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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
 Posted - December 02 2005 : 12:33:20 PM
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Hey, I can't follow who is saying or responding to what. Just using Humphrey's post above as an example. Can we either use the quote feature correctly and sparingly or put a quoted phrase in quotes and respond to it below?
That said - cough - I believe I, if nobody else, demonstrated how removing a large number of markers would change the field and possible interpretations of it. I don't remotely suggest it would be the truth, but how it could be done, the only requirement requested. Further, I believe I presented enough material to quiver any assumption the markers should be used for much in the way of exact representation. Nobody contests it, at any rate.
Second, we don't actually know Calhoun and/or Keogh formed lines. It has become dogma and included in the art work at the field, but we actually don't know any more than that original viewers said that there were piles of shells by some of the bodies that looked like it could have been a line. To declare it fact is risky. If their horses were downed in a line, and they took cover and fought behind them, the image could be interpreted different ways.
Third, what happened to the eye witnesses which, together with "evidence," would support certain theories? Who were they, and what did they say? How many degrees of separation are there between them and us?
Fourth, the dustup about salient and line definitions is exactly the sort of pointless exactitude (if in a line of five men the middle man advances four feet forward, doesn't that create a salient?) that bogs down LBH discussions into Who Recalls The Most Footnotes Of Military Line Dancing. Not doubting its relevance elsewhere, like at The Somme, I'm not seeing it here.
Fifth, how come nobody reacted to the assertion that cavalry always rode in columns of threes? They did always? Really?
Sixth, are we now agreed, or not, that a company commander's and his adjutant's corpses do not necessarily indicate that the other naked and unrecognizeable corpses in the vicinity are definitely from their company? Given that it wasn't true on Custer Hill. Those were initial (and probably mostly true) assumptions of convenience. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
Edited by - Dark Cloud on December 02 2005 12:38:47 PM |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - December 02 2005 : 12:38:56 PM
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That's tactical nonsense.
What do you want me to say?Oh no its not.Is that the level to which you wish to reduce this debate.Your reply requires a reason.
That's a non-answer. I have repeatedly invited you to put the markers where you think they should go (and justify your placement) and show us how this materially changes the battlefield.
By indicating that there are spurious markers on the field places no obligation on me to suggest where the markers should be.
So tell us how it "shattered?"
With respects to DC there is only one reason why Custer is in that area and that is to attack the North end of the Village.His command is streached out over what 4-5 hundred yards in column of march approach deep ravine when the leading troops are hit.Those 3 leading troops turn and retreat in the direction of LSH.Keogh and Calhoun being the rearward troops avoid this initial assault and have time to form a skirmish line.In other words the command is caught in line of march and shatters in two.
But in the process you advance the amateur's idea that somehow commanders know all and can communicate with all.
Put the bottle down and read my posts and while you are at it check your own.They are a mess.[No disrespect intended]
Or he may have done it on his own initiative -- there's a reason companies have commanders, you know.
The same may be true of Keough.
Well then don't post that Custer ordered it and put that bottle down.
I cannot make head nor tail out of the remainder of your post |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 02 2005 : 12:55:45 PM
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That's tactical nonsense.What do you want me to say?Oh no its not.Is that the level to which you wish to reduce this debate.Your reply requires a reason.
No, I would expect you to explain your post. You have made an assertion, but provided no evidence for it.
quote:
That's a non-answer. I have repeatedly invited you to put the markers where you think they should go (and justify your placement) and show us how this materially changes the battlefield.By indicating that there are spurious markers on the field places no obligation on me to suggest where the markers should be.
When you claim the mis-placing of markers is significant, it is incumbent on you to show the significance.
Let me sum up this point -- either the general outlines of the battle are shown by the markers, or else the outlines are materially different from that suggested by the markers.
Now, do you assert that all five companies fought together in a coordinated, mutually-supporting defense? If so, this would refute my proposition that Custer never got more than three companies into action at one time.
Or do you agree that the five companies were divided between the east and west?
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So tell us how it "shattered?"
With respects to DC there is only one reason why Custer is in that area and that is to attack the North end of the Village.His command is streached out over what 4-5 hundred yards in column of march approach deep ravine when the leading troops are hit.Those 3 leading troops turn and retreat in the direction of LSH.Keogh and Calhoun being the rearward troops avoid this initial assault and have time to form a skirmish line.In other words the command is caught in line of march and shatters in two.
Passing over the definition of shattering, that pretty much is what I said -- the three companies in the west form a fairly continuous line, mutually supporting. The two in the east are less organized and not mutually supporting.
I think, however, this is evidence for Calhoun taking the brunt of the attack initially -- that would explain, among other things, how the three companies in the west had time to take up a mutually-supporting position.
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But in the process you advance the amateur's idea that somehow commanders know all and can communicate with all.
Put the bottle down and read my posts and while you are at it check your own.They are a mess.[No disrespect intended]
Disrespect achieved, nontheless. :-)
quote:
Or he may have done it on his own initiative -- there's a reason companies have commanders, you know.
The same may be true of Keough.
Well then don't post that Custer ordered it and put that bottle down.[/quote]
Is that what has you upset? That Custer may have ordered a particular action, or that the company commanders may have done it on their own initiative?
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - December 03 2005 : 1:05:56 PM
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No, I would expect you to explain your post. You have made an assertion, but provided no evidence for it.
And
When you claim the mis-placing of markers is significant, it is incumbent on you to show the significance.
There were 107 men in K/C two units.There are 131 markers in the sector.That is 24 spurious markers.1 in 5 markers is spurious thus casting doubt on the placement of all of them.This means that to use the apparent movement of survivors [as you do]as an indication of one unit going under before another is unreliable.
Now, do you assert that all five companies fought together in a coordinated, mutually-supporting defense?
In a word NO.
the three companies in the west form a fairly continuous line, mutually supporting.
I think, however, this is evidence for Calhoun taking the brunt of the attack initially -- that would explain, among other things, how the three companies in the west had time to take up a mutually-supporting position.
Are you telling the board that Custer first of all fed Calhoun to the Indians followed by Keogh and then had time to spread the remaining 130+ men out over 1300 yards?Yes Vern a very interesting assertion, you can indeed discern the hand of a master tactician here.
DC
Second, we don't actually know Calhoun and/or Keogh formed lines. It has become dogma and included in the art work at the field, but we actually don't know any more than that original viewers said that there were piles of shells by some of the bodies
that looked like it could have been a line.
Is it not bad enough that Sweet jettisoned all his spare markers about the field without now claiming that he laid out spurious patterns?
Fourth, the dustup about salient and line definitions is exactly the sort of pointless exactitude (if in a line of five men the middle man advances four feet forward, doesn't that create a salient?) that bogs down LBH discussions
How aboriginal of you.
Sixth, are we now agreed, or not, that a company commander's and his adjutant's corpses do not necessarily indicate that the other naked and unrecognizeable corpses in the vicinity are definitely from their company
Well if the Co and his Adj. are naked and unrecognizable then the problem does not arise. |
Edited by - wILD I on December 03 2005 1:50:26 PM |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 03 2005 : 1:22:29 PM
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No, I would expect you to explain your post. You have made an assertion, but provided no evidence for it.
And
When you claim the mis-placing of markers is significant, it is incumbent on you to show the significance.
There were 107 men in K/C two units.There are 131 markers in the sector.That is 24 spurious markers.1 in 5 markers is spurious thus casting doubt on the placement of all of them.This means that to use the apparent movement of survivors [as you do]as an indication of one unit going under before another is unreliable.
Once again, place the markers where you will -- and justify your placement. And demonstrate how that changes the battlefield.
Are you telling the board that Custer first of all fed Calhoun to the Indians followed by Keogh and then had time to spread his 200+ men out over 1300 yards?Yes Vern a very interesting assertion, you can indeed discern the hand of a master tactician here.[/quote]
A remark both sarcastic and amateurish -- no one with combat experience would say that.
A commander or leader in combat often has to make decisions that he knows will result in some of his men dying. He does his best to make them so as to minimize losses while accomplishing the mission. In the case of the force with Custer, a rear guard to hold the enemy off and buy time for the rest of the force to form a mutually-supporting defense makes tactical sense.
quote:
Fourth, the dustup about salient and line definitions is exactly the sort of pointless exactitude (if in a line of five men the middle man advances four feet forward, doesn't that create a salient?) that bogs down LBH discussions [/quote]
If you don't understand tactics, it's pointless to attempt an analysis.
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - December 03 2005 : 1:58:50 PM
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A remark both sarcastic and amateurish -- no one with combat experience would say that
Look what you have posted.Custer sacrificed Calhoun's 50 men to buy time.Seeing Calhoun fail he sacrificed Keogh's troop of 45 men to the same fate.Then he spread his remaining 130 men out over 1300 yards.Now that was really concentrating his fire power. |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 03 2005 : 2:07:40 PM
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Look what you have posted.Custer sacrificed Calhoun's 50 men to buy time.Seeing Calhoun fail he sacrificed Keogh's troop of 45 men to the same fate.Then he spread his remaining 130 men out over 1300 yards.Now that was really concentrating his fire power.
First of all, Smith, Yeates and TW Custer's combined front is about 900 yards, not 1300. That's not at all excessive for three companies. A modern infantry company of about that size would be expected to hold up to 1500 meters (1650 yards, or thereabouts.)
Secondly, terrain must be taken into account -- you cannot leave an approach into your position uncovered for the same of reducing frontage.
Third, what choice did they have? |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 03 2005 : 2:33:18 PM
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Wild, we don't know any of that. I'm pretty sure much of your and Humphries' opinions would change once you stand on the field. It's very different from photos and maps, very deceptive. It would take a far more detailed map than I have ever seen to show all the numerous small indentations and blocked views that likely played a role. The most important thing about the field is what lousy horse country it is. I'd suspect that, more than anything, is what doomed Custer's unit.
So long as analyses are based on ether, as at LBH, they remain rather pointless. I'd suppose that's why self-declared military experts, including some with combat experience, have had such widely divergent conclusions through the years.
In any case, my cheerful ignorance about tactics, especially tactics not proven utilized on this field, doesn't alleviate Mr. Humphries of some of his claims. I've listed them previously, and they remain unaddressed.
I'll take just two. How does the ID of Calhoun's body prove he and/or his company was moving north to Keogh as you claimed to the exclusion of other equally plausible explanations? And what eye witnesses to the disaster, which you've referenced, supports any of your theories? |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 03 2005 : 2:41:02 PM
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How does the ID of Calhoun's body prove he and/or his company was moving north to Keogh as you claimed to the exclusion of other equally plausible explanations?
The company commander dying not with his company, but between the companies indicates resistance on his battle position was over and he was trying to get away. The scattering of bodies between Calhoun and Keough's companies suggests the same thing.
While other explanations may be advanced, none is as straightforward as this one.
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And what eye witnesses to the disaster, which you've referenced, supports any of your theories?
The eyewitnesses I've relied on so far in this discussion are:
1. Varnum -- specifically in his testimony about ammuntion and similar matters within his personal knowledge.
2. Benteen -- as regards Custer failing to articulate a plan, and concerning matters within his personal knowledge.
3. Bradley -- in connection with his statements about the condition of the bodies and other things he saw on the field. |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - December 03 2005 : 4:55:01 PM
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First of all, Smith, Yeates and TW Custer's combined front is about 900 yards, not 1300. That's not at all excessive for three companies.
That's not what my map indicates.However taking your 900 yards and approx 90 troopers [the rest holding horses]that makes it 90 troopers with single shot carbines spread out over nearly a kilometer facing 1500 Indians.Custer was therefore outgunned everywhere.And you suggest this was an organised mutually supporting defensive formation ????.
DC
Wild, we don't know any of that.
Of course all this discussion beyond MTC is based on the balance of probability.To quote your good self the simplist explanation is usually the best and most logical.
Sweet was probably a typical soldier----make things easy for yourself but cover your arse.Thus the spurious markers but at least they probably occupy the area where the bodies were located .
The most important thing about the field is what lousy horse country it is. I'd suspect that, more than anything, is what doomed Custer's unit.
I'll half agree with you.It was the lousy horses that doomed him.Unsupported cavalry are useless in a defensive role. |
Edited by - wILD I on December 03 2005 4:58:29 PM |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 03 2005 : 5:11:59 PM
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quote:
First of all, Smith, Yeates and TW Custer's combined front is about 900 yards, not 1300. That's not at all excessive for three companies.
That's not what my map indicates.However taking your 900 yards and approx 90 troopers [the rest holding horses]that makes it 90 troopers with single shot carbines spread out over nearly a kilometer facing 1500 Indians.Custer was therefore outgunned everywhere.And you suggest this was an organised mutually supporting defensive formation ????.
As I point out, a modern Infantry company is just about that size, and is expected to hold a front of up to 1500 meters, about 1650 yards.
The fact that Custer was outgunned and outnumbered doesn't change that. War is like poker -- sometimes you get a hand you can't win, no matter how well you play it. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 03 2005 : 7:22:34 PM
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| Calhoun was congratulated for being where he should have been - standing behind his firing line in a position of command. And on page 388 of Gray's last, his unit - if indeed it all was - forums an L with 33 markers, ten of them forming the short line with Calhoun about half way down it. Based on his body marker (if accurate), a stronger case could be made by position he was heading south east, not north to Keogh. There is about 500 feet between the marker on Calhoun furthest north and the southernmost one of Keogh's. And the markers constitute a number about equal to Calhoun's company. If you take 20% away, rounded off to seven, that's 26 men dead with seven rushing to Keogh across 500 feet with no deaths, an inexplicable lack. Testimony was that there were piles of 30 cartridges here and there on Calhoun Hill, suggesting some stuck it out for a while. Without jamming, of course. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 03 2005 : 7:36:51 PM
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quote:
Calhoun was congratulated for being where he should have been - standing behind his firing line in a position of command. And on page 388 of Gray's last, his unit - if indeed it all was - forums an L with 33 markers, ten of them forming the short line with Calhoun about half way down it. Based on his body marker (if accurate), a stronger case could be made by position he was heading south east, not north to Keogh.
Let's take that for a working hypothesis, then. Calhoun and the survivors with him are heading southeast. Where are they going?
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There is about 500 feet between the marker on Calhoun furthest north and the southernmost one of Keogh's. And the markers constitute a number about equal to Calhoun's company. If you take 20% away, rounded off to seven, that's 26 men dead with seven rushing to Keogh across 500 feet with no deaths, an inexplicable lack.
First of all, the gap is one we talked about earlier -- and is the reason Calhoun and Keough's positions are not mutually supporting.
Secondly, there is no evidence for "no deaths" -- there are markers in the gap.
quote:
Testimony was that there were piles of 30 cartridges here and there on Calhoun Hill, suggesting some stuck it out for a while. Without jamming, of course.
I would hope they would put up a fight -- after all, their lives were at stake. But despite that, they all died. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 03 2005 : 8:15:16 PM
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Calhoun's 33 markers form a T looking north with the left branch of the crossbar missing, and he was in the middle of the short line, page 388, Gray. I see no indication from that he was heading north, but rather east if he was moving at all and not where he should have been, behind the line directing operations. There is a five hundred foot gap between the two closest markers of Keogh and Calhoun, and the total markers on Calhoun Hill is about his company total, so is there any evidence they were heading north? Godfrey thought some, by direction of the head, were, but that's the sole evidence. The position of the dead after the Sioux women got through with them isn't likely to reflect intent of the corpse, the location of the burial and subsequent marker to be at odds with specific point of death, the instability of a wooden marker to retain position is indicated by the Custer body fiasco.
Calhoun's position featured piles of around 30 cartridges, so he seems to have had no jamming problems, and to have been there a while. No other position, by eyewitness Moylan and DeRudio, featured such piles. Depending what you believe about the spurious markers - and it's totally a faith driven exercise - it could be that ALL of L is there on the hill with its commander, none running to Keogh.
What the 98 bodies are in Keogh's sector including the clump above is an utter guess. Too many for two companies, though. It's assumed they've been augmented by the spurious, but we don't know. If they have NOT been augmented, than the evidence would be that I lies there with parts of C and that extra folks came from LSH. No way to tell. But that's another example of how the spurious markers could change viewpoints of the battle.
Witnesses including Godfrey and Edgerly said they saw Indians firing into bodies from Weir Point, and virtually everyone says there was severe mutilation. You quote one of the few, Bradley, who said not. Godfrey changed his story as he got older, but his claim that only Custer wasn't mutilated I think is evident of the concern for the Mrs. and that many witnesses toned down the truth. The Sioux and Cheyenne cheerfully described the mutilations in their drawings, and it certainly looks compelling and gross and likely not deemed appropriate for delicate ears back East at the time.
That Varnum thought they were under fire at Reno Hill from Custer's carbines is attested to, and so I have not "made up" an Indian with a carbine firing into bodies unless there was an unknown aversion to using the Springfield on the dead. In any case, highly likely done, and highly unlikely not to affect a literal series of conclusions from the archaeology of found casings. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 03 2005 : 8:26:16 PM
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Don't know how I did that. Sorry.
I don't know they're going anywhere. Perhaps running away, perhaps wounded early and his guys pulled him back and protected him to the end. There is no way to know.
L and I are within 200 yards between closest markers. Thought that was accurate range of the carbine as claimed here. The positions may have been closer till pulled back, anyway. Not claiming they did; could have.
If there are markers in the gap, they are missing from Gray's map. What are you looking at? |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 03 2005 : 9:16:51 PM
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quote:
don't know they're going anywhere. Perhaps running away, perhaps wounded early and his guys pulled him back and protected him to the end. There is no way to know.
L and I are within 200 yards between closest markers. Thought that was accurate range of the carbine as claimed here. The positions may have been closer till pulled back, anyway. Not claiming they did; could have.
If there are markers in the gap, they are missing from Gray's map. What are you looking at?
I have about a dozen maps handy -- including DeLorme's electonic version. The best source for markers is the US Geological Survery map, "Montana, Custer Battlefield, 1891."
This map is in two parts -- a plat of the original fence, showing 202 markers in the vicinity of LSH, at a scale of 1:5280 (12 inches to the mile) and a topographic map of the entire battlefield at a scale of 1:24000 (about 2 1/2 inches to the mile. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 03 2005 : 9:36:54 PM
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So I understand, all those maps show markers in the space between Keogh and Calhoun? And are they are all in accord? Can we tell which five are missing, then?
Okay, how many markers in what Gray shows as empty space? |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 03 2005 : 9:49:34 PM
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quote:
So I understand, all those maps show markers in the space between Keogh and Calhoun? And are they are all in accord? Can we tell which five are missing, then?
First of all, distinguish between topo maps and plats. The 1891 plat is the best available, and the one closest to the event, made when many survivors were still alive.
The individual markers are not identified, except for selected individuals -- such as the officers and Surgeon Lord.
The topographic map accompanying the plat has the assumed and known routes, plus other information -- such as Sergeant Butler's marker.
quote:
Okay, how many markers in what Gray shows as empty space?
There's a lot of empty space -- which particular empty space do you have in mind? |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 03 2005 : 10:51:43 PM
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Well, wait, now. We were talking about the markers and the Keogh/Calhoun area and you said:
"Secondly, there is no evidence for "no deaths" -- there are markers in the gap."
So that's the empty space/gap to which I refer and the one we were discussing, the roughly 500 empty feet according to Gray's map of the markers. There would be no point dragging in plats and maps if they didn't edify on this topic, and there's nothing to have prevented people from marking them - plat or topo - so it was a valid question whether or not they were in agreement, given that stones have vanished and possibly moved. So I'm interested if Gray's map is way off beyond what he meant it to be.
Unless survivors carried a detailed memory for decades of the locations of markers on a field they saw once under trauma, and were made aware of and saw the 1891 map, I don't know if that's proof of anything. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - December 04 2005 : 1:24:48 PM
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As I point out, a modern Infantry company is just about that size, and is expected to hold a front of up to 1500 meters, about 1650 yards.
A modern infantry company can fire off 6000 rounds a minute and that is not to mention the support weapons such as mortars and rockets.
Now if you can make such a ludicrous comparison you are not capable of remotely understanding the dynamics of the battle.Your posts are full of cantradictions.One minute you have Custer organising rearguards and setting up mutually supporting skirmish lines the next you are laughing at his mental telepathy system of control.
The fact that Custer was outgunned and outnumbered doesn't change that. The one advantage he had over the Indians [if time allowed]was organisation.230 men fighting under control will last much longer than individuals spread out over 900 yards.Reno's survival owed much to organisation.Your scenario would have Custer wasting this advantage by forlorn rearguards ans scattering his troops over 900 yards. |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 04 2005 : 4:05:53 PM
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quote:
As I point out, a modern Infantry company is just about that size, and is expected to hold a front of up to 1500 meters, about 1650 yards.A modern infantry company can fire off 6000 rounds a minute and that is not to mention the support weapons such as mortars and rockets.
Passing aside the fact that the current Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) for infantry units does not have such support weapons (they're at higher levels), let me simply say the modern infantry company doesn't fight indians on horseback -- they fight equally modern forces with T72 tanks, BMPs, and supporting weapons of their own.
Ninty to a hundred men can easily cover a front of half a mile and a good bit more. The key is not supporting arms (that's a matter of expression of firepower) but intervisibility and the ability to provide coverage of the entire front -- which they could easily do with even the Springfield carbine.
The problem was not too much frontage, but too many indians.
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Now if you can make such a ludicrous comparison you are not capable of remotely understanding the dynamics of the battle.
When you make personal remarks like this, you lose the debate. Let's tuy to be gentlemen, shall we?
I fully admit that the battle dynamics you imagine are not the same as those I have seen and experienced. But I point out that Custer fought a real battle, not an imaginary battle.
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Your posts are full of cantradictions.One minute you have Custer organising rearguards and setting up mutually supporting skirmish lines the next you are laughing at his mental telepathy system of control.
You are reading things that are not there. My analysis is based on the evidence. Who ordered what is another thing entirely.
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The fact that Custer was outgunned and outnumbered doesn't change that. The one advantage he had over the Indians [if time allowed]was organisation.230 men fighting under control will last much longer than individuals spread out over 900 yards.
What do you understand that these 230 men "fighting under control" would do? And how much ground would they cover when doing it?
I gather you think if they were concentrated in a smaller area, they'd have some sort of tactical advantage?
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Reno's survival owed much to organisation.Your scenario would have Custer wasting this advantage by forlorn rearguards ans scattering his troops over 900 yards.
Custer had no advantage -- that's why he died.
When attacked, he was faced with immediate annihilation. Any good tactician would have concluded that he needed both time and space to organize a defense. The way to get that, when hard pressed, is to assign one part of the force to hold the enemy off while the rest of the force seeks defensible ground.
And that is basically what happened.
Now, did Custer order it, or did his company commanders act on their own initiative? We'll never know that. |
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 04 2005 : 9:57:41 PM
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quote:
As I point out, a modern Infantry company is just about that size, and is expected to hold a front of up to 1500 meters, about 1650 yards.
A modern infantry company can fire off 6000 rounds a minute and that is not to mention the support weapons such as mortars and rockets.
Vern, I don't see that Wild stated that the Infantry had to have those weapons but that they were available for support.
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Ninty to a hundred men can easily cover a front of half a mile and a good bit more. The key is not supporting arms (that's a matter of expression of firepower) but intervisibility and the ability to provide coverage of the entire front -- which they could easily do with even the Springfield carbine.
As far as a modern Infantry company's "ability to provide coverage" for that much line even with the Springfield Carbine, I find that hard to believe, especially with the terrain conditions. At a rate of 4 to 8 rounds minute and hit rate of 20% which is twice that of police shoot-outs at close range then given the number of Indians on that day willing to fight I believe the outcome was inevitable.
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The problem was not too much frontage, but too many Indians.
That statements confuses me. Certainly there is a relationship between firepower and whether one has the ability to provide adequate coverage.
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The way to get that, when hard pressed, is to assign one part of the force to hold the enemy off while the rest of the force seeks defensible ground.
Doesn't this imply that they believed all the Indians would be coming from one direction?
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Smcf
Captain
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Posted - December 05 2005 : 09:23:59 AM
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| Pardon me for glazing over a bit for the last bunch of salvos here. It seems to me that both wILDI and Vern are assuming that Custer had 3 columns with him. I make it two. Keogh was the commander of C, I and L. Kanipe of C company identified colleagues in Calhoun and Keogh. Is not the most logical explanation of movement of C as directed by Keogh and survivors only reaching Keogh or LSH? The 24 so-called spurious markers in Keogh sector - C personnel? |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 05 2005 : 09:58:13 AM
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[quote]Pardon me for glazing over a bit for the last bunch of salvos here. It seems to me that both wILDI and Vern are assuming that Custer had 3 columns with him. I make it two. Keogh was the commander of C, I and L. Kanipe of C company identified colleagues in Calhoun and Keogh. Is not the most logical explanation of movement of C as directed by Keogh and survivors only reaching Keogh or LSH? The 24 so-called spurious markers in Keogh sector - C personnel? [quote]
There is a theory that Custer divided the five companies with him into two battalions, one of three companies, and one of two.
I make no assumption about such a division. I believe the evidence shows the first attack developed in the east, with great strength. One company was dropped off as a rear guard -- to allow the rest of the force time to seek better ground and take up a defensive position. A second company either was dropped off or came to the aid of the rear guard company. This dropping off may have been by Custer's order, by initiative of the company commanders, or simply forced by the attack.
The remaining three companies took up defensive positions to the west, and were over run there -- survivors apparently fleeing (or rallying, if you prefer the term) in the direction of Last Stand Hill. |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 05 2005 : 10:09:12 AM
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Vern, I don't see that Wild stated that the Infantry had to have those weapons but that they were available for support.
My point is, companies don't have such weapons, and they are immaterial when it comes to covering a front. If you have intervisibility along the front, you can easily cover as much front as those three companies covered.
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The key is not supporting arms (that's a matter of expression of firepower) but intervisibility and the ability to provide coverage of the entire front -- which they could easily do with even the Springfield carbine.
As far as a modern Infantry company's "ability to provide coverage" for that much line even with the Springfield Carbine, I find that hard to believe, especially with the terrain conditions. At a rate of 4 to 8 rounds minute and hit rate of 20% which is twice that of police shoot-outs at close range then given the number of Indians on that day willing to fight I believe the outcome was inevitable.
Yes, they were badly outnumbered, but none of that affects the issue of frontage -- if you grouped them shoulder to shoulder, would that somehow multiply their rate of fire?
The reason to take in more ground is to minimize the effectiveness of enemy fire -- closely packed troops make an easy target, and rounds fired at troops in one part of the position may miss and hit troops elsewhere.
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The problem was not too much frontage, but too many Indians.
That statements confuses me. Certainly there is a relationship between firepower and whether one has the ability to provide adequate coverage.
How does frontage affect firepower? As I said earlier, grouping them shoulder to shoulder would not multiply their firepower.
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The way to get that, when hard pressed, is to assign one part of the force to hold the enemy off while the rest of the force seeks defensible ground.
Doesn't this imply that they believed all the Indians would be coming from one direction?
They may have. Or he attack from one direction may have been somewhat in advance of, or in greater strength than the attack from the other direction. You note that all identifiable company positions are linear, not perimiter defenses. |
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Springfield Carbine
