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Buddha
Private
Status: offline |
 Posted - March 03 2006 : 1:06:15 PM
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Thank you for the compliment regarding ratcheting up the level of debate. I've actually done some of these things and been trained at length in tactics. That should qualify me as a tub of wisdom as you called me, and from reading your comments, you are a thimble full of words. Now, if you want to be personal and petty, I can do that. Lets try being adults though, and stick to facts and ideas rather than personalities.
"The "tactics" employed there and lovingly discussed here are barely more advanced than those instinctively employed in a snowball fight by young children."
And you know this because?
I curious to know what you define as advanced tactics and basic tactics.
You're right about the discussions of the recon in force. No such thing occurred at LBH, but there is no harm in discussing why it did or didn't. Why get so upset just because you disagree?
"If Custer was given to the highly complicated 'hammer and anvil,' er, tactic, he probably would have told Reno to engage the Indians in the south while "I swing around and hit them from flank/rear/another direction entirely." This is necessary, as someone has to be the stationary anvil, othewise it's two small ball-peen hammers flailing rather pointlessly against an armored knight."
If I understand you correctly, the tactics used here are also " are barely more advanced than those instinctively employed in a snowball fight by young children." First you call them childish. Now you are calling them highly complicated. Do I understand you correctly? I'm confused.
The hammer and anvil is not that difficult since there is no timing to be considered as in a two pronged envelopement. That one is a lot harder to carry off.
We don't know what Custer meant by 'the whole outfit'. That is a large part of the problem. Kept his thoughts to himself. Assuming what Custer meant to do or say is why people talk about this. On the other hand, what we know, or think we know, about the situation makes some tactics more applicable than others. Assuming that tactics drove Custer, some things then make more or less sense than others, at least to me.
"As the timeline shows, Reno's 120-160 men (we don't seem to know)could have charged through the village several times from one extent to the other, absent injury or winded horses, long before Custer finished cinching his saddles for a recon (is this a serious supposition? apparently.....)"
Yes, this is a serious idea, not a supposition. Others have brought this up, too, that Custer should have known what the terrain looked like before he attacked over it. Standard procedure now, and a good idea then, because I don't know what was taught in the way of tactics at that time, was for a commander's recon to be conducted before an attack order was issued. It doesn't take place after things have started as you guessed. You have to hope that Custer would have done something differently if he knew more about the terrain and the indian village, but he also seemed to have his mind made up to attack 'on sight' several days early. That's why he stayed on the move for the previous 36 hours.
Reno could certainly have seen more the closer he got to the village, but how much more is a guess. Regardless he followed orders as they normally did in those days. In the absence of an ability to communicate with Custer, he did the best thing, if he thought about it at all, and that was to do what the other commander expected him to do. Failing to do that could have been disastrous for Custer in normal circumstances. That is straight out of the manuals. Be where you are told, when you are told or people may die. There have been lots of complaints about Crook not following orders and going home without telling anyone, even though he was operating independently. There would be no difference here if Reno unilaterally decided to not follow his orders. I know the indians made the difference here, but Reno didn't know that when he would have had to decide, so my point is still valid. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 03 2006 : 2:16:25 PM
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by paragraph
1. Don't thank me, but don't do irony, either. I don't do personalities, but don't think insertion of military terms for simple concepts elevates the debate; quite the opposite, in fact.
2. I know this because I've been a kid in snowball fights. That's how. How else? I don't define tactics, basic or advanced.
3. With what do I disagree? I am alert to the pointless insertion of military terminology not utilized by the officers involved anywhere near as much as it is on Custer forums (and enthusiastic pamphlets on it), and I fiendishly oppose the supposition that discussion of the battle and conclusions from it should be left to supposed military pros - here, or with any historical event's reconsideration - given they agree on nothing and their writings on this battle have been few and not that impressive or accurate overall.....like everyone else's.
4. I cannot explain your confusion. I never called them childish, I never called them complicated. Simple isn't childish, nor vice versa. The Reno 'attack' was suggested, I believe by you, as a Custer conceived hammer and anvil, but at the time Reno's attack was ordered, who was to be the anvil? Reno wasn't ordered to do anything but attack (from one set of questionable recollections) or bring to battle (from another). It's to be doubted Custer saw himself as the anvil. If the order was to attack straight through and be 'pressed', as Godfrey thought, then Reno wasn't the anvil, nor was one in place. If it's now presented as a simple two prong attack, fine. That's not hammer and anvil. I'm far from convinced that Custer was "tactics driven." He was an opportunist in battle as everywhere, and it had worked till the LBH.
5. We not only "don't know what Custer meant by 'the whole outfit'", we don't know he said it at all as other recollections are different. If Custer was driven by tactics, the cart's well ahead of the horse since he doesn't know where his enemy is or what it consists of till Weir Point or Sharpshooter, when it's too late. Since tactics are based on who, what, and where your enemy is, he's not tactic driven, how could he be? Are we now or was the Army ever trained or encouraged to plan attacks against an enemy of which so little is known? If so, much is explained in our history, recent and not.
6. We agree. It should be pointed out that Ft. A. Lincoln was made aware of the Rosebud well before hearing of the LBH, so Crook clearly sent out word expeditiously. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - March 03 2006 : 5:00:18 PM
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To elevate these contemplations as to whether it was a recon or a recon in force is to fuzz up the evaluations with that nifty military terminology delivered beneath furrowed brow that is, alas, painfully absent from officer testimony in anything approaching the frequency that it appears here.
Intellectual consistancy of some kind is a sign of a boring mind DC and anyone contrasting your opinions over defensive manuevers versus offensive maneuvers [springfield thread]and the above could never describe you as boring.
Also your threatment of our new poster is most unkind.No settling period,no honeymoon period just hit him with your complete repertoire of cold civvy cynicism.
Custer and the LBH are a blank canvas.You can write anything you like on it--convoluted advanced tactics for snowball fights or anything that takes your fancy just let's try to at least be original.
DC would suggest that Custer was shot early on ,I'm inclined to think he suffered a breakdown, whatever happened there is no indication of intelligent life on planet 7th cav after 3 pm or so.
However please continue Buddha.Your standing on the board will depend on your analysis of Custer's deployment of his troops and in particular on his use of rearguards and feints.
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 03 2006 : 6:53:36 PM
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In what way are my allegedly offered opinions on offensive manuever and defensive manuever at odds? I don't believe I offered any, only observations on the contentions of others'. And with what are they at odds? In any case, AZ seemed to mostly agree with me.
Second, I remain skeptical of User ID's that appear and vanish sequentially. In any case, if you make assertions, you can back them up or fizzle out. Not a big deal. It's a public forum. And while I am a proud civvy who never served in the military, you need to recall that there are many in the United States and Ireland who are also civvies who've never served who've been in armed combat and under fire far more than most soldiers ever have. Some were children at the time. Their insight is as irrelevant to a discussion of 1876 Indian warfare as is that of most soldiers' today, whose lives bear only a most tenuous relationship to that of Custer's troopers. Otherwise, soldiers would agree more than they do on LBH. Since they don't, we may conclude with some assurance that recent alleged experience (we've here on this forum had people who exaggerated their past, which is highly offensive to me, so if I'm too cynical there's a reason) doesn't clear much up, and the arguing over the terminology of manuevers that may not have occured at all has hardly brought illumination.
Some parts of the LBH are blank; others aren't. What would be the incentive or point to strive for originality? Rather, respectful of the participants, cynical of unsupported assertions, and perhaps correct.
We don't know Custer's deployment of troops, whether rearguards or feints. At some point, it's going to have to be admitted and allowed to sink in. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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Buddha
Private
Status: offline |
Posted - March 03 2006 : 7:23:14 PM
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1. Don't thank me, but don't do irony, either. I don't do personalities, but don't think insertion of military terms for simple concepts elevates the debate; quite the opposite, in fact.
I think of calling things, military actions or anything else, as the correct way to speak, whether it elevates the discussion or not. Why do you think it lowers the debate?
2. I know this because I've been a kid in snowball fights. That's how. How else? I don't define tactics, basic or advanced.
You've made several judgements about tactics. Without knowing how to define them, how can you judge them? This isn't about snowball fights, so I don't think that is a helpful experience.
3. With what do I disagree? I am alert to the pointless insertion of military terminology not utilized by the officers involved anywhere near as much as it is on Custer forums (and enthusiastic pamphlets on it), and I fiendishly oppose the supposition that discussion of the battle and conclusions from it should be left to supposed military pros - here, or with any historical event's reconsideration - given they agree on nothing and their writings on this battle have been few and not that impressive or accurate overall.....like everyone else's.
Sounds like you think you can define what others can discuss. I don't think so.
Why do you think terminology should be limited to the few words from Custer's mouth? If you see a duck, do you need someone's permission to call it a duck? No. Using the correct terminology means that different people can have a common understanding when they speak, and so spend time talking about what happened, not trying to understand what the other guy said.
I didn't say anything about limiting discussion, and I re-read my posting to see if I said anything like that. I enjoy others contributions to discussions of history, but not when they degenerate into arguments centered on what terms mean or don't mean.
4. I cannot explain your confusion. I never called them childish, I never called them complicated. Simple isn't childish, nor vice versa. The Reno 'attack' was suggested, I believe by you, as a Custer conceived hammer and anvil, but at the time Reno's attack was ordered, who was to be the anvil? Reno wasn't ordered to do anything but attack (from one set of questionable recollections) or bring to battle (from another). It's to be doubted Custer saw himself as the anvil. If the order was to attack straight through and be 'pressed', as Godfrey thought, then Reno wasn't the anvil, nor was one in place. If it's now presented as a simple two prong attack, fine. That's not hammer and anvil. I'm far from convinced that Custer was "tactics driven." He was an opportunist in battle as everywhere, and it had worked till the LBH.
DC, I read your posting and it appeared to me that you were calling the same actions basic in one spot and complicated in another, and asked for clarification. I don't think I got any.
If you diagrammed Custer's orders to Reno as he gave them along with what we think was his own plan and showed it to someone with knowledge of tactics, they would describe the attack as a hammer and anvil. That's calling a duck a duck even if Custer made no mention of feathery critters. Reno was the anvil in this operation. Who knows what Custer was imaging himself as?
Its not a two pronged attack. That would require coordination so the prongs attacked simultaneously.
I agree with you that Custer was an opportunist. However, the coordinated movement of military units in combat is taught to all combat officers as something called tactics. That was their common language and gave them all a common understanding of what was to be accomplished by a one sentence order to attack. When I say Custer was tactics driven, I mean that he could not help but see the terrain and the problem before him from the standpoint of tactics. He had been taught tactics at West Point and used them in the Civil War. He would not have been able to stop himself and see it as a snowball fight where everyone just ran around on their own.
5. We not only "don't know what Custer meant by 'the whole outfit'", we don't know he said it at all as other recollections are different. If Custer was driven by tactics, the cart's well ahead of the horse since he doesn't know where his enemy is or what it consists of till Weir Point or Sharpshooter, when it's too late. Since tactics are based on who, what, and where your enemy is, he's not tactic driven, how could he be? Are we now or was the Army ever trained or encouraged to plan attacks against an enemy of which so little is known? If so, much is explained in our history, recent and not.
Two points here. The indians had been located well enough that the 7th reacted to their presence. Thats pretty well located and better than you get lots of times.
You're right about basing tactics on who and where and the terrain. That is what you endeavor to find out with the commander's recon. No. Custer didn't do one and the results showed.
Current officers are taught to do one, even if only on a map.
6. We agree. It should be pointed out that Ft. A. Lincoln was made aware of the Rosebud well before hearing of the LBH, so Crook clearly sent out word expeditiously.
That comment misses the point. Crook left the field, deviating from orders, and didn't advise the other columns that he was not available to assist in any way. There has been criticism of that and I agree. Had Reno deviated from his orders and taken the easy way out, he could not have notified Custer in time. That is analogous to Crook's action, or lack of it. In this case, Custer would have gotten to take on all of the indians. That would not have changed the outcome in this case, but the assumption is always that it will, so when you are ordered to be somewhere at some time, you do so or face severe consequences. This is a big rule in combat units and you do not break it. Reno would have followed this rule because he would have followed orders.
wILD I- Thanks for your concern. Custer left alot of room for discussion. Looking at the battle through the eyes of a tactician makes sense to me, so that is what I see best.
I'm inclined to think that Custer was killed or more likely wounded attempting the crossing at MTC. That would suit his personality. If he were killed his body may have been left behind in the rush to get out, but recovering a wounded Custer would delay the withdrawal and give the indians plenty of time to come after the troops in greater numbers. A wounded Custer would also fix the other troops in place on LSH at some point until his body was retrieved. That would have given some indians time to come around from the north. I've never been comfortable with the disorder and the number of casualties coming from MTC. That theory gives some explanation and well as time for the troops to be surrounded.
Time to go. I have something better looking waiting and it's Friday night. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 03 2006 : 8:08:17 PM
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1. It lowers the debate by affectation of language for very simple moves. Further, military vets here didn't seem to agree on what a recon in force was, whether it happened here, or the relevance of applying the term.
2. Teammates rushing the snow fort from two sides and pinning sister behind her snowman while her snowballs are stomped on reflect my contention that the intent and execution offered under "hammer and anvil" and all is instinctively used by children in snowball fights. That's because they are, and in this case the example is far more relevant and applicable than the standard fall back of football analogies, which never are at all. What judgement have I made about tactics? My observation is of an inflation of terminology to salve ego.
3. No it doesn't imply I'm trying to restrict debate. You've undoubtedly noticed that wannabes and others LOVE military terminology, and for the opposite reason you prefer it: they love to be seen as knowledgeable and maybe - just maybe! - mistaken for a soldier themselves. I understand the clarification correct usage, of words and terms, brings. However, see above: various interpretations between vets of recon in force. Didn't help there......
4. Then you need to clarify what action I called simple and then called complicated. Where?
You don't seem to realize that the "orders" Custer gave to Reno vary both within Reno's accounts to those who claimed or led recorders to believe they had heard Custer give the orders, which he may later have altered as he did with Benteen. If Reno was to be the anvil, then the accusations he was to ride through the village allowing Custer to break through are bogus, and his retreat to cover was assumed by Custer, since there would be an hour before Custer drew Sioux attention after Reno charged. Did General Rosser think this? Godfrey? Who, actually, in the military at the time, thought this was Custer's plan? How come, if educated military minds are trained to think this, there's so much variance of opinion among military men?
Your snowball fights were less organized than mine, I guess.
5. Apparently NOT well enough, or Benteen would have been with the rest. Further, Custer had no appreciation of the enemy numbers. Neither do we. At the low end of estimates, it was doable. At the high end, Custer seems as bonkers as the Prussian general (Blucher?) assuring Wellington he was unwell and pregnant by a French soldier.
6. With the Sioux between Crook and Terry, it was rationally assumed, as Herendeen apparently later rationally assumed about the non-recon of Tullucks and notification of Terry, that the attempt would be pointless and suicidal, just like Reno apparently thought.
And for the record, where had Crook been ordered to be and at what time?
Otherwise, you're in complete agreement with me about MTC and Custer or a Custer relative wounded. I further think that Custer had a actual and an official command structure. This explains TWC's presence everywhere always through the years, with Cooke a mere cipher and secretary. If Custer was wounded, get him quiet and help, no need to notify Keogh till we know his condition, head for high ground. If his condition was good enough that he didn't turn over command, much is explained, I'd think.
I notice you don't address the User ID issue. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
Edited by - Dark Cloud on March 03 2006 8:19:38 PM |
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 03 2006 : 11:40:15 PM
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1. It lowers the debate by affectation of language for very simple moves. Further, military vets here didn't seem to agree on what a recon in force was, whether it happened here, or the relevance of applying the term. I am beginning to see your point to a degree. I served in the USMC getting out in in 1970. We did not spend as much time learning all these terms as we did doing things. As I stated to Vern whom I haven't seen in awhile. I only reached the rank of corporal before getting out. I did spend a year in Viet Nam. Each era has its terms and definitions that it is trained by and this leads to the confusion. I have my Marine Corps manual which was published in 1967. Page 238 describes a reconnaissance with this being one definition--(3) to reconnoiter a safe and fordable stream crossing for an advancing unit. The Marines of my era might have sent Force Recon to do this and hopefully no one would know they were there. The cavalry was the reconnaissance unit of the US Army in the 1870's. If Custer wasn't looking for that or at least a fordable crossing then what was he doing? As I stated earlier I believe the three columns in this operation were on a recon in force and conducted it in the manner that the US Cavalry did for its era. Since they were after an enemy that had lots of horses they did not have to waste time griding areas without water and potential grass. The scouts knew where the water was located. The United States Army Tactics for Cavalry published in 1874 does not have the word recon in it. I believe Terry's Order were to preform the recon as described "unless you shall see sufficient reason for departing from them." So if your point is that Custer was looking for a place to cross the river and attack the village it doesn't matter what modern definitions we try to apply to the situation. Custer with a force of 5 companies went looking for a way to engage the enemy and after MTC something went wrong.
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“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
SEMPER FI |
Edited by - AZ Ranger on March 04 2006 12:12:32 AM |
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 04 2006 : 12:09:15 AM
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| Okay. A recon is done with the intent of getting in and out without the enemy knowing you have been there. A recon in force would be ordered without that hope and by a force large enough, say a regiment, to get itself out of trouble if it had to. It would also be ordered as a precursor to action by a larger force. I would agree. I guess the point of debate is where the recon in force ended and the combat mission, if that is a current term, or the fight with Indians began. To me the recon was not sufficient and the combat mission was unclear. As Vern had stated earlier one of Custer's mistakes was not engaging more than three companies with the enemy at any one time. |
“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
SEMPER FI |
Edited by - AZ Ranger on March 04 2006 12:16:09 AM |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - March 04 2006 : 07:39:50 AM
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We have two issues here ---Hammer and anvil,and recon in force.
Hammer and anvil: for this to succeed the following is required.
1/Timing--the anvil has to be in place before the hammer falls.There is no indication of any timing arrangements.
2/Positioning of anvil must be known.No arrangements for that.
3/Hammer must be the strike force not the anvil.No arrangements for that.
4/Anvil must be stationery.No arrangements for that.
There is nothing in Custer's approach to the enemy to indicate that this was his intention.
Recon in force:
1/The entire force is never committed to this task.
2/Some arrangement for the use of information gained in this exercise is usual however Custer does not appear to have made any arrangements.
Anvil/hammer and recon from a man who not only split his forces by distance he put a great big natural feature between them????
DC's contention that he was wounded/killed explains the lack of anything resembling intelligence from MTC on but the rot had set in much earlier thus Iprefare the breakdown sceanario. |
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 04 2006 : 10:02:41 AM
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We have two issues here ---Hammer and anvil,and recon in force.
Hammer and anvil: for this to succeed the following is required.
1/Timing--the anvil has to be in place before the hammer falls.There is no indication of any timing arrangements.
2/Positioning of anvil must be known.No arrangements for that.
3/Hammer must be the strike force not the anvil.No arrangements for that.
4/Anvil must be stationery.No arrangements for that.
There is nothing in Custer's approach to the enemy to indicate that this was his intention. The only part of Custer's plan to attack the village that was partially carried out was by Reno. Custer's orders for Benteen make little sense other then keeping the Indians from fleeing but Custer must of thought he was close enough to support him in a reasonable amount of time. There was some written about Custer's changed behavior from the beginning on the Yellowstone. Was it a sign or hindsight of Custer's behavior? You may be on the correct path Wild as far as I am concerned. If Custer was wounded why not regroup with Reno and Benteen. There is no evidence of carrying out a hammer and anvil other than the separation of the battalions.
As far as reconnaissance by the whole regiment, in dealing with a highly mobile enemy village at unknown locations the elements of reconnaissances were carried out shortly before switching to engagement. What we know of Benteen's order is both recon and engagement in nature. The regiment did not know the terrain, crossings,and numbers of indians. It was a characteristic of cavalry to be mobile and adaptable to circumstance.
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“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 04 2006 : 11:52:06 AM
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Some clarification on my adopted theory (long held by others).
IF Custer were wounded around MTC while under counter attack, then his brother might insist they call pull back from contact till things can be sorted out. If Custer, while wounded, is still giving orders and not thinking well, I'm not convinced anyone there would override him (imagine doing so and having Custer live and the regiment defeated?) in which case the half-baked retreat and delaying moves make more sense to me. Keogh parallels Yates' companies firing long range to discourage the Sioux and they end up on Custer Ridge to no particular purpose, where they are unexpectedly surrounded and slaughtered and from first to last nobody knew what was happening or why they headed there.
I know the correct command structure, but in such a nepotistic outfit I'd think there was an official structure and an actual one, and under duress the actual took over, explaining the officers with Custer and the fiasco itself. This requires no Custer new to history, no intricate manuevers, no hysterical conspiracy theories, and reflects the constant presence of TWC and the non-entity of Cooke, the adjutant, whose sole imprint is a signed note.
In reality, I suspect, TWC often spoke for his brother, anticipated his decisions (bringing the regiment forward, sending couriers) with brother's blessing and operated outside the official structure. Even Boston did, abandoning his post and riding simply to be with his brother in a fight. Nobody stopped him, nobody objected, nobody commented on it through the years, and he was under others' command and had supposed duties with the train. If Boston had that latitude, imagine what Tom had. Not even Benteen thinks this unusual or inappropriate, but he long had noted and condemned Custer's clique, as had others.
No proof, but it's logical with much previous evidence for an actual structure within and overriding an official one, and explains motivation and the fiasco as well as anything. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - March 05 2006 : 11:29:54 AM
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DC
If Custer, while wounded, is still giving orders and not thinking well,
The weakness in this theory is that Custer did not require a bullet to render his thought processes and performance way below par.Things had started to go down the toilet long before MTC.In fact a bullet could have saved the regiment.The captains of the 7th were not your common or garden variety of junior officer but hard bitten civil war down graded Lt Cols.
I cannot see Keogh sauntering along dreaming of the soft green fields of Carlow within sling shot of thousands of Indians and the quare fella with a round in his butt performing ever diminishing circles.
You are correct about Custer being wounded but that wound could only be treated by a lobotomy. |
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Buddha
Private
Status: offline |
Posted - March 07 2006 : 8:06:25 PM
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I'm pleasantly surprised at the amount of agreement on Custer's death, all possibilities considered.
I sort of regret bringing up the hammer and anvil term. It was a term I used to describe what Reno and Custer's maneuvers added up to, not something that I know he specifically ordered to happen. The debate on it has surprised me. As long as one unit can make contact and maintain it, thus fixing the enemy in place, another unit can come in and engage it from the rear or flank. That is all it takes, and I think that is what Custer had in mind, regardless of the seemingly irrational way he went about it.
From AZ Ranger - "I guess the point of debate is where the recon in force ended and the combat mission, if that is a current term, or the fight with Indians began. To me the recon was not sufficient and the combat mission was unclear. As Vern had stated earlier one of Custer's mistakes was not engaging more than three companies with the enemy at any one time."
I think that no later than the point at which a scout pointed and said 'Look at all of those Indians!', and Custer started thinking about how to attack the village, the recon ended and the mission changed to attack. He should have reconned at that point, decided what to do and let all of the other commanders know what they and each other would be doing. I think that means that basically I agree with you. Lacking this knowledge, the units on Custer Hill and at the MTC had no idea where to go for help except to each other. Question- If, on being recalled to the force and knowing where Custer was going to be, Benteen decided to go around Reno to Custer's location, what might the outcome have been? Reno might have been wiped out, but the Indians may have responded differently and let Reno off.
So far as I know, tactics and definitions haven't changed over the years. Watch a battle described on the History Channel and the weapons cause a difference in the applications compared to modern tactics, but otherwise they are the same as I see them. DC- I understand tactics using the terms I am using already. That's not an affectation for me, and I don't intend to change it. My language shouldn't hurt your feelings if I don't let yours hurt mine. Understanding should be the concern, not the words.
From DC= 4. Then you need to clarify what action I called simple and then called complicated. Where?
From your post Posted - March 03 2006 : 10:08:26 AM
The "tactics" employed there and lovingly discussed here are barely more advanced than those instinctively employed in a snowball fight by young children."
"If Custer was given to the highly complicated 'hammer and anvil,' er, tactic, "
Your words and I'm stil confused about what is basic and what is highly complicated as you describe them and why.
I haven't a clue what the User Id issue is. I log on automatically. What's the problem here? |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - March 08 2006 : 09:55:32 AM
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The debate on it has surprised me. As long as one unit can make contact and maintain it, thus fixing the enemy in place, another unit can come in and engage it from the rear or flank. That is all it takes, and I think that is what Custer had in mind, regardless of the seemingly irrational way he went about it.
I would disagree.If you study the final positions of Custer's 5 troops they lie in a rough circle.I believe Custer was engaged in a demonstration [in force of course].By performing circles he hoped to attract the attention of the Indians and thus draw them away from the hard pressed Reno.
Vern had stated earlier one of Custer's mistakes was not engaging more than three companies with the enemy at any one time."No he engaged 5 companies.
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 08 2006 : 1:53:22 PM
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From DC= 4. Then you need to clarify what action I called simple and then called complicated. Where?
From your post Posted - March 03 2006 : 10:08:26 AM
The "tactics" employed there and lovingly discussed here are barely more advanced than those instinctively employed in a snowball fight by young children."
"If Custer was given to the highly complicated 'hammer and anvil,' er, tactic, "
Your words and I'm stil confused about what is basic and what is highly complicated as you describe them and why.
Then it's because you don't recognize sarcastic irony, which in turn I find hard to believe. Hammer and anvil being elevated to recondite military "tactic" is amusing when the same thing is used in children's snowball fights. Hence the sarcastic "er".
You don't hurt my feelings; I have none involved. But any contentions that military men understand and civvies doen't is daily blown apart on this message board, where experienced military men don't agree on stuff they claim as basic.
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Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
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Posted - March 08 2006 : 10:13:30 PM
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Vern had stated earlier one of Custer's mistakes was not engaging more than three companies with the enemy at any one time."No he engaged 5 companies. That would be the maximum but it is harder to prove. Custer still failed in engaging all 12 companies at the same time.
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Buddha
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Posted - March 09 2006 : 01:55:55 AM
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wILD1
"I would disagree.If you study the final positions of Custer's 5 troops they lie in a rough circle.I believe Custer was engaged in a demonstration [in force of course].By performing circles he hoped to attract the attention of the Indians and thus draw them away from the hard pressed Reno."
I can't see this one at all. For this to work, Custer would have had to know in advance that he was sending Reno off to a position where he would be 'hard pressed' to the point where he would need saving without knowing where the Indians were or their numbers so he could distract them. He also sent another unit, Benteen's, that could have helped to save Reno off into the boonies and told to keep going. When he sent a runner to recall the unit not knowing where it was except generally, he recalled it to his position, not Reno's. Benteen would have bypassed Reno Hill had Reno remained in the valley. Also, if Custer were going to save Reno as you say, he would have kept a better watch on Reno's actions. He waved to Reno once from a bluff, and rode off unseen by anyone from that poiint on, including the Indians. That's not very distracting, I think. Riding down to MTC attracted the Indians attention finally, but Custer didn't know the ford was there, and not knowing would have put Reno at greater risk if his plan was to distract. This also went against the overall plan of corraling the indians by leaving them an avenue to escape to the north.
Dark Cloud
"Then it's because you don't recognize sarcastic irony, which in turn I find hard to believe. Hammer and anvil being elevated to recondite military "tactic" is amusing when the same thing is used in children's snowball fights. Hence the sarcastic "er"."
I have to admit that I have never heard of sarcastic irony, and I'm still not sure that the two words can go together. How's this one work?
Children attack and defend and play wargames that mimic tactics or exhibit them. Why can't that happen? They don't have to understand it to do it, but tactics shouldn't be complicated until the other side gets in the way and causes problems doing otherwise simple things, like riding up a hill.
"You don't hurt my feelings; I have none involved. But any contentions that military men understand and civvies doen't is daily blown apart on this message board, where experienced military men don't agree on stuff they claim as basic."
What does this refer back to?
I watched a show on the Discovery/Times Channel tonight. It was about the forensic archeological exploration (take a breath now) of the battlefield that took place in 1983. Ballistic evidence showed them that Custer and some men (?) went down to MTC and the Indians chased them back. There were Cavalry troops on Calhoun Hill, the Keogh sector or hill, and Custer Hill, forming a circle. The Indians took out Calhoun Hill first, then the Keogh sector, then Custer Hill. Almost no expended Cavalry cartridges were found on Custer Hill, so the fight there must have been short, no last stand. Indian accounts agree that it was short. Some soldiers then tried to escape down Deep Ravine and were run down and killed. That was the last of the men with Custer and that's the short version.
Short range fighting skills and repeating rifles made the end inevitable according to them.
"Your words and I'm stil confused about what is basic and what is highly complicated as you describe them and why."
I've tried to get you to explain this 3 times. I've told you that I don't understand your references and even put your words in front of you. If you can explain your remarks, then I may agree with you. |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - March 09 2006 : 03:25:04 AM
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I can't see this one at all.
As you know Buddha the terrain in the vicinity of LSH is very broken.
By spreading his 5 troops out over a mile they were never all in view at the same time thus confusing the Indians as to his strenght also by performing circles it gave the illusion an endless column of troops.
For this to work, Custer would have had to know in advance that he was sending Reno off to a position where he would be 'hard pressed'
It was a reaction to the news brought to him by Boyer and Curley.
Custer has often been castigated for his handling of the last stages of the battle.I believe that now is the time to reinstate Custer to his rightful position of military genius.His execution of this circle maneuver has sown confusion even to this day. |
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
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Posted - March 09 2006 : 08:16:30 AM
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I can't see this one at all. For this to work, Custer would have had to know in advance that he was sending Reno off to a position where he would be 'hard pressed' to the point where he would need saving without knowing where the Indians were or their numbers so he could distract them. He also sent another unit, Benteen's, that could have helped to save Reno off into the boonies and told to keep going. Since as you state they didn't know where the Indians or their numbers then they were gathering information as they proceeded on the 25th. Reno gathered enough to not charge the village. Benteen gathered enough to change his orders and direction. Custer gathered enough information to know there was too many Indians that wanted a fight. In all three instances each unit did not have this information until they advanced with the full force of their command.
When he sent a runner to recall the unit not knowing where it was except generally, he recalled it to his position, not Reno's. Seemed like the dispatched riders and Boston Custer had little trouble finding their objective.
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“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
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Posted - March 09 2006 : 08:28:15 AM
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Vern had stated earlier one of Custer's mistakes was not engaging more than three companies with the enemy at any one time."No he engaged 5 companies. That would be the maximum but it is harder to prove. Custer still failed in engaging all 12 companies at the same time.
Wild I can't find any Indian description that states they saw all 5 companies engaged at the same time. There is evidence that some companies put up a defensive skirmish line while other companies were not engaged. When you look at the line of markers lying in the pathway to LSH it doesn't appear they were engaged as companies rather as individual and smaller groups of troopers. |
“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
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Smcf
Captain
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Posted - March 09 2006 : 09:08:07 AM
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@Buddha - I'm not sure if the TV show you refer to was the same as one which I watched entitled "Custer's Last Stand" shown on Discovery Civilization last week. That one had Scott (or was it Fox) saying nothing much was found near the MTC ford area. Not surprizing as a 1956 investigation of the same area showed up next to nothing, although its been pointed out on this board that some artifact pilfering over the years may plausibly account for this (the same might be said of Custer Hill). What is confusing to me is that Michno, using Indian accounts, has a troop (or two) marching down the hillocks bounding MTC (not MTC itself) to a point well away from the ford and up the hillocks on the other side bounding Deep Coulee. I can't think why he'd be so sure of this other than the complete lack of any reported trail down MTC itself. In the TV show, the forensic analysis re: cases and firing pin markings pointedly progressed from Calhoun to Keogh to Custer Hill. Nothing was traced from MTC to Deep Coulee, or before MTC for that matter - or if it was, it wasn't mentioned.
The bit about the 40 or so breaking out and getting hit in Deep Ravine - I'm not sure I'd go along with it at all. I'd expect to see Boyer there if he was scouting and with Custer if he was not. How'd he manage to survive as one of the last? Too much like Hollywood. |
Edited by - Smcf on March 09 2006 09:41:25 AM |
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Buddha
Private
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Posted - March 10 2006 : 01:09:46 AM
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Smcf- The show I saw may have been the same one you saw, but on a different Discovery Channel because it was about the forensic investigation that you describe. Ballistic evidence showed the progression from Calhoun to Keogh to Custer. From there, the ~40 who fled down to MTC were the last ones to die, tracked by spent cases and bodies. I think luck has alot to do with who survived to make that last dash.
wILD1-
"I can't see this one at all.
As you know Buddha the terrain in the vicinity of LSH is very broken.
By spreading his 5 troops out over a mile they were never all in view at the same time thus confusing the Indians as to his strenght also by performing circles it gave the illusion an endless column of troops."
I've been wondering just what a circle maneuver is, and I have a guess, but you need to explain to me in detail how and why it works. On the other hand, the Indians couldn't see Custers' soldiers because they were up above their line of sight from the village. Doing such a thing would be considered foolhardy because it left Reno's troops split from Custer, out of sight of Custer, so the Regiment could be defeated in detail. It is also a complete change from Custer's orders, to block the Indians and keep them from running, and we know Custer had a fear this would happen. Supposedly he sent Benteen off on a blocking mission to prevent the Indians from running away. Staying up on the ridge line would mean that Custer had had a complete change in his frame of mind after months. I think this is would not occur.
This circle maneuver, if I have guessed what it is correctly, also means that an enemy unit could attack at a bad time, when units were positioned so they couldn't maneuver without running into each other, and defeat them in detail. It also means that troops were split up even more than we thought and criticized Custer for. There is one other thing. Custer said he would support Reno. This means that he would be firing and maneuvering so that he helped Reno directly. Reno would have expected Custer to attack the village in 'support' of him. This circle maneuver doesn't do it, and making up things as you go isn't the way a tactical genius would do it. I'm also not sure that such tactics would matter to the Indians once they became aware of what was up above the bluffs, and they certainly didn't in the battle.
"For this to work, Custer would have had to know in advance that he was sending Reno off to a position where he would be 'hard pressed'
It was a reaction to the news brought to him by Boyer and Curley."
This took place after the attack started with Reno's departure from Custer. You don't change things once the attack begins unless you are physically prevented from carrying out your orders as Reno was. Custer wasn't.
"Seemed like the dispatched riders and Boston Custer had little trouble finding their objective."
True, they did, but Benteen didn't. He was supposed to go to Custer's position, not Reno's. Benteen never made it and that saved Reno.
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Smcf
Captain
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Posted - March 10 2006 : 04:31:36 AM
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| @Buddha - not having read any of the forensic books, is it true that the same weapon can be traced all the way from Calhoun through to Deep Ravine? Now that would be very impressive. |
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 10 2006 : 07:49:39 AM
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"Seemed like the dispatched riders and Boston Custer had little trouble finding their objective."True, they did, but Benteen didn't. He was supposed to go to Custer's position, not Reno's. Benteen never made it and that saved Reno. That is because Reno was not where Custer sent him. Reno had made a choice to withdraw from the engagement near the village.
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“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
SEMPER FI |
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 10 2006 : 08:38:15 AM
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@Buddha - not having read any of the forensic books, is it true that the same weapon can be traced all the way from Calhoun through to Deep Ravine? Now that would be very impressive.
Smcf--On page 91 of Fox it shows the evidence of two similar .45-55 cartridges locations. One located to the southwest of Calhoun Ridge and the other location just to the Southwest of the South Skirmish Line close to deep Ravine. Unfortunately on pages 89 and 90 there is 4 times as many Indian cartridges that can be traced with the same pathway as described by Fox by drawing a straight line between the locations. This evidence could be argued that an Indian carried the Springfield since it originates from a Indian location to another Indian location. Both locations are adjacent to but outside the markers of troopers from page 76; Fox,1993. |
“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
SEMPER FI |
Edited by - AZ Ranger on March 10 2006 08:39:36 AM |
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The new myth
