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Smcf
Captain
Status: offline |
 Posted - November 13 2003 : 08:59:37 AM
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The commander has to take responsibility for the actions of his troops, although I'd say the Sioux were more resposible for the victory rather than Custer for the defeat.
MANY APOLOGIES - The stuff below was posted before I saw the thread on the self-same subject posted by El Crab. Great minds think alike - eh?
As a side note, compare the apportioning of blame for the Isandlwana disaster suffered by British forces in Zululand in 1879. The commander Lord Chelmsford was roundly condemned, not least for his own assertion that the blame lay with the leadership left by him to guard the main camp. In fact, it was Chelmsford who split his column taking nearly half of the 4000 troops off mistakenly believing he was after the main body of Zulus, when 20000 of them were amassing from the opposite direction and bearing down on the camp. (compare with Benteen's scout). The camp command was further sub-divided before the awful truth was discovered and the camp was overrun. Later the same day, 6000 of the Zulu reserve moved into Natal 10 miles away to attack the supply depot at Rorke's drift (battle made famous to the current generation by the 1960's film "ZULU"). The 12 hour siege that followed is vaguley reminiscent of the Reno/Benteen entrenchment. Unlike Custer though, Chelmsford missed both the debacle at Isandlwana and the heroic stand at Rorke's Drift.
Just for fun, some other noteworthy comparisons: after the Rorke's Drift siege, the Zulus amassed for a renewed attack but melted away when Chelmsford's relief column was seen in the distance (Sioux lift R/B siege when Terry's column spotted), one of Chelmsford's returning company commanders viewed the final phase of the Isandlwana defeat but was unable to intervene due to the numbers of Zulus between him and the camp - and retreated (Weir action), the action to attack the Zululand main stronghold was a 3-pronged strike with the Chelmsford column at the centre (where have I head that one before?), some survivors of Isandlwana tried to escape the carnage and were cut down in a deep ravine leading to the Buffalo river bordering Natal, the strung-out British formed a last "square" and stand against the slopes of the Isandlwana mountain and died in hand-to-hand combat as the ammo ran out, Chelmsford returned to the Isandlwana battlefied to bury the dead British solders - the cairns stand as burial markers to this day, a Victorian monument(similar to that on LSH) was erected on the site, A Zulu monument also stands there.
Its interesting that the Custer action is viewed as the heroic episode, and the Reno /Benteen soldiers as a hapless bunch of desparate men. Compared with the Zulu engagement mentioned above, the opposite was the case. Mind you, 139 men defending 2 huts with a bunch of biscuit boxes and mealie bags as breastworks against 6000 "noble savages" (many had muzzleloaders), when 1700 of their fellows were massacred a few hours earlier - stirring stuff.
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Edited by - Smcf on November 13 2003 09:57:54 AM |
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El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 14 2003 : 07:22:40 AM
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One thing on the accuracy of soldier fire. I don't believe it was important to the Army of 1876 to preach marksmanship. The thinking on volley fire would be something like a shotgun. A simultaneous firing of 40 or so carbines in one direction need not be aimed at anything more than forward and somewhat level to the ground. In the Civil War, dense formations allowed aiming without firing to be somewhat effective, and I'd guess the idea in Indian warfare was to shock and awe. A volley would send warriors scurrying for cover, and the sound and visual would present them with an idea of the firepower the soldiers had. Also, since rarely did cavalry engage warriors at anything closer than long range, why bother? They didn't hold still, they didn't fight in any formation, and they took cover whenever possible. So I think the assessment that the Springfield was the choice due to its ability to reach Indians who probably thought they were safely out of range is right on the money. If they got close, that's what the Colt .45 was for. Maintaining fire discipline was more important than the accuracy of the fire, to a degree.
A mixed platoon in regards to firepower delivery characteristics just wasn't an idea that would spring up. In WWII, where I'd guess this became SOP, units weren't as strictly commanded by officers. In 1876, order and discipline were of the utmost importance to an army force. In 1942, soldiers were expected to be able to fight individually and in smaller groups, and orders for volley fire and independent firing weren't exactly common. The soldier was more polished, expected to do and know more, and given the nature of combat, he had to think for himself while staying within the constraints of his mission. |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
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Smcf
Captain
Status: offline |
Posted - November 17 2003 : 08:12:32 AM
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| As a matter of interest, how far exactly is Luce Ridge from MTC ford? I can't quite get the perspective on this re: providing cover for the E and F movement. The reason I ask is related to the effective range of 1870's Springfield Carbines (as opposed to the related Infantry rifles). I understand it to be 600 yards at best, so somewhat less than that to be accurate (as in not endangering your own men). |
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El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 18 2003 : 05:58:35 AM
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The range was higher than 600 yards, I believe accuracy fell off greatly around there, though. But their range was closer to 1000 yards, if I remember my reading correctly.
And, if this site is to be believed, I'm right.
http://www.texasbeyondhistory.net/redriver/weapons.html
"The best effective range for the Springfield .45 carbine was less than 400 yards, but significant hits could be made up to 600 yards. The bullet was driven out of the muzzle at a velocity of about 1,200 feet per second, and it could travel more than 1,000 yards..." |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
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Smcf
Captain
Status: offline |
Posted - November 18 2003 : 06:26:17 AM
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Thanks for the link El Crab. I was just wondering if the volley fire cover was effective, given the distance and the relatively small number of Indian casualties. I've seen quite a few photos of the MTC area thanks to this site, but none from the viewpoint of C, I and L looking west at MTC.
Thanks again. |
Edited by - Smcf on November 18 2003 06:27:21 AM |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - May 12 2004 : 07:39:33 AM
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I have to agree totally with the point El Crab made about Custer's decision to leave the commands sabres behind.This decision turned a cavalry regiment into mounted infantry.
Further to El Crabs points about trying to load a carbine/pistol while at the gallop, the accuracy would have been non existant.In fact these weapons would have proved to be a greater danger to the troopers rather than the Indians.
Custer had how many troopers with him 220?This ment their fire power amounted to approx 1500 inaccurately fired rounds.If they even achieved 10% accuracy this would mean only 150 casulties amoung the 2000 Indians.So now out of ammo he faced 1850 fighting warriors?
The more I read about this battle I more convinced that Custer was in the pay of Crazy Horse.
Slan |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - May 30 2004 : 9:29:06 PM
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| Your conclusion of the importance of the sabre to the calvery must be further examined. It omits a critically important factor, a calvary without sabres was still a calvary. Military tactics were not soley dependant upon facing the enemy on horseback. Tactics were also designed and, practiced, for fighting in "skirmish." This would call for the troopers to fire their issued weapontry while kneeling, standing, or prone. No trooper would attempt to fire his issued rifle ahorse unless under the most dire of circumstances. During the time of this battle, the sabres were already becoming obsolete. It is only the false images of the media who constantly portrayed soldiers dashing upon the enemy with their swords helh high. This picture had little to do wit reality. Custer's intent was not to face his enemy at close quarters, knowing he was out numbered, where the sabre could be effective. He was astute enough to realize that the clanking of sabres against the thighs of the men would only alert the warriors of his encroachment. His intent, I believe, was to use the collective firepower of the lethal, Springfield rifle to subdue the enenmy. Unfortunately, his position was infiltrated by hundreds of warriors hidden by heavy foilage. The single shot rifle was totally ineffective at close range. |
Edited by - joseph wiggs on May 30 2004 9:35:35 PM |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - June 02 2004 : 09:03:24 AM
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It was not Reno's intention to fight on foot and nothing Custer did that day indicated he was manuevering to fight on foot.
During the time of this battle, the sabres were already becoming obsolete
It wasn't the sabre that was becoming obsolete it was the cavalry.
Cheers
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - June 02 2004 : 8:26:51 PM
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I don't dispute you contention of Reno's intent that day. You are right, although he did give the command to form a line. My point was that skirmishing was as much a part of the calvary as the horse, sabre, and trooper.
Vayas Con Dios! |
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FullSail
Recruit
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - August 18 2004 : 1:50:59 PM
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The Movie "We Were Soldiers," was very entertaining. However, it is typical Hollywood taking their "view" of history. You need to try and read LTC Moore's book of the same name to find out what HE REALLY WROTE, not the lines given to Mel Gibson.
One thing that the movie did bring about was some interesting similarities between the two actions (Ia Drang & Little Bighorn) and a lot of the problems began with those in charge in the upper offices. The other main point that I got out of it was how much modern technology played a major part in the 7th Cavalry surviving the battle. Radio, air support, motor and artillery support, quicker reinforcements, etc., all played vital roles that due to the timeframe, Custer did not have available.
I personally don't think the two battles can be compared. |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - August 20 2004 : 9:37:53 PM
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"A lot of the problems began with those in charge in the upper offices."
I agree with your summarization of responsibility and accountability wholeheartedly. Neither Custer, Reno, nor Benteen were in the hills of Montana on their own "hook." They were ordered there by higher authorities. To identify any one individual as being soley responsible for the outcome of this battle is unfair. To judge the actions of military men fighting in the nineteenth century with present day standards is also unfair. Welcome aboard, its great hearing from you. |
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FullSail
Recruit
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - August 21 2004 : 01:15:04 AM
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Your theory on US Cavalry marksmenship in 1876 is one I agree with and it still exists in the Army today, but I would alter that slightly. Your reasons are sound for Indian Warfare, but Congress and the War Department definitely had their hand in the lack of weapons training that each soldier received. That lack of training, I believe, definitely hurt the regular soldier at the LBH. The lack of fire control, directed by the Officers and NCOs of the 7th Cavalry also did not help in Valley Fight, but appeared to be better in certain areas of the Custer Battlefield (Calhoun Hill). Together, both factors would prove devastating, mainly in the Valley Fight, as Custer had other problems to deal with as well. I also agree with your assesment on the range factor of the Springfield, but on June 25th (not including the Hilltop Fight), quicker firepower response times were needed more than range.
While I was in the Armor branch, we used worthless .45 caliber pistols that had a better chance of hitting the enemy at 50 yards if you threw it at them. On top of that, a tank crewman went out twice a year to "qualify" with the .45. Using the joke of a crew serve weapon, the M3 Grease Gun was stressed even less. The best part is when they gave us M-16s that we hadn't touched except for one day at "basic" and that was two years earlier. |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - August 21 2004 : 9:42:53 PM
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"Quicker fire power response times were needed more than range."
Fullsail, your background places you in a position to know the critical importance of firearm training and firearm responses. I believe that these two factors are primary (certainly not the only ones) reasons that resulted in the downfall of the 7th. Cavalry in 1876. It was an unfortunate practice, of the Army, to not place sufficient importance on firearms training. The single shot,Springfield .45 caliber carbine was extremely accurate for long distance fighting. This type of fighting is certainly less stressful than close, proximity combat. As the enemy draws nearer, the single shot weapon becomes less effective. If firearms combat were an equation, it would read similar to this: X (Springfield rifle) + Y (Distance)= effectiveness. Once the enemy encroaches upon your position, the opposite effect holds true. "Quicker fire power" is then imperative. When this occurs it is more expediant to throw a single shot rifle at the enemy, as you suggested, then attempt to reload. That's what occurred at this battle. I took a roundabout way of saying you are 100% correct! |
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JasonBury
Private
Australia
Status: offline |
Posted - August 26 2004 : 9:06:05 PM
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| Further to the weaponry discussion we all know that when faced with a more efficient but expensive choice compared with a less efficient but cheaper choice, government agencies go with the cheaper option......also alot of times you hear of contracts going to companies that have some sort of affiliation to the government.......myself i think the Springfield single shot was a major factor in the Army issuing the weapon.....single shot means less ammunition used over a period of time....again money!.back to the poll and i find it interesting that overwhemingly GAC is held accountable by people.....myself i voted Army Policy...but in reality I think all contributed to the defeat....... |
cheers
Jason |
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movingrobewoman
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - August 31 2004 : 6:37:34 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by JasonBury
i find it interesting that overwhemingly GAC is held accountable by people.....myself i voted Army Policy...
Jasonbury--
You voted army policy, too? So did I--although I do have to agree with your ultimate choice--EVERYONE contributed to the failure at LBH. My take is that army tactics and tactical manuals had not been adjusted to the guerilla type of war that the Native Americans employed--and the Army had certainly faced a similar battle-type against the likes of Mosby and the battles in the Missouri, Arkansas and Kansas theatres during the ACW. So, it wasn't anything completely foreign. And when one encounters a non-creative, albeit quick on the uptake, officer like GAC ... one died when employing the de rigeour three pronged tactic--or at least it didn't help any ...
But it is strange that nearly everyone blames GAC! |
movingrobe |
Edited by - movingrobewoman on August 31 2004 6:39:11 PM |
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JasonBury
Private
Australia
Status: offline |
Posted - August 31 2004 : 8:58:42 PM
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| The more i read about the battle the more I come to the conclusion that all the particpants contributed in their own way to the result.....but i answered the Army because its intelligence and communications systems where very adhoc and ineffective.....sure they were constrained by the technology of the times but still...... |
cheers
Jason |
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movingrobewoman
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - September 01 2004 : 01:43:08 AM
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quote:
Originally posted by JasonBury
i answered the Army because its intelligence and communications systems where very adhoc and ineffective.....sure they were constrained by the technology of the times but still...
I absolutely must agree with you--LBH is one of those examples of the all-too-famous oxymoron "military intelligence ..." What would have happened had not Bouyer been the only person familiar with the valley of the Little Bighorn River? I mean, what if the Crow scouts convinced Custer that the area was no place to get "stuck" should a defensive situation arrive?
Granted, Custer would never stand on a hill like Crooke, watching and at the same time controlling a battle--but the notes brought by Kanipe and DeRudio to Benteen and McDougall were ineffectual at best, and damnably, ridiculously inadequate at worst.
Many regards, |
movingrobe |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - September 14 2004 : 7:47:02 PM
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| I must place a belated, third entente with both of you. If one were to construct a list of responsible characters for this tragic battle, it would read like the rolling credits of an epic movie: a cast of thousands. I will, however, proffer a fundamental motivation for the military's move against the Plains Sioux and Cheyenne; greed for the lands they possessed. |
Edited by - joseph wiggs on September 14 2004 7:50:37 PM |
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Heavyrunner
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - September 14 2004 : 9:11:00 PM
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| The "who's responsible" issue is, to me, simply the old U.S. habit of laying blame, rather than credit. However, it also occurs to me that Sioux and Cheyenne would have been very aware of Custer's tactics at the Wa****a (why, by the way, are asterisks used on that?). They could well have known that a column attacking one end of the village would be followed by a column attacking the other end. We fail too often, sadly, to give credit for such astute and quickly responding generalship. Gall and Crazy Horse are mostly responsible for Custer's problems at the Little Bighorn. |
Bob Bostwick |
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Heavyrunner
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - September 14 2004 : 9:14:49 PM
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| Oh, I just figured out the answer to my own question. Aw, ****. |
Bob Bostwick |
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movingrobewoman
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - September 15 2004 : 10:51:32 AM
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quote:
Originally posted by Heavyrunner
Oh, I just figured out the answer to my own question. Aw, ****.
That is also my theory of Custer's last words ... hehehe ...
Regards, |
movingrobe |
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - September 16 2004 : 01:57:01 AM
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quote:
Originally posted by Heavyrunner
The "who's responsible" issue is, to me, simply the old U.S. habit of laying blame, rather than credit. However, it also occurs to me that Sioux and Cheyenne would have been very aware of Custer's tactics at the Wa****a (why, by the way, are asterisks used on that?). They could well have known that a column attacking one end of the village would be followed by a column attacking the other end. We fail too often, sadly, to give credit for such astute and quickly responding generalship. Gall and Crazy Horse are mostly responsible for Custer's problems at the Little Bighorn.
If Gall and Crazy Horse were not at the battle, would it have made any difference? What evidence is there that the Indians astutely foresaw the multi-column attack, or that Indian "generalship" even existed? Most of their stories are rather plain about what a surprise each attack was.
I don't think the "whys" of the defeat are that complicated. The soldiers were badly outnumbered, and the ground they fought on exposed and poor for defense.
R. Larsen
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movingrobewoman
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - September 16 2004 : 04:51:42 AM
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quote:
Originally posted by Heavyrunner
The "who's responsible" issue is, to me, simply the old U.S. habit of laying blame, rather than credit. The Sioux and Cheyenne would have been very aware of Custer's tactics. Gall and Crazy Horse are mostly responsible for Custer's problems at the Little Bighorn.
I hate to disagree, but most of the sources I have read (Michno, Hardorff, etc.,) indicate that the Sioux and Cheyenne had no earthly idea who they were fighting (most thought it was Crook) at Little Bighorn! And then there are some examples that a few participants didn't learn until well past thirty years after the battle that they had defeated Custer! In these sources there is a sense of surprise among those Native Americans whose tales were recorded. The NA victory at LBH came as much of a "surprise" to their participants--at about the same time ultimate defeat must have finally registered in Custer's mind.
Although there were war chiefs in the Indian village, there was no formal military command structure among any of the tribes--be it Oglala, Hunkpapa, Sans Arc, Minneconjou, Arapaho, Brule, Two Kettle or Cheyenne.
In "Lakota Noon," you'll find (according to Michno) that neither Chief Gall or Crazy Horse had major, major roles in the Indian victory (though I am not entirely sure if I can buck the traits of legend). Victory, according to Michno, seemed to depend upon mostly upon the directions and the "martyring" of Lame White Man.
Regards, |
movingrobe |
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Brent
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - September 16 2004 : 06:32:29 AM
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| I agree--don't think Gall or Crazy Horse played much of an individual role. Indian "tactics" seemed to be just reactions to Reno's and Custers initiatives (such as they were). Sort of like beetles wandering into an anthill --ants all run to where the beetle is. Add a second beetle from a diferent direction, and they all run over there. |
Edited by - Brent on September 16 2004 06:34:39 AM |
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Smcf
Captain
Status: offline |
Posted - September 16 2004 : 07:38:05 AM
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| I'm of the opinion, albeit relatively uninformed, that Custer's soldiers were fleeing from the MTC onslaught. In that case, Crazy Horse's actions prevented escape to the North, where Reno and Benteen thought they'd gone. Pretty decisive in getting them killed to a man, if not necessarily in achieving overall victory in my view. |
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Responsibility At Little Bighorn
