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Wrangler
Lieutenant
Status: offline |
 Posted - October 23 2003 : 9:25:13 PM
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DC,quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
Attacking a camp you've not seen over land you don't know, how could you possbly conclude that a main force has the most risk before extensive contact?
You are on Step Three. We are somewhere between Steps One and Two. Wait for us to join you or come back and assist.
quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
How are (you) defining "main"?
Good Step One question. This also brings up an important point in this scenario exploration process--and that is definition of terms. As a proposed starting point, I would offer the following as some initial temporary entries in our forum dictionary:
main attack -- The principal attack or effort into which the commander throws the full weight of the offensive power at his disposal. An attack directed against the chief objective of the campaign or battle. (FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, pg. 1-95)(This is a US military/NATO definition)
main effort — The unit, ... axis, avenue of approach, ... the senior commander has determined has the most important task and purpose at that time, whose success will make the most difference in the accomplishment of the higher commander's overall mission or objective. Commanders at all levels should designate a point of main effort along with supporting efforts. This helps them and their staffs to allocate resources accordingly, providing focus to the operation while setting priorities and determining risks, promoting unity of effort, and facilitating and understanding of the commander's intent. There is only one main effort at any time in the operation, although the main effort may change as the situation changes to take advantage of opportunities or to avert failure. In the offense, the commander will conduct the main attack where the main effort has been designated. The unit(s) conducting the main attack normally will shift throughout the operation.(FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, pg. 1-95)(This is a US military/NATO definition)
I will attempt to determine if any stated definitions existed for the period c. 1876.
quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
This project strikes me as layman's game theory,
My Merriam-Webster sez; "Game Theory -- the analysis of a situation involving conflicting interests (as in business or military strategy) in terms of gains and losses among opposing players."
You may have stumbled on something here. If by layman you mean that you need a degree in this, then an overwhelming percentage of Commander's throughout history are laymen when it comes to "game theory". My degree is in history and Inwit's (I assume) is in Law. So maybe we are just the right guys to look at these other laymen. 
quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
but it also strikes me that Gray already has done most of this work. His whole approach was to eliminate the impossible...
A physics problem...
It is 12:12 25 June 1876. According to Gray, Benteen's battalion departs a point on the ground at what time? From that same point on the ground, what time does Reno's Battalion depart? From that same point on the ground, what time does Custer's Battalion depart? From that same point on the ground, what time does McDougall and the pack train of depart?
A layman's questions: How long is a cavalry regiment of 12 companies in column of fours plus 140+ pack mules? How long does it take this regiment to pass a point on the ground? Has Gray eliminated the impossible? Has he done most the work--correctly?
quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
If by "evidence" you refer to shell casings......
Uh, no...Again from Merriam-Webster, I refer to this spectrum: "evidence--1 a : an outward sign : INDICATION b : something that furnishes proof : TESTIMONY; specifically : something legally submitted to a tribunal to ascertain the truth of a matter."
v/r
Wrangler
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 23 2003 : 10:44:56 PM
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Okay. A company is not an exact unit, nor regiment, and shouldn't really appear in your study. Benteen had, in conjunction with the packtrain, I think, the most potential combatants. Is HE the main unit? Reno attacked first, is he? Custer was the commander, did he have the main unit? The full weight at his command - however you define it, as the 7th or his five companies - was NEVER brought to bear. Was there a 'main' attack at all by your definitions?
And: what was the specific point of the potential battle that would designate a specific goal that would illustrate the main attack? To so discourage the hostiles by inconvenience and loss of a burned and pillaged village they'd return to the reservation? To hold the women and children as extortion to the Army's goals, whatever they were? To kill all they could get away with under cover of battle so the subject wouldn't arise again?
If the pack train's first mule putters past your face at noon and the middle mule at 1245 and the last at 1312, when did the train arrive? They 'left' a point when the first mule obeyed the order.
I have disagreements with Gray, but he's hard to argue with till Custer's arrival at Weir Point. Gray clearly, I think, refers to the lead of the individual columns as the unit demarking arrival at a point. Would it not be quicker to, rather than re-invent the wheel, do a systematic analysis of Gray's time line as the reference to which all must be compared and discarded or accepted? Most of us have Gray's book.
And you may well be the guys to do this; layman is not pejorative terminology.
The question is, as it always is hovering over the Greasy Grass, why do it all? To say enjoyment or interest in the battle is not compelling. It's the sort of thing done to achieve a goal or desired result, admitted or not. No other battle in history, no other disaster, attracts this sort of thing, and I think it bears asking the question why it does. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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Wrangler
Lieutenant
Status: offline |
Posted - October 24 2003 : 02:03:57 AM
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DC,quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
Okay. A company is not an exact unit, nor regiment, and shouldn't really appear in your study.
hunh? 'splain your thought here. I ain't trackin.
quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
Benteen had, in conjunction with the packtrain, I think, the most potential combatants. Is HE the main unit?
no...but he could have been later...if the initial main attack lost steam and Benteen and Custer were able to chit chat.
quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
Reno attacked first, is he?
no. But it sounds like Reno thought he was (see discussion on "Support with the whole outfit". But the witnesses who could answer that question are dead so can't I prove it to my satisfaction.
quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
Custer was the commander, did he have the main unit
prolly yes. But the witnesses who could answer that question are dead so can't I prove it to my satisfaction.
quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
The full weight at his command - however you define it, as the 7th or his five companies - was NEVER brought to bear.
War's like that sometimes. Don't seem fair now does it.
quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
Was there a 'main' attack at all by your definitions?
Prolly. But the witnesses who could answer that question are dead so can't I prove it to my satisfaction.
quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
And: what was the specific point of the potential battle that would designate a specific goal that would illustrate the main attack? To so discourage the hostiles by inconvenience and loss of a burned and pillaged village they'd return to the reservation? To hold the women and children as extortion to the Army's goals, whatever they were? To kill all they could get away with under cover of battle so the subject wouldn't arise again?
dunno for sure--all the witnesses are dead. All of these questions are good ones to explore. What do you think?
quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
If the pack train's first mule putters past your face at noon and the middle mule at 1245 and the last at 1312, when did the train arrive? They 'left' a point when the first mule obeyed the order.
That's a good start. Now where did the mules begin moving from to get to that start point? [hint: it's the opposite of "in the front" of the regiment].
quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
I have disagreements with Gray,...
You are a wise man.
quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
but he's hard to argue with till Custer's arrival at Weir Point.
Is it cuz Gray is dead? Or do you mean, to argue with his logic using logic is hard.
quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
Gray clearly, I think, refers to the lead of the individual columns as the unit demarking arrival at a point.
Agree, he is clearly doing that. Crack open the book and look at the chart 'splainin THE point where all those column leads are at 12:12.
quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
Would it not be quicker to, rather than re-invent the wheel, do a systematic analysis of Gray's time line as the reference to which all must be compared and discarded or accepted? Most of us have Gray's book.
That's a good idea too and I'm up for that...IF you are willing to reconsider this statement: "he's hard to argue with till Custer's arrival at Weir Point". If not, let's just agree to disagree right now and avoid the pain.
quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
And you may well be the guys to do this; layman is not pejorative terminology.
waddayamean you guys--ain't you gonna help?
quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
The question is, as it always is hovering over the Greasy Grass, why do it all? To say enjoyment or interest in the battle is not compelling. It's the sort of thing done to achieve a goal or desired result, admitted or not. No other battle in history, no other disaster, attracts this sort of thing, and I think it bears asking the question why it does.
Moths to the flame...and that's all she wrote.
v/r
Wrangler |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
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Posted - October 24 2003 : 03:18:04 AM
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The numbers of men in each of the twelve companies varied widely, so the term 'company' as a measurable unit has no value. "Men" would.
I don't get the point about Custer and Benteen's units leaving at 1212. Of course, they cannot occupy the same space at the same time, but I'd think Gray meant the whole regiment started moving and as soon as feasible Benteen angled off to the left. I don't get the great significance here. Are you calling attention to McDougall's remark about twenty minutes later? Meaning twenty minutes after the last horse left or the first horse moved? The train was a mess and he got a late start twenty minutes after the first horse led out, I'd say. It wouldn't take all that long for the train's way to be clear if the horses trotted off or even at a fast walk. Gray says four knots, roughly. If true, columns of four would have cleared the area before twenty minutes, I'd think. Only about 500 men, the rest with the train. That's what? Twenty five soldiers a minute? In fours? I'm either old or really tired (or stupid), but I don't see the issue here. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
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El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 24 2003 : 06:30:21 AM
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Custer's battalions traveled next to each other, in three columns with the packtrain to the middle rear.
Custer
Reno McDougall
Benteen
Benteen wasn't in charge of the pack train, but since he was either believed to be or actually identified by Custer as closest to it, he was sent orders to bring it up. Benteen's battalion did not initially comprise his 3 companies, B Company and the allotted troopers from the rest of the companies. Custer had the largest force, and since he is the commander of the regiment in the field, I'd say that qualifies his 5 companies as the best candidate for the main attack.
DC: I actually derive enjoyment from reading and talking about the Battle of the Little Big Horn. I don't believe we'll ever reach a conclusion on what happened for sure, and when I talk of it, I only do so to present ideas and theories. It doesn't mean I'll one day decide I've solved the fight. But I do achieve a high level of enjoyment and interest from reading and discussing LBH. But I can appreciate why you don't understand it, or find this to be a compelling argument for discussing theories that cannot be 100% proven. Different strokes for different folks, I guess. |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
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inwit
Corporal
Status: offline |
Posted - October 24 2003 : 3:11:09 PM
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A note on Gray:
In my opinion he is useful if you don't take his conclusions exactly. (12:12 pm, etc.). What he does, to my mind show, is that the timing of Reno's retreat and the intensification of Custer's battle coincide (which is the common sense opinion). I don't necessarily agree with all his points and assumptions, but the fact that Custer was at or near MTC (with some portion of his forces, not necessarily personally), at the time of Reno's retreat is an assumption I make. Then the huge body of warriors comming at Custer from the river bottom and from the bluffs seperating Custer and Reno becomes a crucial point in the overall battle, where any assumptions or plan Custer had is "out the window" and the various commanders must make independent decisions. (Independent in the sense of not tactical adjustments in furtherance of an understood plan - see discussion regarding assumptions - but rather actions to address an entirely new situation).
Thus, Gray, I believe, supports the proposition that Reno's decision to retreat to the bluffs is the decisive moment in the entire battle of the Little Big Horn.
Can we agree on this or not? If not, then why? |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
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vet777a
Sargent
Status: offline |
Posted - October 24 2003 : 5:04:49 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by inwit
I don't necessarily agree with all his points and assumptions, but the fact that Custer was at or near MTC (with some portion of his forces, not necessarily personally), at the time of Reno's retreat is an assumption I make.
inwit: If I understand you correctly then I think you believe Custer did not know that Reno was in trouble when the attempt to cross MTF was made. If thats true, then that would be Custer's support move. If so, why only two companies, E and F? Why not four companies to make a stronger showing holding one in reserve to wait upon Benteen. Unless he wanted two companies to hit the North end of the village to protect against fleeing; and to perhaps capture women and children trying to escape.
If it was a planned support move then it was a very poor plan because Custer did not know that MTC existed until they came upon it.
I know it goes against what many believe, but I still think that Custer knew Reno was in trouble. I know this throws off Gray's timeframes, but not that much. And, who was the official timekeeper of this affair? Three lodgepoles and the sun? |
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inwit
Corporal
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Posted - October 24 2003 : 5:55:35 PM
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A distinction has to be drawn between Reno "being in trouble" and Reno retreating leaving the entire hostile force to suddenly materialize against Custer.
But I agree the time frames are important. One point in this regard:
Think about why Custer made the famous remark "We've caught em' napping!" There wouldn't be a quiet village of women and children after Reno's attack, would there? Panic would have already started. Yet Custer saw a quiet village with women and children "out and about" doing normal daily activities.
This must mean that Custer was ahead of the time frame most have assumed. (The idea of seeing Custer on the bluffs watching Reno in the skirmish line). Perhaps Custer was at MTC while Reno was still on the skirmish line. (Or close to that time).
Reno's problems might have developed after Custer had already deployed his forces. (More on this later). The retreat would have left Custer dangerously exposed - a couple of companies at or across MTC ford, whould have to retreat slowly, there is danger of being outflanked from the south side bluffs and the north side crossing at the far end of the village.
But this comes down to specific questions of timing. Realize, again, Boston Custer was slightly ahead of Benteen, yet he gets through to die on Last Stand Hill.
Thus, I accept Gray's timing as pretty close to a "bottom line" in the generic sense and not as a literal fact to use like a train schedule. |
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vet777a
Sargent
Status: offline |
Posted - October 24 2003 : 7:31:28 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by inwit
Think about why Custer made the famous remark "We've caught em' napping!"
inwit: I appreciate your comments on this. I will get back with you on your ideas. I do question "we've caught them napping." Correct me if I am wrong but was it not Martini who said Custer said this? It is presumed that W.W. Cooke wrote the "come quick" note to Benteen for Martini because Martini did not have a very good command of the English language. He did not trust him to verbally communicate that message. I wonder if he heard Custer right or if Martini made up that statement, or if Custer said "they caught us napping"..? |
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El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 25 2003 : 04:25:32 AM
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I don't think the "we've caught them napping" can be taken literally. If Custer said it, he may have said it to encourage his battalion. The village didn't have to be quiet, it could have been in disarray. Custer could have been alluding to the fact that the regiment had struck a village by surprise, which would lead me to believe that he knew Reno was engaged and the village was not prepared for it.
Its also possible that Custer saw the village BEFORE Reno's battalion was spotted by the village inhabitants. Either way, his "napping" comment did not necessarily mean he thought the village's population was asleep, only that they were clearly not aware his regiment was so close.
Was it even Martini that said Custer said this? Was he the only one? Perhaps Kanipe or some of the stragglers who found their way back to Reno rather than dying with Custer reported what Custer said. |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
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Posted - October 25 2003 : 10:49:27 AM
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quote:
Originally posted by El Crab
Was it even Martini that said Custer said this? Was he the only one? Perhaps Kanipe or some of the stragglers who found their way back to Reno rather than dying with Custer reported what Custer said.
Martin said it. I'm not positive he ever used the words, "we caught them napping," but in his interviews he states that Custer "thought the Indians were asleep," or that Custer said, "We have them asleep in their tepees," etc. Kanipe was also galloping around, shouting to the troops as he passed by, "We got 'em!" which may be related to the story.
R. Larsen
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 26 2003 : 09:29:03 AM
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From Graham, I think the most logical explanation arises. Martin barely spoke English and probably was not up to date on the bling bling colloquial expressions, Dude. So if/when Custer or anyone said they'd caught the camp napping - meaning unprepared, scurrying around, not actually 'asleep' - Martin may have taken it literally.
In the efforts through the years to pat everything into shape, Procustes' unit was resurrected to seriously imply that Sioux and Cheyenne were still asleep at 3 PM in huge numbers from a 'social' gathering for young folks the night before. This satisfies the NA's, who would look pretty negligent allowing the camp to be surprised, and the Custer Buffs, who want Custer correct to the last prescient detail before Judas and the Beast withdrew his deserved victory. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
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inwit
Corporal
Status: offline |
Posted - October 26 2003 : 10:49:43 AM
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There are a couple of facts that do need to be explained though:
- Martin got through safely to Benteen
- Boston Custer got through to rest on Last Stand Hill
- Crook had been aggressively met by the Indians when he was discovered
- The Indians, knowing troops had been sent out after them were not "on the lookout"
- Custer (and Reno) got close to the village without being met by the huge warrior force
- Wouldn't the 7th made a huge dust cloud on approach?
All this needs to be explained. The social gathering idea (which came from Indian testimony), is as good as any. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 26 2003 : 12:00:33 PM
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Martin got through, but with a shot horse, hardly 'safely.' We don't know what condition Boston arrived in or what happened to him. We know - we think we know - where his body was found three days later.
Here's more valid mystery, since someone's going to bring up what we have heard of Boston's arrival: Curley's testimony. First utterly believed, than utterly denegrated, recently resurrected. Supposedly, Boyeur said 'you can leave, you've not obligated to fight and you're too young anyway to know how, etc. etc.' Since when is seventeen years old too young with the Crow or anyone back then? I'd imagine many of the combatants on both sides were closer to Curley's age than Boyeur's. Why would Mitch say such a ludicrous thing, and why is it believed at face value? Curley's testimony could be as accurate as anyone's, but he still might have cut out to save his butt and was not 'released.' I understand the scouts were not obligated to fight, but this convoluted story about this release is something that rings all wrong. It's part of the same testimony that produced 'this man will stop at nothing' and was taking the command 'right into the village' and 'we have no chance at all.' I'd like to know who translated all that, and was it by verbals or sign, and what that person's baggage was. Especially the 'stop at nothing' translation.
The history of the West is composed almost entirely of as-one-with-nature frontiersmen, soldiers, and Native Americans being utterly surprised and slaughtered by each other. The Cheyenne would not know what the Hunkpapa had planned, for example, and a huge cloud of dust could be those returning from a hunting party or those Sans Arcs returning from mourning their own.
If we're believing Indian third hand testimony at face value (for example, we only know what Waterman said because cowboy/movie actor Col. Tim McCoy, supposedly a great Indian linguist with the Sioux - although Waterman was Arapahoe - proferred it much later)we have to equally acknowledge that Gall and others 'said' that they couldn't believe that anyone would attack the village because it was so huge. They didn't think Crook would come again, but it was possible, they knew, and they didn't care. Apparently, because Custer came from roughly the same direction, they thought Crook HAD come again.
There was zero central control of the camp.
Elements of Reno's command might argue about the huge number, and have. If you're only 130 odd men, 35 of which are holding horses, how many would the opposition have to be to seem huge? 300? Gall, again, said there were plenty of Indians for Reno and Custer separately. And there were. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
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El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 26 2003 : 2:26:02 PM
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If 100 troopers were on a skirmish line v. 300 warriors, those odds would not seem daunting. Maybe to some of the inexperienced soldiers, but 50 warriors probably would have scared them. A situation with 3:1 odds, with an officer in control and not scared sh!tless in a skirmish line wouldn't be an untenable situation. But Reno seemed to be determined to get the hell out of the valley ASAP. And he certainly didn't inspire confidence in his command while on the skirmish line or in the timber.
If the warriors knew Custer's regiment was as close as it was, they probably would have come out to attack it, as they did with Crook. Gall's alleged "too huge of a camp" comment doesn't fit with the mentality of the Sioux and Cheyenne. Even if they were confident, they still wouldn't risk losing one non-combatant by allowing soldiers to attack the village. |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 26 2003 : 3:13:30 PM
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Been on lots of firing lines, have we? Hesitate before calling others cowards unless you're Sgt. York. It's not my experience that people who've been in combat are so quick to criticize others.
I don't know what the Indian equivilant of a flower covered boys book is, but you're reading it.
Yeah, if the warriors had been remotely responsible, competent, or alert in their job of protecting the village with the women and children of which they supposedly care so much, Custer wouldn't have got so close. But short of buying radio time or flying a blimp blinking arrival time, Custer by smoke, bugle, and dust had announced his entrance and the bozos didn't react.
If you think that they would not save the village by sacrificing some women, whom they value as commodities of men, like horses, you're dreaming. At the Wa****a they couldn't grovel low enough, couldn't hand Custer anything more valuable than a beautiful, high caste daughter of an important man, which they did. But they apparently didn't think, except for old ladies, that the soldiers could make it into the village. They were correct. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
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El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 26 2003 : 4:09:21 PM
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Why do I have to be in combat to understand basic combat principles? EVERYTHING I've read about the skirmish line in the valley points to all going well, no panicking, etc. Very light casualties (1-2 killed), and yet Reno freaked out. And most the accounts were pointing to Reno being scared before coming under fire. I never said anyone was a coward. But most of the accounts point to a confident regiment marching towards a large village. And these same accounts do not speak of panic-stricken soldiers scared out of their wits during the skirmish line portion of the valley fight. And why would they be? Several hundred warriors staying at a distance and only in front of the soldiers probably would not be of concern. Panic didn't seem to set in until the soldiers were organizing to leave the timber. And a lot of the panic seems to have been due to their commander's inability to maintain control of his own battalion.
No, I've never been in combat, but initial 3:1 odds in a soldier/warrior skirmish would probably not be daunting. Soldiers may not have had much training, but surely they knew they'd be outnumbered in just about any fight, and it probably didn't concern them in the beginning. Warriors didn't press numerical advantages against an unrouted foe, and a lightly threatened skirmish line facing 300-odd warriors who were staying at a distance to screen the village would not be an untenable situation.
Its pretty clear Custer didn't "by smoke, bugle and dust announce his entrance" since the village was attacked by surprise. Custer didn't eradicate 100% of all possible methods of detection, but they must have done a good job, since they arrived at the village without any difficulty or resistance. On the day that fires were lit, I believe it was the same day that Custer had difficulty seeing any signs of the village from the Crow's Nest, due to haze. So the regiment's smoke probably would be difficult to pick up in these conditions. At any rate, they attacked the village by surprise, who had been aware of soldiers in the area. You should give credit where credit is due. They knew Crook was in the area, and came out and attacked him. Custer must have done something right, since he came from the same direction as Crook yet was undetected. Keep in mind, the Sioux sent scouts out to watch Crook to make sure he didn't return. Custer was spotted by warriors who may or may not have been in the village previously, but he was within range to strike the same day. |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
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inwit
Corporal
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Posted - October 27 2003 : 11:45:07 AM
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The issue is simple: if the village was silent and sleepy when Custer was in the bluffs, then Reno had not yet begun his "attack." It really doesn't matter why this happened.
It is significant that this was not a morning surprise attack like Wa****a. This was at high noon or early afternoon. Thousands of warriors were present, and were not off hunting or whatnot. They were apparently in their tepees, or Custer would surley been found approaching at that time of day.
If Reno had begum his attack sooner than Custer arriving in the bluffs, then the probability of Martin or Boston Custer getting through is greatly reduced. After Reno retreated to the bluffs, those bluffs were swarming with hostiles - remember the doctor scalped in plain daylight in view of Reno's whole command. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
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Posted - October 27 2003 : 2:39:15 PM
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When Custer was convinced the Indians had seen him and their camp alerted when he was in the Wolf Mountains, he again resorted to bugle, the soldiers had already annoyed the scouts by the fires, and for several hours six hundred and fifty mounted men and god knows how many mules and extra horses approached the camp on the LBH. During this time, several parties of Indians saw the advance and ran back to camp. For all this, and a dust cloud that had to be visible for a long way off, the camp was surprised, but apparently Custer was as amazed as we by that. That was not due to Custer skill but Sioux and Cheyenne incompetence.
Reno crossed over and began his attack at 3PM, middle afternoon. The earlier times are not supported.
Reno retreated because he saw zero support from any direction, and in fact knew Custer had ridden north where no way for him to cross was visible for miles (two-ish, and that assumes MTC is visible). If the Indians surrounded Reno, he had limited ammo and a sure fate. A retreat uphill to where the trains and help could get him is logical. It's essentially what Custer did down river, isn't that the current theory? Absent an actual attack, I mean.
That he fell apart is not contested, and that it was a disorganized, badly done rout is not contested. That anyone else would have done better is open to question, given what he then knew, could reasonably assume, and having had a man's head blown into his mouth, his only real friend killed, and feeling the weight.
Reno had heard the stories of Custer leaving soldiers of his to their fate, and had been convicted at courtmartial for deserting others and killing men without trial. This could not have inspired a deep belief that Custer would NEVER just head north or would NEVER leave Reno to his own fate, because he hardly had a rep for never leaving anyone behind. Quite the reverse.
And it would be so much more bracing if all the officers who thought Reno's retreat was a bad idea and that he was out of his head with fear had taken charge (isn't that their duty when a commander goes bonkers?) or at least pointed this out in hearing of someone sooner than when they did, which was after holding their digits damp to the thermals and patting everything into shape. They still obeyed him until Benteen's more forceful presence made itself felt. Odd that none of Reno's subordinates was looked to for leadership. At all. Perhaps they weren't in such great shape either? |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 27 2003 : 11:13:21 PM
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| You're not getting what I mean, DC. Here's what I said: "...but he was within range to strike the same day." And being within a few hours of this village and not confronted by a warrior force as Crook was. Custer's regiment got as close to that huge village as any command in that campaign. So he thought he was discovered, and allowed bugle calls. His intention was to attack at that point, and as soon as possible. And his regiment was kicking up dust, as all large bodies moving in the area would. What can you do to conceal that? By the 25th, he was a few hours ride from the village, and the Sioux and Cheyenne couldn't exactly slip away when a regiment was that close. |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
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Brent
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 28 2003 : 06:55:49 AM
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I'm sort of in general agreement with Dark Clouds last post.
Seems clear that the village was "suprised"--at least in the fact that they were not ready to receive any sort of attack. Whether they were simply nonchalant (ie knew Custer was there, but didn't expect anyone to be that foolish and attack) or whether they were truly suprised in the strict sense--dosen't really matter. Suprise was achieved, and that is a MAJOR advantage.
TH thing falls apart tho when Reno with 130 men is expected to "charge" the village after being promised support by the whole outfit. He charges, slows when he sees no evidence of support, then falls apart. Benteen, meanwhile, has been sent on a information gathering mission that could have easily been achieved by a few scouts. This means he has to return to the battle that is shaping up without him.
So then we finally see Custer (the man who has promised support) looking for support himself--success from Reno, and Benteen coming up as per orders. BUT--it was CUSTER who sent Benteen off in the first place, and CUSTER who gave Reno too few men and too little time and no effective support (in the sense that Reno probably expected it).
PS has anyone read that book (article) 'Benteen's Scout to the Left'?
I am still trying to understand what Custer had in mind by sending that # of troops on a scouting mission and what he expected they would find (and what he might have done IF they had actually become engaged themselves, and called for help). |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 28 2003 : 09:23:38 AM
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You said, utilizing a quote from me: Its pretty clear Custer didn't "by smoke, bugle and dust announce his entrance" when in reality he obviously DID. That the Indians were too incompetent to notice it or react is a blemish on them not a credit to Custer. Apparently they didn't take their responsibilities to their beloved women, children, elderly to heart as deeply as romantics suggest.
Inwit, Indians' culture was designed around a small camp. They had no authority over each other, no ability to organize a big village and the greater their numbers the slower and worse they react because there are no 'official' rumor mongers or any command structure. From start to finish that day, the average Joe and Sheila Sioux had zero idea of what the hell was going on and tore down and set up their lodges with the same frequency that Reno did his mount, dismount routine. That they WERE slow, incompetent, disorganized and vicious in immediate defense speaks to a large village with no leader.
This village was long, there were various celebrations that required the shooting of guns, and the fact the Hunkpapa end was being sorta torn up doesn't mean those shots would be heard by the Oglala or Cheyenne over thousands of screaming kids, dogs, horses, and people doing their stuff in between. And they weren't.
Fortunately for them, the Seventh was as disorganized as they were and sent themselves in piecemeal. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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inwit
Corporal
Status: offline |
Posted - October 28 2003 : 7:04:23 PM
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Dark Cloud,
You are critical of the "social gathering" for the young people on the night of the 24th, yet assert "there were various celebrations that required the shooting of guns" on the afternoon of the 25th as the 7th approaches.
You can't just make up facts to try to win an argument. Where do you get that information from?
Has anyone else ever heard of such testimony? |
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MTC: Basic Theories
