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dave
Captain
Australia
Status: offline |
 Posted - December 05 2005 : 10:28:20 AM
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quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
There is about 500 feet between the marker on Calhoun furthest north and the southernmost one of Keogh's. And the markers constitute a number about equal to Calhoun's company. If you take 20% away, rounded off to seven, that's 26 men dead with seven rushing to Keogh across 500 feet with no deaths, an inexplicable lack.
Is that so inexplicable? Wouldn't it be logical to assume that any survivors from Calhoun's company came from amongst the horse holders, and that those in the skirmish line (assuming it existed that is) either fell on the line or were hunted down by mounted Indians.
After all the Indians hardly give the impression of expert marksmen - based on the Valley fight and Reno Hill later on - so would it be all that surprising if some of the horse holders had mounted and then broke out for Keogh's group, with the Indians being unable to hit such rapidly moving targets.
Where any of Calhoun's men identified from the vicinity of LSH? |
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Smcf
Captain
Status: offline |
Posted - December 05 2005 : 10:43:01 AM
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Vern says: "There is a theory that Custer divided the five companies with him into two battalions, one of three companies, and one of two."
Its no theory, Vern - it is attested to by at least 2 officers who said this division occurred at the divide. He took 2 battalions with him, one under Yates, the other under Keogh. Whether that played a role in the after-MTC activity is open to debate, but not the actual splitting of his column well before they all reached LBH.
EDIT: Gray makes the case for the disposition as 2 (Yates) and 3 (Keogh).
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Edited by - Smcf on December 05 2005 10:50:45 AM |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 05 2005 : 11:02:46 AM
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quote:
Vern says: "There is a theory that Custer divided the five companies with him into two battalions, one of three companies, and one of two."
Its no theory, Vern - it is attested to by at least 2 officers who said this division occurred at the divide. He took 2 battalions with him, one under Yates, the other under Keogh. Whether that played a role in the after-MTC activity is open to debate, but not the actual splitting of his column well before they all reached LBH.
EDIT: Gray makes the case for the disposition as 2 (Yates) and 3 (Keogh).
Yes, but I don't need that theory to explain what happened.
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Edited by - Vern Humphrey on December 05 2005 11:04:10 AM |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - December 05 2005 : 1:49:14 PM
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Yes, they were badly outnumbered, but none of that affects the issue of frontage -- if you grouped them shoulder to shoulder, would that somehow multiply their rate of fire?
I think that question explains a multitude about your grasp of tactics.If you have to ask such a question what credibility can the board place in your theory.
So here just for your tactical edification is the answer.
If you spread your 90+ troopers out over 900 yards you obviously have 10 troopers covering a front of 100 yards.If a force of say 700 Indians attack on a front of 100 yards they have only 10 troopers [plus a few on either side]to contend with.What chance your line then?Easly broken and then rolled up.
On the other hand mass your carbines and you get all your fire power into action together.
One company was dropped off as a rear guard -- to allow the rest of the force time to seek better ground and take up a defensive position. A second company either was dropped off or came to the aid of the rear guard company. This dropping off may have been by Custer's order, by initiative of the company commanders, or simply forced by the attack.
Using 2/5 of your force as a rear guard is over doing it a bit don't you think?
And lets dismiss a Custer order because he is not gifted with telepathy.
And Calhoun dropping out of line without orders and Keogh doing likewise?Custer must have thought his force was disintegrating.As regards enemy action forcing 2 companies to halt there is really no evidence for this.Both company positions show some order which means they had time unlike the Custer sector which bears all the hallmarks of a rout.
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 05 2005 : 2:08:01 PM
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quote:
Yes, they were badly outnumbered, but none of that affects the issue of frontage -- if you grouped them shoulder to shoulder, would that somehow multiply their rate of fire?I think that question explains a multitude about your grasp of tactics.If you have to ask such a question what credibility can the board place in your theory.
You just have to get personal, don't you?
If we're going to talk credibility, what is the basis for your expertise?
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So here just for your tactical edification is the answer.
If you spread your 90+ troopers out over 900 yards you obviously have 10 troopers covering a front of 100 yards.If a force of say 700 Indians attack on a front of 100 yards they have only 10 troopers [plus a few on either side]to contend with.What chance your line then?Easly broken and then rolled up.
You seem to have an odd idea about how to deploy troops in action.
The point of fact is, odds of 7 to 1 are probably unwinnable under almost any circumstances -- short of prepared fortifications. But properly deployed troops can easily hold much more frontage than you appear to think -- against odds of around 3 to 1.
You can group them as tight as you wish, and it doesn't change the odds, nor make the fire any faster or more accurately -- all it does is make better targets of them.
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On the other hand mass your carbines and you get all your fire power into action together.
Please explain how.
When the enemy attacks on a broad front (as the indians did), it is no advantage to have your men all huddled together. When he attacks on a narrow front, the unengaged part of your force can maneuver against his flanks.
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One company was dropped off as a rear guard -- to allow the rest of the force time to seek better ground and take up a defensive position. A second company either was dropped off or came to the aid of the rear guard company. This dropping off may have been by Custer's order, by initiative of the company commanders, or simply forced by the attack.Using 2/5 of your force as a rear guard is over doing it a bit don't you think?
It was Custer's great failing that he did not use his 12 companies in a synchronized attack.
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And lets dismiss a Custer order because he is not gifted with telepathy.
And Calhoun dropping out of line without orders and Keogh doing likewise?Custer must have thought his force was disintegrating.
He would not have been wrong if he thought that.
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As regards enemy action forcing 2 companies to halt there is really no evidence for this.
You don't think Custer and his force were under heavy pressure?
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Both company positions show some order which means they had time unlike the Custer sector which bears all the hallmarks of a rout
Yes, they did dismount and attempt a defense. A good company commander does not wait until he is overwhelmed to take action. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 05 2005 : 2:22:08 PM
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See, here's where we civvies need edification.
Wild:
Doesn't grouping all your soldiers together in a surround mean whatever firepower the enemy has is concentrated at them making casualties among your men sure and quicker without increasing your retaliation ability any? I understand if these were knights against a line of pikemen or something, but concentration of people without any cover to speak of isn't concentration of firepower so much as making yourself target friendly. Am I wrong?
Dave:
I would think the horseholders would be Job One for the Sioux, since they had such attractive propulsion units in their control. I have no clue, but I'm trying to pin Mr. Humphrey down because he has contradicted Gray's map and implied evidence (the announcement of these maps) without actually providing it. Gray shows no bodies for about 5 hundred feet between Keogh and Calhoun. I've been there and cannot recall. Mr. Humphrey says they are there, he has maps. Well.....
And no, the Indians were as bad or worse than the 7th and for the same reason: no practice ammo and I'd imagine their maintanence schedule lacked fine tuning. But they were hot with the bow. My interest is that Mr. Humphrey said "all the evidence" says people ran from Calhoun to Keogh and I'm saying there is no evidence one way or the other. There are stories and indications that do not conflict with that theory, but are not compelling to the exclusion of other contradictory theories. Again, I use the cartridge trail. That of a soldier retreating or a Sioux advancing. Same evidence supports either theory.
I never heard of Calhoun's men ID'd on LSH, but what I suspect needs to be harped on is that the vast majority of bodies were not ID'd at all, without clothing or markers, and allegedly covered with dirt. We simply don't know, and cannot know. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 05 2005 : 2:44:50 PM
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quote:
Wild:
Doesn't grouping all your soldiers together in a surround mean whatever firepower the enemy has is concentrated at them making casualties among your men sure and quicker without increasing your retaliation ability any?
Yup -- sure does. That's why more dispersion (in this case, a longer line) is in and of itself a good idea. Of course, other conditions, such as terrain and enemy action also dictated a longer line.
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I understand if these were knights against a line of pikemen or something, but concentration of people without any cover to speak of isn't concentration of firepower so much as making yourself target friendly. Am I wrong?
You're not wrong.
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Dave:
I would think the horseholders would be Job One for the Sioux, since they had such attractive propulsion units in their control. I have no clue, but I'm trying to pin Mr. Humphrey down because he has contradicted Gray's map and implied evidence (the announcement of these maps) without actually providing it. Gray shows no bodies for about 5 hundred feet between Keogh and Calhoun. I've been there and cannot recall. Mr. Humphrey says they are there, he has maps. Well.....
The map I cited, "Montana, Custer Battlefield, 1892) is readily available from the US Geological Survey, Denver Colorado, 80225. You can probably order it online if you wish -- I haven't tried.
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And no, the Indians were as bad or worse than the 7th and for the same reason: no practice ammo and I'd imagine their maintanence schedule lacked fine tuning. But they were hot with the bow. My interest is that Mr. Humphrey said "all the evidence" says people ran from Calhoun to Keogh and I'm saying there is no evidence one way or the other.
Both the bodies and the cartridge cases show movement from Calhoun to Keough. In addition, there is another question -- why would survivors from Calhoun's force run in any other direction?
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There are stories and indications that do not conflict with that theory, but are not compelling to the exclusion of other contradictory theories. Again, I use the cartridge trail. That of a soldier retreating or a Sioux advancing. Same evidence supports either theory.
Except that we have to make a Sioux behave as we want him to behave. There is no need to invent a specific cavalryman nor to construct a pattern of behavior for him.
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I never heard of Calhoun's men ID'd on LSH, but what I suspect needs to be harped on is that the vast majority of bodies were not ID'd at all, without clothing or markers, and allegedly covered with dirt. We simply don't know, and cannot know.
It's true that many bodies were unidentified -- but enough were to allow us to see the pattern. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 05 2005 : 6:17:58 PM
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But.....you're not answering the question. Does that map show markers in the space (we've been through this, Gray's space between the companies I and L) in contradiction of Gray's map? You imply it does, but your avoidance of the point blank and actually saying it does amount to method.
You say: "Except that we have to make a Sioux behave as we want him to behave. There is no need to invent a specific cavalryman nor to construct a pattern of behavior for him."
You're imagining the behavior of the soldier based on those casings and resemblance to what would happen in certain plausible but unknown scenarios. HOW does a line of cartridges show the direction of the person firing it? How is it remotely possible to know 129 years after it was - allegedly, and hardly surely - fired on that field?
Testimony from American soldiers at Weir Point said they saw Indians firing into the ground further north. These are soldier witnesses to the use of firearms by Indians at Custer field. We have no soldier witnesses to their use by other soldiers under Custer. The Indians ended up with the carbines, they used them against Reno's men (Varnum), it would be absurd to contend they did not use them on the dead on Custer field. What carbines we have claimed from the battle came from Indian possession. The preponderance of evidence is that Indians took carbines from soldiers and used them against other soldiers and/or the dead, an action wholly consistent with what we know of them, wholly logical, and known to have happened by Indian tales.
I'm no more making up an Indian and convenient behavior than you are making up a soldier and convenient behavior. Both theories are not endangered by that cartridge evidence. Except....there are soldier witnesses to a pattern of behavior that supports me. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
Edited by - Dark Cloud on December 05 2005 6:21:48 PM |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - December 05 2005 : 6:18:35 PM
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Doesn't grouping all your soldiers together in a surround mean whatever firepower the enemy has is concentrated at them making casualties among your men sure and quicker without increasing your retaliation ability any?
Fire control DC is the secret.Volley fire is vastly superior to individual firing.Custer was not annilated in a fire fight but in close quarter fighting.Volley fire could keep the Indians at bay.Also the difference in fire power between the forces might not have been as great as the numerical difference.Morale among soldiers fighting together under visible effective leadership is higher than among troops strung out and out of sight of their senior officers.A tighter formation also forces the enemy to concentrate and bunch and they were on similar open country as Custer.Heavy casualties just might have forced them to fight a delaying action while the village withdrew.
You just have to get personal, don't you?
Vern this is in no way personal.This is a debate and I shall have a go at your posts if I disagree with them and sometimes that may be just a tiny weeny bit robust but be assured there is no personal animosity.
Yup -- sure does. That's why more dispersion (in this case, a longer line) is in and of itself a good idea. Of course, other conditions, such as terrain and enemy action also dictated a longer line.Your long line allows any part of it to be attacked in overwhelming nombers and defeated in detail something you have been accusing Custer of.
You can group them as tight as you wish, and it doesn't change the odds, nor make the fire any faster or more accurately -- all it does is make better targets of them.
It prevents the Indians getting in among you where their numerical advantage gives you no chance.It turns the battle into a fire fight possible inflicting as many casualties on them as they are inflicting on you.Would the Indians have been prepared to suffer 200 dead?Using your firepower to its best effect makes them pay a price.Your line system succeeded in inflicting a paltry 30 casualties.
Mounted Indians on fresh ponies could cover 500 yards in a minute.How many rounds would your 10 troopers get off in that time?
When he attacks on a narrow front, the unengaged part of your force can maneuver against his flanks.
Oh yeh all 50 of them and controlled by telepathy
Yes, they did dismount and attempt a defense. A good company commander does not wait until he is overwhelmed to take action.
But not as you suggest a rearguard.A rearguard suggests a plan of some sort and as there was unlikely to have been any communication between K/C and Custer. The action taken by K/C was strictly selfdefence.
Both the bodies and the cartridge cases show movement from Calhoun to Keough. In addition, there is another question -- why would survivors from Calhoun's force run in any other direction?Because running to Keogh was like running from the front of the Titanic to the back.Men in a unit being annilated are not going to run accross the front of the enemy but rearwards away from the danger.Which if you look at Gray's map seems to indicate that some troops including Calhoun did attempt a retreat but not towards Keogh.And this in turn trows doubt on your suggested direction of the Indian attack.
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Edited by - wILD I on December 05 2005 6:22:16 PM |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 05 2005 : 6:54:27 PM
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quote:
Doesn't grouping all your soldiers together in a surround mean whatever firepower the enemy has is concentrated at them making casualties among your men sure and quicker without increasing your retaliation ability any?Fire control DC is the secret.Volley fire is vastly superior to individual firing.
How does volley fire reduce casualties among men bunched together?
And how is volley fire "vastly superior to individual firing?"
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Custer was not annilated in a fire fight but in close quarter fighting.
Perfectly true.
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Volley fire could keep the Indians at bay.
How?
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Also the difference in fire power between the forces might not have been as great as the numerical difference.
True, but the numerical difference was so great as to make that irrevelant. There is now no question the indians were well-armed -- ana with a significant number of repeating rifles. So the disparity in arms is less than previously thought.
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Morale among soldiers fighting together under visible effective leadership is higher than among troops strung out and out of sight of their senior officers.
When men are being killed, look to physical issues, not psychological ones.
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A tighter formation also forces the enemy to concentrate and bunch and they were on similar open country as Custer.
No, it doesn't. The logic here is confused, the enemy is not forced to concentrate -- but he is able to concentrate his fire on the concentrated troopers, very much to their disadvantage.
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Heavy casualties just might have forced them to fight a delaying action while the village withdrew.
Yes, but the ability to inflict those casualties was beyond the force under Custer's command.
Let's go back to my original position -- Custer failed to synchronize his attack. With 12 companies, he never got more than three into action at any one time. That's much too small a force to inflict heavy casualties on an enemy who was overwelmingly stronger and pretty well armed.
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You just have to get personal, don't you?
Vern this is in no way personal.This is a debate and I shall have a go at your posts if I disagree with them and sometimes that may be just a tiny weeny bit robust but be assured there is no personal animosity.
Let's try to be a little more gentlemanly, then, shall we?
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Yup -- sure does. That's why more dispersion (in this case, a longer line) is in and of itself a good idea. Of course, other conditions, such as terrain and enemy action also dictated a longer line.Your long line allows any part of it to be attacked in overwhelming nombers and defeated in detail something you have been accusing Custer of..
No, it doesn't. The proper dispersion allows both defense and maneuver within the battle position.
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You can group them as tight as you wish, and it doesn't change the odds, nor make the fire any faster or more accurately -- all it does is make better targets of them.
It prevents the Indians getting in among you where their numerical advantage gives you no chance.
As opposed to concentrating their fire on you, while you are grouped tightly together?
In fact, a proper defense turns such a move as "getting in among you" into a death trap.
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It turns the battle into a fire fight possible inflicting as many casualties on them as they are inflicting on you.Would the Indians have been prepared to suffer 200 dead?Using your firepower to its best effect makes them pay a price.Your line system succeeded in inflicting a paltry 30 casualties.
When the numerical disparity is so great, the casualties are equally disparate.
And a "tighter" defense would have produced even fewer indian casualties, and a faster demise of the defenders.
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Mounted Indians on fresh ponies could cover 500 yards in a minute.How many rounds would your 10 troopers get off in that time?
How would grouping them together helped them shoot faster?
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When he attacks on a narrow front, the unengaged part of your force can maneuver against his flanks.
Oh yeh all 50 of them and controlled by telepathy
Again, personal remarks and sarcasm contribute nothing to the debate.
The fact is, if only one part of the defense is engaged, the unengaged forces can maneuver. There are literally unlimited examples of this in military history. The fact that Custer's forces at the Little Bighorn were few doesn't make that a false statement.
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Yes, they did dismount and attempt a defense. A good company commander does not wait until he is overwhelmed to take action.But not as you suggest a rearguard.A rearguard suggests a plan of some sort and as there was unlikely to have been any communication between K/C and Custer. The action taken by K/C was strictly selfdefence.
A rearguard is self defense.
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Both the bodies and the cartridge cases show movement from Calhoun to Keough. In addition, there is another question -- why would survivors from Calhoun's force run in any other direction?Because running to Keogh was like running from the front of the Titanic to the back.
People on sinking ships with no other alternative have been known to cluster on the last part to sink.
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Men in a unit being annilated are not going to run accross the front of the enemy but rearwards away from the danger.
People who run away are often running toward safety. As long as there is another unit nearby, that's a logical way to go.
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Which if you look at Gray's map seems to indicate that some troops including Calhoun did attempt a retreat but not towards Keogh.And this in turn trows doubt on your suggested direction of the Indian attack.
Calhoun's body was found in the gap between his force and Keough's. |
Edited by - Vern Humphrey on December 05 2005 7:04:15 PM |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 05 2005 : 7:09:40 PM
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quote:
Which map shows Calhoun's body between what is considered I and L? Gray's map doesn't show that.
US Geologcal Survey map, "Montana, Custer Battlefield, 1892." |
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 05 2005 : 8:12:03 PM
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DC and Vern
Page 76 of Fox's A,H,&CLB has map with the same gap as Gray's. |
“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
SEMPER FI |
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 05 2005 : 10:06:44 PM
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Vern I don't dispute that clumping would may have all the effects you state. Isn't it also true that the density or clumping effects on the Indians part was not apparent in their casualties? Is there a tactical difference in deployment for intervals when one is on the attack or taking offensive actions? I believe at that time it was a perfectly allowable cavalry order to vary the interval between troopers in forming a skirmish line. The standard being 10 paces could be reduced to 5 - 7 paces or whatever. Is it your belief that troopers at 18 foot intervals are more vulnerable then troopers at 30 foot intervals? The point here is that no one here on this board, at least I believe, has experience in fighting an enemy that rode horses back and forth in front of their enemy to prove he could not be shot or counted coup. The denser line formation might facilitate a hit on horse or rider. It would also allow for smaller holes in the line while reloading, 10 to 15 seconds per shot, or when trooper was taken out of the battle. Since Indians fought by themselves and some believed that Sitting Bull was making them invincible back in the village, maybe taking out the first invincible ones in front of the rest could be one of the only chances they had. If all the Indians remain willing to fight it is all over anyway. This was probably the most shocking fact to the 7th, that apparently most of the Indians wanted to fight.
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When the numerical disparity is so great, the casualties are equally disparate.
Certainly there are examples were the lesser number has inflicted the the equally greater disparate casualties.
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“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
SEMPER FI |
Edited by - AZ Ranger on December 05 2005 10:10:29 PM |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - December 06 2005 : 10:07:57 AM
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How does volley fire reduce casualties among men bunched together?
And how is volley fire "vastly superior to individual firing?"It is superior because it is controlled by one or two officers who have a better grasp of the situation than your individual trooper,directing it onto the most treatening section of the enemy.It can involve section or troop firing thus giving continious volleys.It is tactically more efficent and far less wasteful of ammo.
Volleys directed onto charging mounted Indians can bring down the first line and then you hit them again with another volley.
While I have argued that a perimiter defence was the only option under the circumstances ,I never suggested that troops should bunch together nor that they should not avail of any cover available.
But all this is academic because Custer got no chance to form any kind of defensive position either line or perimeter.Gray's map shows 14 scattered markers in the vicinity of Calhoun Ravine and Deep ravine.I believe the attack started here and those markers represent the first casualties suffered by Custer in his retreat to LSH.
Your long line allows any part of it to be attacked in overwhelming nombers and defeated in detail something you have been accusing Custer of.
No, it doesn't. The proper dispersion allows both defense and maneuver within the battle position.
That is meaningless drivel.When 700 Indians ride down on your flank take out the last 10 troopers and preceed to roll up your over extended line whoya goina call?Look what happened to Reno's line.
The fact is, if only one part of the defense is engaged, the unengaged forces can maneuver. There are literally unlimited examples of this in military history. The fact that Custer's forces at the Little Bighorn were few doesn't make that a false statement.
You can reel off all the maneuvers you like but if you don't have the men or the time what's the point?
A rearguard is self defense.
The purpose of a rearguard is to cover the withdrawal of the main force.At the LBH Keogh and Calhoun were the last to be attacked so to describe them as a rearguard is not correct. |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 06 2005 : 10:37:50 AM
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quote:
How does volley fire reduce casualties among men bunched together?
And how is volley fire "vastly superior to individual firing?"It is superior because it is controlled by one or two officers who have a better grasp of the situation than your individual trooper,directing it onto the most treatening section of the enemy.
That's completely wrong. The officer cannot see the sights -- the trooper can. He can individually aim, and is not constrained by waiting for a command before tripping the sear. Volley fire was used against massed troops, not against indians on horseback. And, by 1876 was long seen to be obsolete, except in special situations -- which did not pertain at the Little Bighorn.
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While I have argued that a perimiter defence was the only option under the circumstances ,I never suggested that troops should bunch together nor that they should not avail of any cover available.
What you did say is three companies could not hold so much front. In actuallity, faced with reasonable numbers (say, three to one) they could have easily held.
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But all this is academic because Custer got no chance to form any kind of defensive position either line or perimeter.Gray's map shows 14 scattered markers in the vicinity of Calhoun Ravine and Deep ravine.I believe the attack started here and those markers represent the first casualties suffered by Custer in his retreat to LSH.
Then that would make Keough and Calhoun the first companies to be hit, right?
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Your long line allows any part of it to be attacked in overwhelming nombers and defeated in detail something you have been accusing Custer of.
You think that because you don't understand tactics.
Have you ever been in the military?
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No, it doesn't. The proper dispersion allows both defense and maneuver within the battle position.
That is meaningless drivel.
I would appreciate it if you would not use such ungentlemanly language.
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When 700 Indians ride down on your flank take out the last 10 troopers and preceed to roll up your over extended line whoya goina call?Look what happened to Reno's line.
Reno, like Custer, faced overwhelming numbers. No tactical solution existed to his problem.
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The fact is, if only one part of the defense is engaged, the unengaged forces can maneuver. There are literally unlimited examples of this in military history. The fact that Custer's forces at the Little Bighorn were few doesn't make that a false statement.You can reel off all the maneuvers you like but if you don't have the men or the time what's the point?
That statement would apply to any tactical solution at the Little Bighorn.
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A rearguard is self defense.
The purpose of a rearguard is to cover the withdrawal of the main force.At the LBH Keogh and Calhoun were the last to be attacked so to describe them as a rearguard is not correct.
First of all, you already said, "Gray's map shows 14 scattered markers in the vicinity of Calhoun Ravine and Deep ravine.I believe the attack started here and those markers represent the first casualties suffered by Custer in his retreat to LSH."
Secondly, the mission of the rear guard is guard. That is, they are required to accept decisive engagement to protect the main body. |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 06 2005 : 11:18:51 AM
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quote:
Vern I don't dispute that clumping would may have all the effects you state. Isn't it also true that the density or clumping effects on the Indians part was not apparent in their casualties?
By and large, the indians were moving, and the action was apparently over fairly quickly. In cases like that, the much larger force pours bullets into a compact smaller force with devastating effect -- remember, their fire would be converging, the defender's fire diverging.
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Is there a tactical difference in deployment for intervals when one is on the attack or taking offensive actions?
Yes. An attacking force can use a much smaller frontage. An attack like this is called a Penetration, where the intent is to disrupt the continuity of the enemy's defense.
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I believe at that time it was a perfectly allowable cavalry order to vary the interval between troopers in forming a skirmish line. The standard being 10 paces could be reduced to 5 - 7 paces or whatever. Is it your belief that troopers at 18 foot intervals are more vulnerable then troopers at 30 foot intervals?
In practice, defensive lines are not built up by placing individuals, but by placing units. The cavalry company of that era had two platoons, and the best approach would be to base the line on platoons, with gaps between platoons covered by fire. Within the platoons, the best approach would be by threes -- with one being the horseholder.
An enemy (that is, an enemy without overwhelming numbers) would face points of resistance along the line, with the gaps covered by fire -- and being death-traps to ride through.
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The point here is that no one here on this board, at least I believe, has experience in fighting an enemy that rode horses back and forth in front of their enemy to prove he could not be shot or counted coup. The denser line formation might facilitate a hit on horse or rider.
My question is, how?
A dense formation is a "bullet magnet" -- the enemy's fire converges on a small area, while friendly fire diverges.
In a proper defense, each three or platoon first of all defends itself, and then supports the adjacent three or platoon. The effect here is converging fire on the most dangerous attackers -- and much of that fire is delivered by men who are not themselves under direct attack (again, against an enemy without overwhelming numbers.)
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It would also allow for smaller holes in the line while reloading, 10 to 15 seconds per shot, or when trooper was taken out of the battle.
A hundred years earlier, British Infantry prided themselves on firing 5 shots a minute -- with flintlock muzzle loaders! The '73 carbine could be shot faster than that.
Again, when the trooper is taken out of the battle is the key -- the closer they are grouped, the more effective the enemy's fire.
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Since Indians fought by themselves and some believed that Sitting Bull was making them invincible back in the village, maybe taking out the first invincible ones in front of the rest could be one of the only chances they had. If all the Indians remain willing to fight it is all over anyway. This was probably the most shocking fact to the 7th, that apparently most of the Indians wanted to fight.
I have found that generally it is physical effects, not psychological effects that dominate a battle like this -- discouraging the indians by killing a few of the bolder ones would have little effect.
But you are right in that no one expected the indians to fight. Perhaps if Terry, Custer and Gibbon had known of the Battle of the Rosebud (June 17th), things might have been different.
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When the numerical disparity is so great, the casualties are equally disparate.
Certainly there are examples were the lesser number has inflicted the the equally greater disparate casualties.
There are indeed such cases -- but usually when examined, you find there are special circumstances. A good contrast is the defense of Roark's Drift compared to Islandlwana. At Islandlwana, the British position was broken when the attack fell on a salient manned by poorly trained and armed native troops -- plus, of course, the famous ammunition problem.
At Roark's drift, a purely British force in prepared positions with plenty of ammunition produced a different result. |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - December 06 2005 : 1:23:32 PM
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At Roark's drift, a purely British force in prepared positions with plenty of ammunition produced a different result.
Are you now telling us that at Isandlwana the Brits [with plenty of ammo and artillery]in your beloved extended line suffered a catastrophic defeat while little more than 100 of their camrades manning a perimeter position and outnumbered 20 to 1 saw off their attackers?
By and large, the indians were moving, and the action was apparently over fairly quickly. In cases like that, the much larger force pours bullets into a compact smaller force with devastating effect
The Indian form of attack would be a mass charge.This means that most of their firepower would be negated for two reasons.One most of it would be masked by their own comrades and secondly movement and accurate firing don't go together.In the first World War the Brits would not allow their attacking troops to charge their magazines.
That's completely wrong. The officer cannot see the sights
Are you saying that fire control is useless.Are you saying that fire orders are never given and that individual troopers are at liberty to blaze away at whatever takes their fancy?
Volley fire was used against massed troops, not against indians on horseback.
Is there a difference between massed troops and massed Indians?
Then that would make Keough and Calhoun the first companies to be hit, right?
Wrong. Check your map.
You think that because you don't understand tactics.
I think it because it is a fact,The attacking can throw his full force against the weakest point in the defense.
Have you ever been in the military?
10 years
Reno, like Custer, faced overwhelming numbers. No tactical solution existed to his problem.
Well we know a line was no solution.
I have no idea what you mean by the last section of your post. |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 06 2005 : 1:37:02 PM
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Are you now telling us that at Isandlwana the Brits [with plenty of ammo and artillery]in your beloved extended line suffered a catastrophic defeat while little more than 100 of their camrades manning a perimeter position and outnumbered 20 to 1 saw off their attackers?
In fact, what failed at Isandlwana was a salient manned by poorly armed and trained Natal Native Contingency troops.
At Roark's Drift, the perimeter/man ratio was just about the same as in the three companies we've been discussing.
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The Indian form of attack would be a mass charge.This means that most of their firepower would be negated for two reasons.One most of it would be masked by their own comrades
Then what are we to make of the survivor's statements about the indian's fire and the weapons they carried?
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and secondly movement and accurate firing don't go together.In the first World War the Brits would not allow their attacking troops to charge their magazines.
And paid a huge price for it. On the other hand, both the Americans and the Germans (using the Hutier tactics) emphasized fire and movement.
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Are you saying that fire control is useless.
Nope - I'm saying that volley fire isn't effective.
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Are you saying that fire orders are never given and that individual troopers are at liberty to blaze away at whatever takes their fancy?
Nope -- I'm saying that in a close-fought action, troops must idependently aim and fire.
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Is there a difference between massed troops and massed Indians?
Did you miss the part about the indians being on horseback?
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Then that would make Keough and Calhoun the first companies to be hit, right? Wrong. Check your map.
My map (the USGS 1891 map[) clearly shows a disorganized attempt at defense in the wast and a much more organized one in the west -- which would indicate the eastern units were hit first.
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You think that because you don't understand tactics.
I think it because it is a fact,The attacking can throw his full force against the weakest point in the defense.
And the defense can maneuver against such an attack.
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Have you ever been in the military?
10 years
Would it be too much to ask what your duties were, and what combat experience you have?
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Reno, like Custer, faced overwhelming numbers. No tactical solution existed to his problem.
Well we know a line was no solution.
In fact, an extended line -- in the form of a perimeter -- is what saved Reno and Benteen. |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - December 06 2005 : 4:23:08 PM
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In fact, an extended line -- in the form of a perimeter -- is what saved Reno and Benteen.
Obviously you are more familiar with samantics than tactics
At Rorke's Drift, the perimeter/man ratio was just about the same as in the three companies we've been discussing.
There were 139 men present at Rourkes drift manning a perimeter of 230 yards or 1 man per 1.6 yards as opposed to 1 man per 10 yards in your fictitious line at the LBH. Inaccuracies like this combined with your samantics do your credibility no good to put it mildly.
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Edited by - wILD I on December 06 2005 4:25:11 PM |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 06 2005 : 4:44:33 PM
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In fact, an extended line -- in the form of a perimeter -- is what saved Reno and Benteen.
Obviously you are more familiar with samantics than tactics
I don't know what samantics are -- but I recommend you go back and review the basic tactical manuals. Start with FM 7-10.
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At Rorke's Drift, the perimeter/man ratio was just about the same as in the three companies we've been discussing.There were 139 men present at Rourkes drift manning a perimeter of 230 yards or 1 man per 1.6 yards as opposed to 1 man per 10 yards in your fictitious line at the LBH. Inaccuracies like this combined with your samantics do your credibility no good to put it mildly.
There you go with the samantics again.
The force at Roark's Drift included several man who were not combat capable, and some non-combatants. The initial perimeter was about 700 yards, the final perimeter somewhat smaller. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 06 2005 : 7:25:33 PM
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I haven't made it to Denver for the 1891 or 1892 map, but I did receive "Where Custer Died" today, and in looking through the photos and glancing through the text, the markers are far more iffy than even I thought. The relatively clear Fouche and Morrow photos from 1877 and 1879 show few wooden stakes on areas of Custer Hill now a sea of marble. They claim only 10 spurious markers on CH, though. I'm trying to match up early photos on the Keogh, Calhoun sites with Gray's maps to see if the photos agree on not with his basic map.
One thing, apparently stones have been moved and moved 'back' and vanished and been reinstated as proven by sequential photos, including those of officers. The first known photo, taken a year after the battle with horse's manes still with their skulls, shows very few wooden stakes on Custer Hill. None of this suggests that the markers denote much initial accuracy, or that anyone was keeping track of the field's possessions too closely in the early years.
Also, the photos of the 1886 infantry firing lines on the locations where 'evidence' turns up recently to suggest that Custer's men had advanced that far ten years previous. They were there at the behest of Gall, talking through unnamed translators, perhaps the same ones who so annoyed him he took Godfrey aside and decided conversation between two antagonists who shared no language would be better.
The more you read about all this the more absurd any and all theories seem. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 06 2005 : 7:59:39 PM
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| The basic theory is, Custer failed to synchronize his attack -- with 12 companies, he never got more than three into action at any one time. |
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prolar
Major
Status: offline |
Posted - December 06 2005 : 11:52:11 PM
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| The two companies near LSH and the three in the Calhoun Hill area{or three and two as you have it}were not in action at the same time? Also I have read that the Indians fought mostly on foot as attested to by the few dead ponies. Not the mounted charges you and Wild I describe.Also, when Custer approached MTF most of the warriors were near Reno Hill. How did they travel four miles to attack in such over whelming force that you and Wild claim started the battle? |
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Smcf
Captain
Status: offline |
Posted - December 07 2005 : 06:40:13 AM
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@DC
The paucity of original markers in the Calhoun area is interesting. I mentioned the Kanipe and Benteen statements above, but was a little nervous of posting an inference which seemed logical to me. I'd be interested if anyone could set me straight on this i.e. eye-witness statements to the effect that there were a significant amount of bodies there. Kanipe doesn't mention spending any time at Calhoun, seemingly going to Keogh sector from a postition between Finlay and Calhoun in his search for C company colleagues.
EDIT: Sorry - I misread "Calhoun" for "Custer" in your post.
The Godfrey/Gall thing - surely Gall must have picked up a reasonable amount of English in his 10 years at the reservations, otherwise how did he know the translators weren't doing a good job?
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Edited by - Smcf on December 07 2005 07:25:25 AM |
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Springfield Carbine
