27 AM
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Sadly, as far as Indian casualties go, we're bound to the realm of "sheer speculation".
My "gut" feeling is that the majority of Custers troops couldn't hit the broad side of a barn door, even in target practice (which, from what I read, there wasn't much of). In battle conditions, with the "target" moving and shooting back, dust clouds, etc etc it was probably even worse.
Best I can do is give an example of my own experience. Before I went to Vietnam, I had the "pleasure" of duty at Ft Polk, training basic recruits. While there (I was a Lt. by the way), I went thru 2 and a haf basic training cycles, which included many days of marksmanship training. Most of the recruits were poor shots. Percentage wise, about 10% were good shots--30% "fair" and the rest just abysmal. And that's AFTER all the training was said and done!! One exercise we had to "simulate" moving targets was to have 3-4 targets just "pop-up" on the range. Then an entire training platoon (40+ men with M-16's) would open up. Many times, after all that firing, NONE were hit. Once in awhile they'd knock down one or two, but most times it was a total miss!! And this from the prone position!!
In Vietnam (where I was an Infantry Platoon leader with the Americal Division) these observations were borne out. My own Platoon often fired THOUSANDS of rounds of M-16 ammo and hit absolutely nothing. Many times they had no idea even what they were shooting at. And these were troops (unlike poor Custers men )WITH some marksmanship training!!
So I guess what I'm saying is that 30-50 Indian dead is probably really close to the mark. Add another 100-120 "wounded" and that's about it. And sounds like a # of Indian casualties could have come from their own "friendly fire".
Is that a good performance?? Hard to say. I wouldn't call it an impressive performance.
PS: about Reno Hill. Didn't I read somewhere that some Indians got so close that they threw clods of dirt at the Soldiers?? IF true, at least those warriors weren't too impressed with 7th Cavalry marksmanship. |
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BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 22 2004 : 07:24:17 AM
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OK, back to the subject. First, the Army Regulations of 1861 had this in Article I, Para. 1:
"1. ALL inferiors are required to obey strictly, and to execute with alacrity and good faith, the lawful orders of the superiors appointed over them."
The above, worded somewhat differently but with the same meaning, is present in the Officer's Oath when sworn in. I did not bookmark that link so will have to go back and find it. For the Regulations of 1861, see the link in Research.
Also, I found a very interesting essay entitled, How Much Obedience Does An Officer Need by Maj. Dr. Ulrich F. Zwygart at the Combined Arms Research Library. While most of essay does deal with moral dilemmas poised during the 20th century conflicts there are some very interesting quotes from assorted personages, such as the one from Alfred Mahan below.
"In 1902, Rear Admiral Alfred T. Mahan, the American apostle of sea power, wrote that obedience is the cement of the (military) structure, the lifeblood of the organism.66 He recognized special cases in which disobedience might be justified:
When a doubt arises, as it frequently does, between strict compliance with an order and the disregard of it, in whole or in part, the officer is called upon to decide a question of professional conduct. Personal judgment necessarily enters a factor, but only one of many; and, to be trusted, it needs to be judgment illuminated by professional knowledge and fortified by reflection.... The officer at the moment should consider himself, as he in fact is, a judge deciding upon a case liable to be called up to a superior court, before which his conclusion has no claim to respect because it is his personal opinion, but only so far as it is supported by the evidence before him. There is, of course, the necessary reservation that the final judgment upon himself, for his professional conduct as involved in his decision, will be rendered upon the facts accessible to him and not upon those not then to be known, though afterwards apparent.67"
Maj. Dr. Zwygart's entire essay may be found at:
http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Zwygart/zwygart.asp
In conclusion, based upon my research and reading the various postings, I feel that garbled or not, Benteen did receive a direct, lawful order. That being said, military necessity forced him to disobey said order which, as Mahan states, is only being criticized for his reasoning because he acted upon "...the facts accessible to him and not upon those not then to be known, though afterwards apparent." Emphasis is mine and not Admiral Mahan's.
Best of wishes,
Billy
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 22 2004 : 10:55:26 AM
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And what part of the order was disobeyed? He was to hurry (where? to Custer specifically or to the battle or village in general?) bringing the entire train both of which were of necessity separately in process when he ran into combat and Reno required his services. There is very little time between Martin reaching Benteen and Benteen reaching Reno during which this order was paramount and exclusive to Benteen's consideration. It's a straw dog of an issue to detract attention away from inexplicable actions by the Custer group, although perhaps not so inexplicable if this is the sort of thing reverently called an order by that group.
Again, if Buford had sent the exact same message to Reynolds (Reynolds! Come on! Lotta Rebs! Be Quick! Bring guns!), setting aside the rank difference, wouldn't Buford have been shot for such a waste of paper subject to huge misinterpretation? "Hey, Reynolds could just follow his tracks and know..." would get you nowhere. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 22 2004 : 1:19:52 PM
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quote:
And what part of the order was disobeyed? He was to hurry (where? to Custer specifically or to the battle or village in general?)
The logical inference I get reading the "come quick" order is that he is to proceed to the person issuing the order, G.A.C.
quote:
...bringing the entire train both of which were of necessity separately in process when he ran into combat and Reno required his services.
Agree to that point. The portion of the order is ambiguous to say the least.
quote:
There is very little time between Martin reaching Benteen and Benteen reaching Reno during which this order was paramount and exclusive to Benteen's consideration.
During the time interval between receiving the order and reaching Reno, Benteen was attempting to follow the order by going towards the last known location of G.A.C. It was upon reaching Reno and recognizing how disorganized that force was that Benteen used his professional judgment and disobeyed his orders.
quote:
It's a straw dog of an issue to detract attention away from inexplicable actions by the Custer group,
The real straw man argument is the one poised by you attributing Tom Custer with usurping the commander's authority by issuing unapproved orders. That is only speculation without any factual basis. I do agree with your terminology regarding the actions of the Custer battalion though, they were inexplicable.
I neglected to give my opinion on what impact Benteen and his company would have had on Custer's battle. As I do not have a crystal ball, this is pure speculation. At the worst case, another company would have joined the roll of the dead. The best case is that the appearance of Benteen's men would have distracted enough Indians to allow some few of Custer's battalion or Keogh's battalion to escape. The above is predicated on the supposition that Benteen had not joined the Custer battalion nor Keogh battalion until after the battle had been joined. If joining before, well, it would have been closer to the worst case than anything else.
Perhaps the best question to ask is this: Would Reno's battalion, given proper command leadership, been able to sustain itself without the aid of Benteen and his company?
Best of wishes,
Billy
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 22 2004 : 2:00:57 PM
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RE: my straw dog.
1. Martin, the only first hand testimony we have on this if his tale is true, does not mention Kanipe at all OR Custer sending another order back, though Martin says Custer talked with Cooke. Not TWC, Cooke. Martin says he was right with Custer himself the whole time as Custer left Reno.
2. Kanipe never says he heard Custer give his particular order, which in aggregate with Martin presupposes him at some distance from Custer. He says that TWC told him Custer had made this order. But there is no recorded visible connection between GAC and TWC, viewed by either Kanipe or Martin in their testimony - or Curley either I don't think - that would allow this. We only have Custer to Cooke, maybe Cooke to TWC to Kanipe. Or TWC, not without reason or against Custer's wishes, sent Kanipe on his own hook. Custer himself, not knowing this and being otherwise focussed, sent Martin with a slightly different message right after. Zippo proof, of course, but I don't think unreasonable given the general nature of these orders.
I've never claimed it as sure or more than speculation, but given how odd the command was that day - again, the micromanagement to no point of Benteen - it makes some sense. It's not pulled out of the air, and whoever brought the regiment forward at the Crow's Nest, it surprised Custer and he let into TWC, nobody else, about it. Coincidence, yes, speculation, yes, but not baseless claim, not an assumption without reason. In fact, it melds very well with your observation about the regiment being kind of dingy with exhaustion. It explains, without complication, the slightly different orders with Martin's being less hysterical than the one that shortly preceded it. Kanipe's says rush dropping boxes or whatever and leaving them, which is rather hysterical. Martin's order says Benteen, bring the train and hurry.
And again, if you substitute the name Biff Jones for Tom and insert in into the Black Hills or Yellowstone stories, it's very odd this mere Captain is telling others what to do and is always about. TWC did seem to operate outside the command structure, which I don't find odd or even wrong, per se, and nobody seems to comment negatively on it either. Even Benteen, who disliked them both. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 23 2004 : 08:42:44 AM
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Actually, when I first started this, I was going to tease Warlord for changing his stance on Indians killed (1,320 killed or badly wounded posted 9/30 on Responsibility at LBH thread) and currently, 150-170, but then realized that is what learned conversation is for, to receive data which allows you to add to your knowledge of an event and modify your concept of that event. Thus, all I have to say is congratulations to Warlord for being willing to change his opinion.
OK, Dark Cloud, your turn. First, congratulations on that excellent summary of your view about the influence of Tom Custer upon the messages sent. That makes sense despite being partially speculative but, with mainly unknowns to work with, speculation is standard fare. At least you have a logic trail to follow.
This is probably deserving of an entire thread in itself, but as a neophyte in military matters but a veteran in corporate combat, I must state that the command and control structure for the 7th was, to put it mildly, dysfunctional. From the abrupt decision to move at night, to the unordered/canceled movement of the regiment to the Crow's Nest, to the lack of coordination between battalions, there seems to be a pattern of the left hand not knowing what the right hand is doing. To those of you who have studied the history of the 7th during the Plains Wars; was this standard behavior for the 7th under Custer? I seem to recall that after Hancock's hash-up, Custer ended up somewhere besides where he was supposed to be which inadvertently led to Lt. Kidder's party being killed. Custer seems to have given concise and explicit orders during the preparations for the Wa****a attack but was this the exception rather than the rule?
I will check later after I get tired of cleaning up the cellar. Do you realize HOW many boxes you can accumulate in the cellar when living in the same house for 13 years?!!
Best of wishes,
Billy
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Brent
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 23 2004 : 08:42:56 AM
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Billy:
Doubt that Reno's men could have sustained themselves w/o Benteen IF the Indians had made a determined effort.The matter of proper leadership is something else again. Of course Reno was perfectly flummoxed by the retreat and at that point was hardly an inspiration to his men.
From what I gather, had the Indians kept up the pressure during the retreat to the bluff, they may have over-run Reno then and there.
Which brings me full circle in saying that Benteen--coming upon that mess and with that "note/order" in hand--had to make a decision based on what he found. He made it and, in my opinion, was probably justified in doing so. AS I've said before, had he come upon Reno NOT in danger of collapse on the bluff (perhaps still fighting in the Timber), he would have had less justification in not heading for where Custer was--or where he thought he was! Which is another problem when a command is "split" and their movements are largely uncoordinated..
Warlord--guess I should add that my own marksmanship skills were quite poor. My performance on the range with a .45 probably has yet to be duplicated. Which is why in Vietnam I carried an M-14 instead of a pistol!! How can you fire an entire clip and get only one hit on a full sized target only a few yards away?? Believe me, it can be done. And was done by many of the other officers when we were training at Benning. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 23 2004 : 10:56:16 AM
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For what it's worth, I've known excellent pistol shots that couldn't hit a thing with the .45 automatic pistol the Army mandated for years. They were military and would refer to 'difficulty' with the weapon but with the tone suggesting is was designed and built by gigantic, slow witted aphids in enemy employ under Ft. Hood that were the low bidder. If that was the pistol, I can only say it apparently gave a lot of people trouble and had characteristics not shared with other weapons. Apparently its design was very old and went back to the Philippine revolt and was solely designed to stop wild, drug crazed aborigines rushing you with machetes at close range.
In fairness, others had no problem, but I've never known anyone who said they would choose that pistol above all others for a sidearm. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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Brent
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 23 2004 : 11:35:32 AM
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DC:
You are right--designed to stop the Moros and at close range. With the heavy slug providing the stopping power--not muzzle velocity.
Why they continued with it as the firearm of choice for Officers is a mystery--- |
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BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 23 2004 : 7:30:00 PM
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Not to get too involved in a guns & bullets conversation, the Colt Mod. 1911 was developed as a RESULT of the Phillippine campaign. I do not know if it was ever issued as a prototype, but the impetus for the stopping power/automatic was without a doubt the Moros in said campaign.
Best of wishes,
Billy |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 23 2004 : 8:17:17 PM
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What I said was I'd known good pistol shots who didn't like the .45 auto the Army carried, and found other guns much better. That other people disagree is fine, but that's just what I'd heard. Without any effort, I found this on the Web extolling its reliability and stopping power for a defensive weapon but less than complimentary on its accuracy for target shooting, which seems to be from the same magazine your offer up and could well be the issue these guys had.
http://www.gunsandammomag.com/ga_handguns/defining_handgun_accuracy/
Argue with them. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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Benteen's order
Topic Locked
