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Benteen
Lt. Colonel
Status: offline |
 Posted - October 12 2009 : 01:48:14 AM
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Walter Mason Camp…
As Camp well knew there was no order of things associated with the Battle of the Little Big Horn. One simple theme kept appearing over and over. That because Reno claimed that Custer said he would support Reno; where, to logically ascertain - was Custer going to do that? This overriding theme still persist to this day. And all because Reno said that Custer would support him.
When Custer departed from the norm and went northward after having ordered Reno forward; nothing made sense to Camp. So, quite naturally he spent many years invested in interviews with Indians and whites alike to find the answer. These interviews were solidly searching for this answer. And after visiting the battlefield, there appeared to be only one place close enough that Custer could have or should have been heading for - mtf’; the bluffs and badlands between intervening making any route between impossible to consider.
What Camp would find however was an agreement to his premise from the participating Indians. He had found Custer’s destination; and thus the myth of mtc and mtf was born.
The Indians…
It was well known and even testified to at the RCOI that the Indians would say anything that an interviewer wanted to hear, whether it was true or not. Camp’s persistence paid off in ways that even he didn’t comprehend. And had he been able to have completed his work, mtf and mtc would have become a focal point way beyond the potential it held for Custer to go there. Many works to this day focus upon this aspect of Camps work, which quite frankly does not lend explanation to anything Custer or his battalion did do, other than be pushed back from mtf to Calhoun, be overran there back to Keogh, and thence pushed back further along Battle Ridge only to be the last man to die atop Last Stand Hill. This story had its origins in Camps work. And while Camps other contributions vastly outweigh this one in comparison: This one mistake cost history a truth and created the myth.
Curly and other Indians, hostile and friendly alike were heavily influenced by these interviews. And many a time Deep Ravine or others surrounding Last Stand Hill were replaced by Medicine Tail Coulee as the point of origin. Not only the coulee’s but the fords were also placed into this limbo because of the necessity for Custer to have surely gone there. And many a high hill downstream surely must not have been beyond Medicine Tail Coulee or Medicine Tail Ford, because Custer wasn’t supposed to, nor expected to go beyond there to support Major Reno.
"We" will be with you...
Too great an emphasis was placed upon the thought that Custer was to support Major Reno. One of the men at the RCOI actually put this into proper perspective when he replaced the “support” words with, “and we will be with you”. He wasn’t sure of the “we” in his response. And admitted to the court that, that “we” may not have been what Custer said. When questioned about whether or not the “we” may have been an “I” instead; the witness replied no because Cooke would not have said that.
Of course one could stop right here and leave this too in the limbo as it has been for over 135 years. But to do that would place a heavy burden upon those who still believe it was Custer’s intent to support Major Reno. If the witness above testified that the word wasn’t “we”, nor was it “I”; then what should have been the word?
When searching other witnesses testimonies about the last words Custer said to Reno, one finds this: “And take the Scouts with you.” Of course these are not exacting words to replace word for word, but how about this: “And the Scouts will be with you.” Ironically the support Major Reno was waiting for was with him already. Custer never promised support to Major Reno and the witness above knew that. He knew that because the “we” wasn’t a “we” and it wasn’t an “I”: It was “the scouts”.
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Edited by - Benteen on October 12 2009 01:50:12 AM
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 12 2009 : 09:41:53 AM
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The theory that Custer went down MTC and was pushed back east had legs days after the battle, when Camp was nine years old. It was based on the observations of the surviving 7th officers, and was supported by Curly.
Reno is not the sole source for saying Custer proposed to support him, which you so claim and then evidence to the contrary, contradicting yourself. There were several who claimed to have heard Cooke's orders/explanation to Reno in various guises, but they all agree Custer said he was to support Reno. It also made the most sense, since sending Reno to the attack without support wouldn't be, you know, very nice. Nor serve any purpose. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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Benteen
Lt. Colonel
Status: offline |
Posted - October 12 2009 : 10:58:24 AM
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Hey DC, nice to have your input, and I am pleased to be here once again. And it is also my pleasure to disagree with you. I think I have aptly put the issue to rest, although I expected someone to disagree with me. My statements stand as written. And so does yours. We agree to disagree.
Onward to further evidence then:
Sergeant Daniel Kanipe…
Here is the epitome of an age old argument where this one man could have been either, 1] a courier or 2] a deserter. There seems to be no grey areas here to explore, yet everything about his courier ride is in fact grey, or is it?
In almost every case where Kanipe’s ride gives rise to desertion, the verbs used to describe his thought processes betray the authors intent of premeditation. In other words, Kanipe thought up, conceived or created, designed or devised a plan to escape causing him not to go on ahead with Custer’s troops.
What most of these authors forget is the “why” to all of this premeditation? What would or could have been the cause of his desertion? Supposedly his departure point from Custer’s battalion was near Reno Hill, yet there was little cause if any at that time for any man to desert. So obviously there would have been no reason for Kanipe to have deserted at that time; for even at this early part of the battle, Reno had not yet even arrived at his Skirmish Line location.
The next consideration into this is the message itself. The message as relayed was one of sheer desperation. Cutting loose packs that would cause delays, going directly across country to Custer’s location and the message tones that directly implied there was an urgent need of the packs at that time, in other words hurry up, don’t stop for nothing and get here quickly.
Once again, at or near Reno Hill, when and where Kanipe was supposed to have departed from, there was not the urgent need as we should understand it, so ergo he obviously designed that story himself and vamoosed. Yet his fission from the battalion has never been fully analyzed in a proper manner to fully understand his motives in either event.
The first thing the authors of these parables usually try to do is question why it would have been Tom Custer and not George that sent a messenger. Surely George had enough “legal” couriers to have grabbed one and sent him. Yet, we know from Reno’s own testimony at the RCOI that it was proper for the commander to use anyone they could get a hold of quickly and send them if the situation warranted an immediate need or response, even a lowly private, scout or whomever was closest at hand, just as Reno did do with McIhargey and Mitchell. And even if that isn’t bad enough, private Davern was assigned as a courier that day, so there was no “legal” precedent in assigning only Sergeants as couriers.
Why then Tom and not George? From the tone and urgency that the message betrayed, one would expect that at that moment in time, Custer may have had his hands full of decisions. Turning then to the nearest company commander near to him, he instructs him, in this case Tom, to send for the packs and get them here any way you can and quickly, before attending to other urgent matters; that load, just one of many, now off of his mind - Custer can now tend to those other urgent matters injecting itself at break neck speed into his thought processes. This would also explain why Kanipe was also not requested to return to the battalion.
The “if” thought process in extracting information concerning Benteen also explains a lot. “And ’if’ you see Benteen…” , was an add on feature that Tom may have forgot to include in the original message. The implications of this are enormous, because if Kanipe was to take the back trail to get to pack train, by direct inference, Benteen then, was not expected to be there.
Of course there were others who did have horses that quit on them, and many of these are well documented. Yet no claim of desertion was ever made upon any soldier at the battle of the LBH, and if it was, it was never pursued to convict. Sergeant Finckle does creep into the scene at this point, because supposedly he mentions to Kanipe that he is having trouble with his horse. We know that Finckle did drop out of the column for a short time, this being documented in Peter Thompsen’s account. But, he appears in Thompsen’s story as more of a morale booster to Thompsen than as having problems with his horse. As for Finckle indirectly or directly giving Kanipe the idea of desertion through horse trouble, the question remains: Why Finckle? Thompsen, Watson and several others had dropped out, couldn’t Kanipe see that for himself?
While no one seems to question whether or not Kanipe made that courier ride: There were those who did. And they were the very troopers Kanipe had served with, McDougall and Mathey, the leaders of the pack train detail. According to their RCOI extracts one gets the notion that they received no orders, other than some wild “half breed” Mathey mentions informing them of the battle going on ahead. The line of questioning didn’t go on to establish just who that “half breed” may have been. Kanipe anyone? Mathey’s actions after that report was delivered are telling because supposedly he himself rode back to inform McDougall of that report. Things then begin to happen and McDougall supposedly see’s Indians atop a hill, supposedly Reno Hill about a mile or two away from him and orders his company into battle formation to charge them. Once there supposedly they discover Reno and his men, along with Benteen’s and they of course had to send ahead several packs of ammuntion to that position ordered by Reno.
Interestingly enough, it seems McDougall and Mathey must have thought that they had indeed saved the day and had marched as fast as possible to get to the regimental position. I say ’regimental position’ because if one remembers, Benteen thought that the whole regiment had been whipped when in fact he only was observing Reno’s battalion in retreat from the bluffs. If Benteen made that mistake, one would suppose that Mathey and McDougall also made the same error after arrival at Reno’s position with Benteen and his men, thus compounding the numbers, ergo Kanipe mission was completed, successful and over with.
To say that they, McDougall and Mathey were innocent by reason of mistaken identity, awful timing of events etc. would be to put it mildly, unattractive; and intractable at the RCOI. Thus and therefore, the blame game would begin if they admitted Kanipe’s orders through Tom Custer at the RCOI. No they mustn’t do that; no lets not open that can of worms; and they didn’t.
Of course the next argument in this series always begins with; why the urgency, Custer and his men had not fired a single shot? Apparently they had, otherwise it would have made no sense to send the message Kanipe had to deliver, which in short, simply means that Reno Hill wasn’t the place where he was sent from: Well, not the Reno Hill all are familiar with anyway. And by the way, there appears to be several Reno Hills, one occurring at the furtherst Reno advanced, another where they retreated back to, and the old safe standby that everyone has come to know and love. And to sort through that mess one must determine which one was which by the testimony as presented in the RCOI; and that is about as nefariously indeterminate as to which morass was which; and which tepee was where.
The other thing that is thought of at this point is; why would Custer have sent two messages by two different messengers that appeared to be identical in nature, and seemingly close together in time? The answer to that would require a reordering of events, because when Martin was sent was right before Custer attacked a ford (sorry not going there - see Camp notes above). The time when Kanipe had been sent was after Custer had attacked, and was on his way towards battle ridge from that ford. Curley mentioned this man on a sorrel roan horse, who appeared to ride away to the north. Makes sense if the Indians had already cut them off from the south, wouldn’t you agree. That man was Sergeant Kanipe. And the messages and the order of their appearance now makes more sense. Where the urgency in one is lacking, in the other it isn’t.
The last to be contemplated are the terrain considerations. Keep in mind with this that at no time were there any definite references to a particular spot on a map. Coulees being what they were, and ford's being what they were and of course High Places also being what they were. There were just as many of these beyond mtf/mtc as there were before them. And this already has been discussed in the previous work (please refer to it for the end of this matter.)
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 12 2009 : 3:39:49 PM
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A great deal of what you airily describe as settled or offer as fact is anything but, much like Wiggs, who also is in the habit of using three words or phrases sequentially that mean near the same as if that added emphasis or value to his point, itself generally wrong anyway. Are you denying that officers who saw the field didn't entertain the scenario of a move at MTCF being repulsed in much the manner you mention and commit it to paper? It certainly did not emerge from Camp.
Kanipe's departure would not be from Reno Hill but from where the command stopped so TWC could visit with his brother. At least, in one version of his tale. That would be Weir or Sharpshooter. Martin left either from Cedar Coulee or MTC not long after, and Martin did not recall Kanipe's existence at all, and we know Martin was with Custer, as trumpeter and messenger.
It makes no sense to take testimony under oath from 1879 and equate them with accounts in newspapers or decades later. I think it best to avoid any account that emerges after the RCOI, even if you lose some true tales. A generally reliable guy like Herendeen in 1876 is quoted as saying the lone tipi was about half way (specific mileages vary) between the divide and LBH (like Hare, DeRudio, Varnum, Wallace, others), yet in 1878 he's already changed and saying it was close to the river. He's not lying, but the earlier account should be viewed as best evidence. Lot of people did this. It's not like they could reference what they previously said, or were claimed to have said, beyond the conventional wisdom of the time in exchanges with others there.
People chatted up watch time as if they had looked at their own watches and wrote it down after each episode. Which they did not. In some cases, they had no watch at all, but just repeat times by common agreement. Nobody would expect (the COI did not expect)their memory would be infallible or that clocks were all that accurate in the saddle and dust and, further, nobody knows whose watches were set to what time anyway. Gray's point is that along with post-event interaction, memories and distances got scrambled and they ended up saying 'at the lone tipi' as a commonly held error, especially when previously they'd put the tipi miles east.
Might be true, might not, but it has no turgor for the charge of 'lying.' There is too much history of this sort of thing in trials and in history which, embarrassingly enough, are not well read subjects by Custerhiles in Custerland. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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Benteen
Lt. Colonel
Status: offline |
Posted - October 14 2009 : 12:44:54 PM
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DC,
quote:
“A great deal of what you airily describe as settled or offer as fact is anything but, much like Wiggs, who also is in the habit of using three words or phrases sequentially that mean near the same as if that added emphasis or value to his point, itself generally wrong anyway.”
I take it you are referring to Biden‘s airily descriptive, “A noun, a verb an 9 -11” remarks which many derived great pleasure from; and meaning that was all Guilliani was noted for or for that matter worth. Yet the man at the time of the disaster was being credited and to his credit known for the works he did do. Of course by saying this and equating my work with the same logic, one assumes that it would be unworthy if I have nothing more to offer. Of course this logic would presume that I must at this time state absolutely everything I know about the battle, or loose the campaign because of your assertion that it is invalid if I don’t state more.
quote:
“Are you denying that officers who saw the field didn't entertain the scenario of a move at MTCF being repulsed in much the manner you mention and commit it to paper? It certainly did not emerge from Camp.”
Lets try it this way, ok? You certainly offered no more than a noun a verb and “being repulsed” as evidentiary proof, yet you have not elaborated more upon this but the anima argument that it did not emerge from Camp.
quote:
“Kanipe's departure would not be from Reno Hill but from where the command stopped so TWC could visit with his brother. At least, in one version of his tale. That would be Weir or Sharpshooter. Martin left either from Cedar Coulee or MTC not long after, and Martin did not recall Kanipe's existence at all, and we know Martin was with Custer, as trumpeter and messenger.”
And just who did say that Kanipe’s departure was at “Weir or Sharpshooter”? And who stated it was “Cedar Coulee or MTC” where Martin departed? Absolutely no one. And if they did, in what interview? Who was that interviewer? And what part could, would or should he have parlayed that information into what he believed and not what was actually stated.
quote:
“It makes no sense to take testimony under oath from 1879 and equate them with accounts in newspapers or decades later. I think it best to avoid any account that emerges after the RCOI, even if you lose some true tales. A generally reliable guy like Herendeen in 1876 is quoted as saying the lone tipi was about half way (specific mileages vary) between the divide and LBH (like Hare, DeRudio, Varnum, Wallace, others), yet in 1878 he's already changed and saying it was close to the river. He's not lying, but the earlier account should be viewed as best evidence. Lot of people did this. It's not like they could reference what they previously said, or were claimed to have said, beyond the conventional wisdom of the time in exchanges with others there.”
And if there were two “lone tepee’s”; interpreted as such, observed as such on their march down Reno Creek? One being exactly where it was stated it was, about ½ way as you put it from the divide down to the river; about 5 miles from the river. And yet another one about 3/4ths to 1 mile from the river, just as it also was observed to be there?
quote:
“People chatted up watch time as if they had looked at their own watches and wrote it down after each episode. Which they did not. In some cases, they had no watch at all, but just repeat times by common agreement. Nobody would expect (the COI did not expect)their memory would be infallible or that clocks were all that accurate in the saddle and dust and, further, nobody knows whose watches were set to what time anyway.”
Cant say I disagree with this. See my remarks to Ranger on the other thread.
quote:
“Gray's point is that along with post-event interaction, memories and distances got scrambled and they ended up saying 'at the lone tipi' as a commonly held error, especially when previously they'd put the tipi miles east.”
And Gray missed the point entirely, just as he missed many other things that could have led him to the truth, had he not had an agenda. One of these was not considering that there were at least 2 lone tepee’s.
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“Might be true, might not, but it has no turgor for the charge of 'lying.' There is too much history of this sort of thing in trials and in history which, embarrassingly enough, are not well read subjects by Custerhiles in Custerland.”
Careful here someone may think turgor could equate it to lead to gravidity conditions, beyond which spawns “too much history” and “embarrassment“; which in and of itself is not a lie but a fact. And if you’re equating me with being a “phile”, forget it. I hold no one in esteem, this to include Custer, Benteen, Reno, Keogh and/or anyone else on that campaign. One cannot find the truth hiding behind the gravid skirts of someone one must look up to while nurturing one’s ovolo in naiveté as which most still do to this day with Gray, Camp and others who got it wrong in the first place. Get along now and don't be frightened, learning can be fun sometimes, but there are some thing little one's shouldn't know.
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Edited by - Benteen on October 14 2009 12:46:43 PM |
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joe wiggs
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 07 2009 : 9:16:06 PM
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Gee, see what happens we you counter dc's flamboyant but, untrue posts. he catches hic-cups and runs off to the kitchen for a glass of water;failing to return.
dc, if you were capable of making a post, no matter the subject matter, without referring to "Wiggs" you would be amazed at how your stature would elevate. your unusual negativity and obsession with me ruins the articulation and credibility of your post. your antagonism with me, a person you have never met, is obvious to everyone.
Share your knowledge, inter-act with forum members and enjoy the fruits of knowledge that is presented here. |
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Reviewing Research methodology and extrapolations
