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ABridgeTooFar
Private
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 Posted - January 11 2004 : 8:00:45 PM
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Wrangler : "Five companies came down MTC and for whatever motivation have moved to NCR. From Ford B (looking east) the ravines of Deep Coulee and MTC form a 'V' with the NCR at the top. It would seem if we wanted to get thes guys, we would go up both legs of the V."
REPLY : Agreed.
Wrangler : "If an equal number of Indians go up these coulees and our friends from the first split are now coming over NCR to reinforce the effort in north MTC, then there are more Indians to the North versus the South. Why doesn't the 7th continue to go south towards the remainder of the regiment? Or just sit tight because there are too many Indians?"
REPLY : If the Sioux and Cheyenne were a professionally trained army, with officers educated at Sandhurst or West Point, they would have the tactical ability and co-ordination to send an equal number of forces up Medicine Tail Coulee amd Deep Coulee. The Indians were irregulars, however, and it is far more likely that an unequal number of warriors went up each coulee. It is therfore certainly possible that there were many more Sioux and Cheyenne to Custer's south than to his north. And it is also certainly possible that Custer felt he stood a better chance of victory in the area around Calhoun ridge and Last Stand Hill than in the area around Nye-Cartwright ridge and Luce ridge.
WRANGLER : "Given a scenario where all five companies remain together as postulated, and, in order to account for cartridges postulated as being fired by the 7USC on 25 June on Luce Ridge, and NCR, lets say the regiment pusues some alleged Indians previously spotted on the bluffs from MTC to Luce to NCR. Having dealt with the alleged Indians to their satisfaction, the five companies then head down to Ford B, are motivated not to cross and then head north."
REPLY : This scenario that you describe certainly cannot be ruled out, but it would seem to violate the limits of allowable co-incidence. The line of expended cartridges, cartridge cases, saddle parts, etc., seems to run straight from Luce ridge through Nye-Cartwright to Calhoun ridge without a break (and also from Ford B to Nye-Cartwright), and would seem to indicate a continous running battle.
Wrangler :"Your thoughts?"
REPLY : And yours? |
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Wrangler
Lieutenant
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Posted - January 11 2004 : 8:34:02 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by ABridgeTooFar
REPLY: If the Sioux and Cheyenne were a professionally trained army, with officers educated at Sandhurst or West Point, they would have the tactical ability and co-ordination to send an equal number of forces up Medicine Tail Coulee amd Deep Coulee. The Indians were irregulars, however, and it is far more likely that an unequal number of warriors went up each coulee.
Good point and I will concede it to you.
quote:
Originally posted by ABridgeTooFar
It is therfore certainly possible that there were many more Sioux and Cheyenne to Custer's south than to his north. And it is also certainly possible that Custer felt he stood a better chance of victory in the area around Calhoun ridge and Last Stand Hill than in the area around Nye-Cartwright ridge and Luce ridge.
I agree that what you have stated is possible. I can't provide an assessment on probabilty.
quote:
Originally posted by ABridgeTooFar
This scenario that you describe certainly cannot be ruled out, but it would seem to violate the limits of allowable co-incidence.
Indeed. Concur.
quote:
Originally posted by ABridgeTooFar
The line of expended cartridges, cartridge cases, saddle parts, etc., seems to run straight from Luce ridge through Nye-Cartwright to Calhoun ridge without a break (and also from Ford B to Nye-Cartwright), and would seem to indicate a continous running battle.
It is plausible that these artifacts (if associated with the battle) indicate a running fight as you have suggested. Going beyond Medicine Tail Coulee is a perilous adventure cuz things get real controversial from that point forward. I'll watch from the south side and support if I can.
v/r
Wrangler |
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El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 11 2004 : 11:27:55 PM
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One thing that cannot be overlooked is even if 250 warriors went up Deep Coulee and 250 went up MTC, there would still be warriors coming from Reno's field on the east side of the river, being between Reno and Custer. Not to say that the numbers were sufficient to make Custer believe movement to the south wasn't possible (Custer certainly wanted a fight, and if he wanted to move south, he would no problems pitching into these warriors to the south). But there would be more warriors to the south as this group arrived on the scene. And a competent commander of cavalry would probably want to limit their fighting fronts to one if possible, and therefore postured the battalion to do this. Thus, moving north keeps the smaller number heading up Deep Coulee in that same front. In all actuality, they became one front when this happened. When the battalion set up their skirmish line(s) facing south, it occupied all the warriors from DC, MTC and the Reno field.
I really think Custer didn't know what hit him. I don't think he didn't respect his foe, he just probably didn't figure he'd lose. And with his career and temperament, who would? Fighting not to lose it is not the way to win battles. The move north doesn't have to be a result of Custer's mortal wounding. Its possible, but not probable. Nor does it have to be a retreat, or a forced move. I think the move was to reduce the fronts faced by the battalion to one, and Calhoun Hill, I've read, has a pretty good field of fire. I don't think Custer intended to hole up and fight it out on the ridge as he did. I think he chose the best area to engage and still have freedom of movement, and in order to do so, having a company with a clear field of fire and support should be able to do that, and hold open the door for Benteen to arrive. |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
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Rocky76
Corporal
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 11 2004 : 11:44:32 PM
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| Dear El Crab: go there, and see that MTC was a trap...I give Custer enough credit to have seen that. It is possible he sent a couple of Co.'s down towards the river to reconoiter that fact, but it was pretty obvious from the mouth of Cedar Coulee (or more likely from the highpoints above) that it would not be a good idea to try to cross at MTC Ford...Add that to the fact that the village occupied an area further downstream and you have the answer to his moving across NCR and onto the next high point. |
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Rocky76
Corporal
USA
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Posted - January 11 2004 : 11:49:17 PM
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| Bridge Too Far: where do you place Luce Ridge? |
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ABridgeTooFar
Private
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Posted - January 12 2004 : 11:01:16 PM
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Rocky 76: "MTC was a trap. I give Custer enough credit to have seen that...it was pretty obvious from the mouth of Cedar Coulee (or more likely from the highpoints above) that it would not be a good idea to try to cross at MTC ford."
REPLY : True, Custer was attempting a very risky attack by attempting to strike across a river ford with a village on the other side. He could easily be repulsed and then forced to fight a battle on the wrong side of the river. But only a few moments ago he had shouted, "Hurrah, boys, we've caught them napping. Let's finish them off and we can all go home to our station." During the Civil War, Custer was notorious for making risky attacks against overwhelming odds. He had even brought newspaper correspondent Mark Kellogg along, to record his triumph. Most likely Custer would have gambled that he could cross Ford B with all five companies, and follow this with a stirring charge through the village.
Rocky 76 : "it is possible he sent a couple of Co.s down toward the river to reconoiter..."
REPLY : If Custer sends only two companies toward the river, then it is obvious that he doesn't want to fight his battle on the flatland west of the river; he wants to fight his foe on the east side of the Littlehorn. For all he could suceed in doing with this feint is to lure the Sioux and Cheyenne to the other side of the river. If Custer seriously intended this from the start, then he was insane. The east side of the river is full of coulees and ravines that make a cavalry charge impossible and a defensive stand extremely difficult The main advantage of the Cavalry's Springfield carbine, its long range, is largely negated in such terrain, and the short-range Winchester repeating rifle, possessed in abundance by the Indians, becomes a far superior weapon.
Rocky 76 : "Add this to the fact that the village occupied a further area downstream and you have the answer to his moving across NCR and on to the next high point."
REPLY : At the time Custer is moving across Nye-Cartwright and on to Calhoun ridge, the battle is already raging. The trail is littered with expended cartridges and cartridge cases. There is absolutely no point in trying to further outflank the village once the battle has begun and the element of surprise is lost.
Rocky 76 : "Where do you place Luce ridge?"
REPLY : North of MTC and south of NCR. |
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Rocky76
Corporal
USA
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Posted - January 12 2004 : 11:29:20 PM
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I agree that as he moves across NCR he is already involved as much as Reno has been in the valley, I figure at least 7 dead and who knows how many wounded. I am not sure from your statement where you place Luce Ridge, but it is part of the same terrain feature as NCR and is just to the NW of the dam.
I am not sure how many casings have actually been found in this area and would lean towards a low figure (at least compared to what W. Boyes would have us believe). Cartwright and Blummer account for exactly 105...Throw away any that Luce claimed, except the ones he found with Cartwright...which is two. He may have found a couple more with Osten, but those are suspect also. I am not suggesting that there were not hundreds of legitimate casings found in the area, I am just saying that the recording method was not acceptable for making positive statements based on these "finds"....Luce however made stuff up, and that is a fact proven by the statements found in the research records attributed to him.
When Blummer found the first 19 cartridges with Frank Bethune in 1928, Bethune told him, "little boys have been picking up shells here for years...they carry them around for a while and then their mothers throw them away." Neither Blummer or Cartwright were ever convinced that anything happened at MTC. |
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El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 13 2004 : 12:43:17 AM
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Well, the Indian accounts mention light firing at places that most likely are the upper ridges above MTC. And would they be thrown away at or around these ridges?
Blummer found them and Bethune told him cartridges had been found here before and scattered elsewhere? Is that what I gathered from the last paragraph? And by saying they weren't convinced anything happened at MTC, do you mean near the ford or above, on the heights? |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
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ABridgeTooFar
Private
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Posted - January 13 2004 : 12:57:17 AM
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Fine, but the point is that fighting it out in the gullies and ravines east of the Little Bighorn is the very LAST thing that George Custer wanted to do. Ideally, he wanted to charge through the flat terrain of the village, recreating his 1868 triumph at Wa****a, burning tepees, shooting Indian ponies and generally wreaking havoc. The ford at Medicine Tail Coulee was the ideal place to cross the river, providing that Reno could distract the Sioux and Cheyenne long enough to allow him to get across unseen.
Failing this, Custer would want to get out of the area as quickly as possible. He would want to get back to Reno, Benteen and the packs. There was nothing to be gained by going further north.
Only if both alternatives were utterly impossible would Custer even consider making a stand.
But a scenario involving three companies at Luce ridge and two at Ford B all coming under attack and all making a mad dash toward Calhoun ridge is utterly irrational. Custer may have been a flamboyent daredevil, but he was not crazy.
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El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 13 2004 : 5:13:10 PM
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Well, many will contend the move north wasn't a "mad dash" at all, but an orderly and lightly harassed march. The image of Custer's battalion being driven anywhere in the opening phases has been mostly dismissed.
If he was driven there and had to make a mad dash (i.e. on the defensive), why were his two wings so far apart? Many will also agree that Calhoun Hill was a much better position for his battalion than Custer Hill, since it afforded them more room to position, closer proximity to the rest of the regiment, and a better field of fire.
I don't know if MTC was the best place to attack. In order to charge, its probably best to have an open field to gain speed. Would this have been possible on the village side of MTC? They'd quickly be in the midst of lodges and warriors who were gathering there to fire back at them.
I think Custer aborted any thought of a charge by his battalion any time soon, and was looking for other options. |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
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ABridgeTooFar
Private
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Posted - January 14 2004 : 11:09:08 PM
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What other options were there?
I can't believe that Custer was trying to lure the Sioux and Cheyenne to the east side of the river and fight a set-piece battle with them in such unfavorable terrain.
Gray, Fox, Skelnar and Michno all try to convince us that Custer deployed three companies on Luce ridge.
Yet the only piece of evidence that all four of them use to support this theory is two letters from Russell White Bear, a Crow translator for Curley, who hadn't even born yet when the Little Bighorn battle was fought.
Neither of Russell white Bear's letters even mention Luce Ridge. The letters, both written after Curley's death, say that Curley, after crossing MTC, saw Custer send a grey-horse company toward the ford and a lone rider on a sorrel horse to the north, and then go north with the other four companies. It was at this point, the letters say, that Curley left the Custer column.
How Gray, Fox et al can conclude from this second-hand account of the battle (which is in direct contradiction to what Curley said in his three interviews by Walter Camp), that Custer deployed three companies on Luce ridge, is certainly a mystery.
In Curley's interviews with Camp, he said that Custer's column went to Ford B, was repulsed there, and continued on to Calhoun ridge, with a large force of Sioux and Cheyenne in hot pursuit. After watching Custer confer with his brother Tom and deploy some men on the ridge, according to the Camp interviews, Curley escaped from the battle.
Shouldn't more credence be placed on Curley's first-hand account than on the second-hand statements of someone who wasn't even at the battle, and who didn't write them until fifty years afterwards? |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 15 2004 : 12:17:42 AM
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Point of order. Anything not written by or recorded by Curley isn't first hand. A translator gets you no closer than second hand, and even there you have instances of translators having their work corrected. Very iffy stuff, whatever Curley's integrity and intent. Camp's story sounds simpler and more realistic than the others, though. An attack, a rout.
Ole' Windbag |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
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ABridgeTooFar
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Posted - January 15 2004 : 9:07:00 PM
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The story gets even more complicated. With an ironic twist, the man who translated Curley's statements in his 1908 interview with Camp was none other than the ubiquitous Russell White Bear. So, we have two diametricaly opposing statements from the same source -- one made in 1908 when Curley was still alive, and the other made in 1926 and again in 1938 after Curley had died.
Skelnar, Gray, Fox and Michno all treat Russell White Bear's 1926/ 1938 version of Curley's account of the battle as an unquestionable truth even though there was no live Curley around to either affirm or contradict it. The statement made by Russell White Bear in 1908 would have to be judged as far more reliable, if only because Curley could have it read back to him to see if this is what he actually said.
These authors then take one highly questionable piece of evidence and they blow it up into an unsustainable theory of how the Custer battle "must have" unfolded, one which is widely believed, but which doesn't have a scrap of proof to back it up. Russell White Bear has one company going to the ford and four continuing on to the north, so how do people derive from this that two companies went to the ford and three stayed behind at Luce ridge?
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El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 16 2004 : 06:20:20 AM
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| Because Indian accounts, other than Curley, said they saw the Gray Horse Troop closer to the river. I don't know offhand how F company is generally accepted to have gone with E, but some believe they were one wing while C, I and L were the other. So if E made a move towards the river, F probably would have supported it. And even if E and F weren't linked, and despite my amateur understanding of cavalry maneuvers in 1876, I don't believe a move by E towards the river would not involve a supporting unit. |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
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Posted - January 16 2004 : 09:41:15 AM
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quote:
Originally posted by ABridgeTooFar
The story gets even more complicated. With an ironic twist, the man who translated Curley's statements in his 1908 interview with Camp was none other than the ubiquitous Russell White Bear. So, we have two diametricaly opposing statements from the same source -- one made in 1908 when Curley was still alive, and the other made in 1926 and again in 1938 after Curley had died.
Inconsistencies are common in historical accounts. One has only to look at the Martin stories. For instance, Martin never mentioned meeting Boston Custer in his Court of Inquiry testimony, nor did he say that his horse had been wounded during his ride. That all comes from the Graham interviews, taken 50 years later. The Walter Camp interviews of Curley have plenty of inconsistencies themselves.
quote:
Skelnar, Gray, Fox and Michno all treat Russell White Bear's 1926/ 1938 version of Curley's account of the battle as an unquestionable truth even though there was no live Curley around to either affirm or contradict it. The statement made by Russell White Bear in 1908 would have to be judged as far more reliable, if only because Curley could have it read back to him to see if this is what he actually said.
The interview is written in English and Curley could speak only Crow, so any hypothetical "reading" wouldn't be getting around translation problems.
quote:
These authors then take one highly questionable piece of evidence and they blow it up into an unsustainable theory of how the Custer battle "must have" unfolded, one which is widely believed, but which doesn't have a scrap of proof to back it up. Russell White Bear has one company going to the ford and four continuing on to the north, so how do people derive from this that two companies went to the ford and three stayed behind at Luce ridge?
Well, Bridge, I've noticed that your own theory constantly uses scary words like "Custer would have" or "must have" done some thing, and they're also noticeably barren of supporting evidence, except for some selected Curley interviews. Fox & co. do use Indian accounts in reconstructing what they think happened, and your contention that their theories are "unsustainable" doesn't really hold up. OF COURSE they're sustainable. There wouldn't be so much contention about what happened to Custer unless there were a lot of theories that were sustainable.
And if you're looking for "proof," then you'd better run as far away from the Little Bighorn as possible. There is barely anything that can be "proved" about this battle. All that can be done, is go where the evidence takes us, and establish what *probably* happened. Any theory, however, will inevitably have to ignore some evidence ---- just as you ignore the various Indian informants who maintained that Custer *never* approached the ford, but stayed up on the bluffs all the way to his death.
R. Larsen
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El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 16 2004 : 10:57:13 PM
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| Some of the authors are good about explaining why some accounts say one thing happened, and the other accounts from a different source say it didn't happen, like the move to the river. Michno is one example. He says it doesn't contradict the accounts, but rather, proves only that one warrior saw it, and another did not. |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
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Rocky76
Corporal
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 17 2004 : 3:40:47 PM
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Blummer and Cartwright were strongly opposed to there having been a move by any of the Co.’s toward the river at MTC.
I have read these posts and see that we are arguing over what the current crop of researcher/authors are stating….let me out of here, please. Until the complete history of NCR and MTC artifacts are eventually published, including actual findings made at those locations (who and when), all statements that are based on what has been published will remain—opinions.
When Don Rickey and Vaughn first took metal detectors onto the flat at MTC ford there was much resistance from the “old school”….It was even suggested at one point that they were recovering artifacts from the WP episode, which is highly unlikely, but possible. Neither Vaughn nor Rickey seem to have been adept at locating their finds on proper maps, as shown by the work Jerome Greene published, although some of that is Jerome’s fault also. Obviously some artifacts were located in the area of ford B, but of what significance are they? On his first trip to the field in 1998, my son found a three pronged fork with an elegant ( but badly weathered) wooden handle on the flat just above the river at Ford B (he was, I believe, 10 at the time). We had the fork dated by an expert (1870-1890) and if it was a genuine battle artifact, it was probably an officer’s. The problem here is that MTC was used by passengers from the CB&Q RR to travel onto the battlefield for picnics….I also have a photo (I forget the date, but I believe from the 1890’s) showing the hillsides at Ford B covered with people attending a re-enactment…perhaps the fork was dropped at that time, or perhaps it was lost by an Indian woman on the evening of June 25th, 1876. Who knows, as it was a main trail from the battle back to the camps. My point being, almost everyone that visited the field for the first 30 years crossed at MTC.
As for Indian boys carrying cartridge casings away from NCR…. That is a statement of Frank Bethune to Joe Blummer that ends, “and their mothers eventually threw them away”….just like my mom did with my Mickey Mantle Rookie card. How many Indian boys and how many casings???
Personally, I believe the whole column moved onto NCR from Luce Ridge by way of Blummer Pass and at that point two companies were dispatched across Butler ridge to drive those warriors that were harassing the column from the small ravines in that area. This detachment (whatever companies you like) pushed westward across Deep Coulee and back up onto the ridge at Calhoun, suffering several casualties before rejoining the main column. Another company was deployed as skirmishers to protect the rear of the column as they crossed what Fox and Doug Scott named “Henryville”. In fairness to Edward Luce, he proposed the movement across Butler ridge in his speech to the Chicago Corral of the Westerners….Henryville is obvious from the artifacts found there in 85’…by the way, Ralph Cartwright tried for years to get Don Rickey to look there.
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 17 2004 : 3:55:58 PM
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How many admitted picnics and re-enactments can take place on a battlefield before it becomes obvious there is no way to tell when items appeared, or who left them, moved them, dumped them?
It's not been proven that the field was knowingly salted with shells for tourists to find, but the rumors are there and if there was benefit to it, likely. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
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Rocky76
Corporal
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 17 2004 : 4:16:49 PM
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| huh??? Is this science? If so it has been contaminated! |
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El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
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Posted - January 17 2004 : 4:54:06 PM
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Well, I don't know anyone claiming soldiers went down to the river. A move down towards Butler Ridge to drive away threatening warriors to the column's flank makes sense.
When I posted this thread, it wasn't to only discuss what moves to the river occurred. It was to discuss theories on trooper movement in the MTC area, or phase of the battle. It doesn't have to involve soldiers trying to or even making it to the river, or ever intending to. I consider the ridges above MTC to be in play on this topic. |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
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ABridgeTooFar
Private
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Posted - January 17 2004 : 8:31:11 PM
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ANONYMOUS POSTER 8169 : "Well, Bridge, I've noticed that your own theory constantly uses such scary words as 'Custer would have or must have' done some such thing, and they're also barren of supporting evidence, besides some selected Curley interviews."
REPLY : You are absolutely right about this, anon. I ought to have presented this supporting evidence in my earlier posts:
1.) Trumpeteer Martin said that he heard Custer, while on the bluffs overlooking the village, turn to his cavalrymen and shout "WE WILL GO DOWN AND MAKE A CROSSING AND CAPTURE THE VILLAGE!" The troops responded by taking off their hats and cheering.
Martin identified the point at which he left Custer's column as a location in Medicine tail coulee about 600 yards from the river. All five companies were still together. Luce ridge was about a mile back from this point, and Custer had left no troops there. Martin also stated that, while riding to meet Benteen, he glanced back and saw all five companies falling back from the river, and the Indians firing from the far bank.
2.) A Minneconjou warrior named Flying By said in an interview that the troops at Ford B acted as though they would cross and attack the village. He noticed these cavalrymen carried four or five flags.
3.) He Dog, an Ogalalla, stated in an interview, that he saw the troops at ford B moving as though to attack the lower end of the Indian camp.
4.) Foolish Elk, another Ogallala, stated that he saw the troops at Ford B sitting on their horses and firing at the village. He stated that he, along with an "overwhelming number" of warriors, crossed the river and drove the soldiers back. He said that, in their retreat, the cavalrymen kept to the ridges, while he and the other Indians kept abreast of them in the ravines and gullies, and got around their front and rear, and also to positions east of the soldiers.
ANONYMOUS POSTER 8169 : "Any theory, however, will inevitably have to ignore some evidence -- just as you ignore the various Indian informants who maintain that Custer *never* approached the ford, but stayed up on the bluffs all the way to his death."
REPLY : I know that Gall very strongly denied that Custer ever reached the river, but wasn't he busy fighting Reno at first, and didn't he therefore miss the early stages of the Custer battle? With so many Indians saying their was a battle at ford B, it would be iompossible to deny that at least some fighting had taken place there.
ANONYMOUS POSTER 8169 : "Fox & co. do use Indian accounts in reconstructing what they think happened, and your contention that their theories are 'unsustainable' really hold up."
REPLY : I am not attacking their entire work, just the leaky boat they all seem to be jumping on when they place three of Custer's companies sitting and waiting on Luce ridge. In point of fact, there ar NO Indian accounts which assert that this is what happened. Not even Russell White Bear says this.
ANONYMOUS POSTER 8169 : "Inconsistoncies are common in historidcal accounts.....And if your looking for 'proof', then you'd better run as far away from the Little Big Horn as possible. There is barely anything that can be 'proved' about this battle. All that can be done, is go where the evidence takes us, and establish what *probably* happened."
REPLY : Agreed.
ANONYMOUS POSTER 8169 : "The interview is written in English and Curley could speak only Crow, so any hypotheitical 'reading' still wouldn't be getting around translation problems."
REPLY : Yes. but the fact remains that Curley was at the battle and Russell White Bear wasn't, and how reliable can a theory be when its only support comes from an "eyewitness" who wasn't even there? |
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El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 18 2004 : 01:41:19 AM
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There is testimony that there were troops farther up the ridges. Some said it seemed like thousands of soldiers suddenly appeared on the ridge above the ford than the Gray Horse Troop, or something like that. When I can get the books that have these accounts, I'll point ya in the right direction.
Its doubtful all five companies fought in a line of battle near the river. That's generally not how a battle is opened. It would be foolish to commit all your troops without a reserve element to plug the gaps and stay on the offensive.
Custer yelling to his troops to get their spirits up is not a definite verification of his plan of action.
Maybe Michno wanted to view the accounts as non-fatalistic, but his interpretation of all the accounts put together don't support a battalion driven north by hordes of warriors. Neither does Fox. That's not to say they're right and you're wrong, but the new thinking is a 180 from what the original thoughts were on the fight.
Its not that the three companies were necessarily sitting there doing nothing. They probably fired on warriors, moved around, etc. But then again, they could have just sat there, doing nothing, and they could have moved down there with the other companies. But some accounts spoke of more soldiers appearing on the ridge above, seeming like a much larger amount than they really were. |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
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ABridgeTooFar
Private
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Posted - January 18 2004 : 10:47:32 AM
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EL CRAB : "Custer yelling at his troops to keep their spirits up is not definite verification of his plan of action."
REPLY : Martin's account goes on to say that after Custer made his speech about crossing the river and capturing the village:
'The consensus of opinion seemed to be among the officers that if this could be done the Indians would have to surrender when they would return, in order not to fire upon their women and children.'
This sounds like a definite plan. If the Lt. Col. had some other plan in mind, what was it and what evidence of it is there?
EL CRAB : "It is doubtful that all five companies fought in a line of battle near the river...It would be foolish to deploy all your troops without a reserve element to plug the gaps..."
REPLY : There is no way to know exactly what tactical formation was used by 7th Cav in trying to cross Ford B. All I am saying is that all five companies were in the same general area of the ford, and not a mile and a half away at Luce ridge, a distance well beyond the maximum range of Springfield carbines.
EL CRAB : "(Michno's and Fox's) interpretation of all the accounts put together don't support a battalion driven north by hordes of warriors."
REPLY : What is much more likely is that, instead of being 'driven north by hordes', Custer was pulling back the way Reno was, responding to tactical threats to his flanks by withdrawing to a more defensible position.
EL CRAB : "Some (Indians) said it seemed like thousands of soldiers suddenly appeared on the ridge above the ford than the Grey Horse Troop..."
REPLY : Which ridge?
How do we know this is Luce ridge and not Butler ridge, and how do we know these troops spotted on the ridge were not originally at Ford B before withdrawing to the ridge?
If Custer seperated his five companies ito two battalions stationed over a mile apart, why don't Curley or Martin mention it? |
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - January 18 2004 : 3:43:15 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by ABridgeTooFar
1.) Trumpeteer Martin said that he heard Custer, while on the bluffs overlooking the village, turn to his cavalrymen and shout "WE WILL GO DOWN AND MAKE A CROSSING AND CAPTURE THE VILLAGE!"
The fact that Custer didn't, even though the ford was said to be only lightly defended by Indians, suggests that he had had a change in plan by the time he got there --- if that ever was a plan. In Martin's Court of Inquiry testimony the version of the quote is: "Courage boys, we've got them. The Indians are asleep in their tepees." Rather less informative than what you've got there, and it comes from when Martin's memory was freshest.
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Martin also stated that, while riding to meet Benteen, he glanced back and saw all five companies falling back from the river, and the Indians firing from the far bank.
I remember him saying he saw Reno's men fighting on his way back, but don't recall at all him seeing a Custer withdrawal from the river. Where did he say this?
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2.) A Minneconjou warrior named Flying By said in an interview that the troops at Ford B acted as though they would cross and attack the village. He noticed these cavalrymen carried four or five flags.
It's not clear where Flying By saw these flags, or even if he saw them at all. Camp's wording is ambiguous, and Flying By might only be giving hearsay. Flying By goes on to say, propria persona, "When I got to Custer, Indians had been fighting QUITE AWHILE." By that time, both Custer and the Indians were on the other side of the river. I'm doubtful whether Flying By was really a witness to what happened at Ford B.
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3.) He Dog, an Ogalalla, stated in an interview, that he saw the troops at ford B moving as though to attack the lower end of the Indian camp.
He also says, "There was no fighting while Custer down near river but a few shots down there. No general fighting; 15 or 20 Sioux on east side of river, and some soldiers replied, but not much shooting there." I believe it's your contention that Custer's movement at Ford B failed "because of stiff resistance of the Sioux and Cheyenne on the other side of the river". Does He Dog really support you, or Fox?
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4.) Foolish Elk, another Ogallala, stated that he saw the troops at Ford B sitting on their horses and firing at the village. He stated that he, along with an "overwhelming number" of warriors, crossed the river and drove the soldiers back. He said that, in their retreat, the cavalrymen kept to the ridges, while he and the other Indians kept abreast of them in the ravines and gullies, and got around their front and rear, and also to positions east of the soldiers.
According to Foolish Elk, "These men sat on their horses and fired across the river into the village, *without getting into it*." He goes on to state that Indians "soon came up in large numbers," which implies that they were not in large numbers before. Foolish Elk says nothing about "driving" the soldiers back; he says simply that they "followed on after Custer".
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REPLY : I know that Gall very strongly denied that Custer ever reached the river, but wasn't he busy fighting Reno at first, and didn't he therefore miss the early stages of the Custer battle? With so many Indians saying their was a battle at ford B, it would be iompossible to deny that at least some fighting had taken place there.
A conclusion I share, but I was just saying.....
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REPLY : I am not attacking their entire work, just the leaky boat they all seem to be jumping on when they place three of Custer's companies sitting and waiting on Luce ridge. In point of fact, there ar NO Indian accounts which assert that this is what happened. Not even Russell White Bear says this.
Two Eagles is pretty adamant that the soldiers did not attack the village in one huge unit. In a Camp interview, he says that "Soldiers came down from [Nye-Cartwright] to a point near [Ford B] and were driven to [Calhoun Hill]. There were a few [who] went from [Nye-Cartwright] to [Calhoun Hill], [who] did so when the main body of the troops went to [Ford] B." (Hardorff, Lakota Recollections, pg 143).
R. Larsen
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - January 18 2004 : 4:00:19 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by ABridgeTooFar
REPLY : Martin's account goes on to say that after Custer made his speech about crossing the river and capturing the village:
'The consensus of opinion seemed to be among the officers that if this could be done the Indians would have to surrender when they would return, in order not to fire upon their women and children.'
This sounds like a definite plan. If the Lt. Col. had some other plan in mind, what was it and what evidence of it is there?
The fact that Custer did not capture the village, despite it being only lightly defended, per He Dog. Martin's English wasn't so good either, so his ability to judge a "consensus of opinion" is questionable. His poor English is probably why he was sent back with a written note, while Voss, Sharrow, and Kanipe were all asked to relay verbal orders.
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If Custer seperated his five companies ito two battalions stationed over a mile apart, why don't Curley or Martin mention it?
Curley did mention it, according to Russell White Bear's letter; as for Martin, he left before anybody believes this took place. That Custer's five companies were divided into two separate battalions is confirmed by Kanipe, Edgerly, and Moylan, so one would expect them to operate at least somewhat independently, and according to Two Eagles, they did.
R. Larsen
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MTC: Basic Theories
