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And too, gaining the initiative of surprise is just good common sense in any offensive/defensive dichotomy. Of course, I don't think General Custer thought he was surprising anybody.

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Originally posted by whistlingboy

Warlord: You do sound confident about your 'facts.' You seem to have your position in order. You are probably right about 'just dealing with facts.' I don't see them as clearly as you do so I get bogged down in emotion.

When I said he at least 'slowed them down' I was merely alluding to the 'fact' that the Indians never really again won anything and ran into their destiny. The irony was that even though the Army lost that physical battle, it used it to win the propaganda battle by achieving a consensus of contempt against what was left of the Indian nation. They had killed the nation's hero and would have to pay. Custer really didn't slow their movement, he stopped it in its tracks. Their life was reduced to running; being hunted down like a dog.

Not 'lagging' physically, mentally.

You say Custer wasn't a good Indian fighter but you don't say who was a good Indian fighter. I haven't found the manual yet prescribed for the Army at that time to fight the Indians but have some sources working on it for me. In the meantime, he was versed in small-tactical attacks which probably equipped him well enough to handle the situation.

It sounds like we think similarly on the higher-ups, whoever they were. You stated it quite well. Of course, it is nearly impossible to prove such emotional views.

Crook's 'back' wasn't broken down in Wyoming, his spirit was; unbecoming of an officer in charge. I hold him in contempt. Sorry. Reno too! Sorry. It takes a full commitment from everyone on a team--not three-fifths; not three-fourths. When the order is given to 'take the hill' that means everyone in the assault; not one man nor one company has the right to 'tail and run' before the job is done.

If Gibbon/Terry knew of all those Indians, possibly 6000 warriors, then he probably knew where they were and should have had everyone in position including his own rearend. Believing such 'intelligence' and then sending a smattering of soldiers to find 6000 warriors would seem rather suicidal. Being found out by 6000 warriors would be like walking into a Grizzley bear den by mistake--you don't leave without being eaten. I disagree that the 'plan' was well laid out. It had too many 'ifs' built in. So, let's send Mikey to check it out.

As I build my diorama, I will keep much of what you say in mind, though. Mine is going to be a little more elaborate than the one at the LBH park and most likely not totally in tune with its philosophy. But it will still play in the schools and be well received. I assure you of that. I am still trying to recognize a consensus view all along the trail as to the order of events so that my lecture will not have to include as many different 'points of view' as are often portrayed here at AAO.

"No me saques sin razon; no me envaines sin honor"

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Originally posted by BJMarkland

"Carrington was the only commanding officer I have a report on who actually shot a warrior off of his horse who was attacking him. It was probably the only person he ever killed in the line of duty. Nevertheless, he was a keen and competent commander who was never given the credit he deserved. His only real mistake in command was not delegating Fetterman to janitorial duties! Fetterman and Custer would have made a great team! They were both grandstanders and both disregarded orders and got a bunch of troops killed with them!"

I somewhat agree with the above. Carrington did kill an Indian on Dec. 6, 1866 as part of the engagement in which Bingham and Bowers were killed. Whether it was Fetterman or Grummond who really was responsible for leading the troops of the 18th Infantry and the company of the 2d Cavalry into the ambush north of Ft. Phil Kearny, is a topic which is still discussed by historians and psuedo-researchers such as I. It does boil down to the fact that Fetterman was in command of the detachment that day and, if he violated Carrington's orders so as to try to rescue Grummond and the cavalry, he carries the onus of that decision.

Oh, a clarification. To my knowledge, Carrington never even met Kit Carson. To my knowledge, Carson was never present on the Bozeman Trail in 1866 or 1867. However, Carrington had the services of what many of his contemporaries considered the greatest of the mountain men/scouts - Jim Bridger. Bridger defended Carrington's actions during that summer and fall on the Little Piney in a letter he dictated and sent to the Army and Navy Journal as follows.

Best of wishes,

Billy


The Army and Navy Journal
Vol. IV, 6/29/1867

[Trancriber’s Note: Italics are as found in the original.]

To the Editor of the Army and Navy Journal.

Sir: I propose to give, in as few words as possible, my views of Indian affairs in what is called the Powder River country. In June last a so-called treaty was made at Fort Laramie, D. T. I was at Fort Laramie at the time the preliminary council was held, and told the commissioners that the treaty would not amount to anything, but that all the Indians wanted was to receive presents and procure a supply of powder and lead, and then they would take the war path, and would plunder trains and murder emigrants going over the road. A preliminary council was held, at which most of the principle chiefs of the Sioux and Cheyenne tribes were present. They were dissatisfied with the provisions of the proposed treaty, and were unwilling to grant the right of way for an emigrant road from Fort Laramie, D. T., to Virginia City, Montana Territory, and left the fort soon after and returned to their homes. None of the Cheyenne, Arapahoe, or principle Sioux chiefs, who live in the country through which the road runs, signed the treaty. The chiefs who signed the treaty, and the Indians who received the principle portion of the presents, were the “Laramie loafers” and “road beggars” – a class of Indians who hang around Fort Laramie, and gain their living by begging and stealing.

On the 16th of June last Colonel Carrington’s command left for Fort Reno, D. T., the only post then established on the line of the proposed road. On the day after our arrival there, some of these Sioux stole about fifty head of mules and horses from the vicinity of the post.

On the 16th of July the principle part of the command arrived at the place selected as the site of Fort Philip Kearny, D. T. The next day these same friendly Indians, who were said to have made a treaty, ran off eighty head of Government mules, and in trying to recover them several men lost their lives. Three days later a small detachment of officers and men – twenty in all – on their way to join their regiment at Fort Philip Kearny, were attacked on Crazy Woman’s Fork of Powder River, between Forts Reno and Philip Kearny, and one (Lieutenant Daniels) was killed. From this time until emigration ceased passing over the road nearly every train was, more or less, harrassed [sic], and mail and other small parties were frequently attacked.

Now, as to the Philip Kearny massacre, it has been said that the Indians did not approach with hostile intent, but that the commanding officer of the post, mistaking their intentions, fired on them, and thus brought on a fight. This is preposterous. Up to that time the Indians had been hanging around the fort every day, stealing stock on every opportunity, attacking the trains going to the woods, and even stealing up at night and shooting men connected with passing trains, while they were sitting around their camp fires, within one hundred yards of the fort. But a few days before the massacre a train going to the woods was attacked, and in defending it, Lieutenant Bingham, a promising young officer of the Second Cavalry, and one Sergeant, lost their lives. This may be a sign of friendship, but I don’t think so. Every person that knows anything of affairs in this country knows very well that the massacre at Fort Philip Kearny was planned weeks before, and that the Sioux, Cheyennes and Arapahoes had been collecting together, in preparation for it, on Tongue River, until they numbered 2,200 lodges. The intention was to attack Fort Philip Kearny first, and if they were successful to then attack Fort C. F. Smith. At the present time the entire tribe of Northern Sioux are collecting on Powder River, below the mouth of Little Powder River, and their avowed intention is to make a vigorous and determined attack on each of the three posts, and on all trains that may come along the road. Friendly Indians report that they are being supplied with ammunition by half-breed traders connected with the Hudson’s Bay Company. There is no use sending out commissioners to treat with them, as it will be only acting over again last Summer’s scenes. They would be willing to enter into any temporary treaty to enable themselves to get fully supplied with powder with which to carry on the war. The only way to settle the question is to send out a sufficient number of troops to completely whip the hostile Sioux, Cheyennes and Arapahoes, and make them sue for peace. Unless this is done the road had better be abandoned and the country given up to the Indians.

I have been in this country among these Indians nearly forty-four years, and am familiar with their past history, and my experiences and knowledge of them is greater than can be gained by any commissioners during the sittings of any council that may be held. I know that these Indians will not respect any treaty until they have been whipped into it.

James Bridger,
May 4, 1867

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Originally posted by Warlord

Whistlingboy:
Hunc tu caveto! Hoc tempore obsequium amicos, veritas odium parit!

Mundus vult decidi, ergo decipiatur!

Salutations!

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