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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
 Posted - June 26 2004 : 11:03:45 PM
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If the warriors were down south fighting Reno, MTC offers a straight line - the quickest way - to the supposed civvies before the 7th could be attacked from the rear (if that theory is true).
And, if that was his goal, why put 60% of the force high and away (if that theory is true)? If the feint was to draw away from Reno, he was way late, visible, vulnerable, and committed to a defensive battle once stopped and having announced his presence.
By the logic often offered here, why not attack with all 210 through the ten pimpled youths defending MTC, briskly slice off two companies to defend your rear, holding one in reserve because it's in the Manual, and send the other two to capture the Cheyenne and Oglala civvies which may or may not stop the Hunpapa warriors who'd had some of their own killed already. If that's your goal, I mean. You're on ground good for cavalry and with some cover and point to your presence. (This is assuming that the camp, doing a head count, wouldn't risk attacking and killing you all since they aren't going to be killing women when under attack by those numbers themselves.)
Instead, given the same circumstances, we're to retreat east and dismount on high ground with no cover, except for the two companies assigned to attract the attention of the camp (somehow, through the trees, if they're there....) and lead the annoyed warriors to your position strung out in several bordering locations but all sharing the key elements of exposure, bad riding ground, and far away from the rest of the command.
Have horseholders deplete your firing line by 25% for the announced purpose of retaining control of the mounts, leaving - what? - 150 guys ? After the general hilarity dies down among the Sioux at that notional concept, and all the mounts are shot or driven away when the horseholder loses his arm in the stampede - a moment sure to inspire the men to further coherent duty as they watch both escape and ammo vanish into enemy hands - wait till surrounded and be killed at leisure. Sounds like a plan, eh Cookie?
I'm sorry, who did you say was drunk again? I mean, by your lights, that would explain why Custer cringed at MTC and never attacked at all, wouldn't it? And the guys that say he was on the offensive (somehow going further from his goal), do they? Drink, I mean? |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - June 28 2004 : 05:25:57 AM
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. But you said Cooke knew the situation was "desperate,"
Cooke was part of the HQ group.Although he issued Custer's orders he had no command responsibility himself but it was his job to know everything about the command.The location of the units,their troop strenghts, ammo and ration situation etc.He was in fact Custer's secretary.
since there are perhaps no more than two statements here which can withstand close scrutiny.
Now I listed 7 "he knews" and I will stand over them [with the exception of DCs family chain of command]
You use an impression Martin had to question one of them.Well did Martin not give Benteen the impression the Indians were running away.Really Martins impressions can be discounted.
Is this Reno's? In what sense was he "all over the shop"?No its their own battalion.There they are at MTC looking down into an enormous village.The battalion is streached out behind them and the hostiles are no more than 30 seconds away.
Now you're indulging in Wiggery.
Either Custer hadn't a clue or he was seriously wounded.DC pushes the "wounded" theory,I'm inclined to believe Custer was hoping to find a crossing that would thak him to the North end of the village.
The plan of attack was now based on hope and Cooke was well aware of this.
I'm really not interested in inventing a screen name to give people a picture, since it's words that matter, not titles.
You're spot on.
Regards
Richard
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - June 28 2004 : 09:40:58 AM
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If the warriors were down south fighting Reno
MTC offers a straight line - the quickest way - to the supposed civvies
ten pimpled youths defending MTC,
Dark Cloud
The picture you paint of the situation when Custer reached MTC is far too neat and tidy.
All the warriors fighting Reno at the south.All the civvies heading North and a few scabby youths defending MTC.
I do not have my copy of Gray with me but I'll take a chance and say that Reno had reached "safety" at 4.15 and that Custer was hit at 4.40.That leaves 25 minutes for the Indians to disengage get some sort of organisation and race 3 miles north to attack Custer.
I believe that regardless of where Custer/Reno/Benteen attacked the village they were going to be opposed by anything up to 200 Indians.
Look at what happened at Weir Point.Reno/Benteen were halted by numerious warriors.What were they doing there when their comrades were in the act of chopping up Custer?
Perhaps there was only initally a few youths at MTC but there were hundreds of warriors close by and these are the boys who stopped Custer until the warriors from the Reno fight arrived to finish the job.
Cheers |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - June 28 2004 : 3:05:19 PM
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For a Brit you're remarkably insensitive to my brilliant sarcasm. Work on this.
My point is, heavy sigh, that the current scenarios for a smallish village mandates that the three or four warriors present were singlehandedly scattering Reno by a homeopathic combination of Bronx Cheers and interpretive dance. The Custerphiles love this option. After the rout at Reno Hill, the savage warriors head north to kill Custer. Custer is where he is ONLY because he is heroically sacrificing his five companies to save Reno's three in order to allow them to reform and attack again, a real likely assumption by an experienced cavalry officer, but that's the theory.
Custer has decided, concerned about unnecessary deaths, to merely kidnap the civvies after which all the warriors would lay down their weapons and placidly return to the reservations while Custer becomes Dr. Phil. THAT's why he's so far north in his heartbreakingly sincere attempt to get the civvies. To save lives.
My point is, he could have ridden through the village to the civvies quicker and without alerting the authorities to his goal by visible extended trot north on the east bank. But, I don't think the village was small, and I don't think everyone was fighting Reno, and I don't think he seriously thought the civvie route would work. But others do. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - June 28 2004 : 3:48:41 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by wILD I
. But you said Cooke knew the situation was "desperate,"
Cooke was part of the HQ group.Although he issued Custer's orders he had no command responsibility himself but it was his job to know everything about the command.The location of the units,their troop strenghts, ammo and ration situation etc.He was in fact Custer's secretary.
But none of that is evidence for Cooke's view of the situation. It's trivia.
quote:
since there are perhaps no more than two statements here which can withstand close scrutiny.
Now I listed 7 "he knews" and I will stand over them [with the exception of DCs family chain of command]
You use an impression Martin had to question one of them.Well did Martin not give Benteen the impression the Indians were running away.Really Martins impressions can be discounted.
Sure, why not. The point, though, is that no survivors' impressions exist, at all, to support the assertion that Cooke knew Reno was in trouble. All your claim is is speculation, and highly doubtful speculation --- because refuted by the only evidence that exists --- passed off as fact.
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Is this Reno's? In what sense was he "all over the shop"?No its their own battalion.There they are at MTC looking down into an enormous village.The battalion is streached out behind them and the hostiles are no more than 30 seconds away.
I still don't see how that makes them "all over the shop," and how many hostiles are we talking about? 30 seconds away?
quote:
Now you're indulging in Wiggery.
Either Custer hadn't a clue or he was seriously wounded.DC pushes the "wounded" theory,I'm inclined to believe Custer was hoping to find a crossing that would thak him to the North end of the village.
The plan of attack was now based on hope and Cooke was well aware of this.
Custer was not wounded when Martin left him, and it's a puzzle to me how you can claim that Cooke was "well aware" of anything after that. How did we suddenly shift from Cedar Coulee to Medicine Tail?
R. Larsen
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - June 29 2004 : 05:02:17 AM
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But none of that is evidence for Cooke's view of the situation. It's trivia.
A bit rich to debate a trival character and then suggest the answers are trivia.
However that aside ,what I was trying to do was emphise Cooke's position as a witness as opposed to say McDougals.I'm giving Cooke credit that as a professional soldier and knowing the disposition of the elements of the regiment and the size of the village that he would have concluded that the situation was anything but rosey.
. The point, though, is that no survivors' impressions exist, at all, to support the assertion that Cooke knew Reno was in trouble.
On the contrary Reno had sent back two messengers to say the hostiles were in front of him in strenght.Gerard informed Cooke himself that the hostiles were not running.At 3.13 Custer/Cooke see Reno charge the village.Nearly 3/4 of an hour later Custer still has done nothing to support Reno.They send back urgent messages for ammo and reinforcements,not for Reno but for themselves who have not been engaged yet.
If I was to pick one man to survive the Last Stand it would be Cooke.Just to ask him one question."With all the information you had on the developing situation just what condition did you think Reno was in"?
I still don't see how that makes them "all over the shop,"
There was nothing on the battlefield to indicate an organised defence.The troops were scattered every which way.The formation they lay in was the formation they were hit in---all over the shop.
and how many hostiles are we talking about? 30 seconds away?
Enough to surprise 210 troops strung out over broken country and destroy them before they could react.
The plan of attack was now based on hope and Cooke was well aware of this.
and it's a puzzle to me how you can claim that Cooke was "well aware" of anything after that.
You know 69 you might have something there ,considering the total b**ls they made of things.
And just to return to Mcdougal for a moment.Here we have the man in charge of the ammo and he has no idea of Custers plan or the fact that the regiment has split in to 3 battalions etc etc what a shambles.
Cheers
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - June 29 2004 : 11:28:01 AM
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It's trivia because it does nothing to answer the question of how you know what Cooke viewed the situation as. Some sort of evidence is required to speak on something like that. Cooke being Custer's secretary is interesting, but immaterial. It didn't consign him to a certain point of view.
We have no idea how the McIlhargey and Mitchell messages were received, nor do we have reason to assume that Cooke saw it as meaning Reno was in "deep do do". Kanipe and Martin certainly were not aware of any such anxiety on their officers' part, and were there such concern about Reno, then one has to explain why Custer continued north anyway. Again, you're ascribing reactions to a person without basis.
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I still don't see how that makes them "all over the shop,"
There was nothing on the battlefield to indicate an organised defence.The troops were scattered every which way.The formation they lay in was the formation they were hit in---all over the shop.
Explain how in three successive posts we have shifted from Cedar Coulee, to Medicine Tail Coulee, and now to Custer Ridge, all in trying to get you to explain this odd assertion.
quote:
and how many hostiles are we talking about? 30 seconds away?
Enough to surprise 210 troops strung out over broken country and destroy them before they could react.
It's speculation that they were "surprised", and besides, what does this have to do with Cooke's thoughts when he wrote the Martin note?
R. Larsen
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - June 29 2004 : 1:09:12 PM
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Cooke being Custer's secretary is interesting, but immaterial. It didn't consign him to a certain point of view.
It placed him in a position where all info incoming or outgoing probably went through him and if not he was aware of it.He was beside the commander.What better view can you get to a disaster?
We have no idea how the McIlhargey and Mitchell messages were received
The messages from the two troopers to Custer were that the hostiles are in strenght to my front and from Gerard to Cooke the hostiles are not running.This is serious information of a developing situation.Cooke now knows Reno is in a fight.And this is reinforced by the sound of gun fire.The combination of this with the information they have on the size of the village and the advice they are getting from their scouts forces Custer to send for the ammo and reinforcements.Cooke knows that 3 troops are engaged with a force that Custer with 5 troops needs reinforcements to deal with.Cooke knows that support has been promised to Reno but nothing has been done to assist him for the better part of an hour.He knows Reno's men have a 100 rounds which he will have fired off in an hour.He knows time is running out thus his be quick
Kanipe and Martin certainly were not aware of any such anxiety on their officers' part
I won't accept Martin's awareness or lack of it as refuting anything.If you want to expand on Kanipe's understanding of the situation please do.
Explain how in three successive posts we have shifted from Cedar Coulee, to Medicine Tail Coulee, and now to Custer Ridge, all in trying to get you to explain this odd assertion.
I'm not sure what's troubling you here 69 perhaps you can clarify it for me.
It's speculation that they were "surprised",
If that was the best defence Custer could put up when not surprised then it would have been an absolute picnic for the Indians if he had been surprised.
Slan
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - June 30 2004 : 05:04:01 AM
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quote:
Originally posted by wILD I
Cooke being Custer's secretary is interesting, but immaterial. It didn't consign him to a certain point of view.
It placed him in a position where all info incoming or outgoing probably went through him and if not he was aware of it.He was beside the commander.What better view can you get to a disaster?
But for the most part we don't know what info came to them. We also don't know what kind of incorrect perceptions they may have had of the situation, and they probably had some, seeing as how, you know, they all ended up being totally annihilated. We don't know a lot, frankly-- and one of the things we certainly can't know is what one underling was thinking about the matter, especially when you have suggested in another post that those thoughts may have differed from Custer's. We can't know that.
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We have no idea how the McIlhargey and Mitchell messages were received
The messages from the two troopers to Custer were that the hostiles are in strenght to my front and from Gerard to Cooke the hostiles are not running.This is serious information of a developing situation.Cooke now knows Reno is in a fight.And this is reinforced by the sound of gun fire.The combination of this with the information they have on the size of the village and the advice they are getting from their scouts forces Custer to send for the ammo and reinforcements.Cooke knows that 3 troops are engaged with a force that Custer with 5 troops needs reinforcements to deal with.Cooke knows that support has been promised to Reno but nothing has been done to assist him for the better part of an hour.He knows Reno's men have a 100 rounds which he will have fired off in an hour.He knows
time is running out thus his be quick
You're right, they need to start getting more men besides Reno engaged. No argument there. But my point that we don't know how those messages were received is valid. We don't know if anybody thought the situation serious enough to be desperate. They may have thought Reno was quite capable of maintaining his position in the valley for a good while longer; several of the surviving officers did. And they were going to want the packs and Benteen regardless.
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Kanipe and Martin certainly were not aware of any such anxiety on their officers' part
I won't accept Martin's awareness or lack of it as refuting anything.If you want to expand on Kanipe's understanding of the situation please do.
My point was that you have no evidence that Cooke considered the situation to be "desperate" when he wrote the Martin note. You haven't given anything to refute. I'm not arguing that Cooke was singing La Dee Da as he leisurely ambled towards the battlefield. I'm saying that we can't know what he was thinking, or how "desperate" he thought the situation to be, especially when there are even survivor accounts that Custer and his entourage were quite confident of themselves as they neared the village. There's just not enough evidence to justify making a statement about how Cooke thought things were going.
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Explain how in three successive posts we have shifted from Cedar Coulee, to Medicine Tail Coulee, and now to Custer Ridge, all in trying to get you to explain this odd assertion.
I'm not sure what's troubling you here 69 perhaps you can clarify it for me.
Sure. I asked how you knew that Cooke believed the situation to be "desperate" when he wrote the Martin note, and one of the things you said in reply was that he knew their (i.e. Custer's) battalion was "all over the shop". This didn't make sense to me, so when I asked about it you suddenly placed them "at MTC" with their men "stretched out" behind them, which to you meant they were all over the shop, with Indians extremely close by. I still didn't see how that made them "all over the shop," and said so, so then you dragged them all the way to the battlefield where their bodies were "scattered" every which way. Cedar to Medicine Tail to Custer Ridge.
I still don't see how, in any conceivable sense, Custer's battalion was "all over the shop" when Cooke wrote the note and how this added to his alleged desperation.
quote:
It's speculation that they were "surprised",
If that was the best defence Custer could put up when not surprised then it would have been an absolute picnic for the Indians if he had been surprised.
No doubt it would have been, although no group of men, isolated, outgunned and hugely outnumbered, is going to have much chance. The trouble though is that like Cooke's thoughts, it is just speculation that they were caught by surprise.
R. Larsen
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - June 30 2004 : 2:16:38 PM
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No doubt it would have been, although no group of men, isolated, outgunned and hugely outnumbered, is going to have much chance. The trouble though is that like Cooke's thoughts, it is just speculation that they were caught by surprise.
Just a quick reply 69.
It's not speculation that's the problem it's the quality of the speculation.Would that be correct 69?
So in my book if a unit finds itself outgunned and outnumbered the fact that the commander of that unit allowed it to become isolated would indicate that he had been surprised or that he was a total bloody gobsh**e.As Custer was not that let's be realistic and conclude that he was surprised.
Will return to this tomorrow
Cheers |
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - June 30 2004 : 4:36:15 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by wILD I
[quote]
It's not speculation that's the problem it's the quality of the speculation.Would that be correct 69?
So in my book if a unit finds itself outgunned and outnumbered the fact that the commander of that unit allowed it to become isolated would indicate that he had been surprised or that he was a total bloody gobsh**e.As Custer was not that let's be realistic and conclude that he was surprised.
Will return to this tomorrow
Cheers
True, Custer almost certainly didn't expect to get his ass kicked when he started out to fight, so in that sense he was "surprised". He experienced the unexpected. That's surprising. But, this wasn't the kind of "surprise" you were talking about earlier.
You: "The formation they lay in was the formation they were hit in---all over the shop.... [There were enough Indians] to surprise 210 troops strung out over broken country and destroy them before they could react."
Killed in formation. Destroyed "before they could react". An ambush, pretty much. That's an idea that was popular in the 19th century, well thought of by the press at the time, though I think you're the first to carry its banner into the 21st century.
Whether they were wiped out before "they could react" is unknowable, and not supported by a whole lot of evidence either. Fox and Michno, for example, believe that quite a lot of reacting took place, and that the ground was, for good or ill, basically of Custer's choosing ("he was on the offensive"). They have evidence to support them, at least on the first part. The second, of course, because it goes to Custer's intents, is speculative in the extreme. Michno has trouble admitting this, though.
R. Larsen
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Edited by - Anonymous Poster8169 on June 30 2004 4:39:18 PM |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - July 01 2004 : 05:15:00 AM
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Hi 69
You take me to task over speculating that Cooke saw the situation as desperate around about the time Martin was sent off with the "be quick message".So let's just look at the developing military situation at that time.
3 troops under Benteen are sent off on a recce on a dirvirging course from the main element, out of supporting range. Fact.
3 troops under Reno sent to attack an unknown number of hostiles.Fact
Reno told he will be supporded.This is direct support not
some convoluted manoeuver to draw off Indians.Fact
Cooke and co see Reno charge. Fact
Cooke receives messages from Reno that enemy are in strenght.Fact
Cooke informed by Gerard that hostiles are not running .Fact
Cooke is aware that Reno has halted and is in skirmish line.Fact
Cooke is aware that all elements of the command have ammo for 1/2 an hour--3 rounds a minute.Fact
Cooke is aware that the reserve ammo is as much as 2 hours away.Fact
Cooke is aware that Reno has been engaged for more than that critical 1/2 hour and nothing has been done to support him.Fact
Cooke is aware of the size of the village.Fact
A short time after Martin leaves, Curley and Boyer arrive with the news that Reno has been routed.Fact[I think]
At this point Cooke has sufficient information to conclude that they[Custer's battalion]are outnumbered and outgunned and are about to become isolated.Surely based on that evidence we can conclude that Cooke would have viewed the situation as desperate.
Granted I have moved the desperate situation back to the arrival of Curley and Boyer,but I have no problem with Cooke believing that the situation was desperate at the time of Martin's departure.I think a case can be made that he called Martin back and wrote the message for him not because he had poor English but to emphasise the urgency---ps bring pacs [mispelling a 5 letter word????That man was anxious]
Killed in formation. Destroyed "before they could react". An ambush
Whether they were wiped out before "they could react" is unknowable, and not supported by a whole lot of evidence either.
Fox and Michno, for example, believe that quite a lot of reacting took place,
Are you telling us 69 that Custer outnumbered,outgunned and isolated initiated and controlled a series of complex manoeuvers resulting with his command spread out over a mile where the individual troops were destroyed in detail????
If Custer was alive at the time of his death [and that's speculation] I doubt if he even had control of his bowels .
Regards
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - July 01 2004 : 11:37:05 AM
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quote:
Originally posted by wILD I
A short time after Martin leaves, Curley and Boyer arrive with the news that Reno has been routed.Fact[I think]
At this point Cooke has sufficient information to conclude that they[Custer's battalion]are outnumbered and outgunned and are about to become isolated.Surely based on that evidence we can conclude that Cooke would have viewed the situation as desperate.
Granted I have moved the desperate situation back to the arrival of Curley and Boyer,but I have no problem with Cooke believing that the situation was desperate at the time of Martin's departure.
He might have, but I doubt it's accurate, and by pushing it back to after Martin left you're avoiding the issue. Yes, at some point after Martin left, Custer and his men probably realized that Reno had retreated, and no doubt that was a real "Oh crap" moment for everybody. But before? When he wrote the note? There's nothing we know, that they knew, that would require that they think so.
The facts you list, some of them irrelevant (seeing Reno charge), some of them I'm not sure on (half hour's ammunition?), don't justify claiming that Cooke thought things were "desperate" when he wrote the note to Benteen, because he could easily have not thought so. The one man who was there, Martin, detected no such anxiety, and both he and Kanipe left Custer's column in the belief that Reno was doing quite finely and, at least, was holding his position. So, for that matter, did a few of the officers who survived.
What does all this prove? Nothing, which is my point. What Cooke thought of the situation at the time he wrote the Martin note is unknowable, because (1) what we're fairly sure he knew at the time could have allowed more than one view of the situation, and (2) there's no evidence from those who last saw him or the others with Custer that they had the sense that things were getting out of control. Quite the opposite, in fact. That's not a good basis to conclude that when Cooke wrote the note he was desperate. Even you have argued that Custer had a different view of the situation than him, so if what was known would allow more than one opinion, how you can justify concluding that Cooke held one in particular?
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I think a case can be made that he called Martin back and wrote the message for him not because he had poor English but to emphasise the urgency---ps bring pacs [mispelling a 5 letter word????That man was anxious]
Or so sloppy that he carelessly repeated something he had already said.
quote:
Killed in formation. Destroyed "before they could react". An ambush
Whether they were wiped out before "they could react" is unknowable, and not supported by a whole lot of evidence either.
Fox and Michno, for example, believe that quite a lot of reacting took place,
Are you telling us 69 that Custer outnumbered,outgunned and isolated initiated and controlled a series of complex manoeuvers resulting with his command spread out over a mile where the individual troops were destroyed in detail????
If Custer was alive at the time of his death [and that's speculation] I doubt if he even had control of his bowels .
Regards
I'm telling you that you've changed what you meant by "surprise" over a couple of posts, and that the idea --- presented as unqualified fact by you --- that they were caught by surprise and killed "before they could react" is dubious. You're maybe the only one today who believes it.
R. Larsen
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - July 01 2004 : 1:13:02 PM
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Hi 69
the facts you list, some of them irrelevant (seeing Reno charge), some of them I'm not sure on (half hour's ammunition?), don't justify claiming that Cooke thought things were "desperate" when he wrote the note to Benteen,
Taken on their own they might appear irrelevant.As part of a developing military situation they are very relevant.
You use the reported impressions of an NCO and a non English speaking trooper to refute a conclusion based on a list of facts.
What Cooke thought of the situation at the time he wrote the Martin note is unknowable, because (1) what we're fairly sure he knew at the time could have allowed more than one view of the situation
If facing 1500+ raging warriors with 200 men and 1/2 an hours ammo does not suggest to you a desperate situation then we will just have to agree to disagree on this point.
I'm telling you that you've changed what you meant by "surprise" over a couple of posts,
By suggesting that Custer was surprised I'm giving him some credit.I believe he was swamped and had no time to organise anything like a defence.
and that the idea --- presented as unqualified fact by you --- that they were caught by surprise and killed "before they could react" is dubious. You're maybe the only one today who believes itWell here's your chance to explain how 5 troops reacted to an attack by overwhelming forces.
Regards |
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - July 02 2004 : 02:34:15 AM
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quote:
Originally posted by wILD I
You use the reported impressions of an NCO and a non English speaking trooper to refute a conclusion based on a list of facts.
Those "facts" don't support your conclusion, though I didn't try to "refute" it by citing Kanipe and Martin. They show, however, how easily different impressions than the one you cling to could have been held by those there. I don't know exactly what the men in that command thought was going on. Probably there were several different opinions. And since they screwed up so royally, odds are that Custer and those around him misperceived the nature of some things. The condition of Reno's men may have been one of them; it's possible that none of them realized how bad a state he really was in. The retreat even caught some of Reno's own men by surprise, so if Custer wasn't expecting things to fall apart so soon, he was not alone. It's unknowable things like that --- the "facts" that Custer/Cooke may have thought they knew but which were really false --- which keep me from blithely accepting your conclusion.
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What Cooke thought of the situation at the time he wrote the Martin note is unknowable, because (1) what we're fairly sure he knew at the time could have allowed more than one view of the situation
If facing 1500+ raging warriors with 200 men and 1/2 an hours ammo does not suggest to you a desperate situation then we will just have to agree to disagree on this point.
Again, is this something Cooke/Custer would have known they would be facing while in Cedar Coulee? Reno was still in the fight, and as long as he was, there was no issue of whether they'd have to take on the whole village by themselves, outside the reach of support. And what is your source for this half-hour's ammo thing?
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and that the idea --- presented as unqualified fact by you --- that they were caught by surprise and killed "before they could react" is dubious. You're maybe the only one today who believes itWell here's your chance to explain how 5 troops reacted to an attack by overwhelming forces.
Regards
After whatever they did at the ford, they left Medicine Tail Coulee under fire, with Keogh's battalion taking a position on Battle Ridge, Yates's near and around Custer Hill. Before this happened, some shooting apparently took place on Nye-Cartwright Ridge, if we are to believe the relic hunters. A few bodies turned up in the general area south of the main battlefield. There's evidence that Yates did some sort of movement north of Custer Hill, though to what purpose, or to what extent, is uncertain. Calhoun formed a skirmish line, perhaps two, on Calhoun Hill. They fought for some time. C Company occupied Finley Ridge, perhaps after being repulsed in a "charge" (Fox), or just to occupy it (Michno). Several Indians mention a charge or charges taking place, and some indicated that markers in Calhoun Coulee represented its victims. E Company was apparently at Custer Hill at some point (Smith's body was found there, and several Indians remembered their horses being there too), but later left --- hard to tell when, and who knows to what purpose ---- where most of its members were killed in Deep Ravine or nearby. Those who stuck to Custer Hill (F Company and a few others) apparently tried to defend themselves by killing their horses for barricades after things got really bad, but if it did any good it just delayed the inevitable. They reacted. The Indians reacted back. Battle lasted an hour, give or take.
R. Larsen
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - July 02 2004 : 05:04:14 AM
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Those "facts" don't support your conclusion, though I didn't try to "refute" it by citing Kanipe and Martin. They show, however, how easily different impressions than the one you cling to could have been held by those there.
The passengers on the Titanic had an impression that was somewhat at variance with that held by the Captain. And further we are not discussing the impressions of "those" there but one man in particular who like the captain of the Titanic was in possession of all those "facts".
And since they screwed up so royally, odds are that Custer and those around him misperceived the nature of some things.
It was not the nature of "things" that done for the 7th ,it was the nature of Custer.Full of pride he disregardes what messengers and scouts are telling him,what he can see with his own eyes and his experience as cavalry commander.
Again, is this something Cooke/Custer would have known
View from Weir point and the time it's taking to get to an attack point. And confirmed in Cooke's message---big bloody village.Can that be clearer.
And what is your source for this half-hour's ammo thing?
100 rounds fired at 3 rounds a minute lasts for 33 minutes.
Keogh's battalion taking a position on Battle Ridge.
Yates's near and around Custer Hill.
A few bodies turned up in the general area south of the main battlefield.
There's evidence that Yates did some sort of movement.
Calhoun formed a skirmish line.
C Company occupied Finley Ridge, perhaps after being repulsed in a "charge"
E Company was apparently at Custer Hill at some point
They reacted.
Ok then 69 lets conceed your point that Custer was not surprised and that he somehow was able to control and cordinate the independent movements of his 5 troops which you have just described.Why in heavins name disperse them over a mile[anybody got the exact distance]in penny packets?The only chance they had was surely to unite [as Reno and Benteen had done]and occupy as strong a defensive position as possible.
Custer has 200 men,little more than an infantry company and 1/4 of them are nothing but horse holders, and you put forward a plan of manoeuver that a panzer corps would find difficult to carry out.
Have a nice day now.
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - July 02 2004 : 3:14:04 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by wILD I
we are not discussing the impressions of "those" there but one man in particular who like the captain of the Titanic was in possession of all those "facts".
That's ludicrous, because we don't know what all the "facts" were that Cooke knew, or thought he knew. Or Custer, or Yates, or Keogh. You've even argued that Cooke and Custer had reached different conclusions based on the same evidence, which is an unknowable and baffling claim to make.
quote:
It was not the nature of "things" that done for the 7th ,it was the nature of Custer.Full of pride he disregardes what messengers and scouts are telling him,what he can see with his own eyes and his experience as cavalry commander.
Need I tell you that we don't know what Custer saw with his own eyes? And I doubt Custer was disregarding information he knew to be true. Like I said, if he disregarded (which we don't know) what he was told by his scouts, what he saw, and his own past experience, then I'd say he had misperceived how things stood. It usually happens in the fog of battle, and I'd hazard that it always happens when one side gets destroyed to a man.
quote:
Again, is this something Cooke/Custer would have known
View from Weir point and the time it's taking to get to an attack point. And confirmed in Cooke's message---big bloody village.Can that be clearer.
Your claim is not "confirmed" in Cooke's message, so no, it's not clearer. If Cooke/Custer knew they wouldn't get to the village in time to fight at the same time as Reno --- and you're the only one who claims this --- then the entire maneuver was pure madness and Cooke was probably just as deranged as his fearless leader. But, we don't know that. With no Indians around them what a perfect time to go back and regroup with the other companies.
quote:
Ok then 69 lets conceed your point that Custer was not surprised and that he somehow was able to control and cordinate the independent movements of his 5 troops which you have just described.Why in heavins name disperse them over a mile[anybody got the exact distance]in penny packets?The only chance they had was surely to unite [as Reno and Benteen had done]and occupy as strong a defensive position as possible.
I've said ever since I came on this board that I'm reluctant to ascribe intents, because it's hard to read the minds of dead men, and we do not know what these men thought was going on --- and their beliefs probably included false as well as true information, all of which would have influenced their actions. There's also always the chance for freak events that could have a big impact: had there been no survivors, we would never know that one of the most important incidents of Reno's battle was not who, but the manner in which one particular person was killed. You can't discern something like that from cartridge cases, body locations, and Indian testimony. It's easier and more defensible to say what actions took place, since those things can be observed while thoughts cannot.
That said, why Custer picked that ground to fight on --- and I suspect he probably did pick it, since most of the reports we get of the opposition in MTC is that it was not severe and that he was not forced to the north --- is the most puzzling aspect of the battle. I guess he may have been forced onto it. Some Indians claim they "drove" him there from the ford, but whenever one of them tries to get detailed they describe much less vigor on the Indians' part than such a word would imply. Everybody who has written a book has their suggestions. The most popular one seems to be that he was trying to grab the women and draw the Indians from Reno, but none of these ideas are totally convincing. I suspect that Custer was just gambling, riding north into ground he hadn't crossed over on his approach in the hope that something would just turn up --- he may not have even known for sure what. I don't. Since he didn't ride straight back to Benteen and Reno to regroup, the sensible decision based on what we know, it suggests to me that he still hoped he might be able to salvage something. But which theory is correct, if any, I can't say. I haven't settled my mind on it. Maybe they were deranged, but it's easier to say "maybe" than to claim what one of them "knew".
Dark Cloud's theory is simple, straightforward, and may in fact be the right one, but Custer's body did end up on Monument Hill, and the natural inference has to be that he was shot there. We can't even be sure Custer was present at the ford; Curley suggests he wasn't. Every theory though, because it tries to explain what was going on in dead men's minds, will always be tagged with a question mark. More questionable, though, is the argument that they just didn't react at all. It just interferes with too much evidence. They weren't ambushed. They were outnumbered, defeated, and crushed.
R. Larsen
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - July 04 2004 : 2:52:32 PM
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Hi 69
That's ludicrous, because we don't know what all the "facts" were that Cooke knew
Of the list I posted what information do you consider Cooke would not have known?
Will reply to other points tomorrow
Regards |
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - July 04 2004 : 5:34:00 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by wILD I
Hi 69
That's ludicrous, because we don't know what all the "facts" were that Cooke knew
Of the list I posted what information do you consider Cooke would not have known?
Where Benteen was: Cooke may or may not have had a good idea. This is not, by the way, an issue of "they would know" or "they would not know". We frankly don't know, at all. We don't know what information Custer was getting from his own men, flankers, advance squad, etc. We don't know how they were interpreting what they were seeing or hearing. You, for example, state that they knew Reno only had a half-hour's ammunition. I doubt this. Some of the survivors thought that Reno could have held onto the timber, if not forever at least longer than he ended up doing, and against Indian opposition, which doesn't suggest that these men thought a half-hour limit was imposed on the major. Cooke and Custer may not have either. In other words, I question whether such a rate of fire reflects real combat conditions in the West.
The most critical bits of info on your list, which probably would have induced desperation on their part, are all ex post facto. Your list of facts is repetitious and includes irrelevancies, but I would condense it to this: we can be fairly sure that Custer and Cooke at least knew that Reno was fighting, that the village was big, that the Indians were resisting, and that the pack train was some distance in the rear. We can't know that they thought Reno was in serious trouble; Martin and Kanipe, who are our only sources from the soldier standpoint, both believed that Reno was doing good and making headway. That was what they saw, by their lights. Their superiors may have thought differently, but this is not something we can know. What we have is what we have. They did continue on to the village after Martin left, which suggests to me that they felt that Reno was good to hold on for at least that long. I say "suggests," because we can't know these things. The way you phrased your question --- that Cooke would or would not know something --- misses my point. There's no way we can be that rigid in talking about it. These men, except an addle-headed trumpeter, all died within an hour or more. They left no records. We can't know how they interpreted things. We can't even know everything they had to interpret. They had other possible sources of information, you know --- their own eyes, flankers, advance guards. All potentially error-prone. "You say you saw Reno from that ridge up there? How's he doing?" "Great, sir! Got 'em all skedaddling. Those Indians are riding around in circles, they're so frazzled".
If you dig up a lost diary --- perhaps that note which rumor said was found in Cooke's hand by the burial details --- then perhaps you could be confident and declare how Cooke interpreted the things he "knew". We're ignorant otherwise.
R. Larsen
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - July 04 2004 : 9:48:31 PM
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69-"Where Benteen was: Cooke may or may not have a good idea."
According to Gray's time and motiom studies, Boston Custer left the packtrain to overtake the General, he also overtook Benteen. He met up with Benteen when the latter reached Custer's trail. When Benteen stopped at the morass to water his mounts, Boston continued on.
Gray extrapolates Boston's speed as a steady pace of 6mph. When Boston arrived at Cedar Coulee where the troopers were halted he was in a position to report to the General the last known position of Benteen; the morass just above the Lone Teepee. Custer was aware of the physical distance of the teepee to his current position. Again, accordinging to Gray, Custer could,therefore, surmize that if Boston was able to overtake the command at a trot, then Benteen ,ordered to hurry, ought not be far behind. What Custer knew so did Cooke. |
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El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - July 04 2004 : 10:38:23 PM
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| Never heard there was a rumor about a note found in Cooke's hand. Source? |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - July 05 2004 : 07:00:02 AM
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Hi 69
Where Benteen was: Cooke may or may not have had a good idea.
Cooke knew Benteen had been ordered to go valley hunting.So at the time of writing the message, Cooke knew that Benteen if following orders was on a dirvirging course, taking him further away from the main action.The instructions Benteen got were open ended,limited neither by time nor distance.3 Troops now urgently required were as far as Cooke was concerned vanishing down the yellow brick road.
We frankly don't know, at all. We don't know what information Custer was getting from his own men, flankers, advance squad, etc. Are you suggesting that it is a possibility that Cooke/Custer may have know that Benteen was actually returning from his valley hunt and that the message was only to direct him to Custer?That it was a case of no need to panic, Benteen is on his way with the ammo?
Now If this is what you are saying, you've got to back it up with some sort of evidence.All our discussions here are speculation based on the best evidence we have.Now if you want to refute what I'v posted produce the evidence.
The most critical bits of info on your list, which probably would have induced desperation on their part, are all ex post facto. Not at all.What I have listed is in the correct sequence and there is prima facia evidence that Cooke was aware to these actions at the time of writing the message.
We can't know that they thought Reno was in serious trouble;They knew he was halted and on the defensive.They knew he was expecting support.They knew that at 2 rounds a minute Reno could hold out for 50 minutes.[or if you want longer try to imagine what a rate of one round a minute will achieve]They knew time was running out and they had to attack.
You, for example, state that they knew Reno only had a half-hour's ammunition. I doubt this.
How long do you think 100 rounds will last when under attack by hundreds of hostiles?
They did continue on to the village after Martin left, which suggests to me that they felt that Reno was good to hold on for at least that long.
It suggests that there was a time element in this and it was not on their side.
They had other possible sources of information, you know --- their own eyes, flankers, advance guards. All potentially error-prone.
Is it not rather strange that of the 4 messengers who reached Custer none of them carried favourable info, yet you suggest that there may have been other sources of favourable info.Well let's have them.
If you dig up a lost diary
I'm afraid 69 it is your theory that needs that lost diary otherwise you have no other sources.
Regards
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - July 05 2004 : 11:00:23 AM
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quote:
Originally posted by joseph wiggs
It's clear you haven't been reading the thread. Boston arrived after Cooke had already sent the note off with Martin; he's irrelevant.
R. Larsen
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - July 05 2004 : 11:48:12 AM
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Just to play Captain Bringdown here, the main reason we have concluded there was no fighting to speak of at MTC was the lack of shells found.
Earlier this year, I think BHist pointed out that when the railroad was built, it used to stop for picnics at MTC and the people would search and pillage casings and anything else. That's the sort of actual event over a period of time which sorta degrades the surety there was no fighting there, nor attempt to cross. Of course, this hardly proves the opposite.
Still, it was a crossing into the village, wide enough, shallow enough, and right in front of him. Time was of issue, opportunity at hand. Yet... |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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Calhoun Hill
