| Author |
 Topic  |
|
El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
 Posted - September 02 2003 : 01:51:47 AM
|
So, what reasons can we think of that would explain Custer's actions? I don't need or want a big explanation, or just one theory. Just a response like my list is EXACTLY what I'm after. And the scale I am using, based on what I view the probability of it being what actually went on, are 1-10, with 10 being the highest.
An uncrossable bog was at the ford.(1)
He was wounded/killed near or well above the ford.(4)
He decided to chase the noncombatants.(8)
He knew Reno failed, and decided moving into the village alone was not a good idea, and decided to try and engage the warriors and wait for Benteen.(7)
I'll leave some ideas for others to bring up.
|
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
|
|
vet777a
Sargent
Status: offline |
Posted - September 04 2003 : 12:59:03 PM
|
| ElCrab: I will give your fourth question an (8). He did not know Reno had failed until he arrived at the river. When he saw no attack coming from the South he then knew something was amiss and decided to pull back, wait for Benten and regroup. |
  |
|
|
frankboddn
Major
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - September 30 2003 : 5:04:53 PM
|
El Crab: I think No. 1, an uncrossable bog, is the most unlikely reason. Custer couldn't cross it, yet shortly thereafter hundreds of mounted warriors did?
Was Custer wounded there? I tend to think not, only because I'm having to rethink my position about whether he even went down there. I've just seen Gray's account that it was I think Smith and Yates who went down MTC, and that it was a feint to draw warriors away from Reno, and then they would rejoin with George Armstrong Custer--opps. three names--around Calhoun Hill and wait for Reno and the pack train to join them. I'm not saying I'm endorsing this view yet, but it's something to think about.
I don't think it was simply a scout or recon because when he'd been on Weir Point, he could pretty much see everything he needed to see. This doesn't answer your question on a point basis, but I think the feint is just as likely as the recon. |
|
|
|
El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - September 30 2003 : 5:35:09 PM
|
| That was my point about the bog as well. If a bog existed, warriors would have had trouble fording as well. And it might have been mentioned by both whites looking at the field immediately after and warriors in their accounts alike. |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
|
|
|
Pvt. Jester
Recruit
Status: offline |
Posted - October 07 2003 : 5:47:00 PM
|
#8 is the only theory that fits with the tactics. Reno was sent to engage and draw off the warriors while Custer's objective would have been the families and pony herds. With these captured, the warriors would have nothing to defend and little option but surrender.
quote:
Originally posted by El Crab
So, what reasons can we think of that would explain Custer's actions? I don't need or want a big explanation, or just one theory. Just a response like my list is EXACTLY what I'm after. And the scale I am using, based on what I view the probability of it being what actually went on, are 1-10, with 10 being the highest.
An uncrossable bog was at the ford.(1)
He was wounded/killed near or well above the ford.(4)
He decided to chase the noncombatants.(8)
He knew Reno failed, and decided moving into the village alone was not a good idea, and decided to try and engage the warriors and wait for Benteen.(7)
I'll leave some ideas for others to bring up.
|
|
|
|
Wrangler
Lieutenant
Status: offline |
Posted - October 09 2003 : 12:07:09 AM
|
quote:
Originally posted by El Crab
What reasons can we think of that would explain Custer's actions? The probability of it being what actually went on, are 1-10, with 10 being the highest.
An uncrossable bog was at the ford.
He was wounded/killed near or well above the ford.
He decided to chase the noncombatants.
He knew Reno failed, and decided moving into the village alone was not a good idea, and decided to try and engage the warriors and wait for Benteen.
My ratings:
An uncrossable bog was at the ford. [5]
He was wounded/killed near or well above the ford. [1]
He decided to chase the noncombatants. [2]
He knew Reno failed, and decided moving into the village alone was not a good idea, and decided to try and engage the warriors and wait for Benteen. [1]
Explanations:
1. Uncrossable bog? No, Ford B was crossable -- but what was the cost of time and potential casualties vs the "potential gain" of moving further north and getting ahead of the Indian's "withdrawal"?
2. Custer wounded/killed at Ford B. Body of evidence is conflicting and inconclusive to be able to give this a higher rating.
3. Chase the Noncombatants? No. Get ahead of whatever was trying to move north (i.e. perceived retreat)? Yes.
In "perceived retreat", I include the movement out of harm's way of thousands of ponies, and people to the north (which includes any non-"hokahey" warriors). Pick your favorite size of Indian village, pony herd, and/or number of warriors. In what direction do you expect the preponderance of movement of these bodies and numbers given an attack from the south? Given your answer, could/did Lt. Col. Custer see the same movements and reach the same "conclusions"? Isn't the preponderance moving North?
What are your actions? Cross Ford B and assist in Reno's "success" by continuing to push the Indians out of the LBH? Or, be it pony, warrior or noncombatant, do you move north to cut them off?
4. Knew Reno failed. To do what? Drive everything before him? See #3 -- Could it have appeared to Lt. Col. Custer that Major Reno had in fact accomplished that task?
Well them's my thoughts & numbers...and my questions.
v/r
Wrangler
|
|
|
|
El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 09 2003 : 12:46:15 AM
|
| Good point. Reno technically succeeded. He didn't hold his position or do anything of merit beyond his initial movements toward the village, but he did surprise the camp and send the village's population north. |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
|
|
|
inwit
Corporal
Status: offline |
Posted - October 14 2003 : 12:15:37 PM
|
Hello from a newcommer:
Any theory about MTC runs into contradictions.
When I first visited the battlefield, I was struck by the fact that MTC was much different that I'd ever imagined - it looked like a 4 lane highway. If Custer wanted to attack, a thrust there would be logical:
- from there a meeting with Reno's command is very possible
- a strong thrust there really ties down the Indians to that side of the village
- I believe that sound tactics would demand that the "center" be engaged (if, from Custer's vantage point, Reno is the left wing, and the far edge beyond Last Stand Hill is the right wing, then MTC is the center
- Benteen could be used to reinforce the center thrust at MTC to "break" the spine of the defense of the village
Of course, this is what was assumed by Benteen, et al, immediately after the battle (first impressions are crucial where reason to lie later exists). Benteen, at first, thought that all 5 companies had made it into the village. Maguire's map showed a trek to "Ford B." Even Indian testimony talks about soldiers in the village, not to mention human remains and dead cavalry horses. (Although Indian testimony contradicts this too as it does nearly everything else).
But then this gets into the question as to how the troops ended up where they died.
But as to the intended use of MTC, it must have been attack at first.
|
Edited by - inwit on October 14 2003 12:17:57 PM |
|
|
|
Wrangler
Lieutenant
Status: offline |
Posted - October 14 2003 : 8:01:01 PM
|
quote:
Originally posted by inwit
Hello from a newcommer:
Hello Inwit! Welcome aboard! Hope to see you here often. v/r Wrangler |
|
|
|
Wrangler
Lieutenant
Status: offline |
Posted - October 14 2003 : 8:11:09 PM
|
quote:
Originally posted by inwit
Maguire's map showed a trek to "Ford B."
Inwit,
Remember also that Maquire testified on several occassions at the Reno COI that the path he marked to MTC was his impression/theory of what happened and was for the purpose of his report. He stated this several times when questioned about its accuracy. I was left with the impression after reading his testimony that he had lost confidence in his theory at the COI--especially under cross examination. Your thoughts?
The MTC scenario as you have outlined certainly has merit. But as in all things LBH, it's hard to find the "smoking gun"--darn it! :-)
v/r
Wrangler |
|
|
|
inwit
Corporal
Status: offline |
Posted - October 15 2003 : 11:45:01 AM
|
Thanks Wrangler,
Alas, I too only can surmise and conjecture as to MTC. But in response to your points:
- The investigation was not up to a reasonable modern standard. Today we would have photos taken on June 27 along with other forensic evidence. Why did Benteen and Maguire think they went to Ford B? We don't have the "basis" of their opinion.
What if there were parallel shod-horse track ruts going to the Ford consistent with cavalry column movements? Then the shod-horse evidence would not be attributable to Indians driving recovered cavalry horses across the stream.
But we simply cannot say what that initial conclusion was based on.
- The Court of Inquiry was terribly conducted (if it was even honest). Keep in mind that Maguire was under tremendous pressure to not contradict the "theory" (Benteen's) that Custer was dead before Reno left the woods to "charge" the hills. Supporting the view of a thrust at MTC was dangerous for these reasons:
1. Then Benteen's timing argument falls to pieces as the flow of warriors from Reno would clearly have forced the retreat.
2. So, if Reno had held out a little longer things could have turned out differently.
3. If Benteen had come sooner or even taken decisive action upon arriving at Reno Hill, things could have been different.
4. Now the time frame for comming to Custer's aid upon hearing firing by the Reno/Benteen forces enlarges to uncomfortable size. (Some of Benteen's men even reported seeing troopers in the river bed area below the bluffs. It is a long trek from there to Last Stand Hill, or even Calhoun Hill).
The "weight" of the circumstantial evidence seems to support a thrust at MTC, although fitting it together with the other pieces is a difficult task.
|
|
|
|
Wrangler
Lieutenant
Status: offline |
Posted - October 15 2003 : 11:22:52 PM
|
Inwit,
Thanks for your thoughts--I share your pain. Continuing the dialog...quote:
Originally posted by inwit
Why did Benteen and Maguire think they went to Ford B? We don't have the "basis" of their opinion.
I agree.
quote:
Originally posted by inwit
What if there were parallel shod-horse track ruts going to the Ford consistent with cavalry column movements? Then the shod-horse evidence would not be attributable to Indians driving recovered cavalry horses across the stream.
Indeed.
quote:
Originally posted by inwit
But we simply cannot say what that initial conclusion was based on.
True--we can't. Nor could Maguire account for his conclusions in his testimony at the Reno COI. However, that does not negate his impressions rendered at the time he drew the map. That he could not recall the basis of his impression two and a half years after the event does not surprise me. I'm sure you would agree--Maguire cannot be disregarded.
quote:
Originally posted by inwit
The Court of Inquiry was terribly conducted (if it was even honest).
I don't share this conclusion. As you said, things were not done back then as we would expect them to be conducted today. New historicism is interesting to be sure but in the end it isn't history--merely a translation into today's terms and expectations so we can say, "Oh, wow...things sure have changed..."
quote:
Originally posted by inwit
Keep in mind that Maguire was under tremendous pressure to not contradict the "theory" (Benteen's) that Custer was dead before Reno left the woods to "charge" the hills..."
Tremendous pressure from whom and how? Maguire testified days before Benteen at the Reno COI. It was Reno's COI not Benteen's. This prolly sounds blunt but it was not intended to be. I'm just a student of the battle--not an advocate. Would like to know your basis for this statement as this is the first time I have heard of "tremendous pressure". Just point me in the right direction. Chances are the source is in my library.
quote:
Originally posted by inwit
The "weight" of the circumstantial evidence seems to support a thrust at MTC, although fitting it together with the other pieces is a difficult task.
I agree with you fully. There must be a way of thinking about this that will make it clear--at last--to us all. Let's get started! 
v/r
Wrangler |
|
|
|
inwit
Corporal
Status: offline |
Posted - October 16 2003 : 12:44:05 PM
|
Wrangler,
Yes let's continue. I like my thoughts to be challenged, so don't worry. Thanks, though.
Perhaps "tremendous pressure" was a misleading phrase on my part. My agrument is again circumstantial groping in the dark of dead history.
With regard to the Court of Inquiry:
1. The methods of historical examination and investigation in which the COI was remiss on were not things based on technology which did not exist then. Any old law library will have 19th Century books that lay out the basics which are still valid today.
2. Reno, for example said he did not hear firing downstream where Custer was. His official report which was admitted as an exhibit, stated that "firing was heard downstream and we knew it could only be Custer," or words to that effect. (only Benteen and Wallace, the "timekeeper" on the command, said the same).There was no cross-examination regarding Reno's change of tune at the hearing. They let him slide.
3. The "record" was a jumble of time and distance estimates which has sowed great confusion to the present. An intelligent judicial proceeding tries to clarify the ambiguities, not further them (although one side may wish to do so.
4. Benteen (and Reno I believe) both expressed the theory that Custer was dead before Reno left the woods (more on that below).
5. Maguire altered his previous may to include a large extending bluff that did not exist in reality (or on his original maps). See below.
6. No relevant "context" was allowed into the record. For example, the maneuver Custer used of a frontal attack with a wing hammer blow followed by the reserve being brought up, was a standard Cavalry tactic going back to Napoleon. Both Custer and Reno were West Point graduates (class standing aside) and both, with Benteen were Civil War veterans. A standard maneuver does not require elaborate communication as to "role" and "timing."
7. The Court Recorder, Jesse Lee (as I recall), stated in a letter to Mrs. Custer many years later, that he had been misled.
But where am I going with all this? Fair question.
Let's speculate for a moment. Suppose that it were the fact that Custer was dead before Reno left the woods. This would mean:
1. Reno no longer had to keep pressure on the front of the village. His sole obligation would be to preserve the rest of the command to the best of his ability.
2. Benteen is no longer bound by his order to "come quick" and bring ammunition.
3. There were correct to not make a real effort to break through downstream to Custer's position.
Solves all the problems, doesn't it?
Of course they could never prove this. But if the record were foggy enough to keep it alive (pun intended) as a possibility then no adverse findings could be made by the Court as the evidence "cuts both ways." This is in fact what happened. If Custer was still alive at a significantly later time, more definite conclusions than the wishy-washy "findings" would have been necessary.
But how to get there. Two problems:
1. From the point of Reno's skirmish line, Custer hill was visible !!! A huge battle there would be noticed. The new map very convienently places a large bluff between the line of site of Reno's position and Custer Hill !!!
2. Basic time-space analysis (which military men were competent to do), demonstrates Custer was engaged after Reno's retreat.
3. As mentioned above, MTC presents problems also.
What two people can help with this?
Maguire and Wallace.
More later. Thanks.
|
|
|
|
El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 16 2003 : 1:59:01 PM
|
quote:
Originally posted by inwit
1. From the point of Reno's skirmish line, Custer hill was visible !!! A huge battle there would be noticed. The new map very convienently places a large bluff between the line of site of Reno's position and Custer Hill !!!
Custer Hill is visible from the approximate skirmish line position in the valley?
Its not possible for Custer's command to have been wiped out before Reno left the valley. I don't think I have to bother with the reasoning behind this "revelation". |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
Edited by - El Crab on October 16 2003 1:59:46 PM |
|
|
|
inwit
Corporal
Status: offline |
Posted - October 16 2003 : 3:21:28 PM
|
The point is this:
Of course it is an impossibility, based on what we know.
But, the Court of Inquiry is limited to the facts in the record before it. Therefore, that theory had to be kept alive as a possibility, or as an "issue of fact" as current legal terminology puts it.
Therefore the Court of Inquiry had to make a specific "finding" in that regard. Without such a finding, given that Reno and Benteen put forth that theory, Reno's conduct cannot be judged.
The COI sidestepped the question altogether. Because if it said Custer was dead, Reno is largely vindicated (except maybe for the "charge" of the hills, leaving men behind, etc.). If the Custer battle began later, then the "nitty gritty" could not be avoided by the court.
Instead, the COI simply left a muddy record, and issued its non-committal "while others may have, etc. we find no basis for blah blah." All this really amounted to was a dodge of the key question before the Court.
Therefore, the record had to be made as muddy as possible.
I can only guess, but I do think that Reno and Benteen expected the Court to raise the issue by itself, and, when it failed to do so, they had to look ridiculous themselves by alleging Custer was dead before Reno left the wood.
But maybe there was justice in that.
|
|
|
|
Wrangler
Lieutenant
Status: offline |
Posted - October 18 2003 : 11:16:29 PM
|
Inwit,
Before I took us both down a different path, I believe you wanted to discuss the MTC scenario. My apology for that diversion from your intended purpose.quote:
Originally posted by inwit
But as to the intended use of MTC, it must have been attack at first.
If such a movement toward MTC occurred, then the full set of probable intentions of such a move are:
1. Conduct the main attack with intent to cross the LBH River, move into the village and "drive everything before them."
2. Conduct a feint with intent to draw attention away from the main attack (Reno) by engaging the enemy at some other point (i.e. MTC).
3. Conduct a demonstration with intent to draw attention away from the main attack (Reno) without making contact at some other point (i.e. MTC).
4. Conduct a reconnaissance (avoiding contact with the enemy) with the intent to determine the feasibility of crossing the LBHR and assess the potential for a follow-on main or supporting attack into the village.
5. Conduct a reconnaissance in force (accepting contact with the enemy) with intent to discover the enemy's strength and/or feasibility of crossing the LBHR and following through with a main or supporting attack into the village.
Do any of these help to illustrate your position?
v/r
Wrangler
|
|
|
|
inwit
Corporal
Status: offline |
Posted - October 21 2003 : 5:12:56 PM
|
Wrangler,
That's a tough multiple choice question.
The main problem is that many of your alternatives are not mutually exclusive, and are all very viable. I'm trying to get to the essence of what I really think, which isn't so easy given all the contingent possibilities of alternate factual scenarios leading to that point in time: i.e., was Benteen sent "valley hunting" to push the village from the left or was he the reserve in a plan where he would support either Reno or Custer - or was Reno sent chasing 20 Indians seen running away or was he sent to occupy the village while Custer went around the backside. Did Custer originally intend to "support" Reno from the rear and change his mind later? Also the timing questions become crucial as to why the particular theory failed.
And to state what I think while not having a "position" on all those matters (at least in print), makes any theory I advance based on quicksand.
Nevertheless, this is so important a topic that I will try. Just need a bit more time.
But I'm not making excuses .... |
|
|
|
Wrangler
Lieutenant
Status: offline |
Posted - October 21 2003 : 8:11:56 PM
|
quote:
Originally posted by inwit
That's a tough multiple choice question.
Inwit,
Don’t feel like The Lone Ranger (a character I’m sure that "Rocket 'Mobile" Alfuso will recall too). If this was an easy question, no one would ever have a need for a military.
quote:
Originally posted by inwit
The main problem is that many of your alternatives are not mutually exclusive, and are all very viable. I'm trying to get to the essence of what I really think …
Here’s some help…I think. The choices I’ve provided are mutually exclusive if you look at them from this perspective. They are a set of “states of the machine” that must exist at any given moment in time--save transitions from one state to another. In our case, the machine is the 7th USC. Look at them as a menu for the commander of the basic building blocks (or mental models) that a help him to decide--at any given point in time--what he “wants” to do given his perceptions of the terrain, the enemy, and his own forces at the point in time he makes a decision.
The menu I provided is relevant to an offensive scenario involving a commander’s decision—for a point in time—as to what the state he wants the machine to be in. It will remain in that state until the commander perceives a change in the terrain, the enemy, and/or his own forces that “requires” him to make a new decision to account for this change. (Note: The "machine" has defensive states too. The commander will consider the need to transition from the offense to the defense and vice versa at the drop of a hat).
I mentioned “save transitions” above because in order for the machine to assume its new state, it must receive orders to transition to the new state. This takes time to go from the head of the commander to those who have to understand that new state, and convey it to subordinate units for execution. Until that time has passed, the machine is “confused” until the order is conveyed to the lowest level capable of effecting the state change.
Note: The use of the word "machine" is for illustration purposes only. The machine is actually made up of individual men, each with his own "state" that can range from uncommon valor to cowardice--and is subject to change to anywhere across that spectrum at the drop of a hat. If Napoleon is correct in his assertion that, "The moral is to the physical as three is to one", then our isolation of the operations of a machine only solves for 1/4 of the problem. The men count--often decisively; and many times despite the skill or ineptitude of their commander.
quote:
Originally posted by inwit
… which isn't so easy given all the contingent possibilities of alternate factual scenarios leading to that point in time: i.e., was Benteen sent "valley hunting" to push the village from the left or was he the reserve in a plan where he would support either Reno or Custer - or was Reno sent chasing 20 Indians seen running away or was he sent to occupy the village while Custer went around the backside. Did Custer originally intend to "support" Reno from the rear and change his mind later? Also the timing questions become crucial as to why the particular theory failed.
As I stated before elsewhere, I’m a “battle nut” and “a student of the battle—not an advocate.”
A History Ph.D. once lectured in my master’s program that, “At some point you must decide on conflicting historical data and then write.” Like you, I’m not ready to “decide and write”. If we have to write, by what means or criteria do we decide?
As an answer, I would offer as a first step, a method that explores a series of scenarios that must contain certain assumptions (e.g. assume Custer’s battalion [Companies C,E,F,I,L] went down the MTC to the water’s edge of the LBHR in a reconnaissance-in-force…).
The second step is to compare existing evidence to that scenario to see what it reveals. OK, note that. Then devise a new scenario with new assumptions to see what it reveals (e.g. assume Custer had sent Yates’ battalion [Companies E,F] down the MTC, across the LBHR to attack and “drive everything before him…”).
At some point, having explored the potential of the “full set” of possibilities, then one is ready to compare and contrast these possibilities and from the results gathered, and assign probabilities. Then decide and write one’s interpretation of history (if one is so inclined to the pen).
quote:
Originally posted by inwit
And to state what I think while not having a "position" on all those matters (at least in print), makes any theory I advance based on quicksand.
The beauty of the methodology I suggest above is that you don’t have to have a “position”—only a scenario. Now your scenario can be your position, but the forum doesn’t need to know that. A general rule is this methodology is the assumptions are accepted as fact. Then evidence is presented that confirms or denies the scenario—not the assumptions of the scenario. If you disagree with the assumptions, then that is a scenario based on different assumptions and creates a new thread for weighing the evidence.
quote:
Originally posted by inwit
Nevertheless, this is so important a topic that I will try. Just need a bit more time.
OK. First one to post a scenario wins a cookie! Ready...begin! 
quote:
Originally posted by inwit
But I'm not making excuses ....
None perceived here. Get to work! 
v/r
Wrangler
|
|
|
|
inwit
Corporal
Status: offline |
Posted - October 22 2003 : 1:46:16 PM
|
Wrangler,
Your advice and parameters of discussion are very sensible. I am nearly ready with what I will call "Scenario A" - a scenario by design somewhat "idealized." What I mean by that is that it will assume a thought-out plan that was communicated or understood by Reno and Benteen. I will not assign blame to the latter two, or to Custer for that matter. Such an "idealized" scenario will be a useful jumping off point for other scenarios where all those assumptions in "A" cannot be met.
But first, a thought. You use the machine metaphor. However, I use chess. So:
A world class chess player will often have several possibilities in mind, which he will pursue before ultimately choosing one he believes is best, or is forced to by circumstances. Therefore, that player will often try to accumulate many types of small advantages in position before making the final (committing) attack. (Unless a clear "win" is present earlier). What the opponent does is crucial in that choice.
As to the Little Big Horn, I only mean to say, as you will see in Scenario A, that Custer intended a flexible plan of action that would allow coordination of the 7th under various contingencies, attack or defense. Circumstances will dictate what is actually chosen.
The big problem that I will focus on is the terrain. That factor rendered the attack possibilities workable, but not the defense possibilities.
Anyway.... |
|
|
|
Wrangler
Lieutenant
Status: offline |
Posted - October 22 2003 : 9:27:02 PM
|
Inwit,
See below. My response is in two parts. First Chess, then scenarios.quote:
Originally posted by inwit
But first, a thought. You use the machine metaphor. However, I use chess. So:
A world class chess player will often have several possibilities in mind, which he will pursue before ultimately choosing one he believes is best, or is forced to by circumstances. Therefore, that player will often try to accumulate many types of small advantages in position before making the final (committing) attack. (Unless a clear "win" is present earlier). What the opponent does is crucial in that choice.
Chess is a good construct and helps to illustrate what I meant by “the machine”. The 8x8 board is the terrain. The machine is your pieces. You start with a certain number (composition), in certain positions (disposition)—and the enemy likewise. Each piece has capabilities and limitations relative to the board, each other, and the enemy. The conclusion of each move reflects a new state for your machine relative to the board and the enemy. The “commander” in chess analyzes the situation; projects potential future states, makes an assessment of his potential future states vs. the potential future states of the enemy, decides and then moves.
quote:
Originally posted by inwit
So: A world class chess player will often have several possibilities in mind, which he will pursue before ultimately choosing one he believes is best, or is forced to by circumstances. Therefore, that player will often try to accumulate many types of small advantages in position before making the final (committing) attack. (Unless a clear "win" is present earlier). What the opponent does is crucial in that choice.
Agree. But, chess as a metaphor begins to loose its shine if you have to play the game in this way:
First, you don’t know how big the game board is. But let’s assume you do—say 8x8. Each of those 64 squares is not flat; each square contains “1,000 mistakes of terrain” that influence how your pieces move (e.g. can my knight make that L-shaped move in the time I need him to make it?). You don’t know what the terrain is like in that square unless you are physically in position to see it or have an accurate map—or better still—have both.
Second, you are not restricted to moving one piece. They can all move simultaneously. Despite the seemingly added benefit—the bad guys get to do that too—while you are moving.
Third, your pieces sometimes can, and often will, move or stop on their own accord. They will take the enemy’s queen without your help, and loose the king in a befuddled castling attempt despite your best efforts to prevent it. Many times, you can’t even see your pieces let alone the enemies. And at the Battle of the Little Bighorn Chess game the enemy gets more pieces, and after the match, you find out from the umpire that they got to change the behaviors of their pieces during the game.
Fourth, your opponent is allowed to kill or wound you at any time during the match if it is convenient for his purposes.
Other than that, thinking wise, I reckon war and chess are purty similar activities for a commander. 
v/r
Wrangler
|
|
|
|
Wrangler
Lieutenant
Status: offline |
Posted - October 22 2003 : 9:43:21 PM
|
To All:
Part II--the scenariosquote:
Originally posted by inwit
I am nearly ready with what I will call "Scenario A" - a scenario by design somewhat "idealized." What I mean by that is that it will assume a thought-out plan that was communicated or understood by Reno and Benteen. I will not assign blame to the latter two, or to Custer for that matter. Such an "idealized" scenario will be a useful jumping off point for other scenarios where all those assumptions in "A" cannot be met.
Okeedoke. I think this is a good place to start—with the ideal. If I may expand on this idea, I believe the following assumptions must be included in the “ideal” scenario:
• To the extent possible, assume that the Indians and the 7th USC had our level of knowledge of the nature and impact of terrain.
• To the extent possible, assume that the Indians and the 7th USC had our level of knowledge by of the composition and disposition each other.
• To the extent possible, assume that the Indians and the 7th USC had our level of knowledge about each other’s intentions.
quote:
Originally posted by inwit
I will not assign blame to the latter two, or to Custer for that matter.
You are a wise man. I’m content in this position.
quote:
Originally posted by inwit
As to the Little Big Horn, I only mean to say, as you will see in Scenario A, that Custer intended a flexible plan of action that would allow coordination of the 7th under various contingencies, attack or defense. Circumstances will dictate what is actually chosen.
OK. Sounds good. Let’s run it up the flagpole…but…
quote:
Originally posted by inwit
The big problem that I will focus on is the terrain. That factor rendered the attack possibilities workable, but not the defense possibilities.
...Before you post, I would like your thoughts on my first question with regards to “the ideal” so I can push forward with that scenario if you are in fact doing the “somewhat ideal”. In addition, I think we should get some thoughts from the forum on procedures to follow in threads like these. Here are some initial thoughts:
First, a scenario—by design—stands on its own merits. The idea is to learn about what might have happened by exploring the possibilities through the various skills and knowledge brought to the table by this forum.
The first step is to understand the scenario. The second step is to develop it—figure out what is necessary to make it work. The third step (which numerically follows the second step—no jumping to the conclusion!) is to figure out how to make it not work. The forth step is…drum roll…not to reach a conclusion--but look at the next scenario and repeat the process. After at least three scenarios, we can now compare and contrast what we have--or explore more. Whether "A New Theory" comes out of this process is not my aim--but if one emerges well that's cool too.
I think a map with place names and a simple, grid reference system super-imposed would facilitate discussion and descriptions of scenarios.
It may be useful to limit our scenario exploration to activities beyond MTC (to the extent possible) from the Army side until we get a feel for the usefulness of this approach.
Thoughts?
v/r
Wrangler
|
|
|
|
inwit
Corporal
Status: offline |
Posted - October 23 2003 : 11:29:53 AM
|
Wrangler,
I think this will be an interesting experiment. What I would ask is that you (if you wish) present me with a series of questions (over time) in an order you think will help us to perfect an initial model scenario.
I often have a hard time organizing my thoughts (ashamed to admit).
As an initial point I will say that any of you alternatives that have Reno as the main attacking force cannot be my assumption for thiese reasons:
- Reno had a small force.
- Reno was not a known entity to Custer as a commander (especially as against Indians).
- The main force has the greatest risk - Custer would take this.
- The main attack has the "romantic" glory role. (as far as this is relevant).
But there are opposing points:
- Reno was closer to the pack train and Benteen for support.
- Custer could not be sure of the terrain for a good attack at a ford and general logistics. But he could at least creat havoc to allow the frontal attack to break through.
- Custer would want Reno to have the simple role (few decisions to make and especially not crucial decisions).
Thus, I conclude Custer was to be the main attack, but the unknown factor was his knowledge of the feasibility of this (could Bouyer have informed him?).
|
|
|
|
Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 23 2003 : 12:33:20 PM
|
Attacking a camp you've not seen over land you don't know, how could you possbly conclude that a main force has the most risk before extensive contact? How are do defining "main"? The largest? The first? The best? Surely we can all think of examples where the term "main" refers to one of those at the expense of the others in history.
Would someone please point out the incidents previous to LBH that would channel Custer's or anyone's thinking about Reno in combat one way or the other? You make the prejudicial inference that the simple job went to Reno, and that the only attack on cavalry ground all day was therefore made by an undermanned force that could not be supported by any other unit in a meaningful time frame. Reno not only made the main attack, he made the only one.
If Reno was to 'drive all before him' and for some reason succeeded in this, or at least more so, how would he be closer to Benteen and the pack train? What is your temporal baseline here?
This project strikes me as layman's game theory, but it also strikes me that Gray already has done most of this work. His whole approach was to eliminate the impossible and by holding all claims to the clock and by the potential speed of horses, restrict the possibilities.
If by "evidence" you refer to shell casings...... |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
|
|
|
inwit
Corporal
Status: offline |
Posted - October 23 2003 : 12:59:59 PM
|
Dark Cloud,
There is no need to be so negative. We are trying to work out a process to systematically explore the possibilities and the work of various authors (including Gray who did outstanding work). If you don't want to join in then don't.
Yes, the point is that Reno was an unknown factor (although Reno claimed he was familiar with Custer's skill as a soldier and that he had to confidence in him) - and in an "ideal" scenario, Custer would take this into account.
Yes, you make a point about the pack train - this is why I stated my assumptions - to allow for discussion to reach the best conclusions. It's not a contest. If you are right and I am not then so what? Let's get at the truth.
Again, if you wish to make constructive comments, then do so. |
|
|
|
inwit
Corporal
Status: offline |
Posted - October 23 2003 : 3:25:25 PM
|
Reno was told to "drive" the Indians. This indicates to me an intent that Reno, if possible, push them north. At the least it assumes that he will hold a line as long as possible.
Also, Benteen was more of a known entity to Custer. His job was complex - my assumption - Benteen was to scout to left and also shield the pack train from attack from that side. As pack train comes nearer, Benteen to rejoin main trail and decide how to (a) ensure safety of pack train and (b) support where needed Reno or Custer (this is before the Martin note to go to Custer). Custer could not have assumed Reno and Benteen would meet in the bluffs.
Between Reno "driving" the Indians north, and Benteen executing the above maneuver, the pack train is "walled off" from the Indians (remember Wa****a where Custer almost lost the pack train), and the Indians are pushed in the direction Terry is expected to come from (at least the retreating women and children).
Again, these are part of my assumptions for "Scenario A." |
|
|
|
Wrangler
Lieutenant
Status: offline |
Posted - October 23 2003 : 8:03:19 PM
|
Inwit,
quote:
Originally posted by inwit
I think this will be an interesting experiment. What I would ask is that you (if you wish) present me with a series of questions (over time) in an order you think will help us to perfect an initial model scenario.
Okeedoke.
quote:
Originally posted by inwit
As an initial point I will say that any of your alternatives that have Reno as the main attacking force cannot be my assumption for these reasons:
I'm not sure I understand what you are referring to with "your (my) alternatives". Are you talking about "the full set of probable intentions" in my October 18 2003: 11:16:29 PM posting?
v/r
Wrangler |
|
|
|
Topic |
|
|
|
MTC: Basic Theories
