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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
 Posted - April 06 2006 : 10:27:21 AM
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Unasked, I agree with AZ almost totally in his recent Springfield Carbine post. But it deserves its own thread.
In support, I cheerfully steal this from a Markland posting on the LBHA board. It's from the non-official (but might as well have been)Army-Navy Journal well after the Custer fight.
"We all know that it takes from six to nine months' careful and intelligent drilling to turn out out a good cavalry man; we know that horses must hear the discharge of firearms every day in order to make them perfectly quiet and controllable under fire, and that the aim mounted must be quick and sure to be effective. It will not do to wait until the horse cease champing the bit, and becomes like a wooden horse, before the fire is delivered, but, like the shot of an expert at a bird on the wing, it must be prompt and deadly. The position of a cavalry man in the saddle is too conspicuous a target to admit of the slow method of prolonged aiming, such as can be allowed dismounted; he must keep moving, and halt and fire immediately, otherwise either himself or his horse goes under."
Without going into depressing detail, we can all agree that whatever the 7th was, well-trained after being subject to careful and intelligent drilling it was not. The 1876 US Army was a victim of the public's mass distaste for more war and its own institutional assumptions of being the best ever in 1864 and 1865 and therefore the best ever more by association. The experienced CW officers had to know this - had to. The 7th couldn't get a packtrain right, couldn't control its horses, couldn't hit the backside of today's average American, and only certain members were good enough to hunt game and hit anything at all. As a military unit, it was dismal, but Custer maintained a glorious image based on greatly exaggerated and dubious accomplishment, primarily because he was always on the make and needed that for his image.
Really, the Wa****a should have been a cakewalk given the huge odds in the 7th's favor, yet.....
As to Reno leaving the timber.
They couldn't stay there because it's an officer's job to visualize the immediate future, a thrilling prospect at that point for Reno in that it consisted of:
a. It was a very hot day, and maybe one of the fires set by the Indians would catch and burn them out. Due to exquisite training, horses and troopers both would remain calm and professional in a grass and tree conflagation while under increasing enemy fire......
b. .....that was about to completely surround them.
c. An added deleterious feature of the position were those high, enemy encrusted bluffs just across the river allowing them to easily pick off horses and men.
d. This one may actually be found in various military manuals under "common sense." Then again, may not...... But, it was probably a good idea to discuss a retreat before ammo became an issue, rather than "after."
e. "After" included the additional situational quality of "night", during which, of course, all officers knew the 7th excelled performing intricate manuevers, because they were so well trained, even in the midst of a forest fire as their now infantry jumped over their dead horses and ran, unburdened by weapons for which no ammo existed. There's a hot plan...
e. The promised support had just disappeared north with a sincere and emotional wave, and there visually appeared to be no crossing possibility for many miles, which meant no support whatever.
f. The arguably large and growing larger numbers of peevish warriors rendered any possible manuever of the inferior numbers of the 7th rather comic. Comic in a distant sense from what Reno had to have felt.
g. Of course, it's all Reno's fault for not riding through the village unhurt several times while Custer adjusted his saddles and moseyed on down to find a crossing. Custer's genius was betrayed!
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Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
Edited by - Dark Cloud on April 06 2006 10:29:51 AM
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - April 07 2006 : 09:08:48 AM
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Unasked, I agree with AZ almost totally in his recent Springfield Carbine post. But it deserves its own thread.
In support, I cheerfully steal this from a Markland posting on the LBHA board. It's from the non-official (but might as well have been)Army-Navy Journal well after the Custer fight.
"We all know that it takes from six to nine months' careful and intelligent drilling to turn out out a good cavalry man; we know that horses must hear the discharge of firearms every day in order to make them perfectly quiet and controllable under fire, and that the aim mounted must be quick and sure to be effective. It will not do to wait until the horse cease champing the bit, and becomes like a wooden horse, before the fire is delivered, but, like the shot of an expert at a bird on the wing, it must be prompt and deadly. The position of a cavalry man in the saddle is too conspicuous a target to admit of the slow method of prolonged aiming, such as can be allowed dismounted; he must keep moving, and halt and fire immediately, otherwise either himself or his horse goes under."
Without going into depressing detail, we can all agree that whatever the 7th was, well-trained after being subject to careful and intelligent drilling it was not. The 1876 US Army was a victim of the public's mass distaste for more war and its own institutional assumptions of being the best ever in 1864 and 1865 and therefore the best ever more by association. The experienced CW officers had to know this - had to. The 7th couldn't get a packtrain right, couldn't control its horses, couldn't hit the backside of today's average American, and only certain members were good enough to hunt game and hit anything at all. As a military unit, it was dismal, but Custer maintained a glorious image based on greatly exaggerated and dubious accomplishment, primarily because he was always on the make and needed that for his image.
DC-- you mention the other CW officers and I believe they play as much an important role in troop preparedness as Custer. The day to day training would not carried out by the Regimental commander. The NCOs also have a major role in the training. I would like to see others post such as Billy Markland in regards to the condition of military readiness of the 7th.
What is known about the average (June,1876) 7th cavalry trooper in regards to:
1 Horsemanship
2 Use of revolver
3 Use of Carbine
4 Amount of previous experience
5 Hand to hand combat training
Also what was the status of horses,equipment,use of pack trains as deployed by the 7th.
To me it seems like the forming of a new football team. You have a skeleton of experienced players (officers, NCOs) and lots of newer players and draft choices. After a few practices and no skirmishes you declare we have the best team. You instill this spirit into the players but they still need lots training together and some skirmishes, and then some games where you lose but build experience.
The difference is that 7th if it were a team went to the Super Bowl when they did not have all the wins and hard knocks that build football teams. It is reality that 7th was ordered to go because there were no other to send. There also never was another Super Bowl(LBH).
Really, the Wa****a should have been a cakewalk given the huge odds in the 7th's favor, yet.....
How many of the troopers at LBH had the experience of the Wa****a.
As to Reno leaving the timber.
They couldn't stay there because it's an officer's job to visualize the immediate future, a thrilling prospect at that point for Reno in that it consisted of:
a. It was a very hot day, and maybe one of the fires set by the Indians would catch and burn them out. Due to exquisite training, horses and troopers both would remain calm and professional in a grass and tree conflagation while under increasing enemy fire......
b. .....that was about to completely surround them.
c. An added deleterious feature of the position were those high, enemy encrusted bluffs just across the river allowing them to easily pick off horses and men.
d. This one may actually be found in various military manuals under "common sense." Then again, may not...... But, it was probably a good idea to discuss a retreat before ammo became an issue, rather than "after."
e. "After" included the additional situational quality of "night", during which, of course, all officers knew the 7th excelled performing intricate manuevers, because they were so well trained, even in the midst of a forest fire as their now infantry jumped over their dead horses and ran, unburdened by weapons for which no ammo existed. There's a hot plan...
e. The promised support had just disappeared north with a sincere and emotional wave, and there visually appeared to be no crossing possibility for many miles, which meant no support whatever.
f. The arguably large and growing larger numbers of peevish warriors rendered any possible manuever of the inferior numbers of the 7th rather comic. Comic in a distant sense from what Reno had to have felt.
g. Of course, it's all Reno's fault for not riding through the village unhurt several times while Custer adjusted his saddles and moseyed on down to find a crossing. Custer's genius was betrayed!
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Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com
DC -- My response to Hunk was in regards to the use of cover by "domestics" when they were outnumbered and defended against the Indians. I could have said Reno-Benteen but the cover there was not as good as the timber. I have no issue with Reno leaving the timber other than it might have been more orderly. The ammunition alone was a good reason to leave the timber. Some troopers had used quite a lot of their ammo. Also the pack train was somewhere and there were lots of Indians.
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An officer's first duty is to his horses.
SEMPER FI |
Edited by - AZ Ranger on April 07 2006 09:14:17 AM |
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BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - April 07 2006 : 6:13:56 PM
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"In support, I cheerfully steal this from a Markland posting on the LBHA board. It's from the non-official (but might as well have been)Army-Navy Journal well after the Custer fight."
AZ & DC, thanks. I almost fell out of my chair when reading this on the microfilm, published on the five year anniversary of the defeat at the LBH. And there was nothing, nada, zilch that I could find in that issue about the Seventh at the LBH. The absence of which, coupled with the article quoted, speaks volumes to me about whom the publishers of the Army & Navy Journal felt was responsible for the outcome.
And DC, you are right. I am beginning to believe, without any corroborating proof, that Sherman had copies of all telegrams delivered to the A&N Journal.
Best of wishes,
Billy |
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BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - April 07 2006 : 6:19:12 PM
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AZ, this is an excerpt of an article published in July, 1888 in the United States Cavalry Association Journal written by Maj. Edwin Sumner. I will eventually get around to transcribing the entire thing but the excerpt deals with the recruit and his initiation into the army at Jefferson Barracks.
Billy
If there is ever a time in the life of a soldier when he needs care and kindness as an individual it is on his first entering the service. I presume almost every officer has experienced the feeling of having wasted sympathy on undeserving men. This is one of the experiences of life among men. The unfortunate part of it is that it falls so heavily sometimes upon men who really are deserving. It too frequently happens that officers will not take the pains to discriminate in their treatment of enlisted men, between an intentional or an unintentional mistake. Sufficient allowance is not made for the ignorance of men, nor is sufficient patience exercised in the way of overcoming this ignorance.
Every recruit who joins the army is more or less unjustly treated, and each has to receive many hard knocks before he reaches a point where he can look for kindness.
The character of the man goes far toward establishing his status and the man who does not possess the necessary firmness to await the time when he can declare himself, deserts. This may account for the large number of desertions from our army in the first year of enlistment, and as the greater number of desertions take place within that time, the cause may easily be discovered. The men are new to the service and unfamiliar with restraint. They are mixed in with all kind of characters good, bad and indifferent, at the rendezvous, and every discomfort attends the journey from the rendezvous to the depot. While at the depot there is still more crowding and sometimes not even a bed. All these trials have to be endured for three months or more, and at the end, men who enlisted for certain regiments in the south are assigned to regiments in the north and vice versa.
Thus it is that every step on the part of the government has been contrary to that which was expected by the recruit and in utter despair of any change for the better the man deserts.
There are quarters at our cavalry depot at Jefferson Barracks for probably 400 men; that is to give necessary room and comfort for all. They frequently have over 600 there. The men have no place to go, no amusement or recreation, and a large sick report prevails, for it is one of the most unhealthy places in the United States. Those who become discontented and homesick have plenty of time and cause to regret the step they have taken and to mope over the situation. The place has a gloomy appearance; there is nothing bright or cheerful about it, and the men resemble convicts rather than soldiers. If an experience of this nature lasting three months, will not the spirit out of a young man who entered the service with expectations of a bright and happy life, as he understood that of a soldier to be, I do not know what will do so. A depot may be a necessity but it would be far better for the new men, and for the service, and would decrease desertion one-half if new recruits could be enlisted for regiments they select and be sent to their stations, their future homes, with as little delay as possible.
He goes on to say that in 1887, there were 2,240 desertions from the army as a whole (out of 6,168 accepted recruits),
and of that number, 1,105 were men assigned to regiments from depot.
In the cavalry service alone 2,151 men were received at Jefferson Barracks depot from January 1st to December 31st, 1887. During that year 1,739 men were sent to regiments, 137 were discharged at depot, 297 deserted, and 19 died.
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BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - April 07 2006 : 6:51:23 PM
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That is one frustrated and highly annoyed officer, Captain Dorst is. Thank you for that. I wouldn't want to be with him after he mailed that baby off and hit the first bar on the way home. His anger is palpable. I don't think many officers called their training "ridiculous" in any form.
Both pieces are twelve years and up removed from Custer, but if we can ascertain anything it's safe to say things weren't better in the 1870's, given the infusion of attention and dollars the Army received after LBH compared to before. It sorta lays to rest, as previous pieces did about the pack train, that being a cavalryman was not really an earn while you learn routine on the march up the Yellowstone, and newbies probably suffered a much higher death rate then than now. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - April 07 2006 : 11:37:46 PM
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Thanks Billy
I knew you were a source of information but I am still impressed on how much you access to and provide to others.
Thanks Again
AZ Ranger |
An officer's first duty is to his horses.
SEMPER FI |
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - April 07 2006 : 11:51:53 PM
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I am reasonably certain that after reading about the horse and the rider both previous and the information supplied by Billy that 7th was lacking in training of both in that regard. Making the same beginner mistakes over and over is not training. A new rider can not train a horse. The horse learned from the other horses along the way but it may be bad habits rather than perfect control and precision movements. If its months and months to train the horse properly by an experienced rider and then more training with the same rider and longer if a novice rider then it did not occur for majority of 7th Cavalry horses and troopers.
The same must be said for the pack train. If you didn't know what to do at the beginning of the trip either packer or animal then multiple days of the same mistakes is not training. |
An officer's first duty is to his horses.
SEMPER FI |
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - April 09 2006 : 6:14:18 PM
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| Another question(s). Why did so many officers in the 7th believe they were ready to go into battle? Did they have concerns and we(Me) are just not aware of them? |
An officer's first duty is to his horses.
SEMPER FI |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - April 11 2006 : 11:09:07 AM
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As a military unit, it was dismal,
A somewhat harsh judgement I would opine.To judge the 7th solely on the action at LSH is unjust.No body of contemporary troops under the kind of leadership displayed by Custer would have fared any better.If a judgement is to be made then the entire action should be considered.
1/Reno's 130 men were prepared to follow their leader into the village.
2 The skirmish line was held in the face of growing opposition.
3/The withdrawal to the timber was well executed with no hint of panic.
4/The position in the timber was held.
5/The retreat was not initally a stampede.
6/Reno's units defeated with 40%casualties still responded to orders and somehow got themselves advancing towards Weir point.
7/The withdrawal from Weirpoint was well executed covered by a rearguard.
8/Reno hill was stoutly defended.
9/Even at the LSH area showed no evidence of wholesale panic.
The 7th at all times responded with enormous courage to the orders of their officers.If anything was dismal it was the leadership of Custer. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - April 11 2006 : 12:58:21 PM
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Lots of combatants have courage, but they're dismal military units. The Indians were dismal as well for war, if not for the singular battle. They could ride, anyway.
Regardless, when you replant the LSH markers to where the wooden ones actually were, remove the spurious, adjust the others to fit with the early photos and first hand descriptions, LSH looks very much like a panic north from Keogh's area that hit a wall, bounced, and was slaughtered. This assumes it wasn't a construct by the 7th, anyway, reflecting ease of burial and "fitting" placement. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - April 11 2006 : 1:51:00 PM
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Lots of combatants have courage, but they're dismal military units.
I have posted 9 points to support my opinion that a judgement of "dismal" cannot be based on the performance of the 7th at the LBH.
Facing overwhelming odds,placed in an almost hopeless position by Custer,the regiment did recover and perform adequately.
when you replant the LSH markers to where the wooden ones actually were, remove the spurious, adjust the others to fit with the early photos and first hand descriptions, LSH looks very much like a panic north from Keogh's area that hit a wall, bounced, and was slaughtered.
If refugees were fleeing the Keogh position and moving towards Custer then the term panic is unjustified.Is panic not a thoughtless flight from danger?
And on Aug 8th the 7th was back in action.Doughty fighters in spite of all.
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - April 11 2006 : 4:09:00 PM
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That they did those things doesn't affect, one way or the other, that they were a dismal unit. They were bad shots, they weren't good riders - could not have been by the Army's own description of the training needed - and this was all proven in this battle of few Indian casualties, many of which would have had to be friendly fire anyway. Manuever is pointless if you can't hit anything, even if the horse were still. Absent the Sioux running away, the 7th was incapable of carrying out its mission.
Not long ago you described the retreat from Weir Point as a variant of fiasco, so I am glad you've at least indirectly admitting that Benteen did well under the circumstances.
In any event, since nobody has a clue what happened in what sequence on Custer's field, it's as possible as any other theory the 7th was surprised at LSH. The bodies streamed south along the road, different from the markers today, which suggests a more coagulated position of mutual defense than actuality supports. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - April 12 2006 : 4:01:49 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
That is one frustrated and highly annoyed officer, Captain Dorst is. Thank you for that. I wouldn't want to be with him after he mailed that baby off and hit the first bar on the way home. His anger is palpable. I don't think many officers called their training "ridiculous" in any form.
Both pieces are twelve years and up removed from Custer, but if we can ascertain anything it's safe to say things weren't better in the 1870's, given the infusion of attention and dollars the Army received after LBH compared to before. It sorta lays to rest, as previous pieces did about the pack train, that being a cavalryman was not really an earn while you learn routine on the march up the Yellowstone, and newbies probably suffered a much higher death rate then than now.
Well, I have finally placed Dorst. He is mentioned quite often in the biography of Ranald Mackenzie, Bad Hand. So, he quite obviously took the irritability of his mentor. Yes, he wrote the articles in the '80's but he used examples from the early '70's when serving under Mackenzie in the Fourth Cav.
Have a good one gentlemen and ladies,
Billy |
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BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - April 12 2006 : 4:14:20 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by wILD I
As a military unit, it was dismal,
A somewhat harsh judgement I would opine.To judge the 7th solely on the action at LSH is unjust.No body of contemporary troops under the kind of leadership displayed by Custer would have fared any better.If a judgement is to be made then the entire action should be considered.
1/Reno's 130 men were prepared to follow their leader into the village.
2 The skirmish line was held in the face of growing opposition.
3/The withdrawal to the timber was well executed with no hint of panic.
4/The position in the timber was held.
5/The retreat was not initally a stampede.
6/Reno's units defeated with 40%casualties still responded to orders and somehow got themselves advancing towards Weir point.
7/The withdrawal from Weirpoint was well executed covered by a rearguard.
8/Reno hill was stoutly defended.
9/Even at the LSH area showed no evidence of wholesale panic.
The 7th at all times responded with enormous courage to the orders of their officers.If anything was dismal it was the leadership of Custer.
Wild makes valid points. DC, I think you are right but in the sense that the 7th was on a par with the majority of regiments. The lack of training was an Army-wide problem, not only a 7th problem. Remember, Crook's men fired off something like 25,000 rounds and did not account for many Indian dead. And from what I have read on the Rosebud (admittedly little), most of the Indian casualties were caused by either the Indian auxiliaries or the civilians and infantrymen. Perhaps the Ninth and Tenth may have had an advantage in that they had higher retention rates of enlisted men, as well as more field and combat service; but still, they had the same limitations on ammunition to practice with, as well as the responsibility to be cheap labor at the various posts (as did all the western regiments).
Best of wishes,
Billy |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - April 12 2006 : 4:16:29 PM
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Not long ago you described the retreat from Weir Point as a variant of fiasco, so I am glad you've at least indirectly admitting that Benteen did well under the circumstances.
What a deliciously distorted sense of recall you have.The quickness of the pen decieves the eye and our resident conjurer turns advance into retreat.
They were bad shots,
Really there is no such thing.All that is required of the soldier is that he can fire a round in the general direction of the enemy.
Small arms are nothing more than a placebo.Make enough noise and you frighten the enemy while giving youself and your comrades more confidence.Result enemy flees leaving you to plunder his town, his village ,his marble collection.
they weren't good riders
Well some were good enough to race a mile,plunge down an embankment,swim a river and climb a 200 foot escarpment while under close scrutiny by cleaver brandishing amateur surgeons.
and this was all proven in this battle of few Indian casualtiesI read somewhere that Gall's wife and kids were killed.He must have been very unlucky to lose his family to such bad shots.Or is it possible that there was far more casualties in the village than was ever admitted?Did the Indians themselves know?Did they have a numbering system beyond "heap big".
Manuever is pointless if you can't hit anything,
If the enemy appears on your flank or rear you're not going to hang about to find out how good his marksman ship is.
The 7th's combat potential might not have amounted to much but then in the late 1800's cavalry everywhere were reduced to chasing revolting peasants. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - April 12 2006 : 5:24:39 PM
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Wild,
1. You're just being held to your own postings. You called it "a shambles." It wasn't, and now you claim it so without a hint of admitting error.
2. Thus explaining the fiasco of Ireland at war.
3. Yes, I know. SOME were. Most weren't.
4. If true at all, they were shot within the lodge by Reno's soldiers pointlessly firing in the direction of the village or who'd missed their closer targets....again.
5. This was in reference to the soldiers' proposed series of line dances - the skirmish lines and feints that would do....what?
6. Agreed. Except in the American West, where they fought warrior societies, mostly afoot. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - April 13 2006 : 08:49:58 AM
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You're just being held to your own postings. You called it "a shambles." It wasn't, and now you claim it so without a hint of admitting error.
I posted that the advance to Weir point was a shambles.
Thus explaining the fiasco of Ireland at war
Generally the soldier was expected to fire his weapon into the massed ranks of attacking enemy.Slightly later it was the artillery and machineguns which did the killing.Brit soldiers in WW1 advanced with unloaded rifles and were not allowed to return fire.Training soldiers in the finer points of marksmanship is a waste of time.Todays weapons concentrate on rate of fire.Teaching marksmanship has one advantage though and that is it is good for morale.Makes the soldier feel superior to the enemy.
The fiasco of Irish rebellions was due to untrained,poorly armed,poorly led peasants facing professional imperial troops.And just in passing where do you think those French allies of Washington's came from?
If true at all, they were shot within the lodge by Reno's soldiers pointlessly firing in the direction of the village or who'd missed their closer targets....again.
They were doing what was expected of them firing at the biggest target.
Agreed. Except in the American West, where they fought warrior societies, mostly afoot.
The warrior was an unique species.Sending a regular line cavalry regiment into battle against him was going have dismal results but this did not make the 7th a diosmal outfit.
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hunkpapa7
Lieutenant
United Kingdom
Status: offline |
Posted - April 13 2006 : 10:35:23 AM
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| Thought Galls family members were killed by Ree scouts. |
wev'e caught them napping boys
Aye Right ! |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - April 13 2006 : 2:41:58 PM
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Regarding Gall, who knows? How could anyone who fired which bullets? The Scouts were stealing horses, not directly attacking the village, supposedly. Except for the ones directly with Reno like Bloody Knife.
Page 23, Benteen's Orders, Wild: "Let's call it DC.The 7th was a dysfunctional shambles.When the pressure came on it fell asunder.Except for the miracle on Reno Hill." Except for the work of Benteen and a very few other officers, it could be true. They were a dismal military unit as far as skill level, but they didn't fall apart, and this solely due to Benteen in the main.
As dumb as the Army could be, there are no manual instructions for post CW cavalry firing into non-existent massed ranks of Indians, nor was that the expectation and it's absurd to pretend it ever was. There wouldn't have been even the pretence of target practice if that was the case, with no concern about accuracy. They'd be issued shotguns. That may have been true under Cromwell and Cornwallis, but it certainly was never true in the American west. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - April 17 2006 : 5:11:04 PM
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Wild: "Let's call it DC.The 7th was a dysfunctional shambles.When the pressure came on it fell asunder.Except for the miracle on Reno Hill." Except for the work of Benteen and a very few other officers,
It's amazing the effect a round to the temple will have.Transformed the 7th into a unit with some credibility.
I know how much you love the bagpipes DC.Well we had a military parade here on Sunday to commemorate the rising of 1916 and the massed pipe bands heading the parade struck up Garryowen as they passed the reviewing stand.I could not help thinking that at least Custer left us one great marching tune. |
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - April 17 2006 : 10:53:34 PM
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Don't mean to be hard on you Wild but have been gone for a few days patrolling and can't help but make a few comments.
1/Reno's 130 men were prepared to follow their leader into the village. They stopped short of the village by 500 yards or more.
2 The skirmish line was held in the face of growing opposition.The skirmish disintegrated into clumps of troopers firing wildly.
3/The withdrawal to the timber was well executed with no hint of panic. Retreat is easier than charge.
4/The position in the timber was held. Not as long as it could have been held.
5/The retreat was not initially a stampede.That because no one knew they were leaving, Then panic set in when they saw some leaving without them.
6/Reno's units defeated with 40%casualties still responded to orders and somehow got themselves advancing towards Weir point.
They advanced because the Indians were gone and then retreated when the Indians showed up.
7/The withdrawal from Weirpoint was well executed covered by a rearguard. Only because of officer realized what was about to happen and used his company. It was a series of all companies providing cover to rear.
8/Reno hill was stoutly defended. The Indians never tried to overrun with all the warriors at once.
9/Even at the LSH area showed no evidence of wholesale panic.
The 7th at all times responded with enormous courage to the orders of their officers.If anything was dismal it was the leadership of Custer. The Indians state different.
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An officer's first duty is to his horses.
SEMPER FI |
Edited by - AZ Ranger on April 17 2006 11:01:11 PM |
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - April 17 2006 : 10:58:49 PM
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Wild makes valid points. DC, I think you are right but in the sense that the 7th was on a par with the majority of regiments. The lack of training was an Army-wide problem, not only a 7th problem. Remember, Crook's men fired off something like 25,000 rounds and did not account for many Indian dead. And from what I have read on the Rosebud (admittedly little), most of the Indian casualties were caused by either the Indian auxiliaries or the civilians and infantrymen. Perhaps the Ninth and Tenth may have had an advantage in that they had higher retention rates of enlisted men, as well as more field and combat service; but still, they had the same limitations on ammunition to practice with, as well as the responsibility to be cheap labor at the various posts (as did all the western regiments).
Best of wishes,
Billy
Billy I think what you stated answers my question on why the officers weren't concerned. It was the norm for post CW army to have mostly untrained troops. If you didn't like then you could resign your comission.
Thanks Billy
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An officer's first duty is to his horses.
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - April 17 2006 : 11:23:41 PM
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they weren't good riders
Well some were good enough to race a mile,plunge down an embankment,swim a river and climb a 200 foot escarpment while under close scrutiny by cleaver brandishing amateur surgeons. Horses in general try to stick together and follow the lead of dominant horses. If the officers and enough NCOs had good horses the others would follow and the trooper only had to stay in on their horse. The panic of the horses running into the village indicates poor rider on a untrained horse. The same thing happens to a lesser degree on people that have never ridden and go on a trail ride. They are not good riders but the horses are trained to follow the leader.
and this was all proven in this battle of few Indian casualties I read somewhere that Gall's wife and kids were killed.He must have been very unlucky to lose his family to such bad shots.Or is it possible that there was far more casualties in the village than was ever admitted?Did the Indians themselves know?Did they have a numbering system beyond "heap big". Wild I agree with you I have to believe there were more casualties than has been reported and more deaths from injuries that occurred at LBH.
Manuever is pointless if you can't hit anything,
If the enemy appears on your flank or rear you're not going to hang about to find out how good his marksmanship is. DC retreat is a maneuver and it worked quite well and it didn't requiring firing either. Being a poor shot at over 200 yards is much different than saying a trooper couldn't hit anything. No matter what your sights are set at or what sight picture you have at 10 yards or less muzzle indexing would do the job. At that range the number of Indains becomes the deciding factor not whether you can hit them or not.
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An officer's first duty is to his horses.
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - April 28 2006 : 6:09:45 PM
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| Along this line is there known cavalry to be better than the 7th? |
An officer's first duty is to his horses.
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Was the 7th Any Good At All?
