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Smcf
Captain
Status: offline |
 Posted - November 03 2005 : 05:45:21 AM
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Curley and Boyer come down from Weir point, meet up with Custer, cause him to halt on way down MTC and according to Curley, Custer moves north and the gray horse troop move down MTC.
As for Curley, when exactly is he supposed to have taken his leave from the main body of troops and where did he go to watch the events?
Did he have wings, as Gall later asked? - or just darn fine medicine. |
Edited by - Smcf on November 03 2005 05:56:36 AM |
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Benteen
Lt. Colonel
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Posted - November 03 2005 : 08:33:27 AM
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quote:
Smcf ~ Curley and Boyer come down from Weir point, meet up with Custer, cause him to halt on way down MTC and according to Curley, Custer moves north and the gray horse troop move down MTC.
Please give me the reference where this is stated by Curley.
quote:
As for Curley, when exactly is he supposed to have taken his leave from the main body of troops and where did he go to watch the events?
It was known that the indian scouts were not required to go into battle with the troopers. Custer had released the Crow scouts and 3 of them had indeed turned back. Curley had refused to leave on several occasions. This was one of those occasions. Since he seemed reluctant to leave, and also to give battle. It seems natural that from his observations he remained at an observation point perhaps on the upper ridges east of MTC which led down to the ford. There are a number of places near there where he could have witnessed what he did. And his later statement that he had to "cut across" the coulee to reach Custer's retreating column also alludes to this position.
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - November 03 2005 : 08:49:40 AM
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If you hold that there was a full blooded attack down MTC this is what you must accept.
1 Custer orders an attack into the unknown.
2 Custer orders an attack against unknown defences.
3 Custer orders an attack in column.The weakest possible formation.
4 Custer is wounded.
5 Someone countermands Custer's attack order.[Remember his reaction when he found someone had brought the regiment forward without orders].
6 The battalion executes a brilliant withdrawal away from all possible help although knowing that Benteen and pack train [over 200 men]had been ordered forward.
7 Having 40 minutes to organise a defence nothing is attempted.
Coming down by company, "Benteen"'s correct, it's not that big a deal to avoid a pile up.If HQ and the lead company pile up you have total confusion with the following companies not having a clue what is happening.
Curley is with Boyeur on Weir Point, isn't he? Looking down on all this, seeing what they cannot.
Weir point is nearly a mile off.What will you see at that distance through dust?
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Smcf
Captain
Status: offline |
Posted - November 03 2005 : 09:57:53 AM
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Benteen wrote: "Please give me the reference where this is stated by Curley"
Its in Gray somewhere, I'll dig it out tonight (GMT) and post tomorrow, if that's ok.
Can you answer a question? - if Curley stated the 3 crows were harrassed back to Reno (none of the 3 crows seem to have mentioned any harassment on their way back, even stopping down at the east flat of the river for their horses to drink), how come he wasn't harrassed himself, given the obvious proximity of hostiles in that area south of the troops, at that stage? |
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Benteen
Lt. Colonel
Status: offline |
Posted - November 03 2005 : 10:05:51 AM
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quote:
If you hold that there was a full blooded attack down MTC this is what you must accept.
1 Custer orders an attack into the unknown.
2 Custer orders an attack against unknown defences.
3 Custer orders an attack in column.The weakest possible formation.
4 Custer is wounded.
5 Someone countermands Custer's attack order.[Remember his reaction when he found someone had brought the regiment forward without orders].
6 The battalion executes a brilliant withdrawal away from all possible help although knowing that Benteen and pack train [over 200 men]had been ordered forward.
7 Having 40 minutes to organise a defence nothing is attempted.
Coming down by company, "Benteen"'s correct, it's not that big a deal to avoid a pile up.If HQ and the lead company pile up you have total confusion with the following companies not having a clue what is happening.
Curley is with Boyeur on Weir Point, isn't he? Looking down on all this, seeing what they cannot.
Weir point is nearly a mile off.What will you see at that distance through dust?
First of all you are assuming way too much. A tendancy to over dramaticize an event that in simplicity explains itself.
1) Custers statement: "Hoorah boys, we've caught them napping. We'll finish up here and go home to our station." His observations had to have been from atop either sharpshooter ridge or Weir peak, or near there. The reason? Because he had to have seen enough of the village and the effects of Reno's attack to conclude that they indeed had, "caught them napping." That's not my assumption. That's Custer's own words.
2) An all out attack by the whole battalion was exactly what was needed. It's a no brainer to assume and conclude from all the evidence, (Warrior, Curley, Three Crows,Martini and Custer's own words. Not only the "napping", but to Reno as well) that the attack on MTF was no fluke or fly by the seat of your pants type of an attack.
3) quote:
Custer orders an attack into the unknown.
You don't know that. What was thought to be unknown to you, wasn't as unknown to Custer, else why the statement, "Hoorah boys, we've caught them napping..."
4) quote:
Custer orders an attack against unknown defences.
Again you are assuming way to much. You simply do not know what Custer did. Such noted battlefield experts as Neil Magnum said that "whatever Custer saw down there it didn't scare him." In fact, it did the opposite. It encouraged him, so much so that he stated, "Hoorah boys, we've caught them napping, we'll finish up here and go home to our station."
5) quote:
Custer orders an attack in column.The weakest possible formation.
What do you not understand? How was he supposed to cross that river? It's depth was an average that day of 3 to 4 feet deep. Granted this isn't much when one considers just the river alone. But what one must do is examine the rough terrain on both sides of that ford. To the south there are extreme bluffs and cliffs, some nearly 2 - 300 feet above, directly over the river. To the west the same, these are not as dramatic but still imposing when one considers crossing with an army of mounted troopers. The ford area wasn't broad enough to attack in a mounted skirmish line. And besides that the resistance at that time was light. There simply was no reason to form a mounted skirmish line. It simply would not have worked. There simply was no reason for Custer to look further downstream for a ford to cross. The terrain as one looks at it from Weir point is imposing. The river and the bluffs over it stretch way off into the distance past and behind greasy grass ridge.
6) quote:
Custer is wounded.
You forgot to include and/or killed. Which could just very well have been. Some of the evidence suggests otherwise. But, even then a wounded Custer could and indeed would have some effects depending upon the seriousness of the wound. And his impaired judgement from such a wound. You also forgot to include my statements concerning the Cavalry formation. And how the keystone cops analogy isn't justified by you. You obviously don't have a clue as to how a column was designed or functioned.
7) quote:
Someone countermands Custer's attack order.[Remember his reaction when he found someone had brought the regiment forward without orders].
I am not sure what you are alluding to here. But I will try. If you are assuming that because of the retreat from the ford that someone countermanded his orders. Once again you are assuming way to much. This is an unknown. And something that is irrelevant to the conversation.
8) quote:
The battalion executes a brilliant withdrawal away from all possible help although knowing that Benteen and pack train [over 200 men]had been ordered forward.
I can see that from this one and #7 your objective is to not read everything I say. If you haven't completely read any of my previous works upon this subject in this thread then do so now. I am quite sure that like #7 I have fully answered this one too. If not and this post is just too much for your small ability to comprehend then by all means go and argue with yourself somewhere else. I have nothing further to add. And will at the end of this session withdraw and permit your outstanding summations be the know it all end.
9) quote:
Having 40 minutes to organise a defence nothing is attempted.
Another assumption based upon someone else's incomplete working knowledge of the battle. And I have also addressed this previously. I don't intend to keep dredging up the answers if you are unwilling to read and comprehend, and respond in kind with an appropriate rebuttal.
If your goal is to back me into a corner and say this is a standoff, your wrong. If your goal is to intimidate me by not reading and responding in kind to what I have said. Then our business if finished here. I have responded, point by point to each and every issue that you present to me. The same cannot be said of you. And until you go back and find out what I said about the above named issues and give appropriate rebuttal, I refuse to answer any more of your questions, on the basis that I have already answered them.
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Smcf
Captain
Status: offline |
Posted - November 03 2005 : 10:47:52 AM
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| How would Custer have known the ford was only 3 or 4 feet deep that day? - and what would a full charge be like from 200 horses in 4 feet of water? -- very thirsty horses, note. |
Edited by - Smcf on November 03 2005 10:53:03 AM |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - November 03 2005 : 12:57:26 PM
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You will note Benteen that the post was not addressed to you in particular but was rather a collection of points supported by the other side of the debate which I offered to the board in general to highlight a series of strange and unorthodox actions,the acceptance of which is needed to make your arguement.
Now it seems you are upset by my continious questioning of these points so just allow me to take one point---Custer orders an attack into the unknown.And your reply----You don't know that. What was thought to be unknown to you, wasn't as unknown to Custer,But you see you posted previously------ I personally would want to give him the benefit of the doubt when it came to his own words. Both directly before his descent into the unknown," You see the contradiction?
Anyway I hope you continue to post on this subject as your contribution is full of enthusiasm and uniqueness.I hope that did not sound too like Joe W. |
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movingrobewoman
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 03 2005 : 7:49:18 PM
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This might be a bit of a mistranslation, but since the famous "we've caught 'em napping" cry keeps coming up and coming up and coming up in this thread, I was wondering if perhaps this was more of a rallying cry, rather than a complete and accurate summation of what GAC actually noted. Granted, there is evidence that the village appears to be caught off guard--at least at the time of Reno's initial attack--but then we have the note asking for Benteen to "come quick." Seems to me, GAC might have been uncertain he could have taken them all with the companies he had, and might have used the battle cry as a way to spin the situation into one of greater confidence?
As for a ford of the river, wouldn't Bouyer have a guesstimate of how deep it might be? Of course, it depends on rain and snowmelt ...
hoka hey--
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movingrobe |
Edited by - movingrobewoman on November 03 2005 7:50:22 PM |
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movingrobewoman
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 04 2005 : 02:23:26 AM
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Essentially, with the above post, I have continued my theory that Custer was the King of Spin. He had to be, especially after looking upon the breadth of that durn village.
hoka hey |
movingrobe |
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Smcf
Captain
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Posted - November 04 2005 : 05:15:00 AM
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MRW wrote "As for a ford of the river, wouldn't Bouyer have a guesstimate of how deep it might be"
The way it was put, it appeared to me to suggest the depth might be higher on other days - geography not being one of my strong points. I think with regard to a charge, rather than a ford, then its depth might be considered more critical. I agree Boyer probably had some idea as he undoubtedly had of other fording places in the vicinity.
@Benteen - Curley to Russell White Bear (interview 1923, transcript published in 1926 and another version in 1938) - from the 1938 version:
"Custer, turning left, rode down Medicine Tail Coulee. After riding a while, he halted the command. Then the gray horse troop left us and started down the creek, when we turned north, crossing Medicine Tail Creek, going over the hills north of the creek. Here the command halted again; Custer wrote a message and handed it to a young man on a sorrel-roan horse, who galloped away."
Gray makes the argument that references to Custer in Curley's reports to Bradley and interviews with Camp are more to do with the interviewers' interpretation of what he was saying, based on their preconceptions of events there.
King of Spin - hehe, you just reminded me of the Warwickshire cricket player and England spin-bowler Ashley Giles. His club commissioned some commemorative mugs with Giles' photo on them and the caption "Ashley Giles - King of Spin". The mugs all came out mis-printed as "Ashley Giles - King of Spain". He is now known by his Royal title among fans, or El Gilo to his friends. |
Edited by - Smcf on November 04 2005 05:59:55 AM |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - November 11 2005 : 1:06:24 PM
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Rather thoughtless of us to leave the late lamented heading down MTC when his presence is required at LSH.
I have no doubt that Custer did in fact proceed down MTC but did not attempt to attack across the ford for the tactical reasons I'v stated. He turned away probably up Deep Coulee.It leads directly to the area of the "last stand".
He is faced with a problem.On one hand is committed to attack and that can only be from the North while on the other hand he needs Benteen.He compromises and fatally delays his advance on the North end of the village.This allows the Indians time to withdraw from their fight with Reno and attack in huge numbers up Deep Coulee and Deep Ravine catching Custer in neither attack nor defence formation. |
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Smcf
Captain
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Posted - November 14 2005 : 05:00:49 AM
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| If he didn't intend to cross, then it doesn't make sense to me to head all the way down MTC then all the way back up Deep Coulee. It makes more sense to me if he personally kept on the high ridge, while sending a troop down there to hold a position to perhaps prevent a crossing by the Indians. I see that the only 2 bodies (apart from the one just over the river) found between the ford and the Calhoun position were from C and L which may point to them being part of the action at Calhoun/Finlay ridge. I don't know which Company the guy over the west bank was from - I think he was mis-identified by Kanipe as a Sergeant from I who was later placed with Keogh. |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - November 14 2005 : 1:21:53 PM
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| If he didn't intend to cross, then it doesn't make sense to me to head all the way down MTC then all the way back up Deep Coulee.MTC was the best approach to the village ,he had to go down and check it out. |
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Buddha
Private
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Posted - February 28 2006 : 10:17:02 PM
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Finally! Someone figured out why the troops were sent to MTC, to check it out. Custer had not done a recon the way he should have, so he was feeling his way along. He needed to find a way across the river to attack the Indians from the north while Reno kept them engaged in the south. That would help Reno the most. Waiting for Benteen was not an option, not for Custer nor any other commander once an attack was initiated. He knew he would need more ammo though, and soon, so he ordered Benteen to come quick.
Because he wasn't sure, he sent two troops to check out the ford. If it were a good place to cross, good banks and not too deep nor current too swift, one troop would cover the other while it crossed. He had no way of knowing that this was in the middle of the village, so that didn't enter into his decision. If the ford was no good, the narrow, by tactical standards, ravine could accomodate the two troops reversing themselves much better than the entire command. Taking them all down the ravine would be a 2LT's mistake.
While the ford was being checked out, the other three troops proceded north at a pace that would not take them out of reach of the two troops. Custer would most likely have been with the larger group as a matter of protocol. Had he gone to the ford, the three troops would most likely have waited in place so as to respond quickly to his call.
FWIW, you don't attack in column because there is no firepower to the front, just like you don't maneuver in a narrow ravine or charge through a river. Young soldiers learn that in Advanced Individual Training today, just after basic.
Since the ford was in the middle of the village, the indians responded as if their women and children were in danger, strangely enough, and began shooting at the soldiers who then decided that the ford was not a good place to cross for one reason or a combination of them. The remaining three troops heard and saw the other troops in trouble and waited for them or moved to LSH and waited for them there. They may have remained in formation, then set up a hasty perimeter there when the number of Indians became overwhelming. Most of the bodies are in a small depression that would be heaven sent to a man on the ground to use as cover. It's also just below the crest of the hill, at the military crest, which would keep them from being silouhetted. Almost sounds like deliberate placement of the men. Tired and malnourished, poorly trained and informed, the troopers would not have been told what was happening and just followed orders and folowed along, hoping for the best until the saw all of the indians in he world coming after them. Then they probably made some personal decisions about how the end this. Some ran. Some saved a bullet for themselves. Some received a bullet.
Custer had gotten a haircut just prior to starting the campaign, as was a normal military practice then and now, so almost assuredly had no golden locks when he died. |
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 01 2006 : 12:10:16 AM
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| Finally! Someone figured out why the troops were sent to MTC, to check it out. Custer had not done a recon the way he should have, so he was feeling his way along. I believe this to be a recon in force. I am curious on how you would have him do the recon in the way he should? Especially on the depth of water at MTC. |
“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
SEMPER FI |
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Buddha
Private
Status: offline |
Posted - March 01 2006 : 01:18:02 AM
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A recon in force would consist of a recon by the entire 5 troops, not a part of it, through an area, not a spot, where they have no idea what is there, but expect that something is. The large force enables them to get out of any trouble they might get in. This doesn't fit the bill. It's also irrelevant though. A recon in force is a type of mission, like an attack or a withdrawal, and you don't give a unit two missions to accomplish simultaneously. Tactics should be as simple as possible. Ordinarily you would send a sergeant and a private to check out a possible ford. The only way I know to do that is to get in the water if the bank and current are suitable. Another commander in this situation might have sent only a one company, considering that there was the strong possibility of lots of indians in the area, and kept four under his direct command. Custer is being criticized for splitting his command for sending two troops to check out the ford. He can't afford to not do something though. Trying a crossing with all of his command only to find out that it isn't a suitable place, then trying to turn around 5 troops in a narrow ravine would be disastrous at best. Still, Custer needed to cross someplace. He had no choice but to check it out. This was a good way, even if others were suitable, too.
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Smcf
Captain
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Posted - March 01 2006 : 04:13:06 AM
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| The tactics you describe, Buddha, would seem to me to fit a ford at Deep Ravine which is narrow, rather than at the bottom of MTC which is very wide. |
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 01 2006 : 08:09:40 AM
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A recon in force would consist of a recon by the entire 5 troops, not a part of it, through an area, not a spot, where they have no idea what is there, but expect that something is. The whole operation was a recon in force. Benteen to the left, Reno in center and Custer on the right. This was a very typical cavalry tactic against Indian villages. For instance: "Through driving snow and temperatures that ranged as low as 80 degrees below zero, scout Grouard literally felt his way along the trail that led to the Powder River. At about 0230 on 17 March, he halted the column until he could locate the Indian village. While the troops waited in the bitter cold, Grouard successfully pinpointed the Indians' location. This was the grand opportunity to strike the Indians that U.S. commanders had been awaiting. Reynolds' attack orders were inexact, but he did issue a general outline of his tactical plan. Captain James Egan's company of Noyes' battalion was to approach the village quietly and assault it upon being detected."
As far as MTC, I would concur with Smcf it is wide.
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“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
SEMPER FI |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - March 01 2006 : 10:20:00 AM
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The whole operation was a recon in force.
Nope it was not.The purpose of a recon as I'm sure you are aware is to collect information on the strenght and disposition of the enemy forces.There is nothing to suggest that Custer's priority was intelligence.The object of the exercise was to pitch in.
When Reno saw what he was up against he stopped in his tracks.When Reno/Benteen saw what they were up against [and their force was as strong as Custer's]they beat a hasty retreat.
Question ---When Custer saw the extent of the village would he have been overcome with indecision because he did precisely nothing?
As regards sending 2 troops to check out MTC would not a good scout and escort have acomplished the same without yet another devision of a very small force? |
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Buddha
Private
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Posted - March 01 2006 : 1:40:27 PM
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wILD I, you see it. Custer was engaged in an attack once he told Reno and Benteen what they were to do. Attack and we will support you. Two troops to check out the ford and return was prudent.
A better example of a recon in force than all 5 troops going to the ford is the mission assigned by Sheridan to the 3 columns, to search for the hostiles and take action to return them to the reservation, with action in concert acceptable once the hostiles were found. The first part, the search, would be a recon in force by each column. Once found, the actions to be taken were at the discretion of the senior man present. Assigning overall command of the 3 columns to someone would cause a delay if that person were not present when the hostiles were found. He would need to be located, travel to the site and decide what to do on arrival. In the meantime, the Indians would probably be on the move again unless someone could persuade them to wait for the entire force to arrive and attack them. LOL
I may be confusing fords and their widths, but the banks and the depth of the stream were still unknown factors to Custer at that point. Had Custer taken more time, he could have stationed a lookout to watch the ford and see if the Indians used it. That would have told him what he needed to know about it's suitability for his use. While that was going on, he could have sent scouts to look for other possible fording points. I don't recall any that are near enough to support Reno. Custer could have possibly gone on for miles if the Indians hadn't been in such large numbers that they could stop him. |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - March 02 2006 : 04:31:21 AM
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A better example of a recon in force than all 5 troops going to the ford is the mission assigned by Sheridan to the 3 columns, to search for the hostiles and take action to return them to the reservation,
This was carried out by Reno.
When Custer divided his forces and order an attack he did not even take the precaution of scouting ahead never mind a recon.When his units moved to attack he did not even know what side of the river the enemy was on.Can you imagine a bigger blunder than keeping a river between you and the enemy and not crossing unopposed when you had the opportunity? |
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Buddha
Private
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Posted - March 02 2006 : 4:23:59 PM
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wILD I - I think I'm a little confused by your reference to Reno. Sheridan's orders to the 3 columns was in fact to carry out recons in force regardless of how they were stated. Reno's scouting mission early in June could be considered a recon in force. It may have been thought of as a patrol by the people involved. I'm not sure that any differences are worth arguing about. However, Reno's fording and attacking was not a recon in force. Consider the difference to be one of scale. A RIF would cover alot of ground, grid squares or even half of a state or more, to look for unknown enemy location that would enable a commander(s) to find the enemy if he just looked in the vicinity. Notwithstanding that, once Custer separated the trains from the column and gave them additional personnel for security, sent Benteen off chasing wild geese, and sent Reno on his way with the intent of supporting him, an attack was in progress and everyone understood that unless I really missed something in those vague orders. One mission, that attack, is all that a unit can carry out at one time.
IMHO, what I think Custer had in mind was a hammer and anvil attack. Reno was to be the anvil, attacking the indians and fixing them on his position by forcing them to have to defend themselves against his troops. Custer was to then come in from behind and destroy them. I think that only a huge victory with lots of Indian dead would satisfy his ego and his ambitions. The Ouchita showed that he had no problems killing any indian unlucky enough to be present.
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 02 2006 : 8:04:26 PM
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I don't believe a Recon in force is solely to gather intel. That sounds more like recon to me. Testing the enemy's strength is also included in the modern definition of Recon in force. I don't think there was a definition in 1876 they just did it. At best Reno knew the scouts said there was a village ahead and his orders were to charge. Certainly Reno tested the enemy's strength and found it more than he wanted to handle without support. As far as Benteen and Custer they were not going to a known location or had no little knowledge of the the enemy's strength in this particular village on this particular day located on the LBH. Benteen was certainly doing recon and could switch to something like "pitch into them" if the indians were discovered. Custer was looking for some way to enter the village before he met overwhelming numbers of indians. Reno's action because he had a order to charge certainly is the weakest argument for a recon in force. I will give you that,but they had not seen the village yet.
Below is my reference on Recon in force:
reconnaissance in force (JP 1-02, NATO) - An offensive operation designed to discover and/or test the enemy's strength or to obtain other information. (Army) - A form of reconnaissance operation designed to discover or test the enemy's strength or to obtain other information. See FMs 1-111, 6-20, 7-20, 7-30, 17-95, 71-100, 71-123, 100-15, 100-40, and 101-5.
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“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
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Buddha
Private
Status: offline |
Posted - March 03 2006 : 12:53:56 AM
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Okay. A recon is done with the intent of getting in and out without the enemy knowing you have been there. A recon in force would be ordered without that hope and by a force large enough, say a regiment, to get itself out of trouble if it had to. It would also be ordered as a precursor to action by a larger force.
What Reno was ordered to do, charge, and what Custer promised to do added up to an attack. Reno understood this based on his own knowledge of tactics. So did everyone else so they had no questions to ask after 'are you sure you want to do this?' 'This' was to attack. That is why the indians were preparing to die. They knew they weren't going on a recon.
With the combat experience Reno, Benteen and Custer had, as well as any other Cavalry or Infantry officer, there was a common understanding of what tactical terms meant and how to execute them.
I think Custer's knowledge of the enemy location was as good it usually gets, even today. He simply failed to conduct a commander's recon or even send out scouts or patrols to find out more because he was in such a rush to attack. That would have given him more and detailled information that might have changed his mind about some things.
Benteen's mission has always been a question mark to me. There was no tactical reason to send him there, out of reach and out of touch, no reason to think indians were there and no specific mission to carry out beyond loook for indians according to some sources. He was simply sent out of the way for some reason when there was a known bunch of indians at hand even if the numbers were unknown. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 03 2006 : 10:08:26 AM
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The "tactics" employed there and lovingly discussed here are barely more advanced than those instinctively employed in a snowball fight by young children. It's somewhat demoralizing to hear them ratcheted up by grown men as if they were arcane, privileged tubs of wisdom.
To elevate these contemplations as to whether it was a recon or a recon in force is to fuzz up the evaluations with that nifty military terminology delivered beneath furrowed brow that is, alas, painfully absent from officer testimony in anything approaching the frequency that it appears here. This battle was clearly little more thought out than an attack from two directions with Benteen and the train arriving to beneficial effect because that's what Custer needed to happen if he was to have any chance at all.
It's worth thinking that if this battle is fairly typical of Custer's command style, then you can well understand why his officers were sometimes skittish in personal estimations of the commander and not all that impressed, except that till this point he'd won. There had to be a Custer Luck, since it certainly wasn't preparation and brilliance.
If Custer was given to the highly complicated 'hammer and anvil,' er, tactic, he probably would have told Reno to engage the Indians in the south while "I swing around and hit them from flank/rear/another direction entirely." This is necessary, as someone has to be the stationary anvil, othewise it's two small ball-peen hammers flailing rather pointlessly against an armored knight.
He didn't. He told Reno to charge and something or other would happen, probably another charge, which is about all that can be concluded from 'the whole outfit', somehow including the packtrain and Benteen out of sight and miles away, would support him.
As the timeline shows, Reno's 120-160 men (we don't seem to know)could have charged through the village several times from one extent to the other, absent injury or winded horses, long before Custer finished cinching his saddles for a recon (is this a serious supposition? apparently.....) putter down MTC an hour in the future. From Reno's position to the west of the Gary Owen loop, he has a decent view of Custer's options long before Custer did, and there aren't any crossings real handy that would bring Custer into any supportive action. However, he can engage the enemy from a place of increased safety to the same, and probably better effect than an (let's be blunt) utterly stupid and suicidal charge into a village of size unknown beyond 'passing large, armed, and annoyed.' His attack would be a fight of much shorter duration and over without having had much effect. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
Edited by - Dark Cloud on March 03 2006 10:08:49 AM |
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The new myth
