| Author |
 Topic  |
|
wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
 Posted - November 23 2004 : 3:33:41 PM
|
Thanks for the link Dave.
Just one observation on the action at Rourke's drift.The total frontage of the British position was no more than 100 yards at the begining of the fight and when the hospital was over run perhaps 50 yards.Can you just imagine the crush among the 4500 Zulu as they tried to come to grips with the garrison?It must have been a butchers yard. |
  |
|
|
wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - November 23 2004 : 3:44:49 PM
|
| No, folks. Custer's bunch never could have won a fight there.I think Heavyrunner we were speculating that if Custer had done things differently he might have survived.A case can be made for survival but I agree I could never see a victory for the 7th here. |
|
|
|
Heavyrunner
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 23 2004 : 4:09:51 PM
|
wILD,
I agree that he could have survived, but I would only guarantee it had he hauled ass in the opposite direction. He clearly overestimated himself and underestimated his foe. Historians, as I recall, write about numerous villages along the Wa****a in Nov. of 1868, yet they didn't respond in force to the attack on Black Kettle.
Custer's rather sloppy effort there only leaves me to wonder whether it all couldn't have happened to him then, along with most or all of his command. |
Bob Bostwick |
|
|
|
frankboddn
Major
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 24 2004 : 02:43:47 AM
|
DC, I think Fetterman was basically led down massacre ridge by the decoys to Peno Creek, and when the trap was sprung, they were chased back the same way they had come. If you've looked at the terrain, when Fetterman came down Lodge Pole, I'd have thought he'd take the route where highway 87, I think it is, runs. But he was led down that high ground and then retreated back. I was always curious also why the Bozeman Trail would follow such a route instead of easier lower ground. The Indians literally led Fetterman down that part of the Bozeman Trail.
quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
Whoever brought Fetterman's and Custer's guys to indefensibly visible high ground against a much greater number to no military point is the one at fault, although in both cases not necessarily the names associated with the fiascos.
|
|
|
|
Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 24 2004 : 2:47:07 PM
|
| I suppose he or whoever was just following the decoys (who, from descriptions, barely stopped short of having FBI type stencil DECOY on the back of their shirts as their ponies went 'lame' and they dismounted to examine them) regardless of ground, being an apparent idiot and falling for a trap similar to that sprung on them only days before. What's now the highway could have been forest and not so inviting for all I know. Actually, for hundreds of Indians to 'hide' there'd have to be more trees or something. There's a whole lot of this as at LBH that doesn't make a lot of sense to me, but Fetterman's site has probably changed far more than LBH. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
|
|
|
frankboddn
Major
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 24 2004 : 9:33:23 PM
|
DC, I'm curious, I'd never thought about how much the terrain at the Fetterman might have changed. I'd be interested in what you feel it looked like back then. Do you think it was forest? Iv'e often wondered also how they could've hidden so many Indians on the side of the ridge. I've driven down highway 87, or whatever it is, from the north as far as you're allowed to go and looked over the terrain, again, not having thought about it being heavily treed, and felt they could have hidden a lot of Indians there especially if Fetterman had been lead down the middle of the ridge. Have you ever read any accounts by people who served at the fort of descriptions of the ridge and surrounding areas? I'm really interested in hearing this.
quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
I suppose he or whoever was just following the decoys (who, from descriptions, barely stopped short of having FBI type stencil DECOY on the back of their shirts as their ponies went 'lame' and they dismounted to examine them) regardless of ground, being an apparent idiot and falling for a trap similar to that sprung on them only days before. What's now the highway could have been forest and not so inviting for all I know. Actually, for hundreds of Indians to 'hide' there'd have to be more trees or something. There's a whole lot of this as at LBH that doesn't make a lot of sense to me, but Fetterman's site has probably changed far more than LBH.
|
|
|
|
BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 25 2004 : 09:27:45 AM
|
quote:
Originally posted by frankboddn
I was always curious also why the Bozeman Trail would follow such a route instead of easier lower ground. The Indians literally led Fetterman down that part of the Bozeman Trail.
Frank, I am going purely by memory here but I recall from a book of emigrant's journals that leaving the fort, both trails were used. The lower trail, if I recall correctly, was abandoned because of the number of ravines to be crossed. The effort in crossing those ravines negated any time/resource advantage gained over the Fetterman route despite the Fetterman route's steep initial grade that had to be climbed.
I will try to hunt down the book to verify my memory and get it posted today but I still have to do some work to clean up storm debris from yesterday's snow.
Happy Thanksgiving everyone,
Billy
|
|
|
|
BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 25 2004 : 10:19:39 AM
|
quote:
Originally posted by Warlord
Custer and Fetterman are exaples of commanders who did not follow orders and did not handle their command prudently. Fetterman was the outstanding example. Col Carrington, Commander of Fort Phil Kearney was sending a relief detachment to their wood train under attack by Indians. He intended to place Captain Powell in charge of a detachment of mixed cavalry and infantry for this purpose. Captain Fetterman showed up and argued to be placed in command as he outranked Powell by way of a Civil War brevet rank. Carrington allowed himself to be wheedled into placing the glory hungry Fetterman in command of the detachment. He told him three times not to cross Lodge Trail Ridge under any circumstances before departure. Fetterman encountered a number of Indian decoys which he immediately chased. He left the infantry detachment to fend for itself and chased the Indians over the ridge, following a sloping ridge down into Peno Flat which was complete with an estimated 2,000 hostile Indians. The issue was never in doubt!
Let's break that down.
1) The relief force for the wood train was initially only infantry. Only after the infantry left did Carrington send Lt. Grummond and C company of the 2nd Cav. to join it. Grummond was told by Carrington to place himself under the orders of Fetterman.
2) Documentation regarding the veracity of whether Fetterman demanded the role of relief force commander is only Carrington's statement. No one else testified to whether that actually occurred or not. Powell didn't refer to it but Powell's testimony is so flawed as to almost be perjurous. Lt. Wands, acting Adjutant, only states in his testimony that Fetterman was assigned command. All that being said, I have no reason to doubt Carrington's version of this event. Also, Carrington had requested that the committee question John Edwards, HQ clerk who was present when he gave the order to Fetterman, but he was never questioned.
3) Carrington, in his testimony, states that he gave the order to Fetterman to, "Support the wood train, relieve it and report to me. Do not engage or pursue Indians at its expense. Under no circumstances pursue over the ridge viz; Lodge Trail Ridge, as per map in your possession." After Lt. Grummond was assigned to join Fetterman, Carrington instructed Lt. Wands to give the same order to Grummond. Wishing to reinforce that, immediately after Grummond had left the post, Carrington shouted the same orders to Grummond who acknowledged them. Whether Grummond repeated them to Fetterman is unknown.
Warlord, before I started reading up on the Ft. Phil Kearny saga, I had the same initial opinion that you have regarding Fetterman. Over time, my opinion has changed, influenced by reading and conversations with historians who know more about it than I. I am coming more and more to the conclusion that Grummond and Brown were actually the catalysts for the disaster of Dec. 21. It is my belief that Grummond, followed eagerly by Brown, took out over the ridge after the decoys forcing Fetterman and the infantry to march on in support. Once the two forces were separated far enough to be beyond mutually supporting range, and in the case of the cavalry, strung out, the Indians popped the ambush. Regardless of the catalyst, Fetterman was in command and should be considered responsible.
Warlord, I don't know if you have this link but most of the transcripts of the testimony regarding the Fetterman battle can be found at my site:
http://freepages.history.rootsweb.com/~familyinformation/
Carrington's official report of the battle is in page 5 of Carrington's testimony.
Frank, regarding the terrain in 1866. I think, I need to find where I read this, that most of the surrounding area was scrub and heavy brush. Again that is only memory and since I have had only one cup of coffee this morning, it may be erroneous. Also, I saw the other day in the Archives that you were looking for the photographer's name who was killed at FPK. That was Ridgeway Glover of Frank Leslie's Illustrated News.
Happy Thanksgiving,
Billy
|
Edited by - BJMarkland on November 25 2004 10:21:52 AM |
|
|
|
frankboddn
Major
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 25 2004 : 11:29:30 AM
|
Thanks, Billy. Happy Thanksgiving to all.quote:
Originally posted by BJMarkland
quote:
Originally posted by frankboddn
I was always curious also why the Bozeman Trail would follow such a route instead of easier lower ground. The Indians literally led Fetterman down that part of the Bozeman Trail.
Frank, I am going purely by memory here but I recall from a book of emigrant's journals that leaving the fort, both trails were used. The lower trail, if I recall correctly, was abandoned because of the number of ravines to be crossed. The effort in crossing those ravines negated any time/resource advantage gained over the Fetterman route despite the Fetterman route's steep initial grade that had to be climbed.
I will try to hunt down the book to verify my memory and get it posted today but I still have to do some work to clean up storm debris from yesterday's snow.
Happy Thanksgiving everyone,
Billy
|
|
|
|
Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - November 25 2004 : 6:33:36 PM
|
quote:
Originally posted by Warlord
Fetterman encountered a number of indian decoys which he immediatly chased. He left the infantry detachment to fend for itself and chased the indians over the ridge, following a sloping ridge down into Peno Flat which was complete with an estimated 2,000 hostile indians. The issue was never in doubt!
There is no evidence Fetterman ever left the infantry. He died with them. As far as anyone can tell from the Indian reports, what happened is that the cavalry chased after the decoys, and ran far ahead of the infantry which apparently tried to follow them once they broke away. I doubt Fetterman did anything stupid that day, except try to save Grummond's butt once he foolishly chased the decoys way beyond support (the point where the cavalry was ambushed at Wheatley-Fisher rocks is something like a mile from the rocks where it seems all the infantry were killed). Read the accounts of the skirmish on December 6, which fell out very similar in outline to what the Indians say happened December 21. In the 12/6 skirmish, Grummond disobeyed orders and helped get people killed; Fetterman did well and saved lives. Nobody knows for sure what happened that day, but based on past behavior I think it's more likely that Fetterman has been given more scorn than he deserves, and that Grummond has been let off too easily.
R. Larsen
|
|
|
|
Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - November 25 2004 : 6:57:08 PM
|
quote:
Originally posted by Warlord
Ultimately the one in command bears the reponsibility for whatever happens. Like it or not that is the fact of life for the military. Lt. Grummound was a Lieutenant Fetterman was the Captain!
That's military convention, convenient and useful because in a hierarchy someone has to stop the buck, and it makes identifying that person simpler --- but historiography is a different field. A historian has the responsibility to inquire into the details, and consider what mistakes may have been made on other levels than just the top, which may in the event have had more importance than anything the guy with the most brass did.
quote:
Be careful of some "historians" sometimes they tend to slant or rewrite history. Nevertheless we know a lot about when Captain Fetterman left the fort and there are numerous witness'. One of the best books on this matter I like, is "The Fetternan Massacre" By Dee Brown. It is quite clear and unencumbered by stilted language. And I quote:
Brown's book is inferior to a single chapter in one of Jesse Vaughn's books.
quote:
Now this is crystal clear. It is also obvious Col. Carrington was more than a little concerned about Fetterman the impetuous, getting himself and his command wiped out by an ambush. Carrington's testimony is beyond refute. He was a careful and prudent man and should have never placed Fetterman in command. He made a mistake. Happens to all of us. The problem here is, it was the cause of a horrendous disaster. Carrington would spend the rest of his life defending his actions.
Why should he never have placed Fetterman in command? He was one of his best officers, and one of the few who hadn't done anything embarassing on December 6.
quote:
One of the huge problems is the underestimation of the enemy. These officers were continually on record as saying they would be able to cut through the indians with one company or less.
That's just gossip.
quote:
They had just won a terrible, terrible war and were like on a high. In fact, they were facing what most military authorities regarded as "The finest light cavalry in the world." Of course, mistakes are a learning process, but must be paid for.
(good info on the website)
Who are "most military authorities"?
R. Larsen
|
Edited by - Anonymous Poster8169 on November 25 2004 7:53:33 PM |
|
|
|
BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 26 2004 : 10:21:28 AM
|
Slightly off the off-topic conversation department. Personally, I enjoyed Brown's book on the FPK saga. It was readable and interesting. The research was relatively good. To me though, the importance of that book is the fact that it "hooked" me into further hard research of the primary sources as well as other secondary sources.
To further horrify everyone, let me give the chronology of my interest in the Indian Wars.
1) Learned to read
2) Began reading Louis L'Amour westerns - No dirty comments, he was a great writer before he began spending every other page pontificating on the mysteries of life.
3) Discovered Will Henry westerns - Still one of the all-time best Western novelists. His No Survivors is the first (and only) book I am aware of which had the protagonist survive Fetterman's fight and participate and live through the Custer debacle. He also wrote a novel based upon the ride of Portugee Phillips. I think it was Red Blizzard and it may have been written under Henry's nom de plume, Clay Fisher.
4) Read Allen Eckert's The Frontiersman a novelized treatment of the life of Simon Kenton. Eckert, in my opinion, is still one of the best historians on the first American frontier, east of the Mississippi.
5) Read Johnston's first three books dealing with Fetterman's Fight, the Wagon Box & Hayfield fights, and Beecher's Island. Still good reading and well researched.
6) Hooked by the above, found Brown's book and enjoyed that.
7) Moved to Kansas with my company and begin taking vacations out West.
Thus, an expensive and enjoyable hobby was borne.
Best of wishes,
Billy |
|
|
|
frankboddn
Major
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 26 2004 : 2:30:00 PM
|
Billy, thanks for the input. I never thought the area along the ridge or both sides of the ridge was heavily treed, but felt it looked very much like it looks today, which is still scrub brush except for the trees along Peno Creek. There's lots of boulders and ravines also on both sides of the ridge. Thanks for the input also on Ridgeway Glover. He is mentioned in Terry C. Johnston's books abaout the fight at Crazy Woman Creek where Lt. Daniels was killed, as well as accounts of the same fight by Dee Brown in The Fetterman Massacre and Fred Chiaventone's book Moon of Bitter Cold. It's always fascinated me that his photos or the plates he made of Ft. Phil and the surrounding area might be sitting in someone's attic or cellar and the owner's don't know what they have. The Bozeman Trail and Ft. Phil Kearny is of more interest to me, or I should say fascinates me more than the LBH. So much happened there. Oh, well. Thanks again. Happy Thanksgiving.
quote:
Originally posted by BJMarkland
quote:
Originally posted by Warlord
Custer and Fetterman are exaples of commanders who did not follow orders and did not handle their command prudently. Fetterman was the outstanding example. Col Carrington, Commander of Fort Phil Kearney was sending a relief detachment to their wood train under attack by Indians. He intended to place Captain Powell in charge of a detachment of mixed cavalry and infantry for this purpose. Captain Fetterman showed up and argued to be placed in command as he outranked Powell by way of a Civil War brevet rank. Carrington allowed himself to be wheedled into placing the glory hungry Fetterman in command of the detachment. He told him three times not to cross Lodge Trail Ridge under any circumstances before departure. Fetterman encountered a number of Indian decoys which he immediately chased. He left the infantry detachment to fend for itself and chased the Indians over the ridge, following a sloping ridge down into Peno Flat which was complete with an estimated 2,000 hostile Indians. The issue was never in doubt!
Let's break that down.
1) The relief force for the wood train was initially only infantry. Only after the infantry left did Carrington send Lt. Grummond and C company of the 2nd Cav. to join it. Grummond was told by Carrington to place himself under the orders of Fetterman.
2) Documentation regarding the veracity of whether Fetterman demanded the role of relief force commander is only Carrington's statement. No one else testified to whether that actually occurred or not. Powell didn't refer to it but Powell's testimony is so flawed as to almost be perjurous. Lt. Wands, acting Adjutant, only states in his testimony that Fetterman was assigned command. All that being said, I have no reason to doubt Carrington's version of this event. Also, Carrington had requested that the committee question John Edwards, HQ clerk who was present when he gave the order to Fetterman, but he was never questioned.
3) Carrington, in his testimony, states that he gave the order to Fetterman to, "Support the wood train, relieve it and report to me. Do not engage or pursue Indians at its expense. Under no circumstances pursue over the ridge viz; Lodge Trail Ridge, as per map in your possession." After Lt. Grummond was assigned to join Fetterman, Carrington instructed Lt. Wands to give the same order to Grummond. Wishing to reinforce that, immediately after Grummond had left the post, Carrington shouted the same orders to Grummond who acknowledged them. Whether Grummond repeated them to Fetterman is unknown.
Warlord, before I started reading up on the Ft. Phil Kearny saga, I had the same initial opinion that you have regarding Fetterman. Over time, my opinion has changed, influenced by reading and conversations with historians who know more about it than I. I am coming more and more to the conclusion that Grummond and Brown were actually the catalysts for the disaster of Dec. 21. It is my belief that Grummond, followed eagerly by Brown, took out over the ridge after the decoys forcing Fetterman and the infantry to march on in support. Once the two forces were separated far enough to be beyond mutually supporting range, and in the case of the cavalry, strung out, the Indians popped the ambush. Regardless of the catalyst, Fetterman was in command and should be considered responsible.
Warlord, I don't know if you have this link but most of the transcripts of the testimony regarding the Fetterman battle can be found at my site:
http://freepages.history.rootsweb.com/~familyinformation/
Carrington's official report of the battle is in page 5 of Carrington's testimony.
Frank, regarding the terrain in 1866. I think, I need to find where I read this, that most of the surrounding area was scrub and heavy brush. Again that is only memory and since I have had only one cup of coffee this morning, it may be erroneous. Also, I saw the other day in the Archives that you were looking for the photographer's name who was killed at FPK. That was Ridgeway Glover of Frank Leslie's Illustrated News.
Happy Thanksgiving,
Billy
|
|
|
|
Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - November 26 2004 : 4:56:45 PM
|
quote:
Originally posted by Warlord
John S. Gray's book "Custer's last campaign is very dry. I use it to put myself to sleep at night. Nevertheless, he is a spectacular researcher! I have never seen anyone do the time lines he has done on LBH. So you see the military reports are usually much more reliable and on target than amateur "Historiographer's"(sic) as you seem so fixated on!
I don't know what you're talking about.
quote:
All of this makes no difference at the battle site. The commander is responsible! You argue upper decisions, extenuating circumstances and the weather have all affected this. So what! At that time and place the commander must work with what he has! Mistakes found years later are nice to know, but have no influence on the fight!
This doesn't make any sense. If Grummond did charge off without orders, as he did two weeks earlier, how could that not have had any influence on the fight?
quote:
As for Brown's book being inferior to a single chapter of Vaughn's book. That is an assumption on your part! Since I know Brown's book is good, why would I or you, think another somewhat better book might make Brown's no good or moot? A clearly unwarranted assumption!
I never claimed that Brown was "no good or moot" --- that's an assumption all yours. I did express an opinion, though, formed from reading both works, which you have not done. Compared to the work Vaughn did on the massacre, Brown's treatment is superficial and too dependent on gossip and secondary sources. To be fair, Brown's focus was not on the Fetterman Massacre per se, but on Fort Phil Kearny as a whole during 1866 (the original title for his book was "Fort Phil Kearny") though by retitling his book "The Fetterman Massacre" to rake in people like you he invites unflattering comparisons to others who have done superior work on the subject. Vaughn published his work under the bland title, "Indian Fights". I'm sure the sales were predictably poor.
quote:
As far as Captain Fetterman being placed in command (and he was!), you are begining to reach. Fetterman was not one of Col. Carringtons best officer's! He was inexperienced in indian fighting and slow to learn! He was glory happy! And as Brown points out he was the head of a rebellious group of officers toward Carrington. He was the one in command and therefore responsible! This cannot be questioned by anyone familiar with the situation!
Where do you want to draw the line in command? Carrington was in overall command of the thing, he hatched the idea for a sorty against the Indians, and appointed the men involved. Why cut the line of responsibility before you come to him? Conversely, Grummond was responsible for only a small part of the people involved --- the cavalry --- though the actions of this group seems to have done the most to bring the disaster about.
As for Fetterman, he was not one of Carrington's best officers compared to what? Bingham, the guy who panicked and fled the scene of battle on 12/6, only to later wildly ride into the Indian lines (perhaps in overcompensation) and get himself killed? Grummond, who disobeyed orders on 12/6 and had a Civil War record so poor that though a brevet brigadier general he could get a rank no higher than 2nd Lt in the Reorganized Army? Wands, who somehow forgot to obey Carrington's instructions to join him on 12/6 and ended up with his pal Brown? Brown, who habitually joined sorties (including Fetterman's) without orders, so that Carrington didn't even know where he was at the time? Powell and Ten Eyck, habitual drunks? (Powell's testimony to the Commission is so off-center that one half-suspects, not totally unseriously, that he was "loaded" at the time he gave it). I don't have any qualms considering Fetterman one of Carrington's best officers. Though he didn't have much Indian-fighting experience (none of them did, really) he had a Civil War record that was held by those who have looked at it to be competent and untainted by either genius or idiocy, and he'd been exposed to more action than most of the people he was with, including Carrington. His report on the action of 12/6 is reflective and tactfully critical, and gives no support to your claim that he was "slow to learn". I don't think you're writing from much familiarity with the subject. I don't think you read the documents on Billy's website either, though you praised it.
quote:
Now you really lose it! I know you have read the same analysis' I have of the plains indians as light cavalry! You feign ignorance! And like I have said before you do your own research when you act silly! Pick up any book on the plains indian wars!! I think you do this in an attempt to pull people's chains and get them to waste their time. Do it to someone else!!!
I'm just curious who the "most military authorities" you refer to are. Calm down. I haven't actually read most military authorities say this, which is why I ask. If you've actually read the "analysis'" that you claim, then it should be absurdly easy to answer my question. Consult your notes.
R. Larsen
|
|
|
|
Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 27 2004 : 5:29:19 PM
|
I don't understand the rush to revise the opinion of Fetterman.
His direct orders were to protect the woodtrain at the expense of all else and in no case to go over Lodge Pole Ridge. In direct and pointless violation of orders, he left the train to its fate (coincidently it didn't matter) and ran over Lodge Pole Ridge, both endangering the survival of the fort (not unlimited men, horses, wagons, saws in freezing weather) as well as that of his men. If Grummund took off against orders, Fetterman's responsibility was to the train by order and common sense, not to rescue Grummund, and certainly not past a point forbidden.)
Just as Reno and Benteen's responsbilities were not to rescue Custer, but complete the 7th's mission. Wasn't it?
Also, this term "finest light cavalry" in the world I've seen applied to the Commanche and the Cheyenne but not to the Sioux and certainly not the Apache. Was it generic to all plains Indians or is it just a convenient, all purpose phrase? |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
|
|
|
hunkpapa7
Lieutenant
United Kingdom
Status: offline |
Posted - November 27 2004 : 5:55:10 PM
|
IMO Reno/Benteen where probarbly fortunate to a certain degree that Gibbon/Terry arrived when it did,not that I am saying the NA would have charged in large numbers,but probarbly would have kept up firing from sharpshooters ridge,and letting the weather etc take its toll until they decided to move camp.
If GAC had attacked full frontal with his full command,who knows what the outcome would have been.
It certainly wouldn't have been another Wa****a,considering how quick the NA attacked in numbers on Reno and they where going to fight.
Another Rosebud ? on a far larger scale,there certainly would have been a bigger death & wounded toll.Plus the fact they where defending there families etc.
Probarbly GAC would have held the upper hand at first,but once the NA got numbers in there that would tip the balance in there favour.
Close combat would be the order of the day then,and I dont think the 7th had enough experience to cope with that.
Remembering the vision that Sitting Bull had about soldiers attacking the camp & being beaten[upside down]also he had said that the Rosebud battle was not the vision he had seen,they must have been pretty confident.
But there again the LBH throws up these senarios |
wev'e caught them napping boys
Aye Right ! |
|
|
|
Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - November 27 2004 : 9:54:42 PM
|
quote:
Originally posted by Warlord
Fetterman was not a good officer PERIOD. He resented Carrington because he had not been in combat. That means he was thinking with emotions, not concentrating on orders!
Neither you nor I have any idea how he thought, and calling him "not a good officer PERIOD" is silly, and not known to be shared by many who knew him, in both wars. I didn't know being an admirer of Henry Carrington was a qualification of a good officer.
quote:
I am familiar with Brown's book and have reviewed the fight on a number of websites. I have reviewed what some of the messageboard members have said about it. That is the extent of my knowledge, doesn't make me ignorant of it, but does not suggest graduate study, does it? Do you want me to take a exam of yours on a subject I have already said I do not have extensive knowledge on?
No, though if you intend to be so adamant in your opinions it would serve you to acquaint yourself with the originals instead of Brown and "websites". Billy Markland, through what I'm sure was long and tedious work, has conveniently provided them for you, so there's really no excuse not to.
quote:
Now this business about the indians being damn fine horsemen!
Not damn fine horsemen, Warlord. "The best light cavalry in the world". Don't try to change the subject in order to wiggle out of some hyperbole.
quote:
"George Catlin believed the Plains Indians to be the greatest horsemen the world has ever known." P. 219 Mystic Warriors of the Plains.
I never knew Catlin to be a military authority, which is irrelevant in any case since the opinion reported 2nd hand here does nothing to aid your claim.
quote:
"The plains indian who inhabited much of the area were splendid riders. They traveled and fought on horseback with a skill that gained them the respect of the U.S. Cavalry". Armor-Cavalry Part 1, Regular and Army Reserve by staff, Office of Military History.
A lucid appraisal, but one which declines to claim for them the honor of being the "best light cavalry in the world". You said "most" military authorities thought this?
quote:
"While they were probably the finest light cavalry ever, the objective of warfare for plains indians was not total defeat of the enemy, but rather glorification of the individual warriors prowess."
Coup,stick and Lance.
Never heard of this book, though he's more conservative than you in stamping only a "probably" on it. This is the only quote you've included which actually relates to what you were talking about. One quote (out of three) does not represent "most military authorities".
It's not kosher to make claims on authority, Warlord, when (as is painfully obvious) you don't even know who that authority is. For the record, I know of one person who said it, who is probably the source, directly or indirectly, for all the people who have since dutifully mimed it over the last hundred years (it's hard to tell, actually, since the people infatuated with grandiose claims like that tend not to do sourcing). John G. Bourke, "On the Border with Crook," page 338. It was a claim he made (so he says) on the fly while in a rapture observing a "drill" being performed for his amusement by Chief Washakie's Shoshones. Bourke was just a young lieutenant and had no known grounds for making the judgment, other than that he thought Washakie was really cool. I hope the anonymous author of "Coup, Stick & Lance" credited Bourke with the opinion he probably copied from him, but since you seem unaware of a source for the opinion I doubt it.
Anytime somebody calls the Sioux (Bourke was admiring a group of Shoshones, but never mind) the finest light cavalry in the world, whether they know it or not, they're probably quoting a junior officer named Bourke, since his book has been widely read and much of it distilled anonymously into others' books. A comment Bourke did not try to justify, because he could not. I think it's odd that this piece of throwaway rapture is so belovedly repeated by people (and not just you, Warlord) who have no idea where it came from.
R. Larsen
|
|
|
|
Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - November 27 2004 : 10:03:34 PM
|
quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
His direct orders were to protect the woodtrain at the expense of all else and in no case to go over Lodge Pole Ridge. In direct and pointless violation of orders, he left the train to its fate (coincidently it didn't matter) and ran over Lodge Pole Ridge, both endangering the survival of the fort (not unlimited men, horses, wagons, saws in freezing weather) as well as that of his men. If Grummund took off against orders, Fetterman's responsibility was to the train by order and common sense, not to rescue Grummund, and certainly not past a point forbidden.)
I don't argue that Fetterman's decision to take the infantry over the ridge (and unlike the cavalry's decision to chase the decoys, it's pretty certain that that was a decision Fetterman made) was a bad move that, though well-meaning maybe, in cold military calculations should not have been made. I just think the common interpretation that the disaster was caused by Fetterman being superaggressive and stupidly ferocious to be unlikely, and think instead that he was reacting to a situation Grummond unexpectedly (and unwantedly) put him in. He clearly lost control of the situation, since even if it was he who ordered Grummond to pursue the decoys, I can scarcely imagine that it would have been part of his battle plan for the cavalry to outrun the infantry by a mile.
Perhaps it may not make all that much difference in the final assessment, but my own opinion is that the Fetterman Massacre probably never would have happened had Grummond not been there, and I also think that what happened that day, the fault usually being totally put on the head of Fetterman, has distorted people's perceptions of him as an officer to negative extremes unwarranted by his actual actions in life.
R. Larsen
|
Edited by - Anonymous Poster8169 on November 27 2004 10:09:34 PM |
|
|
|
Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - November 27 2004 : 11:20:39 PM
|
quote:
Originally posted by Warlord
As far as the indians not being the best light cavalry in the world, if you can't understand the statement and what is behind it, you are a fool!! It is a case of well known statements and the logical end of lifelong training in the saddle! The fact you can not comprhend that puts you at a low level of learning indeed!
I comprehend it perfectly; I also have never seen anybody seriously try to justify it. Certainly not your phantom "most military authorities". Again, calm down. The rest of your post is incoherent squall.
R. Larsen
|
|
|
|
BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 28 2004 : 08:21:53 AM
|
I just finished transcribing an article from the Journal of the Military Institute of the U.S. by Bvt. Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt entitled "Cavalry: Its Organization and Armament" which touches on a couple of things we have discussed. This article was published in 1880, no month given.
Here are Col. Merritt's comments regarding armament of the cavalry soldier.
"This is covered in three words: sabre, carbine, pistol. The sabre should be carried on the saddle by a simple contrivance now in use on the frontier. In referring to this manner of carrying the sabre, it may be said that it is entirely free from objection, either in injury to the weapon or in inconvenience to the horse or trooper. Also, by this method of attachment the sometime serious objection that the sabre is noisy on marches to be conducted with secrecy, is entirely removed. Besides, it is at hand for use, and never in the way when a command is dismounted.
The carbine now in the possession of the cavalry is an excellent arm. In actual practice at targets, for ranges up to from two to five hundred yards, it has been found to be as good an arm as the infantry rifle in accuracy of fire, and in some respects preferable. As a breech-loader, I doubt if there is any superior arm, though I have always been partial to Sharps' carbine. Improvements in resighting the carbine, as recently suggested, would undoubtedly be advantageous. A magazine gun of about the same size would be a great improvement, as an arm for cavalry. The Spencer answered a good purpose in the last years of our civil war, though much fault was found with it, because of accidents in service, afterwards on the Plains. The carbine should always be carried slung as provided for in our tactics.
The pistol (Colt's revolver) I consider the least useful of the three arms. On all occasions when it can be used, the trooper is least fitted to use it to advantage. In the shock of a charge (no cavalry soldier will recommend firing during a charge) the man and horse are both so excited that nice aim is impossible, and in the mêlée, while the same objections hold, the danger to friends is about as great as to foes, unless the men are careful as well as experienced. A revolver which will fire half as many times, loaded with six or less slugs, would be a very much more effective weapon for a mounted man."
Regarding the "contrivance" in use on the frontier for carrying the sabre, does anyone know what that is?
At the end, he mentions Custer and the Zulu War.
"The result of the battle with Indians on the Little Big Horn, in 1876, would seem to indicate that the breech-loader, under circumstances which may occur in any battle, is not so terrible a weapon as many claim, for while the fate of Custer's command was, considering the numbers against it, perhaps inevitable, yet the casualties with the Indians were so few as to show that a resolute charge leaves but short time for the use even of breech-loaders. Does not the disaster which recently occurred to a portion of Lord Chelmsford's command in Zulu-land point unerringly to the same fact? True, the numbers of the Zulus were great, but when we contrast their arms with those of the invaders of their land, who can doubt that determined, resolute, disciplined soldiers, who have confidence in themselves and their leaders, well armed and brave, can accomplish feats in charges in the heat of battle, such as have made and will continue to make the part of cavalry glorious in all wars?"
For some reason, the sentence fragment, "...yet the casualties with the Indians were so few..." surprised me that the small number of Indian casualties was well known then.
Anyway, thought you all would enjoy that. I will notify you when I post the entire article at my web site along with a few other things I picked up today at Ft. Leavenworth's Combat Arms Research Library. There is one article on the role of the cavalry on the frontier, one on the bayonet and sabre and their usefulness, as well as three or four things on Ft. Phil Kearny and the Fetterman fight. I also found a three-part article about the Mexican revolution that looks very interesting.
Best of wishes,
Billy
|
|
|
|
wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - November 28 2004 : 11:19:01 AM
|
Nice one Billy but
In the shock of a charge (no cavalry soldier will recommend firing during a charge) the man and horse are both so excited that nice aim is impossible, and in the mêlée, while the same objections hold, the danger to friends is about as great as to foes,
what were Custer's troops supposed to fight with if the use of firearms was inaccurate and dangerious to one's own comrades? |
|
|
|
Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 28 2004 : 12:25:49 PM
|
| If you're close enough to use the sabre, Merrit's opinions of pistol deficiencies would vanish, I'd say. Also, what in the world does this mean: "A revolver which will fire half as many times, loaded with six or less slugs, would be a very much more effective weapon for a mounted man." |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
|
|
|
BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 28 2004 : 2:51:32 PM
|
quote:
"A revolver which will fire half as many times, loaded with six or less slugs, would be a very much more effective weapon for a mounted man."
DC, if we tell you, then you will know just as much as we, so...
Seriously, I have been trying to make sense out of that sentence all morning and all I have accomplished is to give myself a headache. At first I thought he was talking about some type of shotgun-type pistol but with his earlier comments about accuracy, that does not ring true. Maybe it will come to me or someone else will have a stroke of inspiration.
Billy
|
|
|
|
Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 28 2004 : 3:50:37 PM
|
Okay, before the Bronco game against the Raiders (who live with their mothers and sing daily selections from Brigadoon a lot...together), and I'm feeling that spark that comes from superior genes, tremendous intelligence, and a pot and a half of coffee, I thought I'd briefly drop kick a few equines around who've been faking it. Well, one dead horse, anyway. Horse as issue.
Larsen, here's what I don't get, and I've been dropping crumbs to this nobody picks up on, on purpose or otherwise.
You (and others) say "...he was reacting to a situation Grummond unexpectedly (and unwantedly) put him in." What responsibility did Fetterman have to Grummond that Grummond put him - or could put him - in a 'position,' given Grummond had disobeyed orders? He could get the wood train and guard it back, following orders, and participate in Grummond's court martial for violating orders or funeral later. What compels him to follow against orders if NOT, well, super aggression (not to say foolish, arguably stupid.....perhaps moronic) given he had infantry - the rabbits of the plains who floated on snow - anyway.
Even then projecting power to no known goal at the risk of the mission (setting aside that the Powder River Forts themselves were projections of power to no point that could barely defend themselves)must have elbowed its way into hallowed manuals, hadn't it?
And the not subtle relevance to this forum is that I don't know why that isn't applied to the LBH. At what point do you risk the 7th's mission just to save Custer who might be in trouble or who might have headed north to join Terry? Dead silence. In essence, isn't that the implied excuse Custer had for NOT searching for Elliot? The major'd gone off message and plan, and there was no good odds risking casualties on such a search. I'm not totally agreeing, but isn't this a relevant issue?
I think it is, and I suspect the reason it isn't chatted up is because the answer is no, the 7th never had any military obligation to save Custer at great risk to themselves because it threatened the 'plan.' Reno and Benteen did not know Crooke was out of it, but thought him still heading north, and they did know Terry was coming south.
What was their real obligation? |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
|
|
|
joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - November 28 2004 : 4:49:00 PM
|
"Fetterman could not have been very bright because two weeks earlier the Sioux just about bagged him in a similar ambush. From that experience he learned nothing. He entered the trap again." E.S. Connell
Here is a rare instance wherein no befuddlement, contradiction, nor ambiguity exists regarding military orders giving for a specific battle of the Plain Indian's War. The culpability for this tragedy rests solely upon the shoulders of the commanding officer, Fetterman. His orders were to rescue a train of woodcutters under attack by Indians. Under no circumstances was he to cross the Lodge Trail Ridge. Col Carrington warned Fetterman twice not to do so before the command set out. He was warned a third time, again by Carrington, who ordered the command to halt as they marched out. This last order/warning was witnessed by others to include Mrs. Grummond who says: "These words were heard by everybody."
The "decoy" system used by the Oglalas, to suck the troops in, was extremely ancient and may have been recognized as an obvious trap had Fetterman's eagerness to attack not clouded his common sense. |
|
|
|
Topic |
|
|
|
Responsibility At Little Bighorn
