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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
 Posted - January 09 2007 : 9:05:54 PM
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I think process improvement is a good thought process but we can't put the improvements in 1876. It would have been interesting to know all the debriefing that went on at the time.
For sure one included the break down cleaning rod installed in the stock of the carbine in 1877.
AZ Ranger |
“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
SEMPER FI |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - January 20 2007 : 8:09:19 PM
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| I think too AZ, that another process that should have been throughly analyzed, after the battle, was the acute stress on the psyche during combat when the enemy is in Close proximity and, well armed. Such conditions may very well have brought about a complete debilitation of a military unit, even a specially trained one. I believe that may have occurred at this battle. |
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 28 2007 : 6:45:18 PM
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| I think whenever it is win or die without a chance of surrender or retreat one is under extreme stress. |
“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
SEMPER FI |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - January 28 2007 : 7:23:40 PM
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Fox mentions in his book the phenomenon he classifies as "bunching" that occurs when leadership decreases or is simply poor. Crowding increases as the enemy contact increases.
S. L. Marshall's World War II battle studies were the first to actually describe this behavior as bunching. "Men will always bunch unless they are insistently told by voice to stop." In my own words, they become sheep unless led by a lion.
I believe this theory is a reasonable rational behind the otherwise inexplicable reality that,excluding Keogh and Calhoun,the majority of officers died some distance away from their respective commands. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 28 2007 : 8:28:34 PM
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Bunching is not a sign of cowardice, of becoming sheep. It doesn't require a lion and none were produced, but simply having innate instinct called to their attention. At least, according to your own quote, which tells us men will always do it. Unless you mean all men were natural cowards.
Officers absent from their men has nothing whatever to do with bunching. The supposed "bunching" on the field was not particularly remarked upon at the time, but only when the markers went up, which are often incorrectly placed, plus the spurious markers supposedly doubled up. When you're already surrounded, coagulation might occur because people took sequential cover behind the same dead animals or peer and met the same fate, plus they want friend at their back facing the other way. It's a really cool term for laymen to use, under furrowed brow, to denote their Oneness with combat vets, using the same terminology and all.
And it might not mean much. An NCO or an officer shot might generate a lot of activity to help them and create the easy targets numbers in close proximity do. It's not proof they had fought like that.
The placement of the markers means zilch, really.
In any case it is not inexplicable if it's reality. There are many possible reasons officers were not with their men, among which: their men were killed elsewhere and they left at the end, they themselves were shot and brought to the doctor, they made it to the top of the hill first because of their superior horses, whatever. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - January 29 2007 : 8:44:02 PM
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Perhaps you misunderstood me, if so thank you for this opportunity for clarification. I never claimed nor implied that "bunching" was a sign of cowardice. I earnestly believe there were no cowards in that battle, on either side, for each combatant did as best as he could do under the circumstances they faced. To flee in terror when faced with immediate death is not cowardice. To prefer life over a horrible and painful demise is not cowardice. To plea for mercy, to be spared so that one may look upon the faces of loved ones one more time in not cowardice.
"Bunching" is the tendency for individuals on the line to "draw" closer together when encountering acute stress exemplified by the approach of a superior enemy; perceived or otherwise. It is an unconscious act that grows stronger as the distance from the enemy decreases. As S. L. Marshall proclaimed, this natural phenom will always occur unless they are told "insistently" to stop. it has nothing to do with cowardice!
The ringing voice of that someone whose vocal encouragement and prodding demands inspires men to "stand fast" is the Lion I refer too, a metaphor as it were. The reference to "sheep", the everyday man like you and I is simply another metaphor which implies an unconscious desire to avoid danger at all cost when, suddenly, the voice of the Lion shakes us from one mental state enabling us to thrive in another. We evolve from apprehension to defiance, from slithering away to standing fast, from death at the hands of the enemy to glory.
No, there were no cowards on the battlefield that day. There were simply human beings who experienced the ultimate in mortal emotions; from abject fear to crowning glory.
By the way, you are incorrect when you state that the placement of markers mean "zilch." While the markers do not, under any circumstances, give testimony to the final resting place of every individual soldier' they certainly display a general picture of the final resting places for the majority of soldiers. |
Edited by - joseph wiggs on January 29 2007 8:50:09 PM |
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - February 08 2007 : 09:01:04 AM
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| I might agree, if there weren't so many spurious markers and people willing to put them there based upon nothing other than we have extras what should we do with them. Someone must have thought well its to far to Reno or they didn't like him so they placed them wherever. |
“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
SEMPER FI |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - February 09 2007 : 8:34:10 PM
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I had an opportunity to read Douglass D. Scott's "The Custer Battle - archaeological Insights." The Historical Background Section of this book confirms what you say. It relates information regarding Captain Owen Sweet's assignment of placing Marble markers on the battlefield in April, 1890.
"The markers were placed at locations that exhibited stakes, fragments of bone, depressions, or luxuriant stands of grass. To complicate matters further, 249 markers were placed on a field where only 214 men had originally been buried. In later years a few more markers were randomly placed on the Custer battlefield, mostly without documentation."
After an intense,meticulous four phase process of investigation of the battlefield by the crewmen of Scott and Fox, virtually every area signified by a marker contained bone fragments. This does not conclude that each marker represented the body of an entire soldier. Bone fragments may very well have resulted more than one marble monument being placed.
"In any event, we must be content with the knowledge that a marker can represent only a close approximation of where a U.S. soldier, seventh Cavalry, fell on June 25 05 26, 1876.
Exactness is a stranger in the study of this battle. Approximation is all that is available.
Rightly or wrongly, the initial attempts to mark the graves of the fallen were restricted to the battlefield were all men perished rather than Reno's bluffs were the majority survived. |
Edited by - joseph wiggs on February 09 2007 8:46:54 PM |
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - February 09 2007 : 8:53:49 PM
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| The extra markers were for those that died and were buried at Reno-Benteen. |
“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
SEMPER FI |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - February 11 2007 : 7:15:35 PM
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| Absolutely correct! I only wonder why the fallen there were initially ignored. |
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prolar
Major
Status: offline |
Posted - February 12 2007 : 11:35:26 AM
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| Joe, according to Gray, at the time Capt Sweet was given the markers to place, only the Custer portion of the battlefield had been designated as a National Cemetery. Sweet was not authorized to place markers on private property, so he mixed markers that should have gone to the Reno area in the Custer field. |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - February 14 2007 : 8:44:21 PM
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| Prolar, thank you much for this information.I was unaware of this historical note but, it makes perfect sense as to why the Reno area was, initially, ignored! |
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 01 2007 : 12:46:21 PM
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| To bad they didn't wait till they could properly placed. |
“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
SEMPER FI |
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prolar
Major
Status: offline |
Posted - March 02 2007 : 7:34:40 PM
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| I believe the area of Reno's valley fight is still private property. |
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Paulvee
Recruit
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 24 2007 : 11:42:36 AM
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I guess i'd comment that there surely could have been greater collections of indians historically but that in the times it was an unusually large camp and due to the self serving subterfuge of indian agents no accurate intelligence was available as to how many indiands were off the reservation.
The estimates from the military side ran 800- 1500 warriors but most accoutns suggest much larger numebers double that or more.
As to the topic of responsibility:
militarily = Custer as in command with orders granting leeway to atta ck.
politically the corrupt government and failure to limit settlement of reserved areas
Tactically Reno and then Benteen. Reno's alcohol fueled funk allow the full weight of the indians to isolate the commands. Instead had he maintained contact with a fighting withrawl or in position in the cottonwoods he would have held down some indians and promoted concern in the others that they could be flanked. The sounds of his firing and the sprawl and multiple bands of indians would have played on their lack of unified command and control.
And there is much evidence that if Reno and Benteen had chosen they may have influenced Custer's fight. Benteen and the packs had clear orders to join Custer and military figures of the day state that marching to the sound of the guns was a standard expectation. Many sources cite awareness of firing and the direction in which Custer was deployed at a time when both the packs and Benteen were close to being in reachof Weir Ridge. The pack reargurad and Benteen plus the seven trooper from each company could have been a substantial reinforcement even if Renos's forse was unable to assist with it's many wounded and dead.
Could Custer have been saved? Well in my opinion perhaps some of his command could have reached Weir Ridge which by some accounts is better ground to defend than Reno ridge. If Benteen had brought his three relatively fresh troops forward rapidly. It seems that the firing went on some time while Benteen was with Reno so much so that some officers finally initiated a sortee.
There is evidence and suggestion that Custer had divided his command again and two troops were at the closer ford to the Weir ridge. Too some of the coulees interconnect and wind back away from the river and might have the allowed the command to circle back toward Benteen if he had shown promptly at the Ridgeline or sortied closer in support.
This could have back fired depending on the timing but clearly a unified command being joined by Reno as soon as the wounded could be shifted, on the highest elevation in the area would have been harder to overrun and less vulnerable to use of terrain to mask firing against positions. The fact that Reno and Benteen alone on what was lower and more enfiladated terrain held against all comers suggested that even if only part of Custer's command was able to re-group they may have held out there.
Even at best it would have been a defeat but less tragic. |
Paul V |
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 25 2007 : 4:33:55 PM
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| There were enough Indians to cause 7 companies to withdraw. How would survivors get through them? |
“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
SEMPER FI |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - June 16 2007 : 3:34:21 PM
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Paulvee,
I believe that you have created a substantial rationale that is inclusive of some of the the major catalytic causations of this battle and its fatal results; for both sides. Too often, I feel, we tend to lay an Albatross of responsibility around the necks of individuals rather than the collective "us" where the responsibility truly lies.
Thank you for an informative thread and, accept my apology for a much belated response. I have been away for quite sometime. |
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - September 30 2007 : 6:35:30 PM
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| Unfortunately the "collective us" in the military is a few officers. |
“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
SEMPER FI |
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Brent
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 20 2007 : 11:21:01 AM
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Paulvee:
It would be nice if we REALLY knew the exact # of Indian warriors--but when THEY had no real idea of how many of themselves there were, it's tough to figure it out. Though most speculations run toward higher #'s, there are a few who argue that the 800 to 1,000 is more realistic. Personally I go with 1,500 but it's merely a guess after reading all the other #'s.
My own view is that NONE of the officers did well that day. Custer for dividing the regiment in the face of unknown numbers and unknown terrain (and not even knowing the size and shape of the village). I cut Reno a little slack since the promised support from Custer never came. But he could have stayed in the timber longer, and that "retreat" that turned into a rout finished him of (offensively) for the day. And Benteen certainly didn't hurry back, nor did he or Reno have much of an inclination except to sit tight while Custer was--well, getting creamed. But again-Benteen didn't just wander off. Custer sent him off on a mission that I still think could have been accomplised just as easily (and much faster) with a small patrol or a couple of scouts.
Add to that a somewhat poorly trained , overcondfident regiment, with Indians at least as well armed as the cavalry and you get a disaster. |
Edited by - Brent on October 20 2007 11:21:32 AM |
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 21 2007 : 11:03:21 AM
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I think Custer's moving to contact plan was sound. Once contact was made or the large number of Indians realized then regrouping seems appropriate. Continuing to engage with a divided regiment against overwhelming odds of willing to fight Indians certainly is factor in its defeat.
AZ Ranger |
“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
SEMPER FI |
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joe wiggs
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - May 26 2008 : 12:59:33 PM
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I just re-discovered the beautiful photo's of the battlefield presented by the great, Bob Reese. His photo's are haunting and mesmerizing. I hope that the new folk and visitors will take the opportunity to view these wonderful momentous. Once again, thanks for all your contributions.
www.friendslittlebighorn.com |
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joe wiggs
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - June 03 2008 : 7:09:14 PM
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| Speaking of Bob, I would like to start a petition requesting his return to this forum. His past inputs were exceedingly rich with warmth and knowledge. His dedication to this topic of interest has been exceeded by no other. He is truly a "friend" of the little Big Horn. If there is anyone out there who agrees with me please stand up and be counted! |
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joe wiggs
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - July 20 2008 : 8:31:03 PM
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| I think I will make it a regular post of mine in which I will greet and hope to hear from Bob once again. His contributions are just that important to me. For all forum members who are not aware of Bob's contributions please go back a year or two and visit some past posts. |
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joe wiggs
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - July 25 2008 : 8:51:07 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by Brent
Paulvee:
It would be nice if we REALLY knew the exact # of Indian warriors--but when THEY had no real idea of how many of themselves there were, it's tough to figure it out. Though most speculations run toward higher #'s, there are a few who argue that the 800 to 1,000 is more realistic. Personally I go with 1,500 but it's merely a guess after reading all the other #'s.
My own view is that NONE of the officers did well that day. Custer for dividing the regiment in the face of unknown numbers and unknown terrain (and not even knowing the size and shape of the village). I cut Reno a little slack since the promised support from Custer never came. But he could have stayed in the timber longer, and that "retreat" that turned into a rout finished him of (offensively) for the day. And Benteen certainly didn't hurry back, nor did he or Reno have much of an inclination except to sit tight while Custer was--well, getting creamed. But again-Benteen didn't just wander off. Custer sent him off on a mission that I still think could have been accomplised just as easily (and much faster) with a small patrol or a couple of scouts.
Add to that a somewhat poorly trained , overcondfident regiment, with Indians at least as well armed as the cavalry and you get a disaster.
Brent,
I just re-discovered this post and your summation of facts are on the money. You have stated clearly and concisely all that we are re-hashing on the other thread. |
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - September 04 2008 : 9:08:32 PM
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Brent - Don't you think Reno had an obligation not to get pinned down in the timber and rely on the Indians to determine his future? Just because you could stay longer does not mean you could leave the timber later, right? As the Indian numbers mounted his choices would be less. Since the Indians had turned from 50 running Indians to hundred Reno had know idea what Custer may have been facing.
According to Moylan when they left the timber they formed up and picked a high point to regroup at. Seems standard procedure for a charge; form up,move out, rapid gait, fight as foragers, and regroup.
AZ Ranger |
“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
SEMPER FI |
Edited by - AZ Ranger on September 04 2008 9:09:48 PM |
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Responsibility At Little Bighorn
