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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
 Posted - July 23 2005 : 11:05:04 PM
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WB, I thought your "jejune babblements" were great. I don't think my limited cranium could have held such a load. I enjoyed it.
You have very often displayed sensitive and extremely well thought out threads. Thanks for being here, I really mean that.
You have asked some very interesting questions which, sadly, I have no absolute answer. However, with your indulgence, I will speculate just a tad. Stanley Vestal spent a great deal of time talking to Indian participants of the battle who supplied this story. Utley mentioned the story in his book. Mr. Vestal observed that Dorman was well liked by the Indians. This feeling, I believe, was diminished by his participation in the assault on the village.
There is an interesting narrative given by Hardorff in his "Lakota Recollections of the Custer Fight." it speaks of our own forum namesake, Movingrobewoman, who may have the answers we seek when dealing with Dorman's death. Her interview begins with pages 91 through 96 of his book. While what she says in this interview is fascinating, it is what she does not say that is critical. In Hardorff's notes(page 94) we ascertain that this furious warrior, not by her own admission, had secured a revolver and, when the battle was over, had killed two of Custer's wounded troopers, one of which was the unfortunate Isaiah. This was reported by other Indian witnesses. On page 101, we read:
Eagle Elk - "As I went along, I saw a man sitting on the ground, and a woman came along and stopped by him, and first I thought she was pointing at him. She drew back her arm and pointed at him again, and the gun she was holding went off and the man dropped. The man was a Hunkpapa who was with the soldiers, and he got wounded and fell off his horse. The man said, "do not kill me, because I will be dead in a short while anyway." The woman said, "If you did not want to be killed, why did you not stay home where you belong and not come to attack us?"
The woman responsible for this action was Movingrobewoman, the victim may have been "Teat", known as Dorman. How ironic, of all the participants of this battle we know more about the final moments of this man than his entire lifetime. Is this not sad?
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whistlingboy
Lieutenant
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - July 24 2005 : 1:58:24 PM
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Good information, Joe, and fascinating. I wonder how many stories there are out there of the same nature? One I want to find a little bit more information on is the rumor of the six or seven soldiers who lagged clear behind the Custer regiment and turned back and supposedly ended up with Reno on the hill. Hope there is credence to this alleged story. If true, would they have been counted as part of the dead in the last stand arena just by going over the rosters?
Thanks. Have a good day. |
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lorenzo G.
Captain
Italy
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whistlingboy
Lieutenant
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - August 01 2005 : 10:39:00 AM
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Lorenzo G. --
Thanks for the post; glad to see your name again. Not much on Mr. Dorman to glean from the past histories. He certainly appears to have been an interesting character type--probably animated, not afraid to work, spoken of as being jovial, probably out of shape at 55 years of age and evidently loyal to his country. Do you know how much 'scouts' were paid by the army on the average? With his wife being a Santee Sioux, I was just wondering what his motivation might have been to accept Custer's "invitation" to work with the 7th against the Sioux? What do you think would have been a higher motivation than money?
Hope you have a good day. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - August 01 2005 : 12:37:05 PM
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That Indians dressed up in uniforms and fooled soldiers (including Weir and Terry's men) and fired at Terry's men is in virtually all the books about the battle. If you've read as much as you pretend, you'd know this. It's in Connell and in Stewart, the two biggest sellers on the battle, the former of which is the one that's sold more than the others combined. It's been the subject of threads on this forum, by me if nobody else.
It's important because it casts large doubt in my mind over whether soldiers made it down to the posited most northerly ford claimed, because we do know that Cheyenne and Sioux women were in panic seeing uniforms on army horses with guidons riding into the camp. All the detritus from those Indians in uniform explains without convulsion all the cavalry artifacts found in that area. Provided they are from the battle at all. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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survivor
Recruit
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - August 04 2005 : 04:05:03 AM
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So, Warlord had an epiphany. Reno, he is now convinced, was drinking while in the valley. Gee, what a revelation. The final bit of information that gives substance to these allegations Warlord discovers in Pvt Wm O Taylor's memoir, "With Custer At The Little Bighorn."
Taylor, Girard, and DeRudio are cited by Sklenar as the three witnesses who observed Reno drinking on the job. Sklenar's authority in each case was Camp's notes, "Custer In '76" edited by Hammer. The material has been available for years, although Taylor's memoir wasn't published until about ten years ago.
My take on Reno's drinking is this: he was under the influence of alcohol, but he wasn't drunk as that term is commonly understood. The effect of alcohol on his decision making was subtle, but definitive at crucial moments. However, I also believe that with the evidence at hand, if Reno were tried for malfeasance due to an alcohol impaired mental capacity he would be found not guilty, based upon the doctrine of reasonable doubt. A person cannot be convicted simply because he made bad decisions. The best testimony that Reno was drinking just before or during the valley action easily can be taken apart.
Frett and Churchill, packers with the train, testified that they saw Reno about 9 or 10 o'clock on the 25th with a quart flask and in a state of drunkenness. It could be established without too much difficulty that the time was really the hour before midnight. In any event, the fighting had ceased. Lt. Mathey testified that very early on the morning of the 26th he saw Reno with a flask that may have been a pint or a quart, but that it was nearly empty. None of this has any relevance to what Reno may or may not have done in the valley, except insofar as it indicates Reno had access to whisky. But Reno candidly admitted to having a pint flask, stating he took a drink about midnight of the 25th, and that the contents of the flask lasted him until the 28th.
Girard and DeRudio testified at the inquiry, and with the opportunity to do so under oath, neither made any allegations in reference to Reno's drinking. Lt. Wallace, when pressed on the issue, refused to say directly whether he had seen any drinking. His statement was that he had seen no "inebriety", a carefully chosen phrase if there ever was one. Since the question referred to Reno's conduct it is entirely reasonable to infer that Wallace did see Reno drinking. However, the statement no "inebriety" also implies that no drinking occurred to the extent that mental capacities were diminished.
That leaves us with Taylor, who did not testify at the inquiry. Taylor's statement is that because of the unusual tone of voice Reno used when calling for the charge he, Taylor, turned to look back and saw Reno, at the rear of A company, drink from a quart flask that was half to two thirds full, and then pass it to Lt. Hodgson.
This bears examining. Taylor was on horseback at a gallop,{9-10mph?}, hears the command to charge, {11-12mph?},and because of Reno's unusual tone of voice , Taylor turns at precisely the right moment to see Reno imbibing behind A company.
A troop is moving at the charge. Assuming a 16' nose to nose separation between each set of fours, Taylor is anywhere from 16' to 160' from Reno, on a horse that is changing gait from gallop to charge, observing two men likewise mounted, while negotiating his way through a prairie dog village, able to observe the changing of hands of a quart bottle half to two thirds full.
Taylor doesn't mention how much of the precious liquid was spilled, but he does state that "...the brim of my hat had become separated from the crown for nearly half the way around, and in consequence I was sometimes looking over the brim and sometimes under it."
To summarize, when Taylor looked back he was on a charging horse, with a floppy hat brim, going through a prairie dog village, at who knows what distance, he was, nonetheless, able to observe two officers, incurring the same attendant problems, exchanging drinks from a quart flask Taylor is able to measure at half to two thirds full.
Think what a moderately competent trial attorney would be able to do to this story under cross examination. Unfortunately, Recorder Lee was not an attorney, simply an infantry officer, and a Court of Inquiry is not a trial. Still, one wishes devoutly that this inquiry had been conducted with competent legal talent on each side.
I have stated that I believe Reno acted under the influence of alcohol, that his judgment was seriously impaired, and he had lost the capacity for rational decision making. But I also believe when we have what appears to be good evidence, what appears to be concrete facts, and especially when that evidence or those facts tend to substantiate what we would prefer to believe, or what we have chosen to believe, that evidence must be subjected to the most severe scrutiny we can apply, and the most severe test we can devise. If, in fact, we wish to discover the truth, insofar as the truth is discoverable, the list of things to mistrust must be headed by our own opinions. |
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BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - August 05 2005 : 9:02:09 PM
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Paul, for crying out loud, you are taking two anecdotes and making a hangman's noose out of them.
OK, let us suppose Taylor is correct, and I have no reason to doubt him, he looked back (per p. 36) and saw, "...Major Reno was just taking a bottle from his lips. He then passed it to Lieutenant Hodgson. It appeared to be a quart flask, and about one half or two thirds full of an amber colored liquid. There was nothing strange about this, and yet the circumstances remained indelibly fixed in my memory." This was about, approximately, about 2:30 p.m.
So, we know Reno had a drink or even a "stiff drink" before the charge towards the village.
Your next "evidence" of Reno being drunk is the unsubstantitated charges of two mule packers, who were under suspicion of rifling unattended packs, made somewhere near midnight.
Hmmm, it is not rocket science but that sounds somewhat like 9 hours, give or take a half hour. If I recall correctly, the decay rate of one ounce of booze is approximately one hour.
Do you seriously think based upon the above evidence that Reno was "proven drunk"? We will get into the Christian magazine/journal in a moment, but based upon your law enforcement experience, what would you say in real life? A person states he saw Reno pull the flask down before the charge, and the next complaint of drunkedness comes around midnight from two packers suspected of stealing from the packs.
Quite personally, if I drank hard liquor, after the day Reno had, I would have taken a strong drink myself.
So, in essence, you haven't proven doodly-squat...only your opinion, which I, believe it or not, do respect.
Anyway you can get me a copy or scan of the Christian magazine article? The reason I want to read it is not doubting you, but having been raised a Southern Baptist, I know that they are some of the biggest hyporcrites on the face of the earth, for example, in my own experience, a preacher, blowing alochol fumes enough to curdle 100 year old paint went through a residential area in 1972 at, in my guestimation, about 60, and hit my German Shepherd...best dog I ever had. The bastard will roast in hell if God is a dog-lover!
Later, and let's keep this above board OK?
Billy |
Edited by - BJMarkland on August 05 2005 9:12:14 PM |
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RonH
Private
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Posted - August 06 2005 : 10:41:37 AM
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| Whether or not it's been proven that Reno was drunk at the Little Big Horn, it's been pretty much established that he was indeed drinking. I'll have to search to find my source, but prior to the charge someone rode by Reno at the first crossing, and splashed water on Reno while he was taking a drink, and Reno said "what are you trying to do, drown me before I'm killed"? Then, when the charge started he was observed taking a drink and passing the bottle to Hodgson. Possibly both sources were lying, although we do know that Reno was an alcholic who let alcohol ruin his life shortly after the battle. Remember, he was on a two year suspension at the time of the Chicago Inquiry. Shortly after returning to military duty, he was again in trouble from drinking. In itself, taking a small sip of liquor prior to the battle may not have much affected some of the men. As was said, the adrenaline rush of the battle and would have quickly erased the effects of a sip. Girard said as the battle was starting, he and Charlie Reynolds each took a drink, and he cautioned Reynolds not to take too much, as they had plenty of work to do. This incident is in Girard's testimony before the court. Reno was an alcoholic, and I know from experience that with an alcoholic, a large drink is better than a small one. If Reno, being an alcoholic had whisky at the LBH, it's pretty much a given that he was indulging, and if he was indulging he was probably over-indulging. I do not doubt that the packers smelled booze on his breath, though if it weren't for the other evidence, I wouldn't put much stock in their testimony. Later, when talking about alcohol among the troops, Godfrey stated that he didn't think anyone had whisky at the battle, except Reno who had a quart flask. Reno was an alcoholic who should never have been in command of troops. I'm not convinced that if he had held his position in the timber, that Custer's attack could not have been successful, especially if Benteen had hurried to his support as ordered. By threatening the village he would certainly have kept a lot of warriors in his front, and given Custer a chance at success. I know I'll probably be flamed for this, as most people believe his retreat to the hills saved his command and Custer had no chance anyway. Even Graham thought this to be the case. Others, such as Godfrey thought Reno could and should have held that position. Under questioning, Girard thought the position in the timber a good one, and that Reno could have held it as long as he had the ammuniton and the will to do so. Yes, I'm familiar with the testimony that the troops had shot up most of their ammuniton supply, but it's very hard to believe given the short duration of the valley and timber actions. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
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whistlingboy
Lieutenant
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - August 16 2005 : 5:53:34 PM
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Stewart in his book "Custer's Luck" reports confusion in the varied descriptions about the numbers of hostiles in front of Reno at the time of his deploying of the skirmish line. Reno said he saw five to six hundred; Lt. Wallace guessed two to three hundred; Girard said he could see for 1500 yards and the nearest hostiles "were fully one thousand yards distant, and that they did not come up to the line until some time after it had been formed." He also said he didn't see more than 50 to 75 Indians in front of the line. Herendeen reported seeing no Indians immediately in front of Reno and the ones he did were content on staying where they were until Reno halted at which time they "began moving out as skirmishers." Dr. Porter testified that the nearest Indians were from "eight to nine hundred yards away and that when the line deployed there were not more than fifty hostiles confronting Reno." Lt. Hare agreed with Dr. Porter. Cpt. Moylan sided with Reno saying "that there were above five hundred hostiles less than a quarter of a mile in front of Reno when he halted." Lt. Varnum agreed with Cpt. Moylan.
Many Indian accounts speak of being surprised by Reno as he came upon many of the "youngsters" who were rounding up ponies and playing their 'games,' crossing back and forth in front of the village, kicking up the dust. These kids is who Reno first saw as they aroused the village's warriors to imminent danger and a latent charge to repel Reno's forces.
As reported in this one book, and we can go one book at a time, if necessary, why does Maj. Reno go from 'attack' mode to 'defensive' mode at this time; with maybe 50 to one hundred and fifty Indians in his wake, 400 to 1000 yards in the distance. At rapid gait, tired horses and all, he has to surprise and befuddle many hostiles and possibly changes the outcome of Custer's fate by, if nothing else, keeping hordes of Indians occupied or if he runs on through the village forces a large contingent to chase him. In either case, they don't go after Custer because he's not threatening the village like Reno is suppose to be doing.
But that didn't happen and his 'momentary' skirmish line then decides to high-tail it for the woods. But why? It hadn't been hard pressed yet. According to Stewart's book, Lt. Wallace "insisted that two men had been killed on the skirmish line and one in the timber." Cpt. Moylan concurred; Sgt. Culbertson declared that "he knew of only one man wounded on the skirmish line but four other had been hit fefore the battalion left the position in the woods."
Dr. Porter thought "only one man had been wounded up to the time the battalion left the timber."
Sgt. Kanipe claims that "up to the time that the retreat from the timber began, Reno had not lost a man." Graham said Reno lost one man. And so on and so on.
Is this truly how a U.S. Cavalry unit operates and fights battles? Were they running from "what was happening" or from "what might happen?" Does taking a casualty or two constitute a 'retreat?' Maybe possibly "being under the influence" is a bigger factor than has been thus believed, especially under the beating hot sun, which facilitates dehydration in a person who has even a small amount of alcohol in them. (and today you can add cokes and like beverages to that list of substances that can quickly dehydrate the human body of its water) William O. Taylor in his book, "With Custer on the Little Bighorn" stated that upon reaching the Little Bighorn river, it's icey coldness prompted the horses and riders alike to drink without any urging at all. That was to be their last drink of water for 24 hours. So if officers had flasks of whiskey on their bodies is it not easy to understand them drinking it? It just may have proved to be costly, causing possible indecision in, among others, Reno's mind.
It is logically possible that if only Reno had held in the timber (many think he could have maintained his presence there indefintely) having forsaken the attack on the village, that he would have occupied the Indians long enough to have given Gen. Custer a fairer chance. Upon retreating to the high bluffs, many of the Indians left to go fight Custer. Reno's presence in the timber and its close proximity to the village would have commandeered the continued attention of all availbale Indians. After all, the Indians were fighting to protect their families in the village. Reno's 'running' leaving his wounded and dead behind signalled 'no more threat' to the hostiles who quickly turned their attention to the threat in the north.
Where in the creeds of the Army, and today other armed forces, does it say a soldier can put his life above his duty? The purpose of military training is to condition the soldier's mind to perform his duty first and foremost at the expense of his life. Officers are expected to lead and ensure such expectations. The non-military minds revel in the fact that "Reno saved lives."
But he betrayed his duty by not obeying his orders at the expense of his life. Some write that the motivation to 'retreat' to the timber was not 'casualties already suffered as it was to prevent further casualties.' I guess that is one way of rationalizing one's fear. Cpt French in a letter to Mrs. Cooke in 1880 said "he was tempted to shoot Reno when the order to retreat was given." Some soldiers wanted to be good soldiers to the end.
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
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Posted - September 04 2005 : 2:49:11 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by whistlingboy
Reno
It is logically possible that if only Reno had held in the timber (many think he could have maintained his presence there indefintely) having forsaken the attack on the village, that he would have occupied the Indians long enough to have given Gen. Custer a fairer chance. Upon retreating to the high bluffs, many of the Indians left to go fight Custer. Reno's presence in the timber and its close proximity to the village would have commandeered the continued attention of all available Indians. After all, the Indians were fighting to protect their families in the village. Reno's 'running' leaving his wounded and dead behind signalled 'no more threat' to the hostiles who quickly turned their attention to the threat in the north.
Where in the creeds of the Army, and today other armed forces, does it say a soldier can put his life above his duty? The purpose of military training is to condition the soldier's mind to perform his duty first and foremost at the expense of his life. Officers are expected to lead and ensure such expectations. The non-military minds revel in the fact that "Reno saved lives."
But he betrayed his duty by not obeying his orders at the expense of his life. Some write that the motivation to 'retreat' to the timber was not 'casualties already suffered as it was to prevent further casualties.' I guess that is one way of rationalizing one's fear. Cpt French in a letter to Mrs. Cooke in 1880 said "he was tempted to shoot Reno when the order to retreat was given." Some soldiers wanted to be good soldiers to the end.
Extraordinary thread W.B. I don't know how I missed it! The only thing I would add are the words of Recorder Lee at the Inquiry:
"He (Reno) left the timber not on account of the losses that had occurred, but of what might occur. His casualties did not occur in charging the village but in going away from it. No formation is made on the opposite bank to protect the men whose horses are plunging and rearing to get out."
Finally, "Maj. Reno states that he gave the order for "G" company to Lt. McIntosh, but there is no evidence to show that it was properly communicated to the company except by rumor, the result being that many of the men of that company did not succeed in mounting and joining the column."
Again, great thread! |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - September 07 2005 : 4:05:54 PM
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Well, while we wait for examples of the courage under fire of heroic posters to this and other Custer boards before damning the dead, it's worth pointing out that when you read battle reports and people's recollections years after any battle, NOBODY got orders on time, heard them at all, heard the same thing others did. In battles won, this is simply brushed aside as 'fog of war' platitudes.
Whistlingboy, for all the talk about "analysis" that makes people feel so scientific and rational, fails to note that if Girard is right and there were no Indians for almost a mile, then the village would have had its southern border not far south of MTC ford from the Garry Owen Loop, when current theory holds that its northern border was there. Other testimony says that the first lodges were only about seventy five yards away from the skirmish line. Of course, all that testimony only is of import if they're varying statements were about the exact same section of time, and everyone could see the same things.
You neglect to mention that according to the official transcript, page 511, officers failed to provide good fire control because they themselves were firing on Reno's line. Gee, that sounds like the officers thought there was a necessity that precluded it. Like, lots of Indians. Girard and Herendeen later give conflicting testimony, and are remarkably absent from anyone's battle memories on Reno Hill after they arrived. I've never understood why some witnesses are given carte blanche.
There is nothing in any of these contentions that suggests drunkeness or under any chemical influence. Further, that would only make sense if alcohol is assumed to encourage timidity. What evidence exists for that, either in general or in Reno's later life? "Indecision" is not what Reno exhibited, especially when drunk. He was decisive and aggressive.
"Where in the creeds of the Army, and today other armed forces, does it say a soldier can put his life above his duty?" Nowhere.
"The purpose of military training is to condition the soldier's mind to perform his duty first and foremost at the expense of his life." If necessary in the performance of his duty, you mean. Otherwise, he's a suicide bomber. And what was Reno's duty, by the way?
"Officers are expected to lead and ensure such expectations." The officers are expected to complete their missions with as low casualties as possible.
"The non-military minds revel in the fact that "Reno saved lives."" And military minds. Like Patton says, it's their duty to make sure the other guy dies for his country.
"But he betrayed his duty by not obeying his orders at the expense of his life." What? What order didn't he obey? He would have been an irresponsible officer and an idiot to ride back and forth through the village till all soldiers were dead.
"Some write that the motivation to 'retreat' to the timber was not 'casualties already suffered as it was to prevent further casualties.' I guess that is one way of rationalizing one's fear. Cpt French in a letter to Mrs. Cooke in 1880 said "he was tempted to shoot Reno when the order to retreat was given." Some soldiers wanted to be good soldiers to the end." Noted drunk French was sucking up to Mrs. Custer and PC spindoctors by this inspiring tale of a potential fragging. What a good soldier! Reno is damned for not narrowly following supposed orders from Custer. Bad soldier. French brags about not murdering him and is a zero during the Hill fight, employed cleaning weapons, supposedly, after the train and booze arrive. Noted drunk Weir someone doesn't crease the page of history again once the train is up. And neither do the scouts. Huh. You'd think those supposed great shots would have been key, wouldn't you? |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - September 07 2005 : 6:23:04 PM
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WB
As reported in this one book, and we can go one book at a time, if necessary, why does Maj. Reno go from 'attack' mode to 'defensive' mode at this time; with maybe 50 to one hundred and fifty Indians in his wake, 400 to 1000 yards in the distance.Well there was in fact at least 1500 warriors in front of him.The number you give for those in his immediate front of 50 to 100 is an assumption.But if Reno was wrong in thinking there was 500 was it not a very fortunate mistake?
But why? It hadn't been hard pressed yet
A withdrawal under pressure can turn into a rout.
if nothing else, keeping hordes of Indians occupied or if he runs on through the village forces a large contingent to chase him. In either case, they don't go after Custer because he's not threatening the village like Reno is suppose to be doing.
No no you see 120 men cannot threaten 1500.And was Reno not supposed to be supported by Custer?
It is logically possible that if only Reno had held in the timber (many think he could have maintained his presence there indefintely) having forsaken the attack on the village, that he would have occupied the Indians long enough to have given Gen. Custer a fairer chance.
How much time did Custer require Reno gave him at least an hour in which Custer did nothing.
Where in the creeds of the Army, and today other armed forces, does it say a soldier can put his life above his duty? The purpose of military training is to condition the soldier's mind to perform his dutyWhen that duty is rendered null and void by misleading information and the unit is left to fend for itself. |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - September 07 2005 : 8:46:41 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by wILD I
WB
As reported in this one book, and we can go one book at a time, if necessary, why does Maj. Reno go from 'attack' mode to 'defensive' mode at this time; with maybe 50 to one hundred and fifty Indians in his wake, 400 to 1000 yards in the distance.Well there was in fact at least 1500 warriors in front of him.The number you give for those in his immediate front of 50 to 100 is an assumption.But if Reno was wrong in thinking there was 500 was it not a very fortunate mistake?
While it is true that,ultimately, elements of the Custer command encountered 1,500 or more warriors,this was certainly not the case in the initial stages of this battle. Reno's encounter at the south end of a village over a mile and a half long would not have been responded to by the warriors at the northern point of the village until a specific amount of time had elapsed. Lt. George Wallace estimated a gallop from the point of receiving Custer's order to the crossing as, "a mile and a half or two miles at a gallop in about 15 minutes." Using this estimation the full force of the warrior reserve could not have met Reno all at once; thus the number of Indians he actually encountered must be re-evaluated.
For example, the main Indian herd was west of the village. These had to be gathered up, mounted by individual warriors, then the mounted warriors must then travel from that location to Reno's position.For those who support the perspective that the village was over three(3) miles long the time element must be doubled.
As usual, the "White" witnesses totally disagree with the number of Indians encountered by Reno, nevertheless:
Sgt. F. A. Culbertson - "There were, when we halted, about 250 Indians riding back and forth.
Dr. Porter - After we crossed I heard him (Reno) command "Forward!" and they on down to the woods, about two miles, at a lope or trot. I saw a few Indians and a great many ponies. They seemed to be driving the ponies down river. There was no opposition."
F. F. Girard - "There were no Indians within 1000 yards. The Indians were firing at our scouts and the scouts at them. They came closer, about 200 yards away. There were only about 50 to 75 of them.
Lt. Hare - "Up to this time , there were probably 40 to 50 Indians riding around and firing. As soon as the command dismounted, 4 or 5 hundred came out of a coulée about 400 yards in front us and moved to our left and rear.
During an approximate fifteen minute time span the warriors increased their forces until they were, indeed, numerically overwhelming. The initial confrontation involved a much lesser number. |
Edited by - joseph wiggs on September 07 2005 8:51:00 PM |
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whistlingboy
Lieutenant
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - September 10 2005 : 9:28:04 PM
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J.W.--I sure like how you add balance in your posts, Joe. I wait impatiently for your responses to everyone's posts as you have a way of adding depth to the varied threads.
D.C.--didn't mean to delay this but just got back in town today. I have no secret intent to 'damn the dead' or put anyone, per se, in unfavorable light. I am simply grappling with the information out there in the cosmos connected with this battle just like you and Utley, Stewart, Gray, and all the other 'gatherers' intrigued by this historic episode.
(a) Distance of skirmish line from the village. Quoting what interpreter Fred Girard said about the distance of the village, or Lt. Varnum or Dr. Porter or whoever, certainly shouldn't imply that I agree with that as 'gospel.' I only offer any quote, like you, I hope, as a 'piece of information' offered by someone connected to the subject as reported by some author. Such is offered only to contribute to the confusion in searching for a truth....there is great disturbance over this distance between the village and the skirmish line. Stewart reports on page 354 of his book, "The command had originally halted some 150 yards from the river but before dismounting had advanced to where it made a quick change of course. The hostile village was across the bend and it was seemingly only seventy-five to one-hundred yards to the first tepee......" or "Once afoot, the line of troopers steadied and even advanced a short distance, Captain Moylan insisting that the line progressed about one hundred yards after it was deployed...."
Wouldn't that put it in the village? What confusion.
or....Lt. Varnum saying "our skirmish line was about two miles from the first crossing and about 800 yards from the nearest part of the village." or Dr. Porter saying "I did not see the village until I got in the woods and then saw it through a clearing...the nearest tepee was one quarter mile away." ---these quotes in Robert Nightengale's book gleaned from the Court of Inquiry testimony.
There are many maps of this battle that seem to differ and in fact Exhibit Two at the Reno Court of Inquiry confronts the changing of the data on the battle map to put Maj Reno in a 'better light' so alleged; to make him look much better than he really was. One fact altered was the position of the skirmish line. Why does the government want to cloud the truth?
But let's say the skirmish line is in fact deployed 75 yards from the village...why? 1500 hostiles in those 75 yards? Horses drop dead? If you've got that close why stop? I think the 75 yard 'guess' can be thrown out. Unfortunately, not everybody has a good grasp on distance and the one who says '800' yards may not be any more accurate. In fact, there are too many guesses and making the fact that those killed or wounded on the line are barely a statistic rings loud in my ears as painting a picture of not much opposition. And IF this is really true, why does he deploy the skirmish line .....because he's afraid of what he might be confronted with even though he would have run through the village for three miles creating such havoc and confusion that Custer would have noticed his presence and slipped down through the flattened MTC and who knows what might have happened. Did I say Custer? Depending where you stand at Weir point you can see down that valley and the dust and the noise would have been deafening.
But, that's a bad and foolish scenario to you because Reno's horses were tired, as well as the men. Besides, surprise doesn't count that much in your eyes when you know that the numbers are 10 to 1 or more against you. How much does surprise count? Besides, maybe Custer and Reno might have been massacred there too, who knows? But they might not have.
I read Stewart's mentioning of the lack of 'fire control' but what were the officers firing at if the Indians weren't hitting anyone on the line?
When you mention Reno seeing all those Indians and the ones PROBABLY behind those 50 or so ones in front of him as a good reason not to finish the attack of the village are you pre-supposing that, if you don't think Reno's surprising them, they think his group is the only contingency attacking them? Why wouldn't they think that there were two or more columns behind his? You see, that's why staying mounted was important, charging frantically, wildly, kicking up dust and compromising visibility adding confusion to their minds. As soon as Reno stops, dismounts and kneels down, the hostiles can now see more clearly for the first time what confronts them and realize their advantage and commence to attack in earnest. You tell me that I am wrong in my thinking but I just can't see it.
You and I are in that charge, side by side, and let's say (well, after I say give me a swig of your whiskey) we see about, what we think is 75 hostiles hollering and Reno yells halt, dismount and form a skirmish line five yards a part. We see no hostiles advancing at first as an occasional zing passes our ears. Being a peon we don't make decisions; we follow orders. What is it we see, DC? What are we wondering about? Have we just entered a trap, an ambush? Is that it? What do you see, soldier?
It surprises me to hear you say that Reno was decisive and aggressive. Even as you play 'devil's advocate' at times, his arrogance was well noted as well his indecision.
Reno's duty was dedication to his professionalism. He was a subordinate officer with orders to attack the village. What if it would have been a good plan and he failed to to his job and Custer would have flanked his attack successfully? Custer would have become trapped at the north end of the village. Maybe Reno knew exactly what Custer was doing and figured he would be there on time. Was he setting up Custer for annihilation?
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - September 11 2005 : 3:17:52 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by whistlingboy
J.W.--I sure like how you add balance in your posts, Joe. I wait impatiently for your responses to everyone's posts as you have a way of adding depth to the varied threads.
Thanks W.B., glad you're back
quote:
But, that's a bad and foolish scenario to you because Reno's horses were tired, as well as the men. Besides, surprise doesn't count that much in your eyes when you know that the numbers are 10 to 1 or more against you. How much does surprise count? Besides, maybe Custer and Reno might have been massacred there too, who knows? But they might not have.
When a commander seeks to engage the enemy,if at all possible, he must make every attempt to ensure the success of the engagement prior to the engagement. This is accomplished through preparation based on the gathering of intelligence reports, adequate equipment,utilizing troops who are well trained and, in good condition. As important, if not more so, is the capability to "surprise" the enemy to stealth and/or trickery. This has been a historical reality since the Trojan Horse. "How much does surprise count?" It can be the whole ball of wax my friend. You are absolutely correct in your assumption.
quote:
It surprises me to hear you say that Reno was decisive and aggressive. Even as you play 'devil's advocate' at times, his arrogance was well noted as well his indecision.
Reno's duty was dedication to his professionalism. what Custer was doing and figured he would be there on time. Was he setting up Custer for annihilation?
I have perused a substantial amount of sources in the last twenty years regarding this battle. Not one of them referred to Reno's actions as "decisive" or "aggressive." I wonder from what source that information was obtained?
I agree with you totally regarding Reno's critical obligation to his profession.
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whistlingboy
Lieutenant
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - September 11 2005 : 7:03:17 PM
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wILD I --I am obviously being too hard on Major Reno, but given all that happened up to that point, it is the scenario I believe should have happened. True, if he would have completed his sorte through the village, he most likely would have lost more men but there should have been more hostile losses and a whole new set of parameters would have been put in place. It is merely my speculative bent on this part of the battle.
True, there might have been 1500 warriors in front of Reno but he didn't know that, did he? He couldn't see them obviously; he barely saw a minute fraction of that number initially, according to all the mixed accounts. I just want to know why he, at the moment he did, order dismounting to form a skirmish line....IF he was relatively close to the village, IF he was not being hard pressed--no Indians advancing on his position, IF he was not losing any soldiers on the line....what spooked him wILD I? The soldiers were yelling, whooping it up, psyching themselves up and were raring to go...but not Reno. He wanted to quiet them down.
Mistakes happened. They started way back but as late as Terry. The way he squealed and cried and did his best to put the blame on this battle on Custer's shoulders in the post-battle days certainly means his wavering moral character was present during the launching of this debacle. He was a good friend of President Grant's and he wanted the credit for this annihilation of the hostiles. At his disposal was Custer, Grant's nemesis. If the expedition was a success, it would have been Terry's plan; if it was a failure, he would find a scapegoat in Custer. It was a no-win situation for Custer in the eyes of Terry, Grant's forward hand.
But Custer made the mistake of going by the book this time because he was glad to have this chance and command and he didn't want to 'mess it up.' A 3-prong attack was standard operation. My question is did Custer know where the Indian village was when he sends orders to Reno to chase that band of Indians down Reno Creek to their village and attack it. Did he know the Indians would go right at the river since huge trails pointed left, or south, at the Little Bighorn River. Benteen was on a left oblique, Reno was chasing them due west and Custer headed off right. Maybe he thought the village was straight ahead across the Little Bighorn and that might explain the support theory and the pincer move to the right. It has to be assumed he was not aware of the terrain however. It is logically possible as some have contended before.
And so, once in the valley after refreshing the troops, Reno heads at a gallop into probably the most challenging moments of his life up to that time. Because the village is where it is, Benteen is clear out of position. If the Indians had gone left, or south at the river to their village, Custer would have been out of position. If the village would have been due west, the 3-prong attck may have worked. If the hostiles would have known the exact location of the soldiers why wouldn't they have attempted to orchestrate a first-strike, given the number of warriors they had? Because they were surprised. The soldiers, on the other hand, didn't know exactly where the village was until it was too late. Reno's charge of surprise (not with the first Indian groups but certainly the camps farther north) may have changed the course of events drastically, if only in changing the time pendulum. This still looms as a tantamount aspect of this battle in my eyes. Okay, wILD I, I'll take my sunglasses off now. |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - September 11 2005 : 8:36:44 PM
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Ironically, no member of this expedition can be praised for any of their efforts. The battle was ill conceived, immoral, and completely unnecessary. When the Department of War insisted that all Indians report to their reservations before January 31, in the midst of winter, or be declared hostile, the government's true intent became obvious. No Indian would have attempted to move his loved ones during the winter season thereby jeopardizing his family. Winter was a time of scarcity of game to feed the Indian families. Hunters had to continuously scour the land to obtain sufficient quantities of sustenance to accommodated their families. Given credible time to comply with governmental demands a substantial portion of the village would have complied. While Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse may have continued to resist, the numbers of warriors would have been greatly reduced.
Custer, Benteen, Reno, and every man who accompanied them were forced into a situation not of their choosing and for that they should receive some sympathy. However, each of these officers were Academy trained professionals and responsible for their military decisions once combat was initiated. Discussing the successes and failures of the participants from the perspective of a "Monday Morning Quarterback" is harsh but, necessary to make some sense of what occurred here.
What is interesting, to me, is the amount of condemnation and/or justification we place upon the shoulders of these men dependent upon our own personal values. we judge them by what we think we would have done under the same circumstances. Strict objectivity is the key here but, how many of us are capable of being so. As human, we all, at one time or another, need to remove our "Rose colored" glasses when possible. |
Edited by - joseph wiggs on September 11 2005 9:04:35 PM |
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Benteen
Lt. Colonel
Status: offline |
Posted - September 11 2005 : 10:41:45 PM
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The extract was taken from "Troopers with Custer", by Brininstool. the ibid refers to this work.
Also nothing here is definitive. It's just a possible sequence of events. And possible explanations offered as questions. Enjoy.
Ford A to 700 yards:
(Captain French ibid pg 48) "I believe it was Company M which had the advance and was the first to ford the river, Company A followed, with G company in the rear." (DeRudio, ibid. pg 129-130:)"..we took the gallop, finally arriving at the high bank over the river (LBH ~ above ford A). Down the river, on the other side, and about a mile from us, we could see the Indian camp at the narrow strip of timber or brush, where there were some small cottonwood trees growing. At this point the stream ran close to the high banks. The Indian village was partly concealed from us by a bend in the river (and the cottonwoods). (Varnum ibid pg 99-100:) "The village was situated along the left bank of the LBH river. Owing to the bend in the stream and the timber around the left bank as you do down the bottom, it was almost impossible, unless one was well out on the plain, to see much of the village in comeing from the direction that we came. We could see some tepees, but it was impossible to note the extent of if or how large the village itself was." (DeRudio....pg 129,130) The indians, however, appeared at the edge of the camp in great numbers, mounted, and running around, apparently greatly excited."
(Lt. Chas. Varnum, pg 97 ibid:)
"We started out fifty to seventy-five yards ahead of the command. The river bottom opened out wider as we went down stream. There was qute a large body of Indians a little ways off, and they appeared to be running away from us, in every direction, apparently trying to kick up all the dust they could. In fact, there was so much dust in the air that it was impossible to judge anywhere near as to the number of Indians there."
(DeRudio....pg 129,130)
"On the opposite bank we formed in fours and took up the gallop toward the Indians. When within about seven hundred yards of them we came left front into line of battle across the river bottom." (***)The order ~Left front~ (still mounted) (Sgt Ryan, Nps LBH - Nat. mon.) "Left front into line," Captain French's Company M on the right and Lieutenant McIntosh's (G) company on the left, and Captain Moylan's (A company) in the rear .(Reno ibid, pg 167)"My first thought was to make a charge with two companies and hold the third as a rallying point." Reno at this point was still in his origional "attack mode" and the Left Front order as explained by Ryan I think, proves this.
(Lt. Chas. Varnum, pg 97 ibid:)"At times they (The indians) appeared to be running way, as I have stated, then halting and circling around. Suddenly I observed that they had stopped and turned backward, and I glanced back to ascertain the cause, and noticed the battalion deploying from column into line [(***) above ie. "Left Front order."] The command then moved forward again (mounted) and we also rode on, I suppose fifty yards in front of the command, and as we went down the river bottom we worked out toward the bluffs (not the bluffs Reno later retreated to ie.) toward the left of Major Reno's line. The Indians let us come closer and closer as we went down. We could see about half way down to where the final halt was made. There we observed a number of Indian tepees, and as we worked out toward the left, we could see yet more. The Indans were meantime circling and raising a dust which did not uncover the village very much."
500 yards to dismount:
(DeRudio...pg 129,130) ~ "When within about five hundred yards of the Indians (not the village) they opened fire on us." (Capt. French account, ibid pg 48): "Soon commences the rattle of rifle fire, and bullets began to whistle about us. I remember that I ducked my head and tried to dodge bullets which I could hear sizzing through the air. This was my first experience under fire. I know that for a time I was frightened, and far more so when I got my first glimpse of the Indians riding about in all directions, firing at us and yelling and whooping like incarnate fiends, all seemingly as naked as the day they were born, and painted from head to foot in the most hideous manner imaginable." Begs the question doesn't it? Did the indians know? Were they really surpised? The indian way of preparing for battle takes a little time, yet they seemed to have done this before Reno's charge. Also was the "smoke" (dust) screen of some significance? Again were they surprised or did they know?
"DeRudio ibid, pg 130) "As the Indians came out in great numbers to oppose us, and moreover as from this point we could see the extent of the village and the immense number of Indians it contained, and how impossible it appeared to be for us -- about 130 or 140 men -- to attempt to charge through such a superior force, our officers decided to act on the defensive. Orders were thereuon given to "Dismount and prepare to fight on foot." (Reno ibid, pg 167) " ...when I saw the number of Indians, I sent my adjutant to bring the third company on the line. (See( ***) above ~ ie Company A) I saw that I could not successfully make an offensive charge; their numbers had thrown me on the defensive. I dismounted by giving the order to the company officers...My opinion is that 600 to 700 (indians) were there, and I had but 112 men." [At 700 yards Reno was still in attack mode, holding to plan. 400 yards later he is dismounting to defend. At a full gallop they could easily cover that distance in a minute and a half, and surely, no more than 2 minutes, given that the horses were tired. What happened? Was it possible that the dust was beginning to clear, and before him was arrayed anywhere from the 400 to 900 indians? Anywhere from 4 to 1 / ~ 9 to 1 odds?]
Dismount
(French account, ibid pg 48:) "Our horses were scenting danger before we dismounted, and several at this point became unmanageable and started straight for the open among the Indians, carrying their helpless riders with them..."(Lt. Chas. Varnum, pg 97 ibid:) "...The ground between the right of Major Reno's command when it was deployed as skirmishers, and the river, along the edge of what was called the second bend in the bottom (Gary Owen Loop), contained some very heavy timber -- large trees (ie Cottonwoods!), the dense underbrush, and little paths, mady by animals, through it; and then there was a rather open glade, or grassy place. Also, there were willows and rushes and small trees down near the river, and brush or smaller timber nearere the bank of the stream. It might have been a hundred yards from the right of the skirmish line down to the river. At the time the line halted and formed the skirmish line, there had been a few shots fired, and there was a sort of engagement between some of the scouts and the indians. The ground immediately in front of the skirmish line in the direction of the village was open prarie, with some ravines."
Skirmish Line:
The Forming of the skimish line ~ a dismount at approximately 300 yards from the outskirts of village occured. (Col. Graham's letter ibid pg 179:) "He formed a skirmish line, dismounted, and that line advanced a hundred yards or more (they then advanced about 100 yards toward the village, making that distance 200 yards), (Col. Graham's letter ibid pg 179:) "and until the nearest tepees were withing range, for many of his bullets reached them." Confimation by (Lt. Chas. Varnum, pg 97 ibid:) "The point where Major Reno's skirmish line was formed was about two miles from the nearest point of the Indian village, and I should think about 200 yards further around the bend of the river to where the nearest tepees were, and the main bulk of the village was below that. There must ahve been a pretty solid lot of tepees right in front close together, in that bend..." (DeRudio ibid, pg 130) "... great numbers circled about within five hundred yards or less, all mounted and shooting at us. Our right rested near the brush, the left extending about two hundred yards across the plain, the men being three yards apart on the line."
Reno later commented; (Major Reno's testimony, ibid pg 167:) "I then knew nothing of the topography..." (Sgt Ryan, Nps internet)"When we got to the timber we rode down an embankment and dismounted. This was where the channel of the river changed (Gary Own Loop) and was probably several feet lower than the level of the prairie. We dismounted in haste, number four of each set of four holding the horses."
"We came up onto higher ground forming a skirmish line from the timber towards the bluffs on the other side of the valley and facing down stream in the direction of the Indian camp. Confirmation (French account, ibid pg 48:) "In forming the firing line ~we deployed to the left.~ By this time the Indians were coming in closer and in increasing numbers, circling about and raising such a dust that a great many of them had a chance to get in our rear under cover of it..." (Sgt Ryan, Nps internet) This was our first view of the Indian camp from the skirmish line. Some of the men laid down while others knelt down."
"At this particular place there was a prairiedog town and we used the mounds for temporary breast e works. We got the skirmish line formed and here the Indians made their first charge. There were probably 500 of them coming from the direction of their village. They were well mounted and well armed. They tried to cut through our skirmish line. We fired volleys into them repulsing their charge and emptying a number of their saddles. (Varnum: ibid, pg 101)
"When the skirmish line was formed I saw a good many excited men shooting right up in the air. There was very heavy firing going on on both sides..." Kinda makes you wonder doesn't it? This reportedly occured at Custer field also. Confirmation(Sgt Ryan, Nps) Lieutenant Hodgson walked up and down the line encouraging the men to keep cool and fire low."
(Col. Graham's letter ibid pg 179:) "He formed a skirmish line, dismounted, and that line advanced a hundred yards or more, and until the nearest tepees were withing range, for many of his bullets reached them. As soon as he did this, the Indians massed against his left flank, and came into the timber, where Reno had put his horses, from the right flank and rear." Seeing this Reno then: "... took G troop off the line and put it in the timber to protect the horses, and Moylan (A troop) extended to the right to fill the gap, and this extension made the line so weak that the left flank was crushed in, and he was forced to change front, and bring the line in to the edge of the timber."
Something to consider:
(Capt. Thomas French Pg 46 Troopers with Custer, Brininstool)
"This forced night march (24-25th) had much to do with the worn condition of our horses during the battle of the Little Big Horn. The Grazing had been por for several days, and as we were traveling in light marching order -- that is, without wagons -- there was little, if any, grain for our horses."
"As I recall, it was about daylight when we halted and made coffee. I remember this distinctly, because I did not get any of the coffee, haveing dropped down under a tree and fallen asleep, holding the bridle-rein of my horse, and I did not awaken until called to fall into line. WE did not unsaddle at this halt, so the animals secured but little rest."
(Lt. Varnum ibid pg 97) "I had not ridden near the troops from the morning of the 24th, haveing beenout in the hills, and I was so completely exhausted that I could hardly sit in the saddle. Nothing but the excitement of going into action kept me in the saddle at all."
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - September 12 2005 : 2:49:49 PM
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Wasn't aware this was French's first action.
Second, using terms like "the Indians" has its issues, since it implies all the Indians. Some Indians were aware the Army was coming, but there wasn't any structure to distributei information, and it was hit or miss. Later arrivals could easily have been in warpaint easily enough.
I'm not sure what you feel is accomplished here. You neglect contrary testimony, and although I tend to agree with you and these officers more than not, I'm not sure selective presentation is any more truthful than declaring shell casings part of the battle. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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Benteen
Lt. Colonel
Status: offline |
Posted - September 13 2005 : 10:03:03 AM
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| I am just using soldier testimony to create a chain of events. These "events" are of course open to criticism and discussion. I did ask several questions during the course of the statement. Thankyou for your reply. |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - September 13 2005 : 12:45:31 PM
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WB
he most likely would have lost more men
He would have lost them all in 15 minutes.
and a whole new set of parameters would have been put in place.Too true the Indians would have been free 45 minutes earlier to deal with Custer and Benteen.
True, there might have been 1500 warriors in front of Reno but he didn't know that, did he?
120 men according to my boyscout book of military tactics are required to defeat 40 defenders.Do you think the size of the village would have influenced Reno's actions?
what spooked him wILD I? The soldiers were yelling, whooping it up, psyching themselves up and were raring to go...but not Reno. He wanted to quiet them down.
It's called leadership.What he was getting paid to do.I really don't think the fact that raw inexperienced troops creating a song and dance should be taken into consideration.
A 3-prong attack was standard operation.
No no WB there was no 3 pronged anything.There was only a one pronged attack see that was the problem no coordination.
If the Indians had gone left, If the village would have been due west, If the hostiles would have known if only in changing the time pendulum.
If only me aunt had balls .Sorry to be rude WB but ya know----- |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
 Posted - September 13 2005 : 8:44:18 PM
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Wild, If your aunt had balls, she'd be your uncle. |
Edited by - joseph wiggs on September 13 2005 8:49:09 PM |
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whistlingboy
Lieutenant
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - September 14 2005 : 12:50:50 AM
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wILD I: I don't doubt that Major Reno in his career enjoyed some fine moments leading men into battle, but please tell me what book it is you read that is replete with his fellow soldiers lauding his fine leadership qualities and his cool, calm and collected behavior during this battle. Most of what I have seen reported of him during this battle speaks of his confusion, incoherency, shock, bewilderment, puzzlement and his indecisiveness as he reacted to the unfolding events.
You write with a sense of surety that Reno would have lost his men in 'fifteen' minutes if he would have maintained his course into the village. Maybe, but you have not mentioned, nor has anyone else, why Reno stopped and set up a skirmish line with no advancing Indians in his face and nearly negligible casualties. In my opinion, if this assumption is correct, and it may not be, this was his first mistake. His retreat to the woods and his ultimate decision to leave those woods for the high ground was his second and most costly mistake. His third mistake was the ineffective and indecisive implementation of his order to abandon the woods, which resulted in soldiers being left behind to fend for themselves. His 'charge' was panic motivated and not systematic army regulation. He disrespected himself, his soldiers, his professionalism and his country as he put his men in position to die running from the enemy instead of facing the enemy head-on. His helter skelter leadership instilled fear, not confidence, in his men as they scrambled for the high ground. His selfish disregard for his wounded and soldiers left behind was an abomination; their supreme sacrifice he was willing to risk. I am trying to find good in this strategic officer in this battle but his attitude was no longer out of West Point. |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - September 14 2005 : 04:35:26 AM
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Most of what I have seen reported of him during this battle speaks of his confusion, incoherency, shock, bewilderment, puzzlement and his indecisiveness as he reacted to the unfolding events.
First of all WB you have to realise a force of 120 men is negligible.Reno found to his surprise and puzzlement that the promised Custer support had not materialized and he had no reserves or fallback position.Custer had sent a pathetically under strenght force of tired raw inexperienced troops galloping into an enormious village.
No he was not indecisive.Only one maneuver could be called into question and as I have posted before I feel that his withdrawal to the timber was a mistake he should have got the hell out of the valley when he saw the size of the forces building in front of him but he stayed probably because of that promised support.
His 'charge' was panic motivated and not systematic army regulation.He disrespected himself, his soldiers, his professionalism and his country as he put his men in position to die running from the enemy instead of facing the enemy head-on.
Sure we know all that WB,but you see running from the enemy is regulation.As a general rule 50% of combatants will run from the enemy in combat.Most West Pointers who went through the civil war will have participated in that sort of thing but they lived to fight another day just as Reno did.Naw he was ok WB.He saw more action that day than any of the other senior officers and stuck to his task. |
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Responsibility At Little Bighorn
