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mcaryf
Private
United Kingdom
Status: offline |
 Posted - October 05 2008 : 05:19:38 AM
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Poll Question:
The Custer Association of Great Britain is having a debate in November about whether Benteen disobeyed orders at LBH. Francis Taunton and I are speaking in favour of Benteen. I do not actually want to debate that topic on here as I am keeping my powder dry for CAGB but I would like your opinion on whether a lack of clarity in Custer's orders was a factor in the defeat.
In my opinion his lack of clarity was a significant factor and I will give you examples for each of the units that he commanded.
For Benteen's mission to the left some argue that it was intended to be of short duration and certainly Benteen's absence at a crucial time had an impact. Custer chose to formulate his orders to Benteen relative to geographic features concerning which Custer himself had an incomplete knowledge. Thus he could easily have said something like "Proceed to the SW for up to 1 hour, if you see Indians attack them and send word, if you see a reasonable route to the LBH Valley take it and advance down it otherwise return quickly to the main trail".
I do not need to discuss the Martini message as its lack of clarity has been a subject of debate for over 100 years.
With respect to Reno, Custer ordered him to charge Indians or the Village. It is not at all clear that Custer expected Reno to charge into a standing village of over 1.000 lodges and most sane commentators reckon he would have been destroyed if he had.
Also with respect to Reno Custer said that he would be supported but did not explain what he meant by this so Reno was left to form own conclusions. Indeed no obvious support was provided during the 40 minute or so duration of Reno's fight and it would clearly have been impossible for Reno to have maintained an offensive posture for that long with the ammunition that Reno's men carried.
With respect to the scouts Custer apparently ordered that the scouts should accompany Reno although he intended that the Crows remain with him. In the event two Crows went with Reno so there was plainly confusion.
Also with respect to the scouts Custer apparently told Bouyer and the Crows to go back. The Crows obeyed this order but Bouyer did not. It seems likely that if Custer's order had been obeyed, Bouyer might have been much more useful in telling Benteen and Reno what was happening than he could have been as one extra gun with Custer.
With respect to the pack train, Custer's initial directive was to minimise dust thus trading speed for stealth whilst the train was not actually near the enemy. Once the train gets into the enemy vicinity Custer (according to Kanipe) reverses his priority and tells the train to proceed as rapidly as possible cross-country and abandon loose packs if necessary. In fact the train actually stops for 20 minutes soon after Kanipe's arrival and eventually arrives on Reno Hill proudly claiming not to have lost a single pack.
With respect to the two battalions he kept under his own command, we obviously do not know what Custer's actual orders were, but he can hardly have intended that his two battalions should be obliterated out of supporting range of each other.
Thus when you look at any of the units that Custer commanded it seems that his orders were either confusing, could not actually be obeyed or were not obeyed for whatever reason.
In my view this lack of command effectiveness was clearly a significant factor in the disaster although other issues played a part as well.
Do you agree with me?
Regards
Mike
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Brent
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 06 2008 : 10:55:45 AM
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Lack of precision is something of an understatement. Certainly orders cannot be given (or written) that can account for each and every circumstance (especially when time is of the essence), and subordinate commanders must support the total effort as best they can. But in this case, we have a situation where the orders were vague, ambiguous, unclear, and issued in great haste, w/o knowledge of the enemys numbers or even whereabouts.
Recipe for disaster. |
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - October 14 2008 : 08:19:28 AM
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Precision movements and adaptations to a changing environment was the military edge and was missing in this action. Instead piece meal feeding of the 7th with no more than 3 companies engaged at the same time within supporting distance of each other is the formula for defeat against an enemy with superior numbers but lacks the organization that one would expect from the military.
AZ Ranger |
“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
SEMPER FI |
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mcaryf
Private
United Kingdom
Status: offline |
Posted - November 09 2008 : 2:26:30 PM
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Hi All
Just to let you know the CAGB debate on whether Benteen disobeyed orders took place on Saturday. Francis Taunton was actually unwell so in the end I was the opener and the closer of the presentations speaking in favour of Benteen. I am pleased to tell you that the meeting found in favour of Benteen in the scale of 3 to 1.
I used a new possibility in Benteen's defence which I would be interested to try on you here. I have previously suggested that perhaps Custer's intention for Benteen with his mission to the left was based on a misreading of the terrain as Custer might have thought the LBH River was closer to the SW as its apparent course from the Crows Nest appears that way.
I certainly think that Benteen and his officers thought they had been sent to find the LBH so they could attack any camps in the upper valley or any Indians trying to escape up it. During the mission Gibson reported to Benteen that he had looked into the valley and it was empty. This was the reason why Benteen turned back to the main trail. Thus Benteen thought at that time that he had done what Custer intended. However, I am sure that Benteen must have started to doubt what Gibson had reported after he returned to the trail and had to ride another 6 or 7 miles to reach the LBH valley and found it was actually full of thousands of Indians and tens of thousands of ponies! Gibson himself only realised he had been mistaken some years later after decent maps became available in 1908. You can see Gibson's admission that he was wrong in his interview with WS Camp in Custer in 76 - in that he admits he must have been looking up S Reno Creek.
Benteen's suspicion that Gibson's report was wrong explains his testimony at RCOI where he admitted that he thought he had not carried out Custer's intentions but indicated that effectively he could not because he could not find the valley and it was an unrealistic order from Custer that he should do so. In fact Benteen would have been right in saying it was unrealistic for him to have got to the LBH Valley by a SW route or indeed any route other than down Reno Creek.
My new thought is that perhaps Benteen and his officers were wrong and actually Custer's intention had been for Benteen's column to check out S Reno Creek all along. This is mentioned as a possibility by Edgar Stewart in "Custer's Luck" although Stewart does not expand on the idea. The reason why Custer might have been interested in S Reno Creek is given to us by Wooden Leg when he reports that the 700 - 1,000 warrior warparty that went to fight Crook treavelled up S Reno Creek. He does not say this but it is possible the warriors returned by a different route. The Rosebud battle was fought by tthe warriors from the West side of the Rosebud and Crook pushed probes down the river so quite possibly the warriors withdrew Northward and returned to the camp via Thompson's or Davis Creek. In this case there would be a heavy trail up S Reno Creek without clear signs of a return.
The Crow scouts including Curly and Hairy Mocassin tell us they went foward from the Crows Nest to reece along the Creek before Custer's main column went down there and Curly says he spent much of the forenoon on the white bluffs overlooking the Lone Tepi and of course S Reno Creek. Messages about the S Reno Creek trail would undoubtedly have been sent to Custer. This would be a good reason to send Benteen off in a SW direction to examine the upper reaches of the Creek in case the warparty was thereabouts.
Further evidence for this is found in the account of the Arikara, Soldier, given to both Libby (Arikara Narrative) and Camp (Custer in 76). Soldier says that Stabbed caught him up down the Reno Creek trail after he, Stabbed, had been sent up S Reno Creek to check out a trail and to take a message to the soldiers in the East (must be Benteen). Obviously Stabbed did not meet Benteen because he had turned back along No Name Creek.
Beenteen was travelling on the North side of Reno Creek (he looked in Lone Tepi) so would not have seen the trail up S Reno creek and would never have realised that this might be whyCuster sent him to the SW.
I am not saying this is definitely the solution just that it is another possibility for Custer's intentions in sending Benteen to the left. What makes it interesting is that it means Benteen might have done just what Custer wanted but never realised that.
Another small rinkle on this is that if Custer thought a large warparty had gone up S Reno Creek and not yet returned then this could be why he might have thought the village was only weakly defended and went through with his flank move.
So what do you all think - might this be yet another possibility to add to the list of reasons for Benteen's mission?
Regards
Mike |
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 15 2009 : 11:38:58 AM
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“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
SEMPER FI |
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Captain Outwater
Recruit
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 27 2009 : 3:09:08 PM
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| I believe I read that Benteen suspected Custer was sending him on a wild goose chase just to get him out of the way during the battle. Benteen had a grudge against Custer since the last Major had been killed by the Indians without Custer even looking for him and his men. |
Your humble servant,
Captain John Outwater |
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joe wiggs
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 20 2009 : 1:12:45 PM
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There were many causes for the defeat, all of which were either major or minor in content. I need not list them here. As there were no surviving "White" witnesses (coupled with an inherent distaste by many to accept the testimony of the Native American)the enigma of the battle was created and, continues to baffle,infuriate,and awe millions of students to this very day.
The cause of the defeat need not be belabored with a myriad of "what ifs" and "how comes's", nor "could it be's"! The 7Th. calvary was numerically outnumbered by superior armed warriors who fought the battle in an unanticipated and, completely functional manner.
Benteen disobeyed orders because he realized that his men were gravely and immediately affected by the battle shock and the resulting mental debilitation of Reno's defeated troops.
the failure of Reno and Benteen to render immediate aid to Custer(I believe) was prompted by two factors: the shortage of man-power to break through and, the hopeful but false premise that Custer should not be in any dire a position than they.
My response would be "all of the above and then some.!" |
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joe wiggs
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - March 20 2009 : 1:15:38 PM
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There were many causes for the defeat, all of which were either major or minor in content. I need not list them here. As there were no surviving "White" witnesses (coupled with an inherent distaste by many to accept the testimony of the Native American)the enigma of the battle was created and, continues to baffle,infuriate,and awe millions of students to this very day.
The cause of the defeat need not be belabored with a myriad of "what ifs" and "how comes's", nor "could it be's"! The 7Th. calvary was numerically outnumbered by superior armed warriors who fought the battle in an unanticipated and, completely functional manner.
Benteen disobeyed orders because he realized that his men were gravely and immediately affected by the battle shock and the resulting mental debilitation of Reno's defeated troops.
the failure of Reno and Benteen to render immediate aid to Custer(I believe) was prompted by two factors: the shortage of man-power to break through and, the hopeful but false premise that Custer should not be in any dire a position than they.
My response would be "all of the above and then some.!" |
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Was lack of precision in Custer's orders a factor
