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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
 Posted - March 19 2006 : 6:36:49 PM
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MRW,
There's an excellent example in Buddha's offered article, as I said. Then, compare and contrast his three versions of shooting the horse in the head, the appearence of dogs in his stories after he said they'd been killed, his boast of testimonial importance in the Belknap matter and the reality.
Since apparently you aren't going to read it:
Considering Custer's experience with the quartermasters corps in the spring it is to wonder how be could believe that the horses would be ready for him just because they bad been promised and he needed them. As for the horseshoes to be applied for, they would not fill more than one wagon. Altogether his excuses were rather weak and when he wrote his memoirs a few years later he set forth more compelling reasons for going down to Fort Harker, with a large detail. He wrote that when he reached Fort Wallace on July 13, he found it in dire straits:
Stages had been taken off the route. . . . . . . No despatches or mail had been received at the fort for a considerable period, so that the occupants might well have been considered as undergoing a state of siege. Added to these embarrassments . . . a more frightful danger stared the troops in the face. . . . The reserve of stores at the post were well-nigh exhausted. . . . Cholera made its appearance among the men, and deaths occurred daily. [95]
No one of these statements was true. The post was in better shape than it had been in June and certainly did not now consider itself besieged. There was food for a month and there was no cholera. It would not reach the Seventh cavalry until July 22 and then it would be frightful. Confined to the cavalry camp, the mortality would be higher than anywhere else -- 11 deaths out of 17 cases -- because the men were so worn by the hard marching. [96] But Custer was not there to see it. Probably on July 13 Fort Wallace was not even aware of the cholera at Harker. Yet historians would repeat and repeat again that Custer had gathered together his best troops and horses to break through a trail swarming with fierce Indians in order to bring back badly needed medicine for the sick and food supplies for the beleaguered and hungry post.
His Lie On the Plains......
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Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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movingrobewoman
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 19 2006 : 7:55:28 PM
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| True, cholera had not reached Wallace and Keogh had done a fair job with the situation he had. But that and other exaggerations does not make a man a "pathological" liar. There's a clear difference between a notable psychiatric condition and the type of writer Oprah would have on her television programme (that genre of creative non-fiction). What's the difference between Custer and other autobiographers who might take a broad paintbrush to the truth? Your argument is about as sound as Buddha calling the fellow "an idiot." The man had issues, certainly with addiction and its qualities, perhaps with ADHD, but I think you and Buddha are barking up the wrong tree, psychologically speaking. Folks are far too quick to label the man a nutcase. |
movingrobe |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 19 2006 : 8:46:35 PM
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He wasn't a nutcase, he lied a lot. One does not ensure the other. He certainly was not an idiot.
Custer was a compulsive liar. Read the Courtsmartial again. His Wa****a Report. His explanation of Elliot's fate, Kidder's, and those men he'd had shot. He lied, exaggerated, and misled by intent and only to his own benefit in his own words and sometimes at odds with himself, as if nobody would ever notice. A pathological liar. I don't know how that can be denied, given his own writings. Everyone lies to one extent or another, but Custer left a paper trail of his outright and self serving fibs, and it's fairly chronic from beginning to end. Apparently, he broke promises to his wife as well, and had lied about it.
What makes you think Oprah hasn't had pathological liars on her program? Would her vetting service notice? Apparently, not. There is no difference between Custer lying and anyone else lying, except his was habitual and theirs might or might not be. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
Edited by - Dark Cloud on March 19 2006 8:49:08 PM |
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movingrobewoman
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 19 2006 : 9:39:04 PM
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| You've changed your tale. First he was a "pathological" liar, now he's a "compulsive" one. I can tend to believe compulsive, but one term is NOT interchangeable with the other. You can't have it both ways, DC. |
movingrobe |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
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movingrobewoman
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 19 2006 : 11:15:22 PM
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Grow up, Richard. Nyeah, nyeah doesn't become you. Go ahead and say that GAC was an *idiot;* I know you'd really like to. It's quite a simple term--though its been used here before--and since no Custerphile lurks these boards, you might have free reign. However, you take examples from here and there and then extrapolate and multiply them into some kind of raging psychiatric condition. Show me the notation in the DSM, where it refers to Custer, and maybe I'll give ground.
Argue the minutae of the Springfield, dude. You're boring me. |
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Edited by - movingrobewoman on March 19 2006 11:26:52 PM |
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 20 2006 : 08:12:15 AM
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I stand corrected I should have
No AZ you don't stand corrected you still stand in error.None of the scouts civilian or Indian had scouted beyond the CN.Varnham only reached it on the 25th.
and had scouted the Rosebud to the location of the Sioux camp site after the battle with CrookThe camp site of the Indians on the 17th was on Reno Creek just short of the LBH perhaps 5 miles beyond the CN.
The trail from that camp headed down the little Bighorn.This was not known on the 24th.
I believe this to be "sufficient reason" to deviate from the orders.On the 24th Custer had only 2 pieces of new information.1 He had found the turn off point of the Indian trail and that it was fresh.You recall Terry's orders that he should proceed further South past this point.The purpose being to coordinate his arrival time with Terry's and to ensure that the Indians were caught between the two forces.
he would leave a trail as readable as a poster, and discovery would warn the village to flee and scatterThis possibility was known at the planning stage and if he had continued South his trail would have been seen as going away from the Village.
No AZ Custer had no reason to deviate from his orders. Wild I stood corrected because I knew Custer didn't know the exact location of the village even from CN. It is my my belief and Gray's that Custer had to go as far as CN to recon the new trail. The scouts believed they could find the village from that point and they were correct. Although Custer didn't know the exact location of the village following a trail a mile wide would lead to the village. The Wolf mountains would prevent Custer from knowing whether the Indians went up or down the LBH or retraced their trail and Cross back over the Wolf Mountains. Moving to CN to recon the direction is sufficient reason. Again the order can not be used for timing the attack on the village. It was the preferred alternative but it is clear, if anything is clear in the order, that the columns also had the latitude to adapt to the actual location of the village rather then run into Wyoming and leave the Indians behind. As far Gibbon's location in the orders, I believe it states going up river as far as the forks of the BH and LBH. That location they reached by the 25th.
As far as what Custer knew on the 24th, LT. Wallace states" Custer came up: and then he reported his orders to me to be sure to have the Indians follow the left-hand trail,no matter how small it might be - he didn't want any of camps of the Sou ix to escape him. He wanted to get them all together and drive them down to the Yellowstone."
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“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 20 2006 : 09:05:52 AM
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AZ Ranger –
I think you and I mostly agree except for semantics.
1 Drawing a line between two cases fired from the same carbine or any other weapon does not indicate the actual route of travel. There is no drawings showing direction of firing by bullet recovery in Fox. Without immediate access to the scene it would be impossible to have it accurate. If you could find a bullet and several points it passed through then maybe you could. You would need at minimum two points a bullet passed through to determine direction and angle but deflections could make it unreliable.
I’ve been thinking about this one. You said you were a cop at one time, so you would feel the need to account for every bullet to an unquestioned degree. This isn’t evidence though, and bullet impacts that aren’t accompanied by others to corroborate them aren’t included in the data to draw conclusions. That would best be done by a grouping of bullet impacts that all seem to come from a common direction and form a discernible pattern in the ground. If the ground had shifted to any significant degree over the years, the majority of bullets would then point back in random directions rather than in a common one. Otherwise you have to think that the ground shifted exactly the same over say, a 100 yards stretch. From there, you look at likely possibilities and make some educated guesses about where the fire originated from, and the types of bullets would tell you the likely who fired them.
Buddha-- I am currently employed as a peace officer for the State of Arizona as the law Enforcement Program Supervisor in Flagstaff Arizona, Region II Arizona Game and Fish Department. The investigator works for me. I guess DC can't ever say that I hide behind my identity.
The use of evidence in a criminal case has a much higher standard then a civil case. If there can be more than one conclusion drawn from evidence then it goes in favor of the defendant. The judge will instruct the jury of this concept. The sufficient reason discussion would fit that quite well. Bullet orientation as described by Fox is not admissible as evidence in a criminal as he described it. It would be excluded based upon Fox's own statements that it does not meet the Frye test.
In fact Fox doesn't give much support to his own theory. He states on page 120 "The bullet orientation concept is a tentative measure of origin points. Some bullets can be expected to lodge in the earth consistent with the origin direction. On the other hand, tumbling on impact can also occur. But it may be that all of the bullets fired from a given location, a statistical contant(i.e., percentage) or a narrow orientation range can be expected. Such measures may indicate points of origin. Experimental firings, which have not been conducted, ought to confirm, deny, or modify the idea."
Yet when this appears on TV , the bullet orientation concept,it is scientific fact portrayed to the public. Fox's last sentence above says it all. He never conducted any test of his theory.
I was down at the Sedona police range on Saturday. Looking at the target backstop pits, according to bullet orientation concept officer fired from all directions including, toward other officers up range,underground shooting upward and directly overhead shooting into the ground ( which was the majority of the recovered bullets orientation). All of which never happened. We know the ground was hard the day after the battle at LBH because of burial problems. Hard ground and other objects do not help to preserve the true path of a bullet.
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 20 2006 : 09:14:53 AM
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2 None of the bullets have been identified to the carbine it was fired from. It would useless since the Indians have the carbines. I would also suspect that as the troopers were over run they would be firing in their own ranks and possibly could have placed a bullet in the ground within their ranks.
I suspect I would have been one to shoot the ground, but bullets that are pointing so vertically aren’t included in the data.
Buddha-- That is my point-- if you don't like the orientation just eliminate it from statistics. You know what they say about statistics. |
“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - March 20 2006 : 09:22:50 AM
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AZ
if anything is clear in the order, that the columns also had the latitude to adapt to the actual location of the village
Terry's order to Custer directed him to ascertain definitely the direction of the trail and if it led to the LH as was expected he was to continue southwards.This was to ensure that the Indians did not escape southward.
The Wolf mountains would prevent Custer from knowing whether the Indians went up or down the LBH or retraced their trail and Cross back over the Wolf Mountains.
All this was known at the planing stage and it was agreed that Terry's maneuvers contained in the plan were the way to conduct the campaign.Custer just decided to disregard the plan and strike at the Indians directly.Nothing had changed since the 3 general officers agreed the plan to justify Custer's action. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 20 2006 : 1:52:38 PM
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MRW,
You said a pathological liar wasn't a compulsive one. I proved you wrong, with a citation. I took examples from Custer's own writings and statements and I'm quite happy to remain seated with my opinion Custer was a compulsive liar. You can agree or not. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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Buddha
Private
Status: offline |
Posted - March 21 2006 : 2:10:01 PM
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FWIW- I've changed my mind about Custer being an idiot. He was a liar, and such a bad one that he just appeared to be crazy to tell stories that didn't always stand up well.
Last week in the middle of a discussion of how the Regiment got moved up toward the Crow’s Nest without Custer being aware of it until after the fact, it occurred to me that this and the other difficult to explain decisions and actions by Custer might be part of a pattern of inexperience or lack of knowledge of some kind. I’ve done some research since then to try to find out what training Cavalry officers might have had in Custer’s time, how Cavalry was used, and what specific experience Custer had in making an attack such as at Little Bighorn. This would make up the attitudes and the body of knowledge that Custer and the officers of the 7th brought with them when they started toward the Little Bighorn in 1876. That is considered to be very telling in determining how Custer would react to what he saw there. You might have seen examples of doing this in the movie 'Patton'. The Germans read about Patton to see what kind of man he was, and Patton read Rommel's book.
I’ve included 3 sources, 2 with links for your information, to add to what I previously posted from the KHS, and have a conclusion, but am going to look for more information to support it. Any comments are notes about what I found, for the most part. Personal comments are limited and explanatory.
Light and heavy cavalry
There was a question in a posting about what constituted light and heavy Cavalry. This should answer that, along with how Cavalry has been used historically.
Notes from Wikipedia search (cavalry)
Early light cavalry (like the auxiliaries of the Roman army) were typically used to scout and skirmish and to cut down retreating infantry. Heavy cavalry like the Byzantine Cataphract were used as shock troops — they would charge the main body of the enemy and in many cases, their actions decided the outcome of the battle.
Historically cavalry improved mobility, an "instrument which multiplied the fighting value of even the smallest forces, allowing them to outflank and avoid, to surprise and overpower, to retreat and escape according to the requirements of the moment."
In some modern militaries (especially the United States Army), the term Cavalry is often used for units that fill the traditional horse-borne light cavalry roles of scouting, screening, skirmishing and raiding.
Attacking an unbroken infantry force head-on was usually unsuccessful.
The extended linear formations used by Cavalry were vulnerable to flank or rear attacks. Besides the weight of sheer numbers, this may have been why Reno was forced to retreat.
In the early American Civil War regular cavalry was significantly absent, but it continued to play a role as part of screening forces and in foraging and scouting. The later phases of the war saw the Federal army developing a truly effective cavalry force fighting as mounted infantry.
National Park Service
Custer turns back a major attack at Gettysburg
http://www.nps.gov/gett/soldierlife/cavalry.htm
Class lecture on “Cavalry in the Offensive” at the Infantry and Cavalry School, Fort Riley, 1904
This is now the Command and General Staff School
http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/lectures/Craig2.pdf
This is a class for Cavalry officers being taught how to use Cavalry in it’s various roles, which were ‘unchanged since the Civil War’, so this should apply to Custer, his officers and peers and their uses of Cavalry units.
Pg 12 of the lecture has a comment on the necessity of a recon prior to a charge, ‘or the results will be disastrous.’
Pg 15 comments on the use of Cavalry against Infantry. It says that Infantry that is well armed, rested and ready will defeat a Cavalry charge. When listing the times Cavalry will defeat Infantry, it says that a demoralized enemy will lose to Cavalry, and this must be what Custer’s vision of the Indians was.
The lecture includes repeated comments about the vulnerability of Cavalry from the flank and rear. For that reason, a support and a reserve element was always required in close proximity, 50-200 yards, from the element that is charging.
There is also a comment about dismounting to fight as skirmishers when confronted with a good defense by infantrymen. This is what Reno did when he charged the Indian village.
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 21 2006 : 6:42:37 PM
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Buddha--The cavalry definition fits what we have been saying about the difference between light and heavy cavalry. The US Army only had light cavalry for horse mounted units.
The two web you posted I have visited in the past and contained some worthwhile information. Also if you look at one of the earlier threads here you find one containing lots of information including a site by Billy Markland with some good information.
When listing the times Cavalry will defeat Infantry, it says that a demoralized enemy will lose to Cavalry, and this must be what Custer’s vision of the Indians was. Correct, and it was not only held by Custer it was what the US Army thought in general about the Indians.
1 Recon was the number 1 role of cavalry.
2 There is also a comment about dismounting to fight as skirmishers when confronted with a good defense by infantrymen. This is what Reno did when he charged the Indian village. Indians fought on foot but as individuals not as US Army infantry would fight. In order to deploy the Springfield carbine the cavalry has to halt to shoot. The could shoot turning their horse slightly or dismount as skirmishers. Reno never charged the village itself. He was headed in that direction when he halted. Reno's own words were that he went on the defensive when they halted. Moving forward to a more defensible position does not change whether or not you are on the defensive or continuing the charge. The amount of time before retreating to the timber was very short.
My theory is that Custer's whole plan was based on the theory the US Army held - that the Indians would run. He split the 7th to keep them from running around the Regiment in small groups. Lt. Wallace states this as part of his orders from Custer and they were to drive the Indians to the Yellowstone (in Terry's direction). There was no plan to fall back on if the Indians didn't run. Since the Indians didn't run what happened at LBH is the result of not having considered any other alternative.
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“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
SEMPER FI |
Edited by - AZ Ranger on March 21 2006 6:43:39 PM |
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 21 2006 : 6:52:01 PM
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AZ
if anything is clear in the order, that the columns also had the latitude to adapt to the actual location of the village"Terry's order to Custer directed him to ascertain definitely the direction of the trail and if it led to the LH as was expected he was to continue southwards.This was to ensure that the Indians did not escape southward." Custer did both he determined the direction of the trail toward the LH and the Indians did not escape to the south or back across the Wolf Mountains as long as Custer was alive. Unfortunately for Custer the Indians were ready for a fight.
The Wolf mountains would prevent Custer from knowing whether the Indians went up or down the LBH or retraced their trail and Cross back over the Wolf Mountains.
All this was known at the planing stage and it was agreed that Terry's maneuvers contained in the plan were the way to conduct the campaign.Custer just decided to disregard the plan and strike at the Indians directly.Nothing had changed since the 3 general officers agreed the plan to justify Custer's action. Fortunately for Terry, Custer saved his bacon. The village was planning on moving toward Terry's direction when Custer attacked. Terry had Gibbon's sick on the boat,had followed bad information from Muggins Taylor, had a lost cavalry unit, Gatling guns were missing for awhile, and the cavalry was separated from the infantry. The discrepancy between the facts and what Terry believed when he wrote the order was sufficient reason for Custer to deviate. The trail was fresh and not as old as the order presumed when it turned toward the LBH. If you are within 1 days march as determined by the scouts you don't continue to go in a different direction. |
“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
SEMPER FI |
Edited by - AZ Ranger on March 21 2006 7:14:21 PM |
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Buddha
Private
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Posted - March 22 2006 : 12:42:51 PM
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AZ Ranger,
I understand about the bullets. It’s hard to prove anything with them, and a scientist would use a level of proof that a court would find acceptable. On the other hand, a number of 45-55 bullets found impacted in an area can let you draw a conclusion that there were a number of targets there, and that they were Indians. The reverse could be true if other types of bullets were found. I don’t think I’ve used the words that say ‘this proves something’ in a posting, just assumptions and conclusions.
FWIW, there is a formula showing what datapoints should be excluded from a statistical grouping. The symbol for it is ‘R’. You shouldn’t be surprised.
I’m going to try to find Billy Markland. Thanks.
I agree that Custer’s plan was based on the idea that the Indians would run if given any chance at all. Given that the braves on horseback would have to leave behind the old men, the women and children and all that they owned, a second look was in order. The Indians were known to fight in such cases. When the Indians didn’t follow the plan, Custer had no way to make any changes in his units, even if he considered them. I doubt that he did because he called up Benteen to join him, which I see as a way to continue his plan, not change it. Who knows, though?
I’ve changed my mind about Custer being an idiot. He was, personality aside, a product of his training and experience. He was trained to recon first, to screen (patrolling to stop enemy recons), skirmish (see some bad guys, duke it out, and run), and charge an enemy whose formation is breaking or broken, and do so from the flank if possible. The ideal Cavalryman was quick reacting and quick moving, and hitting a demoralized enemy from the flank or rear and further defeating them must have seemed heroic. Custer did this well in the Civil War. In the 10 years following, he fought with Indians only once. It was O-dark-thirty on a cold winter morning when they were asleep and he surprised them. There was little or no planning required, and he ran, that is, he withdrew his unit from the field, when he received word that other Indians were in the vicinity, leaving Major Elliot and his men to fend for themselves and die. In 1876, he found himself at the Little Bighorn, never having planned an attack nor ever trained to do so, and was surrounded by others like him. At that point, he fell victim to the Peter Principle, which says that having done well, you get promoted until you reach your level of incompetency. It’s sometimes expressed as just because you can do one thing well doesn’t mean that you can do others well also. The only people who told Custer ‘No’ that day were people he wouldn’t trust, the Indian scouts. The recon, which was required or disastrous results will occur’, didn’t take place. For Custer, I think that quick reactions and a desire to charge from the flank took over. Reno was to get their attention, Custer would act as support according to doctrine, and Reno would be in reserve. That may be all wrong, but I’m trying to think like Custer might have then. This is subject to change based on further information at a later date. : )
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 22 2006 : 4:54:43 PM
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"On the other hand, a number of 45-55 bullets found impacted in an area can let you draw a conclusion that there were a number of targets there, and that they were Indians."
Why would it? Why not Indians firing into the dead with captured carbines, or firing into groups of soldiers running up or down the hill? Why would it have to come from the battle at all, given the witnessed firing from Weir Point AND Indian tales also. Then, the next day, then the next year when the exposed skeletons disgusted everyone, and which Indians traditionally would shoot up or hack apart. They had LOTS of ammo after the battle.
"In the 10 years following, he fought with Indians only once." Untrue, Buddha. He was not vastly experienced, but he fought Crazy Horse's Oglalas and friends along the Yellowstone in '74 several times and there were dust ups in Kansas as well. Your description of the Elliott/Wa****a issue is misleading as well. He knew other Indians were in the vicinity from about midday, and the 7th didn't leave till late. Despite having hostages (supposedly his goal at LBH), they feared attack, and feigned one of their own, apparently Ben Arnold's idea. He didn't run and he didn't look hard for Elliott, either. Hard to say how much ammo he had left, though, given they'd used a lot to shoot the ponies after the battle, so called, itself. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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Buddha
Private
Status: offline |
Posted - March 23 2006 : 8:49:15 PM
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Why a number of 45-55 bullets found impacted in a given area indicates that there were Indians there even in the face of numerous possibilities:
“Occam's Razor (also spelled Ockham's Razor) is a principle attributed to the 14th-century English logician and Franciscan friar William of Ockham. It forms the basis of methodological reductionism and is fundamental to the scientific method. It is also called the principle of parsimony and the law of economy.
In its simplest form, Occam's Razor states that, in explaining a phenomenon, one should make as few assumptions as possible, trimming away all unnecessary ones. Furthermore, if multiple theories or subtheories have equal predictive power, the simplest one — the one with the fewest unnecessary assumptions — should be chosen.
As an example, imagine that a fallen tree is noticed after a storm. One reason the tree fell might be that the storm blew it down. Another hypothesis would be that the tree was blown down by the storm and then found by space aliens, who carefully replanted the tree, knocked it down themselves, and left without leaving any sign of their presence. This second hypotheses fits the evidence as well as the first one, but it contains unnecessary assumptions, so the first explanation should be preferred (even though the second one might, in fact, be true).”
Regarding Custer’s having fought the Indians only once in the years preceding LBH: I read through Custer’s book , “My Life on the Plains”. Aside from Ouchita, he mentions no battles. There are a few skirmishes that the 7th was involved in, but they were reactive situations and Custer did not personally participate in all of them. In these fights, his role was like a Cavalryman, adapting and responding. What I am concerned about is whether there were situations where Custer planned an attack in advance and went through all of the steps, such as a recon and telling all of his officers what they were doing, and so on. At Ouchita, he did a good job. He even trusted his scouts when they told him the village was there when he couldn’t see it. If there were other fights, I’m curious to know about them to help me understand his frame of mind when he marched on LBH.
By his own words, at Ouchita, Custer was surprised by the Indians who showed up after the attack was over. He was surprised because he thought they had all been run off, but a scout told him that they were from a neighboring village after talking to a squaw. When their number reached well over a hundred, he became very concerned that they would attack before his ammo train arrived., which it finally did with a few thousand rounds. After shooting the 875 horses, they left. Elliot had not been seen, according to Custer, since the attack began. When things slowed down in the afternoon, he sent a scout and some men 2 miles out to look for them with no luck. Near dark he left.
FWIW, in the US military, it’s customary to not leave people behind, as in Blackhawk Down. It’s promotes loyalty and morale and makes troops fight harder. Other armed forces do the same thing for the same reasons. Also, his men took off their winter coats and left their rations behind for the attack. Afterward Indians found them and took them. Not taking care of your men, as demonstrated by their coats and food being stolen would get you a really low efficiency report rating and kill a career today.
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 23 2006 : 10:22:00 PM
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Why a number of 45-55 bullets found impacted in a given area indicates that there were Indians there even in the face of numerous possibilities:
“Occam's Razor (also spelled Ockham's Razor) is a principle attributed to the 14th-century English logician and Franciscan friar William of Ockham. It forms the basis of methodological reductionism and is fundamental to the scientific method. It is also called the principle of parsimony and the law of economy.
In its simplest form, Occam's Razor states that, in explaining a phenomenon, one should make as few assumptions as possible, trimming away all unnecessary ones. Furthermore, if multiple theories or subtheories have equal predictive power, the simplest one — the one with the fewest unnecessary assumptions — should be chosen.
As an example, imagine that a fallen tree is noticed after a storm. One reason the tree fell might be that the storm blew it down. Another hypothesis would be that the tree was blown down by the storm and then found by space aliens, who carefully replanted the tree, knocked it down themselves, and left without leaving any sign of their presence. This second hypotheses fits the evidence as well as the first one, but it contains unnecessary assumptions, so the first explanation should be preferred (even though the second one might, in fact, be true).”
We all can Goggle wikipedia so try the link to the scientific method "Specific hypotheses are formed to propose explanations for natural Phenomena, and experiments (or studies) test the predictions for accuracy in order to make increasingly dependable predictions of future results." Fox never tested the hypotheses and states so in his book.
Regarding Custer’s having fought the Indians only once in the years preceding LBH: I read through Custer’s book , “My Life on the Plains”. Aside from Ouchita, he mentions no battles. There are a few skirmishes that the 7th was involved in, but they were reactive situations and Custer did not personally participate in all of them. In these fights, his role was like a Cavalryman, adapting and responding. What I am concerned about is whether there were situations where Custer planned an attack in advance and went through all of the steps, such as a recon and telling all of his officers what they were doing, and so on. At Ouchita, he did a good job. He even trusted his scouts when they told him the village was there when he couldn't’t see it. If there were other fights, I’m curious to know about them to help me understand his frame of mind when he marched on LBH.
In many attacks the military tracked the Indains to a village and attacked. That was the only Recon they did prior to the attack. Custer's method of attack at the Wa****a was used frequently by the military. They did not recon how many were in the village before attacking. One source I read stated there were over 100 attacks made by the military this way. I have tried to find that source again but believe it was a military site that is not working now. Maybe someone knows the source for that information.
FWIW, in the US military, it’s customary to not leave people behind, as in Blackhawk Down. It’s promotes loyalty and morale and makes troops fight harder. Other armed forces do the same thing for the same reasons. Also, his men took off their winter coats and left their rations behind for the attack. Afterward Indians found them and took them. Not taking care of your men, as demonstrated by their coats and food being stolen would get you a really low efficiency report rating and kill a career today.
Leaving military dead is not limited to Custer or the US Army. If the choice is to save a command or retrieve the dead then the commander must make that choice. It wasn't long ago we saw bodies of an American soldiers being dragged through the middle of a street in Africa. The Marines have a proud history of not leaving wounded or dead behind but it happens. Certainly Reno's battalion left a wounded soldier in the timber. When two of the troopers horse broke loose Reno didn't go to their rescue. Custer was faced with overwhelming forces and saved his command, although he came back much later and buried the dead. If it not something that someone just made up then when Major Elliot said a brevet or a coffin he knew the risk he was taking. Did anyone claim they could hear Elliot fighting in the distance before he was overrun and killed to the last trooper? Sounds familiar?
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“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
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Edited by - AZ Ranger on March 23 2006 10:24:41 PM |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 23 2006 : 10:28:07 PM
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Oddly, perhaps, most here understand Occam's Razor. Now, apply it. We know all of Custer's men were killed. The only Army witnesses to the action on Custer's field saw naught but Indians firing, and that into the ground. They had Custer's carbines. The Indians, by all accounts, had low casualties, and a significant percentage had to have been friendly fire. Now, what's the simplest explanation for found bullets from those carbines? Or, at least, equally plausible?
Whether he mentioned them or not, I've forgot, he fought battles with the Sioux under Crazy Horse in 1873 along the Yellowstone. Of course, he fell for a ruse, took to the trees, and was rescued in the largest fight. Perhaps, for space considerations only, he overlooked it, but more likely since MLOTP was published in Galaxy Magazie in early 1874, it was completed and sent East before the Stanley expedition. No doubt, you've also noticed other activities of interest missing from his MLOTP, like his courtsmartial and verdict. Folks can read MLOTP here: http://www.kancoll.org/books/custerg/ Also, Markland has some articles about the Yellowstone Expedition.
Regarding accepting Custer's story on anything, be wary. Read Barnitz on the Wa****a as well.
I'm not sure how you can assume his frame of mind in one battle from his claimed actions in others. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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Buddha
Private
Status: offline |
Posted - March 24 2006 : 1:33:16 PM
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The information is incomplete and it’s reliability is unknown. That’s normal, at least for me. I can choose to continue to debate about it in a search for something more, or you can say I think I know what it means and move on. That means that the real truth may lie with space aliens or that all of the Indians who picked up carbines got together and fired as many rounds after the battle was over as during it. Who knows? I’ll adjust to new information when it arrives. In the meantime, I think that an impact area of carbine bullets is where Indians most likely placed themselves, and impact areas of mixed bullets probably means that soldiers were there being shot at by Indians.
I wouldn’t argue that the ‘no recon’ method of attack wasn’t frequently used given the philosophy of the Army at that time, that the Indians would run whenever possible, and a few soldiers could defeat any number of Indians. What I was looking for were events from Custer’s past that would likely influence how he thought and acted at LBH. Without some momentous event occurring, most of us continue on in our lives as logical extensions of our past. What worked for us once, we repeat rather than wake up in a whole new world and start over every day. That’s what I want to know, his past, to better understand what Custer might have seen and thought at LBH.
I don’t think Custer, based on his own description of events at Ouchita, was in a bind or had a command
that was in danger of surviving. Here’s why. He had 800 troops under his command. The Indians who gathered did not outnumber him, or he didn’t claim so. They just watched, even when the soldiers started killing horses. Ammo may have run low, but the Indians didn’t know that. There was no lack of control in the unit, and events were moving at a slow pace for Custer rather than rushing at him quickly and ceaselessly. Custer had time to send out a patrol to look for Elliot, and to wait for it as well as the pack train to arrive. So what was the rush? He could have bivouaced in the village rather than heading out on the trail one hour prior to nightfall. Without coats or crackers, sleeping in teepees or whatever they could find, and stealing Indian food, would have been helpful for troops that had been up most of the last 48 hours and would be hungry in the cold weather. Indians don’t fight at night, so the night’s rest would have made dealing with an attack, if it came, much easier the next morning. In so doing, he could have waited for Elliot, or sent out more patrols to look for him. Instead, he did just what he did on the trail in Kansas. He let his thoughts or fears of what Indians might do drive his thinking and he moved away from them. Both times, soldiers died.
How did the Cavalry ever ride to the rescue if they all thought like Custer?
I understood that Custer’s words are not necessarily reliable, especially if Custer is a sociopath as I suspect. Nevertheless, he is the only one who is in contact with his own mind, and that is worth something.
I’ll keep looking for stories of actual fights with Indians. However, if it turns out that the no recon, lets split up and surround’em school of thought was the prevailing practice, then Custer just got screwed.
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - March 24 2006 : 5:26:04 PM
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AZ
Custer did both he determined the direction of the trail toward the LH and the Indians did not escape to the south or back across the Wolf Mountains as long as Custer was alive.
By directly following the trail Custer took a risk for which there was no need.He also placed his troops where they were discovered which then forced him to attack a day early with fatal consequences.
Fortunately for Terry, Custer saved his bacon.
This cannot be used to justify Custer's disobedience.Also with infantry supported by gatling guns Terry's bacon could give a good account of itself.
The discrepancy between the facts and what Terry believed when he wrote the order was sufficient reason for Custer to deviate.This is hind sight.If you are going to justify Custer's actions by hind sight you have to condemn him by hind sight---- by disobeying his orders he was defeated. |
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 25 2006 : 2:11:51 PM
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AZ
Custer did both he determined the direction of the trail toward the LH and the Indians did not escape to the south or back across the Wolf Mountains as long as Custer was alive.
By directly following the trail Custer took a risk for which there was no need.He also placed his troops where they were discovered which then forced him to attack a day early with fatal consequences.
The military by the nature of its occupation takes risks. The potential location of the village within 25 miles of current Busby needed to be determined before continuing on the jaunt into Wyoming. How much further do you believe the headwaters of the Tongue in the Bighorn Mountains is if you continue up the Rosebud? From there how much further would you have to travel to the LBH and follow it downstream till you ran into Indians? These are both important questions because it goes to timing in Terry's order. Custer would have known that the Tongue headwaters was several days ride in the wrong direction of the fresh trail. This trail was fresher than would have been antic pated in the terry orders based upon Reno's
Custer could not do what the order suggests as "perhaps" and be at the Indian village on the 26th which would have moved in Terry's direction on the 25th. The Indians were planning on moving downstream on the 25th when Custer modified their plans. They needed to keep moving to feed all those horses within a reasonable distance of the village.
Fortunately for Terry, Custer saved his bacon.
This cannot be used to justify Custer's disobedience.Also with infantry supported by gatling guns Terry's bacon could give a good account of itself. It was a statement of fact not of Custer's intention. The camps of Terry's command were scattered with a several miles separation of some of them. The Gatling guns and a cavalry troop were lost for awhile and the cavalry had moved ahead of the infantry to water their horses. It was a good thing the Indians didn't attack Terry at dawn. If Terry himself believed he was going to cooperate with Custer on the 26th why was his command so disorganized on the 25th. I believe head still was under the impression that the Indians were several days away up the LBH or or the Tongue headwaters area.
The discrepancy between the facts and what Terry believed when he wrote the order was sufficient reason for Custer to deviate.This is hind sight.If you are going to justify Custer's actions by hind sight you have to condemn him by hind sight---- by disobeying his orders he was defeated. Terry believed that the headwaters area of the Tongue and LBH river may have been the the location of the village. If he didn't why suggest in the order to check it out. Custer knew from scout information that this was not correct. Without knowing the exact location of the village Custer knew it was closer than the headwaters of the Tongue. |
“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
SEMPER FI |
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movingrobewoman
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 25 2006 : 3:48:00 PM
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"Especially if Custer is a sociopath as I suspect ..."
Buddha--
No disrespect meant, and welcome to the board, but you're going to have to try harder than that or show a little more imagination than to paint the Boy General with such a wide, cliched paintbrush. The man had emotional issues, gambled way too much, exaggerated many things, indeed, but a *sociopath* he weren't ... your deductions are not unlike the few who take GAC's penchant for vanity and extrapolate it into a classic, textbook case of narcissism. My feelings on the subject, which are well-known, are that he had ADHD and its accompanying traits, which I think explains quite a bit.
Regards, |
movingrobe |
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lorendead
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 25 2006 : 8:49:08 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by movingrobewoman
"Especially if Custer is a sociopath as I suspect ..."
Buddha--
No disrespect meant, and welcome to the board, but you're going to have to try harder than that or show a little more imagination than to paint the Boy General with such a wide, cliched paintbrush. The man had emotional issues, gambled way too much, exaggerated many things, indeed, but a *sociopath* he weren't ... your deductions are not unlike the few who take GAC's penchant for vanity and extrapolate it into a classic, textbook case of narcissism. My feelings on the subject, which are well-known, are that he had ADHD and its accompanying traits, which I think explains quite a bit.
Regards,
There are a host of issues that are not discussed concerning the emotional issues of the officer members of the Seventh cavalry before and durning the LBH battle.
The emotional issues started well before this campaign was even developed. |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - March 26 2006 : 12:05:04 PM
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AZ
The military by the nature of its occupation takes risks.To diviate from an agreed plan without the knowledge of the other parties to the plan is not a risk it is betrayal.
How much further do you believe the headwaters of the Tongue in the Bighorn Mountains is if you continue up the Rosebud?
It was left to Custer's discretion how far South he proceeded.[Read the order]
The camps of Terry's command were scattered with a several miles separation of some of them. The Gatling guns and a cavalry troop were lost for awhile and the cavalry had moved ahead of the infantry to water their horses.
Custer knew nothing of this and it cannot be used to justify his disobedience.
Terry believed that the headwaters area of the Tongue and LBH river may have been the the location of the village. If he didn't why suggest in the order to check it out.
He did not.[once again read the orders]
Without knowing the exact location of the village Custer knew it was closer than the headwaters of the Tongue.
He disobeyed orders without knowing where the village was. |
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The new myth
