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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
 Posted - November 29 2005 : 8:54:36 PM
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How do you know extra markers were placed among Keogh and Calhoun's groups? Source? Gray is careful not to say that. He deals in assumptions that may or may not be correct.
And the eighteen dead north of Keogh's group are probably part of C company, Gray thinks. What percentage of C is included in what are called Keogh's or Calhoun's groups? C men were found all over the field, their horses missing, their commander not with them but with his brother, and that's when they were found at all (Harrington's body was never ID'd). Gray is careful to not fail to use the words "speculate" and "if" and even - ahem - on page 392 suggest Keogh may have turned back to help Calhoun IF Calhoun was used for a rear guard action. And of course, page 394, "one can only speculate" about these issues. He also suggests that what are called company locations were inspired by a dead officer and "several" recognized men from the same company in the area. He also makes a point of saying company "equivilents" rather than "company", because he knows most bodies were not identified and it is only an assumption that companies fell is such order.
Nowhere does Gray feel comfy with the surety you have, Mr. Humphrey. Perhaps your eye witnesses can be of use?
Benteen is one of the few who DID make a detailed study of the field while the bodies were on it. Nobody else there contradicted his conclusions, although some expressed different opinions.
Have to place a previous post on the correct thread. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 29 2005 : 9:33:16 PM
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quote:
How do you know extra markers were placed among Keogh and Calhoun's groups? Source? Gray is careful not to say that. He deals in assumptions that may or may not be correct.
I don't know that they were placed amoung Keough and Calhoun's companies -- I say if they were, it still doesn't change the general pattern of the battle.
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And the eighteen dead north of Keogh's group are probably part of C company, Gray thinks. What percentage of C is included in what are called Keogh's or Calhoun's groups?
What difference does it make? Do you deny that Keough's company and Calhoun's company were over-run in the positions where most of the markers are?
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C men were found all over the field, their horses missing, their commander not with them but with his brother, and that's when they were found at all (Harrington's body was never ID'd). Gray is careful to not fail to use the words "speculate" and "if" and even - ahem - on page 392 suggest Keogh may have turned back to help Calhoun IF Calhoun was used for a rear guard action.
That's possible, and consistent with my interpretation.
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And of course, page 394, "one can only speculate" about these issues. He also suggests that what are called company locations were inspired by a dead officer and "several" recognized men from the same company in the area.
In my personal experience (and I have commanded two companies in combat), company commanders do not die alone. If you find the company commander and some of his men, you have found the company.
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He also makes a point of saying company "equivilents" rather than "company", because he knows most bodies were not identified and it is only an assumption that companies fell is such order.
I agree, and you may have noted I also have used the term "company equivallents" (particularly in respect to the pack train detatchments.) It is not at all unlikely that men cut off from their companies attached themselves to the nearest company they could find.
But none of that changes the general tactical picture we see -- two companies (or company equivallents) died in the east. Calhoun was in command of one, Keough of the other. Calhoun's company was over-run, and the survivors tried to get to Keough's group, which was over-run in turn.
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Nowhere does Gray feel comfy with the surety you have, Mr. Humphrey. Perhaps your eye witnesses can be of use?
I cite eyewitnesses only when they exist.
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Benteen is one of the few who DID make a detailed study of the field while the bodies were on it. Nobody else there contradicted his conclusions, although some expressed different opinions.
Which means what? Benteen did ride over the field and examine the bodies. But where is his map or plot? Where does he try to trace the action?
For more than a quarter of a century I have worked at the Army's Maneuver Training Centers on various projects analyzing tactical outcomes. I don't find any evidence Benteen used any of the standard techiques of analyzing a battle.
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 30 2005 : 03:23:28 AM
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"For more than a quarter of a century I have worked at the Army's Maneuver Training Centers on various projects analyzing tactical outcomes. I don't find any evidence Benteen used any of the standard techniques of analyzing a battle."
Vern quick question. What was the standard techniques of analyzing a battle in 1876 if any? I only a had two years in the Marine Corps (1969-1970) but my son was in Intel in the Marine Corps 20 years after me and it changed in that short time. I have been working in law enforcement now for 27 years and our techniques are substantially different then when I started. |
“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
SEMPER FI |
Edited by - AZ Ranger on November 30 2005 03:32:25 AM |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - November 30 2005 : 04:21:06 AM
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Calhoun's company was over-run, and the survivors tried to get to Keough's group, which was over-run in turn
Keogh and Calhoun's units were in line forming a front facing in the approx direction of the river/village from which it is logical to assume the attack materalized.In other words both units were hit at the same time from the same direction.Thus there is no way of knowing which went down first.Also for survivors from either unit trying to seek safety with the other ment crossing a front not retreating from an attack.
As regards tactical movements on the field such as rearguards and such like there are no indications.
That's incorrect. First of all, Custer's force died in several distinct locations. In the east, Calhoun's and Keough's companies, and in the west, Smith, TW Custer and Yeates' companies.
That just indicates confusion.Custer would not have had the means or time to command and control 5 companies individualy.
Could there have been a worse tacitical disposition of those units spread as they were over a mile.
Did you say you had a military background Vern ?If so you must know that his only option was to concentrate his forces and firepower.
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 30 2005 : 08:38:31 AM
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Vern quick question. What was the standard techniques of analyzing a battle in 1876 if any?
By and large, there weren't any -- which is why I say that while Benteen rode over the field and formed a general impression, he did not do a battle analysis. He did no interviews, drew no sketches or maps, and applied no orderly analytical technique in arriving at his conclusion -- which he never explicated in detail.
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 30 2005 : 08:45:54 AM
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Keogh and Calhoun's units were in line forming a front facing in the approx direction of the river/village from which it is logical to assume the attack materalized.In other words both units were hit at the same time from the same direction.Thus there is no way of knowing which went down first.Also for survivors from either unit trying to seek safety with the other ment crossing a front not retreating from an attack.
They were not in a line -- they were forming a salient, with a gap between the companies. The evidence is men ran from Calhoun's to Ksough's company.
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As regards tactical movements on the field such as rearguards and such like there are no indications.
Other than the indications of flight of survivors, you mean.
That tells us quite a bit. For example, if a company commander died away from the bulk of his men, that indicates disintegration of the unit. If he lies in the midst of them, the company probably fought until overrun in position.
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That just indicates confusion.Custer would not have had the means or time to command and control 5 companies individualy.
Where do you get the idea that he did or even attempted that?
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Could there have been a worse tacitical disposition of those units spread as they were over a mile.
Probably not -- which is my main theme. Custer, with 12 companies, never got more than three of them into action at any one time.
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Did you say you had a military background Vern ?If so you must know that his only option was to concentrate his forces and firepower.
Actually, he had multiple options. In modern military parliance, we would say he failed to synchronize his attack and was defeated in detail. |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - November 30 2005 : 10:52:13 AM
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They were not in a line -- they were forming a salient,
What's a salient only a bent line.The angle was no more than 20 degrees off the straight and probably conformed to a ridge.
Where do you get the idea that he did or even attempted that?From you.You posted that he had Keogh and Calhoun form a rearguard.
Actually, he had multiple options.
At 4.30 approx he had but one.
Actually the position of the markers would indicate that it began and ended very quickly with men falling where they had dismounted.There is no indication that there was even time for a general panic/rout/scatter. |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 30 2005 : 11:08:49 AM
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They were not in a line -- they were forming a salient,
What's a salient only a bent line.The angle was no more than 20 degrees off the straight and probably conformed to a ridge.
We do not consider a salient to be a line. And in this case, there was a significant gap between Calhoun and Keough -- this is a typical tactical error often seen both in combat and at highly realistic training centers, like the US Army's National Training Center.
{quote]Where do you get the idea that he did or even attempted that?From you.You posted that he had Keogh and Calhoun form a rearguard.
This is in response to the suggestion that Custer attempted to command companies individually. He did no such thing.
The essense of command and control is to reduce the mission to tasks, and to assign forces to those tasks.
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Actually, he had multiple options.
At 4.30 approx he had but one.
At that time, he had none at all -- but earlier he had many options. One signature of defeat is running out of options.
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Actually the position of the markers would indicate that it began and ended very quickly with men falling where they had dismounted.There is no indication that there was even time for a general panic/rout/scatter.
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We're getting lost here. Let's review the bidding. My position is that Custer failed to synchronize his attack. Out of 12 companies, he never got more than three into action at any one time. Artguments that show the fight was confused, over quickly, and so on reinforce that position -- we differ only in the details.
If, on the other hand, someone can show the fight took a long time, that the units were well-handled, were mutually supporting and maneuvered within the battle position, I would be wrong. |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - November 30 2005 : 1:13:33 PM
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We do not consider a salient to be a line.A salient is a bulge in a line.
there was a significant gap between Calhoun and Keough [/i]
Yes but the units were alongside each other facing in approx the same direction to meet the same attack.
My position is that Custer failed to synchronize his attack. Out of 12 companies, he never got more than three into action at any one time.[/i]Because he lost the initiative due to an unexpective massive counter attack. |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 30 2005 : 1:38:23 PM
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We do not consider a salient to be a line.A salient is a bulge in a line.
Tactically we do not consider a salient to be a line. A salient is a tactical solution, not a linear formation.
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there was a significant gap between Calhoun and Keough [/i]
Yes but the units were alongside each other facing in approx the same direction to meet the same attack.
There's no evidence of that -- and considerable evidence that survivors of Calhoun's company ran toward (and some reached) Keough's company.
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My position is that Custer failed to synchronize his attack. Out of 12 companies, he never got more than three into action at any one time.[/i]Because he lost the initiative due to an unexpective massive counter attack.
No, because he failed to plan for a synchronized attack. Even had the Sioux been much weaker, his forces would have gone into action in a disjointed and uncoordinated fashion.
If you like, we can talk about TLP (Troop Leading Procedures) and what his failings were in that regard. |
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prolar
Major
Status: offline |
Posted - November 30 2005 : 2:35:14 PM
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| Vern, I agree with much of what you say, though DC has some valid points and questions. I am curious about your placement of C troop with E and F. From the areas where identified bodies of C troopers were found, isn't it more likely that they were with L and I? |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 30 2005 : 3:14:26 PM
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Vern, I agree with much of what you say, though DC has some valid points and questions. I am curious about your placement of C troop with E and F. From the areas where identified bodies of C troopers were found, isn't it more likely that they were with L and I?
You have a good point -- which I why I prefer to identify the companies (or company equivallents) by the name of the commander, rather than the letter designation. It is very likely -- especially toward the end of the action -- that troops were intermixed. But clearly two company commanders were on the east, three on the west. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 30 2005 : 5:34:32 PM
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Mr. Humphries:
1. "I don't know that they were placed amoung Keough and Calhoun's companies -- I say if they were, it still doesn't change the general pattern of the battle."
You did say they were. You at 1825 Tuesday: "Correct -- extra markers were set amongst those of Calhoun and Keough's companies." No 'if.' And yes it could change the general pattern. Further, there is much evidence there may be only tenuous relationship between the markers and where bodies were found, and between where bodies were found and where they died. Further yet, you have got to entertain the possibility that Sweet did not place the stones in a proportion, but in handy groups. He certainly could have simply buried the extras till a decision was made; he had, despite Gray's reverence, no dedication to the truth or accuracy. Once that image of him is accepted (the proof is in the pudding; he lied), lord knows what other errors of convenience he gave us. This is the Army that assured us many times of the burial dignity and all that. This field compelled lying by the Army from the beginning. And it's hard to blame the guys, given how far away it was from anything likely to be civilization soon.
2. "What difference does it make? Do you deny that Keough's company and Calhoun's company were over-run in the positions where most of the markers are?"
The difference is we don't know if most of the bodies around Calhoun and Keogh belonged to their companies, for one. Half of each of what has been assumed L and I could have died on Monument Hill, and the bodies on the hogback with Keogh and Calhoun belong to C and remnants of E - after you take out the spurious markers. An officer and his staff dead in a clump does not prove that the hacked up naked bodies about were same company. Most bodies were not recognized by their friends. So I can neither claim nor deny it. I have no clue. Nor does anyone. That's an example of an assumption being pounded into fact. Gray goes out of his way to avoid that, for the most part.
I agree much of what you claim is both likely and logical. But it's still an assumption, and given the kicks this battle has always provided to conventional wisdom, it's best avoided. We have no idea what happened beyond MTC to Custer.
3. "That's possible, and consistent with my interpretation."
Except yesterday you said that Keogh's men didn't head towards Calhoun, but the other way around. We don't know.
4. "In my personal experience (and I have commanded two companies in combat), company commanders do not die alone. If you find the company commander and some of his men, you have found the company."
Really. How many slaughters of whole companies have you come across? In any case, that's not necessarily relevant to this fight, which has no equivilant in the US military's history. How many company commanders died with Custer and not their companies?
5. "I agree, and you may have noted I also have used the term "company equivallents" (particularly in respect to the pack train detatchments.) It is not at all unlikely that men cut off from their companies attached themselves to the nearest company they could find.
But none of that changes the general tactical picture we see -- two companies (or company equivallents) died in the east. Calhoun was in command of one, Keogh of the other. Calhoun's company was over-run, and the survivors tried to get to Keough's group, which was over-run in turn."
Well, how do you know Calhoun's company was over-run before Keogh's? And if you agree survivors attach themselves to groups, the six clumps of bodies around the battlefield may bear only a minimal amount of death by organization.
6. "I cite eyewitnesses only when they exist."
Then cite them to the events you've already introduced them for.
7. "Which means what? Benteen did ride over the field and examine the bodies. But where is his map or plot? Where does he try to trace the action?
For more than a quarter of a century I have worked at the Army's Maneuver Training Centers on various projects analyzing tactical outcomes. I don't find any evidence Benteen used any of the standard techiques of analyzing a battle."
That he didn't write it up is true, but he's a an experienced battlefield commander who examined the actual field first-hand looking for indications of what happened. There's reason to trust his analysis over, perhaps, that of those who went by the book and used MacGuire, the guy who drew the highly inaccurate map used at Reno's Inquiry. Benteen came to his conclusions and offered them. By the standards of battlefield analysis of his day, what are his failings? It looked to him like a ragged horror, except for Calhoun's position, and he said as much. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 30 2005 : 6:03:14 PM
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quote:
Mr. Humphries:
1. "I don't know that they were placed amoung Keough and Calhoun's companies -- I say if they were, it still doesn't change the general pattern of the battle."
You did say they were. You at 1825 Tuesday: "Correct -- extra markers were set amongst those of Calhoun and Keough's companies." No 'if.'
I stand corrected -- I shouldn't have said that.
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And yes it could change the general pattern.
How? Tell me how the battle field would be materially changed.
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Further, there is much evidence there may be only tenuous relationship between the markers and where bodies were found, and between where bodies were found and where they died.
Again, tell me how the battlefield is materially changed.
Did all five companies fight in a continuous, mutually-supporting defense? What evidence do we have for such a conclusion?
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Further yet, you have got to entertain the possibility that Sweet did not place the stones in a proportion, but in handy groups.
How can you that? Where did I say he placed the stones in proportion?
But I can tell you this from personal experience -- when you're burying bodies, "Handy" means as close to where they fell as possible.
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He certainly could have simply buried the extras till a decision was made; he had, despite Gray's reverence, no dedication to the truth or accuracy. Once that image of him is accepted (the proof is in the pudding; he lied), lord knows what other errors of convenience he gave us.
Again, please explain how this materially changes the battlefield?
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This is the Army that assured us many times of the burial dignity and all that. This field compelled lying by the Army from the beginning. And it's hard to blame the guys, given how far away it was from anything likely to be civilization soon.
And how is this "lying" relevant?
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The difference is we don't know if most of the bodies around Calhoun and Keogh belonged to their companies, for one.
How does that change the battlefield? It is not at all impossible that the men under Keough's command included some from other companies -- which is why I tend to use commanders' names and not letters to identify companies. But that doesn't materially affect the battlefield.
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Half of each of what has been assumed L and I could have died on Monument Hill, and the bodies on the hogback with Keogh and Calhoun belong to C and remnants of E - after you take out the spurious markers. An officer and his staff dead in a clump does not prove that the hacked up naked bodies about were same company.
But how does that change the battlefield?
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Most bodies were not recognized by their friends. So I can neither claim nor deny it. I have no clue. Nor does anyone. That's an example of an assumption being pounded into fact. Gray goes out of his way to avoid that, for the most part.
I agree much of what you claim is both likely and logical. But it's still an assumption, and given the kicks this battle has always provided to conventional wisdom, it's best avoided. We have no idea what happened beyond MTC to Custer.
The point is, battle analysis must be like a lawsuit -- go with the preponderance of evidence. If we demand absolute proof, then we should be discussing mathmatics, not war.
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3. "That's possible, and consistent with my interpretation."
Except yesterday you said that Keogh's men didn't head towards Calhoun, but the other way around. We don't know.
But we do know that -- the identification of Calhoun is strong evidence for that fact.
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4. "In my personal experience (and I have commanded two companies in combat), company commanders do not die alone. If you find the company commander and some of his men, you have found the company."
Really. How many slaughters of whole companies have you come across?
In a series of fights lasting five nights, my company killed the equivallent of a North Vietnamese regiment -- over 600 men.
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In any case, that's not necessarily relevant to this fight, which has no equivilant in the US military's history.
I can cite several cases of worse "massacres" -- from Fort Mims to the Battle of the Bulge.
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How many company commanders died with Custer and not their companies? quote:
The evidence is all the company commanders in the west wound up near Custer.
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Well, how do you know Calhoun's company was over-run before Keogh's? And if you agree survivors attach themselves to groups, the six clumps of bodies around the battlefield may bear only a minimal amount of death by organization.
Because the pattern of flight is from Calhoun to Keough -- Calhoun himself died in the gap between the two forces.
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6. "I cite eyewitnesses only when they exist."
Then cite them to the events you've already introduced them for.
Where have I cited an eye-witness who did not exist? Give me an example of what you consider an inappropriate citation of an eye-witness on my part.
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For more than a quarter of a century I have worked at the Army's Maneuver Training Centers on various projects analyzing tactical outcomes. I don't find any evidence Benteen used any of the standard techiques of analyzing a battle."
That he didn't write it up is true, but he's a an experienced battlefield commander who examined the actual field first-hand looking for indications of what happened.
No -- it's one thing to be an experienced battlefield commander, and another to be a good battlefield analyst.
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There's reason to trust his analysis over,
He didn't do an analysis -- he rode over the battlefield and later delivered a short opinion.
[quote]perhaps, that of those who went by the book and used MacGuire, the guy who drew the highly inaccurate map used at Reno's Inquiry. Benteen came to his conclusions and offered them. By the standards of battlefield analysis of his day, what are his failings?
Let's not identify with the men of the 7th -- we're not accusing Benteen or anyone else of any crime.
Therefore we measure the quality of an opinion not by "the standards of the day" but by the best standards.
[quote]It looked to him like a ragged horror, except for Calhoun's position, and he said as much.
I'm sure it did -- but he didn't do a detaoiled analysis.
And nothing so far refutes my thesis that Custer failed to synchronize his attack -- of 12 companies, he never got more than three into action at any one time. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 30 2005 : 7:48:24 PM
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1. "Tell me how the battle field would be materially changed."
Because if Sweet put an improportionate number of stones somewhere - he has control of 20% - that would materially affect the battlefield pattern. How could it not?
2. "Did all five companies fight in a continuous, mutually-supporting defense? What evidence do we have for such a conclusion?"
I have none. But you're finessing the fact you said Custer never got more than three of his 12 companies in action at the same time. That's different from "continuous, mutually-supporting defense."
3. "How can you that? Where did I say he placed the stones in proportion?"
You didn't say it directly, but if he did not, you can't also say the battlefield isn't altered by taking out the 20% and moving them around.
4. "But I can tell you this from personal experience -- when you're burying bodies, "Handy" means as close to where they fell as possible."
In soft ground. In pounded flat prairie, it might do to roll bodies into a gully and bury them there, or someplace where your three or whatever shovels for 260 burials might make a difference in a short amount of time.
5. "Again, please explain how this materially changes the battlefield? "
Because if the burials were dug up and bodies dragged around in the first year or so, and the wooden stakes mostly missing, when Sweet arrived with the stones, it might have been a crap shoot where they put them. Lush growth was one indication at one point for marking burials. And the Army wouldn't be honest about that and, in fact, hasn't been. We could be doing analyses based on those stones.
6. "How does that change the battlefield? It is not at all impossible that the men under Keough's command included some from other companies -- which is why I tend to use commanders' names and not letters to identify companies. But that doesn't materially affect the battlefield."
If 20% vanish of the total vanish from one area and are applied to another, it changes it.
7. "The point is, battle analysis must be like a lawsuit -- go with the preponderance of evidence. If we demand absolute proof, then we should be discussing mathmatics, not war."
Good point, but only in civil court. But virtually nothing of what is claimed known about Custer's activities would be accepted in a court. Hearsay, highly unreliable translations by unvetted people, a chain of evidence security that would shame anyone.
8. "But we do know that -- the identification of Calhoun is strong evidence for that fact."
How is the ID of Calhoun evidence one way or the other for movement of soldiers around him?
9. "In a series of fights lasting five nights, my company killed the equivallent of a North Vietnamese regiment -- over 600 men."
Because you found VC officers you confirmed their specific companies as wiped out? None escaped?
10. "I can cite several cases of worse "massacres" -- from Fort Mims to the Battle of the Bulge."
Your examples make no sense if we're talking about Custer's end of the battle. Our forces at Mims were part militia, part Indians and civvies in a stockade. 'Only' about half were killed. Eh. I don't get the Bulge analogy either, given we won it.
11. "I'm sure it did -- but he didn't do a detaoiled analysis.
And nothing so far refutes my thesis that Custer failed to synchronize his attack -- of 12 companies, he never got more than three into action at any one time."
Only true if we don't think Reno and Custer ever shared a period of fighting. That Custer didn't syncronize his attack - to say no more, and that's the kindest way to put it - is unassailable and I've never claimed otherwise. I only suggest be very careful with blanket assertions of "fact."
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Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
Edited by - Dark Cloud on November 30 2005 7:52:20 PM |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 30 2005 : 8:17:35 PM
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Because if Sweet put an improportionate number of stones somewhere - he has control of 20% - that would materially affect the battlefield pattern. How could it not?
"How could it not?" is not the same as "Here's how."
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I have none. But you're finessing the fact you said Custer never got more than three of his 12 companies in action at the same time. That's different from "continuous, mutually-supporting defense."
How? Can you give me a quote from a manual to support that?
The separation in space between the eastern and western forces clearly demonstrates a separation in time. After all, they didn't march in that formation!!
The evidence seems clear as well that Calhoun's company was over-run before Keough was significantly engaged.
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You didn't say it directly, but if he did not, you can't also say the battlefield isn't altered by taking out the 20% and moving them around.
Just tell me how the alteration would be significant?
Would it show us all five companies together? Would it show the largest force in the east, not the west? How?
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In soft ground. In pounded flat prairie, it might do to roll bodies into a gully and bury them there, or someplace where your three or whatever shovels for 260 burials might make a difference in a short amount of time.
Rolling bodies that had lain exposed for that long is not a chore you would want to undertake -- believe me.
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Because if the burials were dug up and bodies dragged around in the first year or so, and the wooden stakes mostly missing, when Sweet arrived with the stones, it might have been a crap shoot where they put them. Lush growth was one indication at one point for marking burials. And the Army wouldn't be honest about that and, in fact, hasn't been. We could be doing analyses based on those stones.
But how would that change the battlefield in a tactically significant way?
In other words, how would it change the general conclusion that the five companies were in two forces?
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If 20% vanish of the total vanish from one area and are applied to another, it changes it.
How? Put the stones where you like (and justify putting them there) and tell us what the change means.
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Good point, but only in civil court. But virtually nothing of what is claimed known about Custer's activities would be accepted in a court. Hearsay, highly unreliable translations by unvetted people, a chain of evidence security that would shame anyone.
Which is why we use evidence sparingly. For example, I have not cited Amos Bad Heart Bull's pictograph ledger, with copious drawings of the fight, including those which clearly show the terrain pretty accurately.
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How is the ID of Calhoun evidence one way or the other for movement of soldiers around him?
It shows him moved from the company position. Going toward Keough.
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Because you found VC officers you confirmed their specific companies as wiped out? None escaped?
We found officers -- including the regimental commander and his staff. The casualties they took were greater than the 7th Cavalry took, both in absolute numbers and in percentage.
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Your examples make no sense if we're talking about Custer's end of the battle. Our forces at Mims were part militia, part Indians and civvies in a stockade. 'Only' about half were killed. Eh. I don't get the Bulge analogy either, given we won it.
Only about half of the 7th Cavalry was killed. In the Bulge there were instances of whole battalions being savaged -- the 555th TAB is an excellent example.
In any case, what is the significance of this issue?
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Only true if we don't think Reno and Custer ever shared a period of fighting. That Custer didn't syncronize his attack - to say no more, and that's the kindest way to put it - is unassailable and I've never claimed otherwise. I only suggest be very careful with blanket assertions of "fact."
If someone with Custer actually fired a shot while Reno was engaged, it had no effect on the outcome of the battle. The fact that the indians drew off after Reno reached the ridge is significant here -- they left the tag end of a fight to join a fresh one. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 30 2005 : 9:17:01 PM
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1. ""How could it not?" is not the same as "Here's how.""
Subtract all fifty from the groups of people about Calhoun and Keogh. You could hardly claim them as a rearguard action, but more likely shot from the saddle as they moved. That isn't my case, but that's how it could change the field.
2. "How? Can you give me a quote from a manual to support that?
The separation in space between the eastern and western forces clearly demonstrates a separation in time. After all, they didn't march in that formation!!
The evidence seems clear as well that Calhoun's company was over-run before Keough was significantly engaged."
Oh, come on. Don't get me started on manuals. If five of the 12 companies are firing at the same time at a common enemy, more than three are in action at the same time. I don't know or claim that. The separation in space does not preclude Custer's forces being in action while all three of Reno's were, and some think that's what happened. I don't know.
You keep referencing evidence and eye witnesses but never produce them. What evidence makes it clear to the exclusion of other scenarios that Calhoun was over-run before Keogh?
3. "Just tell me how the alteration would be significant?
Would it show us all five companies together? Would it show the largest force in the east, not the west? How?"
Goodness. If you subtract all Sweet's spurious markers from Custer Hill (not claiming he did that), and out of the remainder move Custer and say ten others to the top of the hill where he was supposedly found (able to be hit from 360 degrees, but whatever) it looks not like a defensive position but people shot from their saddles with a much smaller group over a wider area. Or, my previous Calhoun alternative.
4. "Rolling bodies that had lain exposed for that long is not a chore you would want to undertake -- believe me."
No, it isn't. But you're under orders to bury them, there is hardly any equipment, and you've got limited time and lots of nearby gullies.
5. "But how would that change the battlefield in a tactically significant way?
In other words, how would it change the general conclusion that the five companies were in two forces?"
You're going back and forth between the specific and the general, "significant" and "the general conclusion that..." I've not argued that Custer wasn't in two forces, but we don't actually know.
But - gack - it's easy to see what affect it would have. Put those markers of soldiers supposedly trying to escape in the gully where they supposedly died, whatever it is. Then, from the remainder above, subtract out fifty stones for the roughly 20% that should be on Reno field. The line is gone, the argument about this being a company action and a sign of Custer's offensive is gone. I don't claim it, but that's how this would affect how the battle is visualized. It's a lot of ground with very few stones. Subtract all fifty from Calhoun Hill, and then tell the story.
6. "How? Put the stones where you like (and justify putting them there) and tell us what the change means."
Repetitive previous examples. Further, if you don't feel the obligation to justify their placement, I don't feel compelled to overexcuse their movement.
7. "Which is why we use evidence sparingly. For example, I have not cited Amos Bad Heart Bull's pictograph ledger, with copious drawings of the fight, including those which clearly show the terrain pretty accurately."
If it was made right after the fight with no contamination from other sources and/or exposure to the official tale, fine. Given that Indian dioramas didn't feature much attention to topographical detail, that his has any is a concern right off.
8. "It shows him moved from the company position. Going toward Keough."
Where in the world did that come from? Calhoun himself was found heading north? What?
9. "We found officers -- including the regimental commander and his staff. The casualties they took were greater than the 7th Cavalry took, both in absolute numbers and in percentage."
No doubt, but that isn't what we were talking about. You said that when you found a dead company officer, you could assume the dead around him were from his company and from experience knew this to be true.
10. "Only about half of the 7th Cavalry was killed. In the Bulge there were instances of whole battalions being savaged -- the 555th TAB is an excellent example.
In any case, what is the significance of this issue?"
We weren't talking about the entire battle of the LBH, but about the five companies with Custer, who were wiped out to a man. Being savaged ain't being wiped out to a man. You avoid Mims, this time through. It's your issue, you brought it up.
11. "If someone with Custer actually fired a shot while Reno was engaged, it had no effect on the outcome of the battle. The fact that the indians drew off after Reno reached the ridge is significant here -- they left the tag end of a fight to join a fresh one."
No, a shot didn't affect the battle. But that's not what you said. You've said, for sure, that Custer never had more than three companies in combat at one time at the LBH. We don't and cannot know that. If only one of his companies was engaged while Reno's companies were, you'd be incorrect. I don't know one way or the other, I'm just warning against all that sort of stuff. We simply do not know. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - December 01 2005 : 04:25:46 AM
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Tactically we do not consider a salient to be a line. A salient is a tactical solution, not a linear formation.
You cannot have a salient without a line.A salient is a formation as was the Keogh/Calhoun sector.A solution is the term given to a set of ideas.Ideas are not formations.The pattern of markers at the K/C sector formed a curving line no more than 20 degrees off the straight.
The Indians did not attack the K/C sector in echlon which is the only way one unit would have gone down before the other.
As regards the spurious markers making a difference to our understanding of the battle,Sweet made a complete balls of the field.For example there are fewer markers in the Custer sector than the K/C sector yet commentators always suggest survivors fled to this sector.
You suggest somewhere in your lenghty debate with DC that the position of the units could not have been that of line of march.Are you suggesting that those positions were tactical decisions?That they were the best solution to the dodo Custer found himself in?
Spread out men its our only chance?????
There's no evidence of that -- and considerable evidence that survivors of Calhoun's company ran toward (and some reached) Keough's company.
"Considerable" well I consider the evidence based on a few wandering shell cases [via multi ownership]and spurious markers to be tenuous at best.
It is all very simple really.Custer was in line of march approaching the North end of the village when hit by 1500 Indians.He had just time to turn and run for LSH while K/C just had time to dismount and form a skirmish line. |
Edited by - wILD I on December 01 2005 04:29:47 AM |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 01 2005 : 10:43:43 AM
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quote:
Tactically we do not consider a salient to be a line. A salient is a tactical solution, not a linear formation.
You cannot have a salient without a line.
You can't have a car without an engine, but an engine is not a car. We don't make up tactics as we go -- there is established doctrine, based on long experience. And tactically we do not consider a salient to be a line.
Nor is there a real salient on the ground -- there is a gap there.
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A salient is a formation as was the Keogh/Calhoun sector.
In whose army? Which army considers a salient to be a formation?
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A solution is the term given to a set of ideas.Ideas are not formations.
Nor are made-up ideas tactical doctrine.
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The pattern of markers at the K/C sector formed a curving line no more than 20 degrees off the straight.
Which is immaterial. Keough and Calhoun's companies are not a mutually-supporting defense.
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The Indians did not attack the K/C sector in echlon which is the only way one unit would have gone down before the other.
Check your compass.
Keough's position is north and west of Calhoun's. If you started out in the Sioux encampment and crossed the river, you would come up to Calhoun's position before you reached Keough's.
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As regards the spurious markers making a difference to our understanding of the battle,Sweet made a complete balls of the field.For example there are fewer markers in the Custer sector than the K/C sector yet commentators always suggest survivors fled to this sector.
And how does this affect the battlefield?
Did Keough and Calhoun form a continuous line? Were they tied in with Smith, Yeates and TW Custer?
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You suggest somewhere in your lenghty debate with DC that the position of the units could not have been that of line of march.
Take a look at the map. Cavalry marched in columns of three. The axis of Calhoun's command runs almost magnetic north. Keough's is about a half mile away and running west. Smith, Yeates and TW Custer are about a mile from Calhoun and running more or less north and south.
Does that look like a compact column of march?
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Are you suggesting that those positions were tactical decisions?That they were the best solution to the dodo Custer found himself in?
Spread out men its our only chance?????
I see we have the standard illusion here that a commander is in mental telepathic communication with his units. :-)
You assume Custer planned the battle, communicated his plans to his subordinates, and they executed them flawlessly.
The best bet is that the indians crossed the fiver on a wide front, came up onto the bluffs by multiple routes, and the battle developed as they arrived. I think Calhoun may have been ordered to hold off one group of attackers while the remaining four companies sought a defensible position.
The attack on Calhoun came too fast and in too great a strength for this to work. Keough may have been ordered to assume that mission as Calhoun was being over-run, or as someone has suggested he may have turned back to help Calhoun on his own.
The remaining three companies did finally achieve a continuous defense position, but were simply too weak to hold it.
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There's no evidence of that -- and considerable evidence that survivors of Calhoun's company ran toward (and some reached) Keough's company."Considerable" well I consider the evidence based on a few wandering shell cases [via multi ownership]and spurious markers to be tenuous at best.
Well, you tell us what happened. Replace the markers where you think they should be and tell us why you chose those particular spots. Then tell us what that means in terms of how the battle went.
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It is all very simple really.Custer was in line of march approaching the North end of the village when hit by 1500 Indians.He had just time to turn and run for LSH while K/C just had time to dismount and form a skirmish line.
Very good!! You've described the battle almost exactly as I describe it. :-)
Now explain why Keough and Calhoun dismounted and formed a skirmish line -- what was the tactical intent?
And why did Smith, Yeates and TW Custer form their line elsewhere? |
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Heavyrunner
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 01 2005 : 12:33:19 PM
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Vern,
Are you suggesting that Calhoun and Keogh established skirmish lines at the beginning of the fight? Regardless of who was running to whom, it strikes me that both sites were "last stands" unto themselves, possibly with men still fighting after all on LSH were finished off.
Unlike you, I do not write from military experience, but my own visits to the battlefield impressed me that there was a severe breakdown in the chain of command. We also know that the Indians made pretty short work of Custer's column, perhaps made easier by dividing and scattering those in it--from the river to Deep Ravine, LSH, ect., ect..
Viewing from LSH, it struck me very strongly that the attack on the village was broken piecemeal and soldiers were heading in all directions, perhaps looking for anyone in charge and, at the same time, making themselves easy targets in the midst of a swarming foe.
So, I felt Calhoun's and Keogh's positions, along with LSH, simply represented the end of the retreat--to the point where it could go no farther.
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 01 2005 : 12:54:47 PM
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quote:
Vern,
Are you suggesting that Calhoun and Keogh established skirmish lines at the beginning of the fight? Regardless of who was running to whom, it strikes me that both sites were "last stands" unto themselves, possibly with men still fighting after all on LSH were finished off.
That's exactly right. Calhoun and Keough were separated from the rest of the force. And both the gap between those two companies and their orientation tells us they fought two separate fights -- albeit they were probably over in minutes.
And yes, it is perfectly possible someone, somewhere on the field was still armed and defending himself after Last Stand Hill was overrun.
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Unlike you, I do not write from military experience, but my own visits to the battlefield impressed me that there was a severe breakdown in the chain of command.
Absolutely -- which is why I made the comment about the idea that somehow commander are in touch with their subordinates by mental telepathy. They aren't, of course.
And in the 7th, the situation was made worse by Custer's habitual refusal to develop and communicate a plan. It was his habit to have his AAAG send messages to individual company commanders and tell them what to do -- without telling them why, or telling the other company commanders.
It was a recipie for disaster.
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We also know that the Indians made pretty short work of Custer's column, perhaps made easier by dividing and scattering those in it--from the river to Deep Ravine, LSH, ect., ect..
As I said, they probably crossed the river on a broad front, and took multiple routes up the bluffs. This got a lot of indians into battle rapidly. From Custer's point of view, this would look indians popping up everywhere -- too fast for him to deal with the tactical problems they created.
In modern military parliance, we would say the Sioux "operated inside Custer's decision cycle."
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Viewing from LSH, it struck me very strongly that the attack on the village was broken piecemeal and soldiers were heading in all directions, perhaps looking for anyone in charge and, at the same time, making themselves easy targets in the midst of a swarming foe.
That's exactly what happened. Companies tried to stay together, but wiht the separation between two companies in the east and three in the west, their full combat power could not be expressed.
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So, I felt Calhoun's and Keogh's positions, along with LSH, simply represented the end of the retreat--to the point where it could go no farther.
It we accept Bad Heart Bull's pictorial record, that's the case. However, Bad Heart Bull was only 7 years old at the time and, being in the village, cannot be considered an eye-witness to Custer's defeat. Much of his information comes from his father and uncles, and some of that is demonstrably wrong.
It makes more sense to see LSH for what it obviously was -- the focal point to which survivors ran. In other words, he lines of flight ran toward LSH, and the companies were probably overrun before LSH.
That being the case, it makes more sense to assume the initial attack came from the rear, with Calhoun and Keough being overrun first, while Smith, Yeates and TW Custer formed a coherent defense that was overrun a few moments later, with surviors running for LSH |
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Heavyrunner
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 01 2005 : 2:48:30 PM
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Vern,
It's no fun if we agree on everything...
In truth, my mind's eye saw the battlefield as a complete mess, void of any military coherence. I also feel that Custer's overconfidence grew from his only similar experience--the Wa****a. I may be the only one here who's been to both sites. Regardless, Custer's plan of action was almost the same at LBH--a divided command striking from two sides (or more). Of course, 600 troopers attacking a village of 150 bodes well for the troops.
I'm quite sure that the Sioux and Northern Cheyenne knew all too well what happened to Black Kettle--and how. It's highly unlikely they knew Custer was leading the column, but they knew enough not to allow anything like the previous result.
Back along the Wa****a
the Cottonwoods still grow.
And sometimes, in November
there comes and early snow.
When winter gains an upper hand
and Autumn leaves have fallen,
the mind can turn a page in time
to strains of "Garryowen." |
Bob Bostwick |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - December 01 2005 : 5:01:23 PM
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Keogh formed a skirmish line,Calhoun formed a skirmish line,both lines are at a slight angle to each other and face the same direction ,there is a gap of 100 meters between the two units.Taken together they fit the description a defensive line.
Which is immaterial. Keough and Calhoun's companies are not a mutually-supporting defense.
Wrong.Indians in the area of Upper Deep Ravine because of the curved formation of the skirmish line would have come under cross fire from both units.
And how does this affect the battlefield?
Because it was no longer possible to ascertain the movement tactical or otherwise of troops during the fight.It means all the markers are suspect.Which is a spurious marker which is genuine?
Does that look like a compact column of march
It looks like a shattered column of march.To state that it is a tactical formation is to take leave of one's senses.
I see we have the standard illusion here that a commander is in mental telepathic communication with his units.
Read my post .Can you not recognise cynicism?
And then with all the talk about telepathic communication you post I think Calhoun may have been ordered to hold off one group of attackers while the remaining four companies sought a defensible position.
The attack on Calhoun came too fast and in too great a strength for this to work. Keough may have been ordered to assume that mission as Calhoun was being over-run,Sure!Keogh was just 100 meters away from Calhoun,they acted together.
Well, you tell us what happened. Replace the markers where you think they should be and tell us why you chose those particular spots. Then tell us what that means in terms of how the battle went.
Individual markers mean nothing.Taken all together however they give an indication of how little control Custer had and what a total undiluted balls he made of everything.He could not even ensure a fighting chance for his men.
Now explain why Keough and Calhoun dismounted and formed a skirmish line -- what was the tactical intent?
They were the rearward units when the head of the column ran into hundreds of Indians.They had a few minutes before the tide hit.They could have run but to Keogh and Calhoun's eternal credit they stood and fought.
And why did Smith, Yeates and TW Custer form their line elsewhere?They did not form a line.They turned and followed Custer in a desperate race [much like Reno's retreat]for LSH where the survivors got the chop.
It makes more sense to see LSH for what it obviously was -- the focal point to which survivors ran. In other words, he lines of flight ran toward LSH, and the companies were probably overrun before LSH.It was not the focal point for Keogh and Calhoun because they could see the desaster unfolding there .No point in running into a disorganised butchers yard. |
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Smcf
Captain
Status: offline |
Posted - December 02 2005 : 10:14:54 AM
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From the snippits I've seen from Benteen and Kanipe, not much is said about the Calhoun area representing a stand. Kanipe, who was focused on his C company buddies, refers to bodies in plain sight generally in the area, his viewpoint covering a broad area. Benteen refers only to a small group of 5 or 6 near Calhoun himself which could possibly be representative of some sort of stand. By contrast, both Keogh and Custer sectors are mentioned by Kanipe as containing bodies thick on the ground and close to the commanders. Benteen mentions Custer Hill only in this regard.
From these statements, I get the distinct impression that the original burials would have been more spread out in the Keogh and Custer sectors, particularly the latter and perhaps concentrated more in the Calhoun area - no evidence to support it, just an impression. As C company seemed to be all over the battlefield, its difficult for me to picture what was going on with them, whether they were split up before the main fighting began, acting as a support to L in toto, or a portion send in to support L when the going got tough. |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 02 2005 : 10:40:13 AM
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quote:
Keogh formed a skirmish line,Calhoun formed a skirmish line,both lines are at a slight angle to each other and face the same direction ,there is a gap of 100 meters between the two units.Taken together they fit the description a defensive line.
That's tactical nonsense.
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Which is immaterial. Keough and Calhoun's companies are not a mutually-supporting defense.Wrong.Indians in the area of Upper Deep Ravine because of the curved formation of the skirmish line would have come under cross fire from both units.
Again, nonsensical. To see how nonsensical it is, take the topographic map and do visibility profiles from Keough's and Calhoun's positions.
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And how does this affect the battlefield?
Because it was no longer possible to ascertain the movement tactical or otherwise of troops during the fight.It means all the markers are suspect.Which is a spurious marker which is genuine?
That's a non-answer. I have repeatedly invited you to put the markers where you think they should go (and justify your placement) and show us how this materially changes the battlefield.
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Does that look like a compact column of march
It looks like a shattered column of march.To state that it is a tactical formation is to take leave of one's senses.
So tell us how it "shattered?"
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I see we have the standard illusion here that a commander is in mental telepathic communication with his units.Read my post .Can you not recognise cynicism?
I see the personal nature of your tone, if that's what you mean.
But in the process you advance the amateur's idea that somehow commanders know all and can communicate with all.
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And then with all the talk about telepathic communication you post I think Calhoun may have been ordered to hold off one group of attackers while the remaining four companies sought a defensible position.
Or he may have done it on his own initiative -- there's a reason companies have commanders, you know.
The same may be true of Keough.
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The attack on Calhoun came too fast and in too great a strength for this to work. Keough may have been ordered to assume that mission as Calhoun was being over-run,
Sure!Keogh was just 100 meters away from Calhoun,they acted together.
Keopugh and Calhoun's companies were about a quarter of a mile apart. The gap between them has a scattering of survivors who tried to make for Keough's position.
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Well, you tell us what happened. Replace the markers where you think they should be and tell us why you chose those particular spots. Then tell us what that means in terms of how the battle went.
Individual markers mean nothing.Taken all together however they give an indication of how little control Custer had and what a total undiluted balls he made of everything.He could not even ensure a fighting chance for his men.
So reposition as many as you think need to be repositioned -- and justify your repositioning. Then show us how this changes the battlefield.
Keogh formed a skirmish line,Calhoun formed a skirmish line,both lines are at a slight angle to each other and face the same direction ,there is a gap of 100 meters between the two units.Taken together they fit the description a defensive line.
Which is immaterial. Keough and Calhoun's companies are not a mutually-supporting defense.
Wrong.Indians in the area of Upper Deep Ravine because of the curved formation of the skirmish line would have come under cross fire from both units.
And how does this affect the battlefield?
Because it was no longer possible to ascertain the movement tactical or otherwise of troops during the fight.It means all the markers are suspect.Which is a spurious marker which is genuine?
Does that look like a compact column of march
It looks like a shattered column of march.To state that it is a tactical formation is to take leave of one's senses.
I see we have the standard illusion here that a commander is in mental telepathic communication with his units.
Read my post .Can you not recognise cynicism?
And then with all the talk about telepathic communication you post I think Calhoun may have been ordered to hold off one group of attackers while the remaining four companies sought a defensible position.
The attack on Calhoun came too fast and in too great a strength for this to work. Keough may have been ordered to assume that mission as Calhoun was being over-run,Sure!Keogh was just 100 meters away from Calhoun,they acted together.
Well, you tell us what happened. Replace the markers where you think they should be and tell us why you chose those particular spots. Then tell us what that means in terms of how the battle went.
Individual markers mean nothing.Taken all together however they give an indication of how little control Custer had and what a total undiluted balls he made of everything.He could not even ensure a fighting chance for his men.
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Now explain why Keough and Calhoun dismounted and formed a skirmish line -- what was the tactical intent?They were the rearward units when the head of the column ran into hundreds of Indians.They had a few minutes before the tide hit.They could have run but to Keogh and Calhoun's eternal credit they stood and fought.
Which is exactly my position.
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And why did Smith, Yeates and TW Custer form their line elsewhere?
They did not form a line.They turned and followed Custer in a desperate race [much like Reno's retreat]for LSH where the survivors got the chop.
Whoa, there, Big Fella!! Up above, you say Keough and Calhoun's disjointed and separated companies formed a line, but Smith, Yeates and TW Custer's companies, which are in a compact and mutually-supporting defensive position did not form a line?
The definition of "line" seems strangely mutable! :-
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It makes more sense to see LSH for what it obviously was -- the focal point to which survivors ran. In other words, he lines of flight ran toward LSH, and the companies were probably overrun before LSH.It was not the focal point for Keogh and Calhoun because they could see the desaster unfolding there .No point in running into a disorganised butchers yard.
Or because they had already been over-run.
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Springfield Carbine
