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terri
Private
USA
Status: offline |
 Posted - November 27 2005 : 3:58:57 PM
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From Grey's time motion study to Lakota Noon, I've spent the past few months imersed in Custer's defeat at the Little Big Horn. I'd like to ask you gentlemen and Ladies as to your thoughts on what brought about the 7th's defeat. Was it one thing or a combination of mistakes? Was it Custer's staff? Was Reno drunk? Was Benteen content to allow Custer to suffer and therefore not respond to orders to hurry?
For myself, I think its rather simple:
1. Custer was reckless.
a. Failure to alter his plan of battle. He possessed a seeming disregard for his Scouts intel on the hostile's strength. (In reading, Killing Custer, the author notes that Custer often failed to reconiter before attacking. The attack on Black Kettle's village was a prime example cited.)
b. He divided his force by sending Benteen off on a fruitless search for hostiles on the western fringes of the area. This kept Benteen out of close proximity for the crucial opening of attack. He went on to further splinter his force by ordering Reno to attack from the south.
c. AND, it appears to me he hadn't improved upon tactics he devised during the Civil War; tactics which coined the phrase, Custer's Luck. I believe Custer wanted a great charge from the north as well as the south to crush the hostiles. (Custer's charges were often noted by his detractors as causing a great loss of life- the lives of Custer's own men.).
2. He was out-generaled and out fought.
a. Crazy Horse was simply an undeniable force in melding Plains Warriors into a cohesive military fighting unit. What matter if they never fought together like this again. June 25th was all it took for Custer.
b. Sitting Bull's vision. Great way to psych up your side.
c. Rightous anger. Hard fuel to beat when its channeled correctly. In June 1876, the Plains Indians channeled it correctly.
d. Custer, who left men missing in action after the attack on Black Kettle's Village, hated by his command in Kansas, and Court Martialed for an offense in which he had other men shot, was nothing more than a mediocre battlefield commander.
3. Technology.
a. The Springfield carbine was hidious and left the soldiers at a severe disadvantage.
So basically, it wasn't one mistake which defeated the 7th. The defeat had many contributors. I've listed my top three above. I'd like to invite your comments. If you disagree with me, please spell it out. I'm open to learning as much as possible and I value your opinions. I will say this; I don't believe Custer disobeyed Terry's orders. Those orders were ambigious.
On Terry's orders, I will not change my mind. And I cite my opinion on the order's first paragraph as well as the much argued line giving Custer leeway.
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 27 2005 : 11:39:00 PM
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You're arguing old themes, many long disproved. Officers were hated Reno said he was not drunk. Benteen was sent south, not west, and did respond appropriately to orders to hurry and would have been shot by other officers if they thought he'd left people to die, their friends among them. Benteen would greatly enjoy rescuing Custer, saving his friends, and having the 7th know the truth which Custer could not contest. He had no motivation to see Custer killed, given it would threaten his own life and that of everyone else.
Custer wasn't out generalled. There was no corresponding person on the Indian side who had total control and could tell people what to do, not even Sitting Bull. Crazy Horse was well regarded, but he commanded nada. People could follow him or not depending on whatever they felt like. Indians were not cohesive and did not fight as a unit. They never did before and they did not after. It was most likely a street fight for Custer, start to finish, without ever really knowing what was going on. Sitting Bull's vision may or may not have happened, but it melded in well with what people wanted to think about the battle. Great story.
I think the village was too incoherent for anyone to organize to fight or run, and it was its simple mass that prevented any option but staying and fighting (because they had no communication system and nobody in charge to give such an order for everyone)that fueled the warriors, which in aggregate with their numbers sealed the deal. Whatever Custer's conception was, it was dependent on the Sioux running, not taking the fight to Custer.
As always, I think all LBH stories that are so perfect, almost twee, so reflective of then current literary templates like Sitting Bull's dreams (which shockingly found correspondence in Mrs. Custer's thoughts the day of the battle, did they not? and so conform to dualism themes like Ambrose tried with Custer and Crazy Horse) should deservedly be snorted over, even if, however unlikely, they're true. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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Smcf
Captain
Status: offline |
Posted - November 28 2005 : 06:45:24 AM
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Hi Terri,
I'd have to agree with most of what you say. I don't know about Reno being drunk, though. We can't know. Custer was certainly reckless with regard to the safety of himself and his men, but his decision to split his troops into 5 units (Reno, Benteen, Yates, Keogh and McDougall with the packs) points to him having some sort of plan of attack. That he didn't deem it fit to tell his officers what that plan was may be a factor in the failure of his units to come to his aid when he needed help. Benteen was confused as to his scout and Reno didn't know what Benteen was doing and further thought Custer was supporting his charge.
Custer was certainly out-fought and it was difficult for him not to be out-generalled. He out-generalled himself. That he was obviously playing the general makes it appear to me that he never actually got round to leading an attack on the Village himself. The Indians were natural guerillas and fought effectively as small units of tribal societies or just groups of friends and family. Leadership was encouraged naturally by acts of bravado while warriors like Crazy Horse were followed due to his reputation as a brave warrior. That Crazy Horse saw himself as a general might be argued, though. On the day, it would seem the Cheyenne Lame White Man was the only chief was actually led a concerted charge. The rest of the action seemed to consist of creeping up and picking off.
The Springfield carbine was as good a weapon as was there, apparently. The troops just got caught in the open while I believe Custer was still thinking offensively. I believe he had an opportunity to effect a re-union when the troops were on Nye-Cartwright, but Custer chose to press on after waiting for some time. This wait allowed the Indians to mass below while support was not forthcoming from the south. He gambled on being able to complete the job, but lost. |
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terri
Private
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 28 2005 : 09:16:47 AM
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quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
You're arguing old themes, many long disproved.
True, but in all my readings some of these themes seem to me to be the better advanced theory.
Officers were hated Reno said he was not drunk. Benteen was sent south, not west, and did respond appropriately to orders to hurry and would have been shot by other officers if they thought he'd left people to die, their friends among them. Benteen would greatly enjoy rescuing Custer, saving his friends, and having the 7th know the truth which Custer could not contest. He had no motivation to see Custer killed, given it would threaten his own life and that of everyone else.
Sorry, I thought Benteen was sent west. Still, he missed out on the crucial opening attack. How far south was he sent and why did he in fact stop at Reno's defensive site? As for Reno drinking, there is a lot of conflicting testimony on this. I'd have to say that more than likely, some of the stuff was snuck on the march. I had a professor once who called this generation, "An alcoholic nation." And as far as troopers supporting Reno's sobriety, if memory serves, this was at his inquest. And the prevailing theme was to save the face of the command.
Custer wasn't out generalled. There was no corresponding person on the Indian side who had total control and could tell people what to do, not even Sitting Bull. Crazy Horse was well regarded, but he commanded nada. People could follow him or not depending on whatever they felt like. Indians were not cohesive and did not fight as a unit. They never did before and they did not after. It was most likely a street fight for Custer, start to finish, without ever really knowing what was going on. Sitting Bull's vision may or may not have happened, but it melded in well with what people wanted to think about the battle. Great story.
Yeah, Sitting Bull rocked! Ya know I still gotta hand it to Crazy Horse though. In reading some of the Indian accounts, its almost as if he were considered a demigod. And one cannot stand by and not give this man some credit. His aura pulled in these people from off the reservation and his poweress did inspire during combat. I read somewhere that at times he did in fact co-op standard military techniques. I assumed that he used those during the battle. I like your metaphore of a street fight. I've not thought about the battle like this before. Thanks.
Thanks DC for the reply. And thanks for not jumping down my throat about those orders from Terry! I was visiting back in Kansas a few weeks ago and the topic came up. When I pointed out how ambigious Terry was, you'd of thought I'd fired a brand new volley on Fort Sumpter. 
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terri
Private
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 28 2005 : 09:39:07 AM
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quote:
Originally posted by Smcf
Hi Terri,
Custer was certainly reckless with regard to the safety of himself and his men, but his decision to split his troops into 5 units (Reno, Benteen, Yates, Keogh and McDougall with the packs) points to him having some sort of plan of attack. That he didn't deem it fit to tell his officers what that plan was may be a factor in the failure of his units to come to his aid when he needed help.
Thanks for taking the time to respond to my topic. Reckless, you bet; he gave birth to the phrase, "Custer's Luck". As for his plan of action and not relaying it to his staff, well that serves to further point out his mediocracy on the battle field. And if he did in fact have a battle plan, its obvious he failed to take into acocount his own scout's intel; otherwise, would it be deemed safe to weaken his command by dividing it and sending Benteen off during the crucial opening of the attack? I don't think so.
Custer was certainly out-fought and it was difficult for him not to be out-generalled. He out-generalled himself.
Interesting. I hadn't given that consideration. A very good friend of mine is a Marine and supporter of Custer. Rick has always held firm (While patiently arguing with the tiny redhead-that would be me) that Custer was a good soldier following orders. So that stated, perhaps it is possible that the soldier beat himself that day.
It would seem the Cheyenne Lame White Man was the only chief was actually led a concerted charge. The rest of the action seemed to consist of creeping up and picking off.
Are you sure? Have you read Lakota Noon? I've enjoyed the read. Didn't CH and Gall lead charges? I sort of thought they did. Or it could have been in NA testiomy that War Chiefs led charges without naming specific individuals. Anyhow, I believe its worthwhile to study the attack from the NA point of view. They won the fight.
The Springfield carbine was as good a weapon as was there, apparently. The troops just got caught in the open while I believe Custer was still thinking offensively.
Well here is where we might disagree. If you're in a hot fight, you want a weapon that fires without having to worry if you need a knife to un-stick a cartridge - precious seconds might save your life.
Thanks for your observations. I appreciate it.
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 28 2005 : 10:14:49 AM
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Okay, drinking and drunk are not the same. For sure Reno and many of the men, officers, and civvies drank, and had booze with them on the train. Noted drunks Weir and French vanish when the train comes up, and French, the supposed great shot, is reduced to clearing carbines - not appropriate distribution of skill. Reno got into a fight with packers when both may have looking for booze. Weir vanishes. Saying he was not drunk is not saying he wasn't drinking. I suspect they were all alcoholics in the modern sense, where alcohol replaces certain foods in the metabolism, and as such were more dangerous and irrational when deprived of booze or with a hangover than when actually drunk. REno displayed aggression and anger in later years when drunk without question, not the timidity with which he's accused here.
Crazy Horse is a mystery. We know very little about him, and most from Black Elk's supposed memoir, itself highly suspect and run through the PC approval mill of their time and ours, edited and translated when certain known myths and stories were in place. Sitting Bull, it was, that had the aura back then and it was SB who brought in the young men. It was SB's camp, for all intents. That gathering and camp was designed to fight, incite the soldiers to a battle, and had a higher percentage of young men per capita than a "normal" village because of it. SB had the big C Charisma whereas Crazy Horse is rather vague in folks' recollections, although all agree he was a great warrior. As such, his image is and was highly malleable. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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Smcf
Captain
Status: offline |
Posted - November 28 2005 : 11:38:11 AM
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| @Terri - I must admit to having an agoraphobic view of the battlefield and have some small difficulty in reconciling the distances involved with significant action, particularly in the early stages. With the Indians accounts stating a lot of posturing and popping from long distances, I'm more comfortable with a Custer who thinks he's in control for a longish period of time as he made his way north. Its only an opinion, though. Yes, I've read Lakota Noon too and found it a great read. I haven't got the book handy and just had the impression that the CH action was related as more of a firefight, then overrunning beaten troops rather than a charge against a defended position. Perhaps you're right. |
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Benteen
Lt. Colonel
Status: offline |
Posted - November 29 2005 : 3:29:53 PM
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Terri here's my 2 cents....
First off...Both Gray and Michno's work are good learning tools about the battle. But the miserably fail to properly tell the story. While what they did was admirable. It also has left many false impressions.
quote:
Was it one thing or a combination of mistakes?
That all depends upon where one starts. If Custer had followed his directive to not "turn towards the Little Horn", following "the trail discovered by Major Reno", on his previous scout. It was very unlikely that this disaster would have happened.
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Was it Custer's staff?
That all depends upon what you mean by staff. If you are referring to Cooke and those with the HQ then no. Cooke had a brilliant military carrer during the Civil War. Rivalled only by Custer himself. If you mean his immediate family, Tom etal. Then that is a different story.
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Was Reno drunk?
I don't know. I don't think from what I have read that if he had been drinking it would have made any difference. The orders he gave that day did after all preserve the most part of his command. Which I can't say the same for Custer. Perhaps it was Custer who was drunk?
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Was Benteen content to allow Custer to suffer and therefore not respond to orders to hurry?
NO! Not at all. Benteen has been blamed only in recent times because of his "slowness." This is primarily from sources like Gray. And is where Gray falls short. His timing is off there, bigtime! Had Sherman, Grant and Sheridan had Gray's evidence, they would have hung him. Don't ya think?
quote:
1. Custer was reckless.
I wouldn't say Custer was wreckless. I would put it more like Terry, over zealous. And after he "turned towards the Little Horn", events unfolded too fast to comprehend and make certain allowances for. Custer's plan was to wait until the following morning, surround the camp during the night and go from there. Whether that was to be an attack or a heap big talk, no one knows.
Events began to rapidly unfold after the crows nest. The threat of discovery. And who wouldn't be concerned? A whole regiment less than 15 miles from that large of an indian encampment. The cracker box incident, and Tom's brilliant deduction that because they were discovered they should atttack. This what? After 36 hours in the saddle. After a forced night march in a rainstorm, no less. And then barely time to make a pot of coffee before they are off to attack the indians?
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He possessed a seeming disregard for his Scouts intel on the hostile's strength. (In reading, Killing Custer, the author notes that Custer often failed to reconiter before attacking. The attack on Black Kettle's village was a prime example cited.)
This is an unknown factor. Even after witnessing the huge village from the bluffs east of the Village, he made the remark. "Hurrah boys, We've got them now. We'll finish up here and go home to our station." As former Park Superintendent Neil Magnum said. "Whatever Custer saw down there, it didn't scare him." He seemed to remain undaunted by either report. Yet, he argued with on of his scouts prior to Tom's cracker box thingy that he was going to stick to his plan and wait until the morning. The scout was trying to tell Custer that they had been discovered.
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b. He divided his force by sending Benteen off on a fruitless search for hostiles on the western fringes of the area. This kept Benteen out of close proximity for the crucial opening of attack. He went on to further splinter his force by ordering Reno to attack from the south.
Whether one chooses to believe it or not. This was Custers first attack at the village. Lets suppose 1 thing here. What if the village was further upstream? And what if Benteen happened upon it during his mission? According to his orders what was he supposed to do? Custer gave him orders to "pitch in" to anything that he came across. And send back a courier to advise him. Reno may not have been the beneficiary of getting the first crack at them. That honor went to Benteen, didn't it? Reno's attack on the village was based upon faulty information by Hare and Varnum. What they witnessed was mounted warriors that were stirring up the dust in front of the village. And they just happened to be going at the time they observed them in the direction of the Village. Thus they were in a false sense - fleeing.
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c. AND, it appears to me he hadn't improved upon tactics he devised during the Civil War; tactics which coined the phrase, Custer's Luck. I believe Custer wanted a great charge from the north as well as the south to crush the hostiles. (Custer's charges were often noted by his detractors as causing a great loss of life- the lives of Custer's own men.).
This is not entirely Custer's fault. It was honcho's in Washington's fault. They refused to modernize their priciples of warfare. Heck they even didn't want to upgrade to Winchester's because the Secretary of War thought it too wasteful of ammunition. Custer had to work with what was given him. And to be quite honest. Napoleonic tactics was even then becoming outdated. There was some signs that Custer knew the risks involved. And was pressing for this change. Sadly it didn't occur until after his death.
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2. He was out-generaled and out fought.
It's a simple and somewhat true statement. But over generalized. What it basically came down to was numbers. Place several thousand warriors on horses with every concievable weapon immaginable at that time. Place Custer's supposedly well disciplined but understrength companies with single shot rifles on the ground, and what have you got? Reno knew, and he didn't stick around to find out did he?
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3. Technology.
a. The Springfield carbine was hidious and left the soldiers at a severe disadvantage.
Yes. A true statement. And one that I have already addressed. Lets take an example though. Lets put Custer with 80 or so troopers on Custer Hill. Lets have them firing volleys at the charging and mounted warriors. Keep in mind. It took about 20 or so seconds to fire, expend, and then reload another cartridge. What happens when lets say they all fire a volley at the warriors charging from the south. And then 10 to 15 seconds later another group of warriors charge over the hill from the north?
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So basically, it wasn't one mistake which defeated the 7th.
Too simple....If one says that Custer disobeyed orders and followed the warriors to the LBH against Terry's instruction. Then it was ONE mistake. That one. If one doesn't beleive it, then I suppose many mistakes were made, not the least of which was to disobey Terry's orders.
While I am on the subject. Why does eveyone want Custer to be the obedient soldier here? This is something that I just don't understand. What was so terrible about not obeying an order? By today's standard. I suppose it's a terrible thing to comprehend. But back then it was a standard practice. It wasn't a movie, it was the real thing! In his over zealous approach to the problem he disobeyed. And I don't see anything especially sinister in it. And evidently neither did Sheridan, Sherman nor Grant see anything sinister in it. Why else would they not charge Benteen or Reno with the supposed infractions they made? It wasn't them that requested the RCI, it was Reno himself who requested it after being harassed by the problem. Everyone back then knew. They knew Custer disobeyed Terry's orders. But to pacify his wife and keep the situation stable they made him a national hero instead. A rallying call that would eventually put every indian in this country on the reservations. What other choice did they have?
So was it wrong for Custer to disobey Terry's orders? Ask the 200 or so men who died that day? All the men who did survive from Reno and Benteen battalions never did understand the reason for the forced night march. To them it never made any sense. And you know what? It still don't.
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - November 29 2005 : 4:14:14 PM
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Custer had to work with what was given him.
He refused the Gatling gun detachment and units of the 2nd cavalry.
Yes. A true statement. And one that I have already addressed. Lets take an example though. Lets put Custer with 80 or so troopers on Custer Hill. Lets have them firing volleys at the charging and mounted warriors. Keep in mind. It took about 20 or so seconds to fire, expend, and then reload another cartridge. What happens when lets say they all fire a volley at the warriors charging from the south. And then 10 to 15 seconds later another group of warriors charge over the hill from the north?
Well firing by troops would overcome this problem but he had neither the troops nor time.
Place Custer's supposedly well disciplined but understrength companies with single shot rifles on the ground, and what have you got?
And you might add fragment them into 4 seperate battalions and when you've done that spread 5 troops out over a mile and what have you got?Pathetic handfuls of troopers cut off , isolated and over run.
While I am on the subject. Why does eveyone want Custer to be the obedient soldier here?
OK so let's have Custer disobey orders and arrive in the LBH valley a day after Terry.Guess what 1500 warriors would have done to a mainly infantry force? |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 29 2005 : 8:57:09 PM
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Driving bison off a cliff was handy a hundred fifty years previous before everyone had horses. While the concept is simple, there aren't a lot of handy cliffs where there are buffalo. Like dog soldiers and the stake in the ground, it was a custom made pointless by the horse.
In any case, I'd think what was meant was that they rode and shot among their prey without much danger, that buffalo are pretty easy to kill. To say they were stampeded to a place gives the Indians too much credit for a competence nowhere exhibited that day.
This was placed on another thread like an idiot. Very like. Sorry. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 01 2006 : 01:23:06 AM
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quote:
While I am on the subject. Why does everyone want Custer to be the obedient soldier here?
OK so let's have Custer disobey orders and arrive in the LBH valley a day after Terry.Guess what 1500 warriors would have done to a mainly infantry force?
My question then is did Terry really expect Custer to arrive at the same time as he did? |
“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
SEMPER FI |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - January 01 2006 : 11:03:28 AM
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| Probably not but the agreed timetable covered Terry's arse. |
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Nomad
Recruit
Status: offline |
Posted - January 04 2006 : 7:43:48 PM
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Hello everyone,
Terri claims that Custer was reckless because:
1. He failed to alter his battle plan.
2. He disregarded his scout’s estimates of the hostile's strength.
3. He divided the regiment.
4. He hadn't improved upon Civil War tactics.
To begin with, the objective of the expedition was offensive, i.e., “President Grant, through the Bureau of Indian Affairs, ordered the [summer roamers] to return to their reservations by 31 January 1876 (Electronic document-http://www-cgsc.army.mil /carl/resources/csi/sioux/sioux.asp#Sheridan's
%20Campaign%20Plan). When the dead-line passed and no [summer roamers] had returned, the bureau ordered General Sheridan to use military action to enforce their directive” (Nomad, lbha.org: 1/6/06). Troop disposition on Battle Ridge clearly indicates that Companies C, I and L were deployed dismounted, and in skirmish order, i.e., a defensive posture. Obviously, Custer’s battle plan had changed.
Custer’s understanding of the number of hostiles was based on Indian Bureau estimates. When he parted company with Terry and Gibbon on 21 June, he believed that he would encounter approximately 800 to 1000 warriors. While on the march, his scouts began reporting a high volume of recently abandoned hostile encampments, which caused Custer to expand his estimate to approx. 1500 (Graham 1953: 23). According to Graham (inter alia), his scout’s intelligence reports were qualitive in nature and not quantitive, i.e., based on the growing number of lodges they had seen in the abandoned camps, they estimated the number of warriors, and then compared their estimate to the number of 7th Cavalry troopers (1953). Intelligence from the Crow’s Nest observation didn’t improve matters. In this instance, the probable number of warriors was based on the size of the pony heard (ibid). In essence, the best information that Custer’s intelligence network could provide him, was a comparison between an unknown quantity and a known quantity.
Based on his experience, Custer knew that Indians either fought as individuals, or in small bands, and not as a homogenous tactical unit with a command structure. Add to this the fact that contemporary military doctrine encouraged him to believe that the hostile’s first reaction would be to scatter; therefore, it should come as no surprise that Custer was confident that 650 cavalrymen could handle 1500 disorganized warriors (Electronic document-http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi /sioux/sioux. asp#Sheridan's%20Campaign%20Plan).
The idea that Indians normally scattered when confronted by an organized military force, permeated U.S. military thinking during the 1870’s (ibid). Sheridan’s solution to this problem was to deploy three separate columns, each starting from a different direction, and march them toward the suspected region with orders to seek and destroy (http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources /csi/sioux/IMAGES/MAP8
.GIF). This strategy had the combined effect of confining the hostiles to a shrinking arena, and closely monitoring, if not closing off, their escape routes. Sheridan believed that each of his columns was capable of handling whatever size hostile band they might encounter; evidently, he was so enamored of this concept, that he left it to his field commanders discretion to maneuver in concert, if they so desired (Electronic document-http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/ csi/sioux/sioux.sp# Sheridan's%20
Campaign%20Plan). Alfred Terry commanded two prongs of Sheridan’s tri-dent, and with Custer’s help, he planned a double envelopment to trap the hostiles between them. Unfortunately, circumstances turned the 7th Cavalry into the tip of a spear.
Among Terry’s senior field commanders, i.e., Terry, Gibbon and Custer, Custer had the most experience fighting Indians; thus, it is reasonable to assume that Terry must have relied heavily on his insight when he made his attack plan. Terry’s written orders to Custer, indicate that he was following Sheridan’s strategic blueprint, i.e., the purpose of the Tulloch’s Creek investigation was to ensure that no large bands were lingering there to attack Custer’s rear, and/or to evade capture.
That Custer was following Terry’s tactical plan is apparent in his deployment of Benteen’s battalion south of the main column, and then west to seek and destroy whatever roving bands of warriors he may encounter, or if he found it, to attack the hostile’s village. Custer’s decision to divide the regiment is not only consistent with Terry’s double envelopment scheme, but also with established military practice.
If Benteen had followed Custer’s orders, and continued to march toward the river, and had he encountered a roving band of warriors or the village along the way, then Custer and the main column, who were marching parallel to Benteen, and approximately 6 miles north, were near enough to attack the hostile’s flank and/or rear. The idea of double envelopment is timeless; both Hannibal at Cannae, and Schwarzkopf in Iraq employed it. That Custer attempted to employ it along the Little Bighorn speaks well of his tactical acumen, and thus, diminishes Terri’s accusation of recklessness.
Thank you for your time and consideration.
Nomad
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - January 05 2006 : 09:44:40 AM
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Hi Nomad and welcome.A nicely argued post.And forgive me if I seem picky but one or two points---
Unfortunately, circumstances turned the 7th Cavalry into the tip of a spear.Do you not think that these "circumstances" were greatly influenced by Custer himself?
That Custer was following Terry’s tactical plan is apparent Other than advice to guard against a possible escape by the Indians past his left flank Terry gave no Tatical instructions to Custer.
Custer’s decision to divide the regiment is not only consistent with Terry’s double envelopment scheme, but also with established military practice.Terry's double envelopment tactic was based on two major columns not on a subunit of a subunit. And there is also a little matter of cordination, lack of which brought about a subunit [Reno]of a subunit [Custer] of a subunit [Terry ]enveloping the entire Indian force on his lonesome.
That Custer attempted to employ it along the Little Bighorn speaks well of his tactical acumen,
It may speak well of his acumen but his execution was woeful.
Regards
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Nomad
Recruit
Status: offline |
Posted - January 05 2006 : 7:41:45 PM
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Hello Wild I,
Thank you for your kind comments, and I don’t think you’re being picky. Questions and diverse perspectives make good discussions. No?
In response to my conclusion: “Unfortunately, circumstances turned the 7th Cavalry into the tip of a spear”, you wrote: “Do you not think that these "circumstances" were greatly influenced by Custer himself?” No, just the opposite, i.e., the circumstances influenced Custer.
I argued that Sheridan’s solution to the problem of Indians scattering when confronted by an organized military force, was to “deploy three separate columns, each starting from a different direction”, and have them converge on the area where the hostiles were believed to be located. In effect, this action would enclose the hostiles, cut off their avenues of escape, and thus, bring them to battle. The downside of Sheridan’s strategy was that he allowed one prong to maneuver independently of the other two. A three prong maneuver, minus one prong, equals a double envelopment.
Terry, commanding two of Sheridan’s prongs, continued maneuvering his two battle groups in accordance with the objectives of Sheridan’s strategy, i.e., to enclose the hostiles, cut off their avenues of escape, and thus, bring them to battle. The circumstances that turned the 7th Cavalry into a lone prong are twofold:
1. Military protocol obligated Custer to act in concert with Sheridan’s objectives.
2. He believed that his column had been discovered and that the hostiles would scatter; therefore, he had to act immediately to remain consistent with Sheridan’s objectives.
You wrote: “Other than advice to guard against a possible escape by the Indians past his left flank Terry gave no Tatical instructions to Custer”. Terry knew the hostiles would be encamped next to a river. Therefore, his desire that Custer scout the lower region of Tulloch’s Creek is tactical in the sense that he was trying to locate the hostile’s village through a process of elimination, i.e., if they aren’t on the Tulloch, then they must either be on the Bighorn, or the Little Bighorn.
Your comment, “Terry's double envelopment tactic was based on two major columns not on a subunit of a subunit. And there is also a little matter of cordination, lack of which brought about a subunit [Reno]of a subunit [Custer] of a subunit [Terry ]enveloping the entire Indian force on his lonesome”, examines my argument out of context.
Terry’s strategy was to attack the hostiles from two directions, i.e., a double envelopment. I argued that “if Benteen had followed Custer’s orders, and continued to march toward the river”, and he encountered a band of warriors or found the village (ala Terry’s desire for Custer to scout Tulloch’s Creek), then the main column with Custer was in position to attack the hostile’s flank and/or rear, i.e., a double envelopment, which is “not only consistent with Terry’s scheme (A bi-directional attack preceded by a scouting mission), but also with established military practice”.
And finally, you wrote: “That Custer attempted to employ it [Double envelopment] along the Little Bighorn speaks well of his tactical acumen, It may speak well of his acumen but his execution was woeful”. At the Reno Court of Inquiry, Captain Benteen testified that he willfully disobeyed Custer’s orders (p 381). Therefore, if Custer’s attempt to employ a sub-unit double envelopment south of Ford A depended on Benteen executing his part of the plan, and Benteen admits that he purposefully abandoned his mission, then it follows that Benteen, and not Custer is responsible for the poor execution of the double envelopment.
Thank you for your time and consideration.
Nomad
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
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Posted - January 06 2006 : 4:34:09 PM
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Nomad
A three prong maneuver, minus one prong, equals a double
envelopment.
Could I respectfully disabuse you of the notion that Custer was committed to this double envelopment thingy.
When Custer went against Terry's advice and followed the Indian trail across the devide he in fact put in jeopardy this double envelopement plan,for when he turned West he only had a rough idea of where the village lay.As we know it lay 3 miles North of where Custer struck the Little Bighorn but it could have just as easely have been 3 miles South.In which case Custer would have been forced to attack from the North allowing the Indians an escape route to the South.
Further if the plan was for Custer to drive the Indians North towards Terry then how do you reconcile this with his attempt to attack the village from the North?
Unfortunately, circumstances turned the 7th Cavalry into the tip of a spear.
Three major factors were under the control of Custer.
1 The strenght of his force.
2 The timing of his attack
3 The direction of his attack.
All three opportunities he blew.He turned down the 2nd cavalry and the G. gun detachment.He blew the timing by going against Terry's advice and getting himself spotted and the direction of his attempted attack on the village was disasterious.Custer hung himself high on his own petard.
Military protocol obligated Custer to act in concert with Sheridan’s objectives.
No he took his orders from Terry.
a double envelopment, which is “not only consistent with Terry’s scheme Terry's scheme was strategic and did not oblige commander to adopt it tactically----sending 120 men in an uncordinated attack on a force they had estimated as at least 1000 strong.
but also with established military practice”.
Military practice also said the attacking force should number 3 times the force being attacked.
if Custer’s attempt to employ a sub-unit double envelopment south of Ford A depended on Benteen executing his part of the plan, and Benteen admits that he purposefully abandoned his mission,Custer's order to Benteen if carried out would have totally removed Benteen from the board.
Slan
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 06 2006 : 7:44:02 PM
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This has the whiff of pretentious language, specifically pretentious military terminology, like "tactical disintegration." I'm not even going to look it up to see if I'm wrong. But what is a double envelopment? How does it differ from a regular envelopment? Two, no three, concentric circles? The victims and then two circles of enemy enveloping them? A two pronged attack is not necessarily any envelopment.
I don't think anyone thought at any time that any combination of soldiers were going to surround the Indians and escort them back to the reservation. First because they'd have better luck trying to herd cats, second because they were quite convinced - and correctly - that a major whumping of the warriors in any form would send everyone back pretty quick anyway. The fear was they couldn't be brought to battle at all, not necessarily corralled.
The three to one attack ratio had to do with muskets and time between reloadings over specific distances, I recall. Napoleon, wasn't it? Big in the Civil War, and wrong there as often as not. Virtually no attacks were launched anywhere near that ratio, nor could they be.
Custer's orders to Benteen are actually unclear and unknown. Custer was so disorganized he sent two additional couriers to update Benteen on what he wanted done when it could have been done in one short, considered sentence hours previous. Custer was famous within the 7th for changing his mind a lot. If Custer actually told Benteen - oddly, nobody in the 7th contradicted Benteen, including Gibson - to keep going till he hit something, then Benteen disobeyed his orders. If it was just to check out the LBH's upper reaches, then he didn't. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
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Nomad
Recruit
Status: offline |
Posted - January 07 2006 : 12:43:21 AM
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Hello Wild I,
You wrote: “Could I respectfully disabuse you of the notion that Custer was committed to this double envelopment thingy”. I think we’re arguing at cross purposes here.
When Tom Custer brought word that a few Indians were found rummaging through a fallen box of hardtack, George Custer decided to attack immediately. Up to that point he had been maneuvering his column in accordance with Terry’s plan to attack from two directions, i.e., a double envelopment.
You wrote: “When Custer went against Terry's advice and followed the Indian trail across the devide he in fact put in jeopardy this double envelopement plan”.
Terry’s orders to Custer mandated his crossing the divide to examine the southern sector of Tullock’s Creek.
“When he turned West he only had a rough idea of where the village lay. As we know it lay 3 miles North of where Custer struck the Little Bighorn but it could have just as easely have been 3 miles South”. I agree. Custer, it seems, also believed that the village could be south of the main trail, because he sent Benteen to reconnoiter that region.
You wrote: “Further if the plan was for Custer to drive the Indians North towards Terry then how do you reconcile this with his attempt to attack the village from the North?”
Terry’s written instructions to Custer didn’t require him to drive the hostiles north; however, they did mention that the hostiles “may be so nearly inclosed by the two columns that their escape will be impossible” (Graham 1953: 132-134).
As the circumstances changed, Custer’s tactics changed. He must have realized that his decision to attack before Terry’s column was in position to “inclose” the village from the north, left that zone uncovered, so he moved north to attack from that direction, and in effect, seal off that escape route.
You claim that Custer failed to take advantage of three opportunities that would have:
1. Strengthened his force.
2. Controlled the timing of his attack.
3. Controlled the direction of his attack.
You wrote: “He turned down the 2nd cavalry and the G. gun detachment.He blew the timing by going against Terry's advice and getting himself spotted and the direction of his attempted attack on the village was disasterious.Custer hung himself high on his own petard”.
Custer described Gibbon’s 2nd Cavalry detachment as 200 men, mounted on inferior horses. Is there anything in the historical record that you can point to, which decidedly dispels his assessment? If not, then the question becomes: Would 200 poorly mounted cavalrymen have made the difference between victory and defeat?
Custer also claimed that the horses of the Gattling Gun detachment were also of poor quality, and thus, would hampered rapid movement through rough terrain. Again, there is nothing in the historical record that can decidedly argue against his assessment.
Reasoning with the information in the historical record reveals that the proximity of the 7th Cavalry to the village was not know to the hostiles, until Reno’s battalion was deploying to attack.
I argued that “military protocol obligated Custer to act in concert with Sheridan’s objectives”.
You claim that “he took his orders from Terry”. My point is, that Custer operated within a chain of command, i.e., Sheridan devised a strategy and issued orders to his subordinates accordingly. It follows that if military protocol obligated Generals Crook and Terry to act in concert with Sheridan’s objectives, and Custer was operating within that chain of command, then Custer was likewise obligated to act in concert with Sheridan’s strategic objectives.
You wrote: “Terry's scheme was strategic and did not oblige commander to adopt it tactically----sending 120 men in an uncordinated attack on a force they had estimated as at least 1000 strong”.
Terry commanded two of Sheridan’s three prongs, i.e., Gibbon’s combined force, and Custer’s cavalry regiment. On 21 June, Terry consulted with Gibbon and Custer aboard the Far West re: the tactical execution of Sheridan’s strategy. I agree. Reno’s mission makes no sense, unless it was part of a coordinated attack. I believe it was (See the last paragraph below).
You wrote: “Military practice also said the attacking force should number 3 times the force being attacked”.
I believe Dark Cloud’s 1/6/06, 7:44 pm post, addresses this issue.
You claim that had Benteen carried out Custer's orders he would have been “totally removed” from the field of action.
I argue that had Benteen carried out Custer's orders, he would have been part of Custer’s tactical operation. Let’s assume that Benteen continued marching west to the valley, and found nothing at the Little Bighorn. Do you really think Custer would have left 125 men to sit idle by the riverside, while he and Reno engaged the hostiles? Or do you think it more plausible that Custer would have had him participate as part of the “whole outfit” that he promised would support Reno’s attack?
Once again, thank you for your time and consideration Wild I.
Nomad
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Nomad
Recruit
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Posted - January 07 2006 : 01:50:02 AM
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Hello Dark Cloud,
I don’t see anything pretentious about using accurate military terminology. It adds to the clarity of the discussion. I’m sure you’ll agree that clarity is preferable to ambiguity. No?
You asked: “what is a double envelopment? How does it differ from a regular envelopment? Two, no three, concentric circles? The victims and then two circles of enemy enveloping them?”
Envelopment occurs when the flank of an opposing force is attacked and defeated, i.e., rolled up. Therefore, a double envelopment occurs when both flanks of an opposing force are rolled up, e.g., Hannibal’s double envelopment at Cannae.
You wrote: “A two pronged attack is not necessarily any envelopment”.
I agree. It could be a pincer movement, which is designed to skirt around the flanks, and attack the rear echelon.
You wrote: “I don't think anyone thought at any time that any combination of soldiers were going to surround the Indians and escort them back to the reservation".
I agree. In my 1/4/06, 7:43 pm post, I wrote: “To begin with, the objective of the expedition was offensive, i.e., “President Grant, through the Bureau of Indian Affairs, ordered the [summer roamers] to return to their reservations by 31 January 1876 (Electronic document-http://www-cgsc.army.mil /carl/resources/csi/sioux/sioux.asp#Sheridan's%20Campaign%20Plan). When the dead-line passed and no [summer roamers] had returned, the bureau ordered General Sheridan to use military action to enforce their directive”.
Clearly, the time for passive observation had passed; the president was calling for decisive military action.
You wrote:“The fear was they couldn't be brought to battle at all, not necessarily corralled”.
Military doctrine at the time assumed that the hostiles would scatter when confronted by an organized force; therefore, they could not be brought to battle unless their escape routes were sealed. In other words, if you couldn’t coral them, you couldn’t fight them.
You wrote: “Custer's orders to Benteen are actually unclear and unknown. Custer was so disorganized he sent two additional couriers to update Benteen on what he wanted done when it could have been done in one short, considered sentence hours previous”.
An equally plausible, alternative explanation might be that Custer needed to send two additional couriers to update Benteen, because the situation had changed since he began his mission; thus his original orders were no longer viable.
You wrote: “If Custer actually told Benteen - oddly, nobody in the 7th contradicted Benteen, including Gibson - to keep going till he hit something, then Benteen disobeyed his orders. If it was just to check out the LBH's upper reaches, then he didn't”.
If Benteen’s mission was “to check out the LBH's upper reaches”, and he returned to the main trail before he reached the river, then he still disobeyed orders.
Thank you for your time.
Nomad
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Edited by - Nomad on January 07 2006 01:53:17 AM |
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 07 2006 : 09:33:36 AM
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I quote:
don't think anyone thought at any time that any combination of soldiers were going to surround the Indians and escort them back to the reservation. First because they'd have better luck trying to herd cats, second because they were quite convinced - and correctly - that a major whumping of the warriors in any form would send everyone back pretty quick anyway. The fear was they couldn't be brought to battle at all, not necessarily corralled.
"The fear was they couldn't be brought to battle at all" I believe this key to Custer's strategy. A small force, Reno, might bring the Indians to battle(which was correct) and maybe he if the whole regiment charged they would scatter and not be brought to battle. In the the latter I believed he erred. They were mentally ready for battle. |
“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 07 2006 : 10:32:09 AM
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quote:
Military doctrine at the time assumed that the hostiles would scatter when confronted by an organized force; therefore, they could not be brought to battle unless their escape routes were sealed. In other words, if you couldn’t coral them, you couldn’t fight them.
The military also knew that they could be brought to battle with a small force. Did Custer intentionally use Reno as a small force to bring them to battle as a strategy?
Certainly his instructions to Reno were to bring them to battle. |
“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 07 2006 : 12:08:13 PM
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No, no, no. Even if correct by prolonged use, it makes no sense, however elevated and, yes, pretentious. You're either enveloped or you're not. An attempt of envelopment by two enemy wings cannot be called an envelopment, single of double, until envelopment occurs and is sustained. It makes no literal sense. You don't call an attempted double homicide a double homicide: it would be inaccurate to do so. In any case, it seems to be reflective of strategy in war rather than tactics in battle. It's like saying we're surrounded on two sides. It's the sort of free form association of sound departed from sense and delivered in Stentorian tones the military loves. If English is their chosen vehicle, the military should learn to use it accurately.
Winkpedia disagrees with you, and I'm willing to bet various actual military authorities will give various definitions, all delivered loudly in the hopes the civvies don't notice the weak logic.
From Winkpedia: "The pincer movement (double envelopment) is a basic element of military strategy which has been used, to some extent, in nearly every war. The maneuver is mostly self-explanatory; the flanks of the opponent are attacked simultaneously in a pinching motion after the opponent has advanced towards the center of an army which is responding by moving its outside forces to the enemy's flanks, in order to surround it. At the same time, a second layer of pincers attacks on the more extreme flanks, so as to prevent any attempts to reinforce the target unit."
This is not what Sherman, Sheridan, Terry, or Custer were doing whatsoever. First, Indians have no strategic flanks (and coincidental tactical flanks only) and no organizational ability to wield flanks and a center and all that, and so wouldn't react as an army trained in such would. Second, a two pronged strategic approach by the Army leaves all sorts of openings for dispersal and reassembly elsewhere for the amorphous Indians, were they competent in large body manuever, which they were not but apparently assumed to be because it didn't tax existing "military doctrine."
The hope was that the Indians were in the general area where they were found, that at least one prong would hit and wallop them with a fair chance that a large clump of refugees would get walloped by another prong, and they'd return to the rez for protection and shelter. It was possible and the best if all units hit the camp together, but nobody thought that likely, just something to hope for. The assumption was that the Indians would dissolve into their smallest tribal units and fade away.
It occured to nobody, it seems, that like Kildeer Mt., large villages of Sioux (probably the only tribe large enough to make this an issue) reacted differently than smaller villages. This was likely due to the fact that communication was so bad. Kildeer Mt. showed that the Sioux didn't run always, did prepare to fight, would face artillery, and could be a real pain if gathered in summer strength. Many of the same Sioux were at the Little Bighorn in 76, in warm weather, fed, watered, satiated, tanned and rested, with happy memories of the Rosebud, and truly and seriously motivated when Custer hit.
It took a serious lack of imagination within the Army not to prepare better from Sherman on down. But Custer, for all his alleged experience (Crook would laugh), didn't seem to view LBH as different from the Wa****a. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - January 07 2006 : 4:29:19 PM
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When Tom Custer brought word that a few Indians were found rummaging through a fallen box of hardtack, George Custer decided to attack immediately.
That is not the reason he decided to follow the Indian trail he had already turned down Davis Creek and away from the Rosebud when this incident occured.This risked as I have pointed jeopardizing the entire strategy.
Terry’s orders to Custer mandated his crossing the divide to examine the southern sector of Tullock’s Creek.
It does no such thing and expressly states that a scout was no more than required mentioning that a detachment of Gibbons command would scout the lower section.A scout was all that was required not an attack via Tullock creek.
I agree. Custer, it seems, also believed that the village could be south of the main trail, because he sent Benteen to reconnoiter that region.Inever heard of that.And if you agree that Custer believed the village could be to the South why go against Terry's advice?
Terry’s written instructions to Custer didn’t require him to drive the hostiles north;So no double tingymagiggy required?
As the circumstances changed, Custer’s tactics changed.
What circumstances changed? The village was sitting there oblivious to Custer's approach enjoying the after glow of bloodying Crook's nose
He must have realized that his decision to attack before Terry’s column was in position to “inclose” the village from the north, left that zone uncovered, so he moved north to attack from that direction, and in effect, seal off that escape route.
Sure great thinking.200 Men would now do the job of 6 infantry coys 4 cav troops and Gatlings?
Custer described Gibbon’s 2nd Cavalry detachment as 200 men, mounted on inferior horses. They had no trouble getting to the LBH on time.
Custer also claimed that the horses of the Gattling Gun detachment were also of poor quality, and thus, would hampered rapid movement through rough terrain. Again, there is nothing in the historical record that can decidedly argue against his assessment.
Once again he was wrong as they got to the LBH at the agreed time.[would have to check this But I read somewhere that Reno had a gatling with him on hes recce.]
You wrote: “Military practice also said the attacking force should number 3 times the force being attacked”.
I believe Dark Cloud’s 1/6/06, 7:44 pm post, addresses this issue.Don't mind DC he dosen't know his arse from his elbow just get your great big picture book out of civil war battles and count the no. of brigades attacking Marye's Heights as against the defenders likewise Lee's attack at Gettysburg or any other significant military encounter.
and found nothing at the Little Bighorn. Do you really think Custer would have left 125 men to sit idle by the riverside,
The LBH was 11 miles from where the command devided and Custer did not order Benteen to strike out for it but to check the valleys in that direction.But just for the sake of arguement if Benteen had carried on to the LBH he would have been 3-4 miles below Reno when Custer sent for him and Martin would never have reached him and he might have been too late to do Reno any good.[but interesting point on Benteen Inever considered it]
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terri
Private
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 07 2006 : 9:19:14 PM
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| You guys make fantastic arguments for your particular points of view (Grad school level no kidding). I guess we could all bluster forever and when it gets down to fish or cut bait (bad cliche), I circle back to the simplistic, alledgely discredited viewpoints. Custer didn't recconiter, and if he gave weight to his scouts warnings, he chose not to alter his tactics. Subsequently, he was out numbered due to splitting his force and out gunned by Native American firepower. Finally, he was out fought by a determined enemy who did the unexpected: they united; they did not flee; they fought a fearless, determined battle in which they gained the momentem and never relinquished it. Simplistic, sophomoric and probably contains a lot of truth. |
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Benteen
Lt. Colonel
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 Posted - January 07 2006 : 11:38:44 PM
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Terri ~ It works for me!  |
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 10 2006 : 12:11:51 AM
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quote:
I circle back to the simplistic, alledgely discredited viewpoints. Custer didn't recconiter, and if he gave weight to his scouts warnings, he chose not to alter his tactics. Subsequently, he was out numbered due to splitting his force and out gunned by Native American firepower. Finally, he was out fought by a determined enemy who did the unexpected: they united; they did not flee; they fought a fearless, determined battle in which they gained the momentem and never relinquished it. Simplistic, sophomoric and probably contains a lot of truth.
Terri- The arguments and discussions are more entertaining -
Why would he reconnoiter if he believed the expected was not "a determined enemy who did the unexpected: they united; they did not flee; they fought a fearless, determined battle "?
"if he gave weight to his scouts warnings, he chose not to alter his tactics." Wasn't the attack on the 25th an alteration of tactics? Some of the scouts told him to do so.
Wasn't the 7th outnumbered in total?
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Regarding the 7th's defeat
