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Rich
Commander-in-Chief
USA
Status: offline |
 Posted - October 10 2002 : 11:23:50 AM
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Poll Question:
Who was the most responsible for the 7th Cavalry's defeat at Little Bighorn?
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frankboddn
Major
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - February 05 2003 : 6:33:29 PM
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Rich, regarding your poll on who or what was the major reason for Custer's defeat, one possibility was left. The more I've studied this and talked to other folks like us the more I'm convinced that on that particular day, NO ONE, Custer, Crook, Merrit or any other officer, could have defeated the Indians for one simple reason: Too many Indians. The more I read, the more I'm convinced that Custer's plan wasn't that far off from what was used in previous campaigns by other officers. I think what was different here was that when Reno charged in the valley, the Indians,instead of turning tail retreating and fighting a rear defense while the women, children and elders fled in the opposite direction, you had around 3000 warriors flush with their victory/stalemate over Crook eight days earlier, and they weren't going to run from 140 or so cavalrymen. They must've thought the army was crazy to attack with so few men.
One mistake GAC made, in my opinion, other than a lack of information, was sending Benteen off on his scout to the left, thus diluting his men even further. And, yes, the wrong man led the charge in the valley. But, as I've often said, even if it was Benteen who led the charge, had those men tried to ride through the village, and had Weir tried to ride to Custer's rescue, there would've been four Last Stand Hills: The one in the village; Custer's LSH; Weir's attempt to support custer by "riding to the sound of the firing," and Reno Hill might've been wiped out, too.
So, in my opinion, there were just toooo many Indians who just weren't in a running kind of mood. What do y'all think? |
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Anonymous Poster2396
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Posted - February 19 2003 : 5:25:33 PM
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In reply to who was the most responsible for the 7th's defeat; Has anyone ever brought up the fact that this was only the second time Custer ever fought a stand up fight with Indians? The first was the so called battle of the Wa****a in 1868 in the dead of winter against a small village of peaceful Indians. Even then the Indians managed to kill 19 of the soliders(Maj. Elliot and his troops). This battle was against well armed, highly modivated, flushed with victory and as Crazy Horse is quoted as saying, "This Is a good day to die" light cavalry that were protecting their homes and family. Custer was not the experienced Indian fighter a lot of people thought he was. Custer was in fact not the real commander of the 7th. The commander of the 7th was a Col. Sterigis who was on a recruiting detail in St. Louis at the time. His son died with Custer. Thanks for listening,
James Alderman Jim00s@aol.com
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Anonymous Poster2374
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Posted - April 23 2003 : 12:41:11 AM
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Well, if you're going to agree that there were too many Indians, what did Reno do wrong and become the 'wrong man'? He saved his men, and obeying Custer - who had no clue how far he would have to go to find a crossing down river - would have, as you point out, killed them all. Who was the right man? Benteen? He wouldn't have charged whatever; he could see the village.
Who fought numerous standup battles against Indians except Crook? Custer was no worse prepared than all other officers. Merrit fought, what, three? Nobody fought the number Custer stumbled on.
The Army got whupped, outfought and outthought in some areas. It happens. Custer followed a logical (but wrong) plan that unfortunately was not anchored in any knowledge of numbers or terrain. And given that Grey has demonstrated that Custer had a lot of time without much going on when he could have returned to Reno or regrouped to force the Indians north, Custer didn't exactly demonstrate quick thinking tactical genius when his supposed plan hit the fan.
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com |
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pjsolla
Major
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Posted - April 23 2003 : 03:47:50 AM
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Who was responsible for the 7th's defeat at LBH???? As much as most do not want to admit it, the Indians very simply outfought the command. They outnumbered them, shocked the troops with their voluminous firepower, and managed to cause the tactical disintegration with their raw, sheer show of power.
Custer, while very visible, is the easiest target to throw darts at. But, he was never going to outfight the Indians on this particular engagement. They were too intense and focused on their goal. The bloodlust bagan when the Indians overtook Calhoun Hill. They knew the troopers were breaking ranks and all hell followed.
The Reno/Benteen site, by the grace of God, was just plain lucky. I do not doubt the military leadership of Benteen in securing and holding this site, but it doesn't take a rocket scientist to realize that if the Indians had put together their forces, they could have, on one direct charge, overrun the entire position. The troopers there were just too spread out. What the Indians were thinking, I don't know. But if you have been to the site, you realize, again, that Reno/Benteen were just plain lucky. Remember, the plains Indian was not too keen on losing warriors when they engaged the enemy. It may have accounted for their less than aggressive charge on the Reno/Benteen site. Similar to the Calhoun Hill episode. They engaged in lengthy skirmishing before C companys charge down the coulee, which failed, and began the deterioration process. It was at that point that the Indians began their aggressive push for Calhoun Hill and overwhelmed the troopers.
This is a highly controversial subject and many of the conversations I have on it always seem to turn to the General. I tell others that my interest in the battle is on the command itself. The General just happens to be one of the players. Too much took place to keep putting Custer at the front. If anything, I fault him for underestimating the determination of his foe. But, I was not there and cannot understand his mindset at the time. I do not profess to even try. I do however, keep studying the battle and fine tuning it. And it does appear to have been a rout! |
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lorendead
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - April 23 2003 : 10:18:38 PM
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| Who is the most responsible for the 7th defeat at the Little Big Horn? Ultimately George A. Custer as commander.Failure to have knowledge of the terrain,size and strength of the enemy.Inadequate supply line support. Selection of underling officers was shoddy at best.Under lying to Custer's mistakes was Reno failure to charge into the village.This tactic was in my estimate a tactic to cause confusion,and gain time for Custer to deploy his troopers elsewhere. Benteen I feel is another poor selection,but I also feel Custer knowing he was not with him sought to place him out of the action. One wonders how the battle would have turned out had Custer used only his most trusted officers,and left Reno and Benteen with the supply train. |
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Anonymous Poster2374
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Posted - April 23 2003 : 11:23:28 PM
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Custer's conundrum is that his most trusted officers were not his most competent; in any case, several were detached for recruiting in St. Louis. I doubt Custer was stupid enough to want any sizeable portion out of the fight; he didn't have time to get far enough north to help Reno and, in any case, after Weir Point knew Reno was retreating. He can be excused for command errors to that point; his actions from there on are just stupid. Proof in the pudding.
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com |
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frankboddn
Major
USA
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Posted - May 27 2003 : 9:40:02 PM
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I noticed there was one vote for the Crow and Arikara scouts? What in the world did they do to deserve a vote, except tell Custer there were too many darned Indians? |
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Anonymous Poster3123
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Posted - May 27 2003 : 10:04:38 PM
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Well, also custer refused to accept a gatling gun, and also, he had his men use single shot weapons, while the Indians used repeaters like lever actions. So while custer's soldiers were firing one bullet, the Indians could get 3 or 4 shots off at the calvarymen. Garry Owen!!!! Oh yah, if you wanna learn more about the 7nth cav, watch we were soldiers!!  |
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Robert Downard
Recruit
USA
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Posted - June 11 2003 : 9:43:27 PM
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The 7th cavalry was doomed as soon as it initiated the fight. There were just too many Indians. Dividing the force just made it quicker.
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Anonymous Poster4401
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Posted - June 13 2003 : 07:48:49 AM
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In the end, Custer was responsible. What's the saying--"A commander is responsible for all that his unit does, or fails to do"...
I have always believed that his words to Reno after he orders the charge into the village ("We'll support you with whole command") left lots of room for confusion. I'm sure Custer meant "support" from his own attack elsewhere. I wonder tho if Reno may have thought he would come to his aid immediately. When Reno is stopped and he sees Custer riding along the ridge (away from him)I can imagine him thinking "There goes our support". And where in the hell is Benteen??Sent by Custer on a wild goose chase. |
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Rich
Commander-in-Chief
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - June 18 2003 : 7:43:32 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by Anonymous Poster3123
Well, also custer refused to accept a gatling gun, and also, he had his men use single shot weapons, while the Indians used repeaters like lever actions. So while custer's soldiers were firing one bullet, the Indians could get 3 or 4 shots off at the calvarymen. Garry Owen!!!! Oh yah, if you wanna learn more about the 7nth cav, watch we were soldiers!!
Yes, "We Were Soldiers" is excellent [as is the book] and draws frequent analogies to Custer's 7th ...
Gotta correct 2 things, though - Custer didn't choose the single shot carbines. They were standard issue. And, only some of the Indians brandished repeaters. Many had bow & arrows, single shot rifles, even muzzle loaders ... Ammunition, even with the repeaters, would have been a concern, I'd think. Especially after expending so much the week before against Crook at the Rosebud.
Fact remains, though, it ended up a pretty one-sided affair! |
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lorendead
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - June 20 2003 : 4:45:38 PM
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Rich RE:Who was the most responsible for Custer's defeat at the Little Big Horn?
One could question the entire support units,interesting facst brought up on a television program last nite.
Why did General George Crooks reportedly one of the,if not the greatest indian fighters of that time not continue after the indians after the battle of the Rosebud? He was never brought to the light for his removal off the field.
The Rosebud battle in terms of wounded,and those killed in action were mere skirmish numbers.
Sheridan, Terry,also share the blame for suggesting Custer was at fault by disobeying orders,a fact they knew not to be true.
Custer,does shoulder the most blame in this matter.Inadequate support,lack of enemy numbers,unfamiliar with the terrain over which a cavalry unit had to travel.
The list goes on and on down to Reno/Benteen failing to first order the pack train ammunition be brought up. This had to be ordered by a subordinate officer.
There is enough blame all the way around in the failures in this battle to coat everyone several times over. Even after the battle the so called Court of Inquiry was a complete joke. the Army knowing that Reno could not be court-martialed because it was two years after the incident.
The officers that lied about their roles in the battle,orders ect.The Court of Inquiry was a mere show,to get them out of the newspapers.Officers had complained that they were under the whip of who? The Army. they very well could not have Reno a West Point grad come under fire,could not admit to the public that there was nothing they the Army could even do to him. loren Dead |
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Anonymous Poster2133
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Posted - June 20 2003 : 9:19:50 PM
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I saw the program on the PAX network last evening. Some interesting thoughts on a conspiracy against Custer from Grant on down; however, I don't think the means of communication available to the soldiers in Montana, let alone those who would be involved in Washington, would allow a conspiracy of that magnitude to be pulled off. I think the problem was to many indians and no contingency plan to deal with the large numbers.
Capt. Jinks |
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El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - June 25 2003 : 4:59:08 PM
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The Springfield carbine was superior to any lever action at medium to long range. Your average Winchester/Remington repeater had a limited range, but was superior at short range. I would liken the difference to the same comparison of the M-16 and the AK-47. The rate of fire was only an advantage within 200 yds.
One thing I have never understood is the leaving of sabers at the Powder River camp. Granted, they did make noise on the march and were somewhat heavy, but how can you sustain a charge into a camp with pistols and carbines? Trying to load a gun on a horse so you can defend and attack seems much more difficult than slashing and thrusting with a saber. Also, the soldiers in close quarters had little to no chance against hatchets and lances and knives. They did not have hand-to-hand combat training, and they were up against a tough close quarters opponent. Not to mention that many indians feared the "long knives". I read somewhere the effect of the threat of being stabbed with a bayonet was more valuable than the actual bayonet attack itself. Humans prefer shooting and being shot. When faced with a bayonet charge, the results are rather bloodless in history. And many soldiers with bayonets fixed would hit with the butt of the rifle instead. There just aren't that many records of bayonet wounds, at least in US history.
I voted that the Government policy was to blame. They made the problems, then expected the Army to fix it. And they did not give the US Army what they needed to succeed. They were poorly trained and, in most cases, poorly led. |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
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El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - June 25 2003 : 5:08:21 PM
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| I don't believe Custer thought that Reno was 100% out of the fight from what he saw. To me, he seemed to be trying to relieve the pressure while he waited for the rest of the regiment to move north to him. I think he realized the surprise was lost, hence he moved on the top of ridges and bluffs in plain sight. He engaged the Sioux and was looking for terrain for the entire regiment to operate on. He could only assume that Benteen would follow his order to join the fight, and that Reno would do the same. But Reno lost 40 men, and Benteen decided to hole up upon finding Reno. I don't believe it was a lost cause when Benteen arrived. Custer may have even seen Benteen's troops from Luce Ridge, as Michno suggests. |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
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El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - June 25 2003 : 5:18:38 PM
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| I forgot one last detail. Crook's army was basically out of action due to the insane amount of ammunition burned to kill less than 30 warriors. I believe they fired almost 30,000 rounds at the Rosebud. Crook claimed victory, since he held the field. But he held the field when he was attacked. He fought a defensive fight while most likely outnumbering his foe while his cavalry searched for the village. Upon finding it, they received a message to return. And their poor fire discipline left them unable to continue forward. To top everything off, he seemed to make no attempt at informing the other columns of the Sioux's resolve and strength. |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
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pjsolla
Major
Status: offline |
Posted - June 26 2003 : 11:14:35 PM
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According to scouts who were with Custer, they say "he stood atop Weir Point and watched Reno falling back". He made no motion to assist, but allegedly turned away.
And from all the data I have been able to amass, I do believe that Custer sent C,I, & L up to Luce Ridge and he went with headquarters and E&F down to the river. I know there is heavy talk that Custer went up to Luce Ridge. In his entire career, he always went to the front, where the action was. Why change at this point? After tons of reading, I honestly could not see him commanding his troops from atop Luce Ridge. This in essence, takes him away from the "action", to which he was so predisposed. I know there is also talk that he could get a better view of the valley from Luce Ridge. I think that Custer went down to the ford on exactly what it was, a recon mission, with the intent to meet up with Keogh and the other three companies at what is now Calhoun Hill as soon as he ascertained what he was after. I cannot see him intending to charge across a river with two companies, and have three others a good mile away. It's just not his temperment nor his military strategic mind. |
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pjsolla
Major
Status: offline |
Posted - June 26 2003 : 11:21:01 PM
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El Crab: The visitors center at the battlefield has a map with all the markers shown on it. It is available for purchase. Suggest you contact them.
You are aware that some roughly 40 markers are spurious? Capt. Sweet at the time of the placing of the markers was not aware that some were for Reno's men. So, he went about placing them at the Custer site. According to the evidence to date, anywhere you see two markers paired, one is usually a spurious one. |
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steviebee
Corporal
United Kingdom
Status: offline |
Posted - July 05 2003 : 1:44:09 PM
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El Crab, sorry for this late post, only just read this thread. I'm not sure that Anson Mills actually found the village before he was recalled to Crook, although his message back was 'we have the village...and can hold it'. Neil Mangum in his Rosebud book says that 'officers were in disbelief [at being called back], for many of them thought they were close to a village', but the village was more supposed in Crook's mind than actual. He sends over half of his cavalry after it, a big contribution to 'the battle's dismal outcome'.
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Pvt. Jester
Recruit
Status: offline |
 Posted - October 07 2003 : 5:29:29 PM
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I can only guess that apart from the considerable noise sabers made on the march which would have alerted the enemy and given them time to scatter - and this was the army's BIGGEST concern at the time- it also takes a lot of practise to use the saber effectively and maybe the you troopers of the 7th just didn't have it. Also, all the experience of Indian fighting up to then was of hit & run skirmishes at long range, and the enemy just didn't present much of a target for a mounted saber charge.
This is one of the reasons the army adopted the Springfield carbine as unlike the Henry or Spencer, it could 'reach out and touch' the enemy before he ever got within bow shot or repeater range. Custer's command was overwhelmed because the indians did the exact opposite of everything they were expected to do on past performance.
quote:
Originally posted by El Crab
The Springfield carbine was superior to any lever action at medium to long range. Your average Winchester/Remington repeater had a limited range, but was superior at short range. I would liken the difference to the same comparison of the M-16 and the AK-47. The rate of fire was only an advantage within 200 yds.
One thing I have never understood is the leaving of sabers at the Powder River camp. Granted, they did make noise on the march and were somewhat heavy, but how can you sustain a charge into a camp with pistols and carbines? Trying to load a gun on a horse so you can defend and attack seems much more difficult than slashing and thrusting with a saber. Also, the soldiers in close quarters had little to no chance against hatchets and lances and knives. They did not have hand-to-hand combat training, and they were up against a tough close quarters opponent. Not to mention that many indians feared the "long knives". I read somewhere the effect of the threat of being stabbed with a bayonet was more valuable than the actual bayonet attack itself. Humans prefer shooting and being shot. When faced with a bayonet charge, the results are rather bloodless in history. And many soldiers with bayonets fixed would hit with the butt of the rifle instead. There just aren't that many records of bayonet wounds, at least in US history.
I voted that the Government policy was to blame. They made the problems, then expected the Army to fix it. And they did not give the US Army what they needed to succeed. They were poorly trained and, in most cases, poorly led.
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Brent
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 08 2003 : 06:51:35 AM
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Regarding the Springfield vs. Henry, etc issue.
Always seemed to me that a lever action repeater would be a nice weapon to have around.
Seem to notice that whenever Indians had a chance to obtain weapons, was often the lever type repeaters. Recall from my Civil War reading that many Union cavalrymen would go out and spend their own $$ just to get a 16-shot Henry.
But anyway-wonder why no one thought of "mixing" the weapons?? You know, having several men in each squad armed with repeaters (ie--like todays' "automatic weapons") and the remainder with the Spencer?? I don't mean each guy decide what kind of repeater--too many ammo issues and concerns for that. But just pick ONE and go with it. Think about it--a 10-12 man squad, with 2-3 guys with 16 shot Henrys, the rest with their Springfields. |
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Brent
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 09 2003 : 06:46:46 AM
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Forgot to add one more "observation" about the Springfield/repeating rifle matter:
Kind of ironic that the Springfields would be touted as having those long range capabilities, when it was in the hands of troopers most of whom could not hit the broad side of a barn door at 100 yards.
For most of them hitting anything beyond that range would be pure luck.
And I'm not panning them in particular. My days in the Army 1967-1969 showed that soldiers in that time were equally pathetic when it came to marksmanship. |
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alfuso
Corporal
Status: offline |
Posted - October 09 2003 : 11:46:58 AM
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quote:
Originally posted by pjsolla
According to scouts who were with Custer, they say "he stood atop Weir Point and watched Reno falling back". He made no motion to assist, but allegedly turned away.
And from all the data I have been able to amass, I do believe that Custer sent C,I, & L up to Luce Ridge and he went with headquarters and E&F down to the river. I know there is heavy talk that Custer went up to Luce Ridge. In his entire career, he always went to the front, where the action was. Why change at this point? After tons of reading, I honestly could not see him commanding his troops from atop Luce Ridge. This in essence, takes him away from the "action", to which he was so predisposed. I know there is also talk that he could get a better view of the valley from Luce Ridge. I think that Custer went down to the ford on exactly what it was, a recon mission, with the intent to meet up with Keogh and the other three companies at what is now Calhoun Hill as soon as he ascertained what he was after. I cannot see him intending to charge across a river with two companies, and have three others a good mile away. It's just not his temperment nor his military strategic mind.
I cannot see him turning away from Reno IF he indeed really saw Reno' falling back. It wasn't in Custer's nature to miss a chance to ride to the rescue, guidons flapping, bugles blaring.
And the Crow scouts whyo claimed this did so decades after the battle and even quoted things Custer said to his officers. This from Crow who were still using an interpreter decades later. To my knowledge, Custer did not speak Crow.
It sounds like Crow CYA.
And you're right, GAC would be at the front -- except for probes and recce's.
But if others are correct, such as Fox in his Legacy essay, and GAC was after fleeing non-combatants, it would indicate GAC wasn't out for just a good fight, but trying to avoid one because he did have a smaller force.
He also knew that Terry and Gibbon were heading that way with a much smaller force than his own.
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Deny Everything
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alfuso
Corporal
Status: offline |
Posted - October 09 2003 : 11:52:04 AM
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quote:
Originally posted by Anonymous Poster2396
In reply to who was the most responsible for the 7th's defeat; Has anyone ever brought up the fact that this was only the second time Custer ever fought a stand up fight with Indians? The first was the so called battle of the Wa****a in 1868 in the dead of winter against a small village of peaceful Indians. Even then the Indians managed to kill 19 of the soliders(Maj. Elliot and his troops). This battle was against well armed, highly modivated, flushed with victory and as Crazy Horse is quoted as saying, "This Is a good day to die" light cavalry that were protecting their homes and family. Custer was not the experienced Indian fighter a lot of people thought he was. Custer was in fact not the real commander of the 7th. The commander of the 7th was a Col. Sterigis who was on a recruiting detail in St. Louis at the time. His son died with Custer. Thanks for listening,
James Alderman Jim00s@aol.com
Yes, we know all that.
Sturgis was kept on detached duty, mostly recruiting at a D.C. desk job with which he seemed most comfortable. He certainly didn't agitate to be with his regiment.
As Lt. Col without the Col present, Custer was in command of the 7th.
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Deny Everything
Prepare to Panic |
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movingrobewoman
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 12 2003 : 3:59:55 PM
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| Gosh, a poll that actually assesses blame to someone OTHER than GAC and Major Marcus Reno! The more I read about LBH (and when it comes to that battle, I am a novice--I am more interested in GAC the PERSON), the more I am convinced that it was the US Army and its policies, in their infinite wisdom, that caused the debacle at LBH. As I have read it in other forums and books, GAC was using, with the three-pronged attack, a method tried and true throughout history, one hammered into his head whilst at West Point, specified in Upton's "Cavalry Tactics", and as ... gosh, who was it again, mentioned--a GREAT way of dealing with a FOREIGN enemy, not one of the Sioux's cunning and individualistic fighting techniques. In addition, Custer knew that Reno had failed him, perhaps all of Terry's command, when he did not complete the scouting mission that he was assigned from the Far West, and was powerless to change, due to Army protocol, the battle order--that the Major would take the initial offensive to the united tribes' village, leaving Custer unable to change orders or risk court martial himself (although I am constantly wondering that had GAC WON, would anyone have cared if he re-arranged his men). An army that does not change itself, does not allow for some command creativity is asking for a loss--and unfortunately, at LBH, it was a magnificent one. And now, just learning that Sheridan MIGHT have known just how huge the gathered village might have been, as soon as 6.08.76, and DID not notify Terry ... yep, Reno messed up ... Custer had some blame in the debacle, but I look at the US Army and say "shame on you!" |
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Responsibility At Little Bighorn
