| Author |
 Topic  |
|
AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
 Posted - January 11 2006 : 11:50:33 AM
|
quote:
As I have posted on another thread -----The skirmish line reduced the fire power of the command by 25%.What % did jams reduce it by.
Wild- good question. The answer may be different than just the frequency of "jams" which I believe to be in the range of less than 5%. Just my opinion from looking at different data. The timing of when it occurred and the training the troopers had in clearing these "jams" now comes into play. The trooper must remove his eyes off the advancing enemy to clear the problem. He must recognize the problem and know how to clear it. The more practice the trooper gets the more likely he would clear it quicker. Lots of Indians advancing increases th stress and less likelihood that the trooper cleared the "jam". My conclusion still is that it did not happen enough to be deciding factor at LBH.
As a side note we now train our officers to transition to their handgun if they have a shotgun or rifle malfunction that is not easily cleared. Before we provided the training we went to the range and created hard to clear malfunctions. None of the 20 officers transitioned to their handgun. The kept trying to clear the malfunction. At the end of that day after training and to the present day they now transition to the handgun when faced with the same malfunction or when they run out of ammunition in the rifle or shotgun. |
“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
SEMPER FI |
Edited by - AZ Ranger on January 11 2006 11:53:12 AM |
  |
|
|
wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - January 11 2006 : 12:53:54 PM
|
I think it was DC who decribed the Springfield as the main armament of the 7th.But here's what happens when it is employed by a cavalry regiment.When attacking on horseback [I know there is no other way]one round can be discharged.When defending on foot 25% of the units firepower is lost.
Sure Custer had a bad day but his staff and system were obsolete. |
|
|
|
Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 11 2006 : 1:04:16 PM
|
quote:
As a side note we now train our officers to transition to their handgun if they have a shotgun or rifle malfunction that is not easily cleared. Before we provided the training we went to the range and created hard to clear malfunctions. None of the 20 officers transitioned to their handgun. The kept trying to clear the malfunction. At the end of that day after training and to the present day they now transition to the handgun when faced with the same malfunction or when they run out of ammunition in the rifle or shotgun.
This is my point when I mentioned Fox' Black Bomber Error -- some unknown number of cavalrymen may well have simply abandoned attempts to clear the carbine and resorted to the revolver. Another unknown number may have died before getting the jam cleared. So the number of cleared jams (represented by cases with pry marks) cannot be extrapolated to give us a reasonably accurate estimate of the total number of carbines that jammed.
It doesn't mean jamming was a significant factor in Custer's defeat -- but it does illustrate how good data can be improperly interpreted. |
|
|
|
Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 11 2006 : 2:41:46 PM
|
I think it was the U.S. Army that described the Springfield as the cavalry's primary weapon, given that cavalry was often or mostly used as mounted infantry or dragoons in the west, like the Indians themselves.
AZ, that's exactly my feeling as well. If they had practiced, they'd have known long before - I've complained for awhile - and in any case a quick wipe of the ammo might have eliminated many of the few problems they had if Godfrey is correct. You notice his complaint isn't the same one being voiced here. He says it was dirty ammo.
But I'd rather hammer on the issue of training in general. If they were so unfamiliar with their primary weapon's - sorry, weapon system's - issues, how good could they have been overall? It takes time and practice to be a good rider, to be a good shot. It takes a lot of practice to be good with a sword or in any kind of hand to hand. How lax was the training overall? Custer spent budget and time coloring the companies and had a bloody band, but after five rapid shots in combat his men discover....... That's evidence, I'd say, wouldn't you? As a law enforcement officer?
As for jamming, how often - given the strict maintanance routines with oil and rag and general understanding of technology extant among the Sioux - do we think Sioux weapons malfunctioned? How many of the cavalry rounds thought evidence for cavalry jams are actually from Sioux attempts to utilize the wrong ammo? What were failure rates with well maintained Winchesters and Henrys and what would they have been with the Sioux? I'd imagine the Sioux envied the soldiers' failure rate. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
|
|
|
AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 15 2006 : 3:42:46 PM
|
quote:
But I'd rather hammer on the issue of training in general. If they were so unfamiliar with their primary weapon's - sorry, weapon system's - issues, how good could they have been overall? It takes time and practice to be a good rider, to be a good shot. It takes a lot of practice to be good with a sword or in any kind of hand to hand. How lax was the training overall? Custer spent budget and time coloring the companies and had a bloody band, but after five rapid shots in combat his men discover....... That's evidence, I'd say, wouldn't you? As a law enforcement officer?
DC,Certainly it would be testimony allowed in a court. In fact in modern times there are attorney's who make good money off of failure to train. The officers of the Cavalry if civilians would be subject to vicarious liability along with the agency (Army). LBH if it had been a police action in modern times there may have been some rich widows. Again Mrs Custer loses out because her husband failed to train. So without having to research,which is probably a mistake here, wasn't Custer gone for a period of time before going to LBH. I would suspect that NCOs would be in charge of the daily training with some oversight by an officer.
I believe one of the problems is that training develops from a need. Some training needs are learned the hard way. The use of cartridge cases in rifles was relatively new. I know there were some Henry's and the Spencer's but they used a smaller cartridges and weren't readily available. The.45/70 was developed for the Springfield and was relative new.
|
“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
SEMPER FI |
Edited by - AZ Ranger on January 15 2006 3:48:50 PM |
|
|
|
Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 15 2006 : 3:55:20 PM
|
quote:
Again Mrs Custer loses out because her husband failed to train.
So many officers' wives were left destitute after the Little Big Horn that the Army Mutual Aid Society (now the Army and Air Force Mutual Aid Society) was formed (I'm a member.) The AAFMA provides low-cost insurance to regular officers -- and almost went bankrupt during Viet Nam. Fortunately, it has recovered and is doing so well that they periodically increase my coverage without raising my premiums.
quote:
So without having to research,which is probably a mistake here, wasn't Custer gone for a period of time before going to LBH. I would suspect that NCOs would be in charge of the daily training with some oversight by an officer.
Custer had been called before Congress to testify about irregularities in supplies -- specifically, rations issued to the 7th Cavalry that bore the US Indian Department mark (indicating they had been stolen from the USID and re-sold to the Army.)
This was the work of the Belknap Indian Ring (named for Secretary of War Belknap, who profited from it.) This did not endear Custer to President Grant (who was unfortunately unable to tell good subordinates from bad, and was loyal to all.)
Custer was derailed on a trumped-up charge -- supposedly he failed to pay a call on the President (although he tried, and send a note telling them he had tried and had to get back to his station.) It was only through negotiation that Terry was able to convince the President to relent and let Custer command the 7th during the upcoming campaign.
|
|
|
|
AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 15 2006 : 4:31:33 PM
|
quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Again Mrs Custer loses out because her husband failed to train.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
So many officers' wives were left destitute after the Little Big Horn that the Army Mutual Aid Society (now the Army and Air Force Mutual Aid Society) was formed (I'm a member.) The AAFMA provides low-cost insurance to regular officers -- and almost went bankrupt during Viet Nam. Fortunately, it has recovered and is doing so well that they periodically increase my coverage without raising my premiums.
quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
So without having to research,which is probably a mistake here, wasn't Custer gone for a period of time before going to LBH. I would suspect that NCOs would be in charge of the daily training with some oversight by an officer.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Custer had been called before Congress to testify about irregularities in supplies -- specifically, rations issued to the 7th Cavalry that bore the US Indian Department mark (indicating they had been stolen from the USID and re-sold to the Army.)
This was the work of the Belknap Indian Ring (named for Secretary of War Belknap, who profited from it.) This did not endear Custer to President Grant (who was unfortunately unable to tell good subordinates from bad, and was loyal to all.)
Custer was derailed on a trumped-up charge -- supposedly he failed to pay a call on the President (although he tried, and send a note telling them he had tried and had to get back to his station.) It was only through negotiation that Terry was able to convince the President to relent and let Custer command the 7th during the upcoming campaign.
Thanks Vern for the info which is what I had believed had happened. My question to you is who would have been responsible to make sure the troopers were trained on a daily basis? Did they make reports to superiors that the training was complete and the Troopers ready to go, etc? Ultimately it the officers and up the chain of command. |
“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
SEMPER FI |
|
|
|
Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 15 2006 : 5:17:41 PM
|
quote:
Thanks Vern for the info which is what I had believed had happened. My question to you is who would have been responsible to make sure the troopers were trained on a daily basis? Did they make reports to superiors that the training was complete and the Troopers ready to go, etc? Ultimately it the officers and up the chain of command.
There was not a systematized training approach in those days. New recruits were sent to the unit, officers and NCOs were not periodically sent to school for more training, and there was nothing like a decent reporting system. The catch-all Morning Report was the form on which you entered everything, from unit strength, to combat actions.
There were manuals, but no positive check to be sure they were actually used for training. The Marksmanship Revolution didn't start until 1877 -- when former Civil War officers formed the National Rifle Association and used its leverage to get the Army to improve marksmanship. |
|
|
|
AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 19 2006 : 12:06:24 AM
|
quote:
There was not a systematized training approach in those days. New recruits were sent to the unit, officers and NCOs were not periodically sent to school for more training, and there was nothing like a decent reporting system. The catch-all Morning Report was the form on which you entered everything, from unit strength, to combat actions.
Vern- So how would they know if they were ready to go into battle? |
“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
SEMPER FI |
|
|
|
Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 19 2006 : 09:55:11 AM
|
quote:
Vern- So how would they know if they were ready to go into battle?
They wouldn't. To this day there is no way to really quantify training. Training is complex:
1. What should we train? How do we know that the things we select for training -- even if the units could do them perfectly -- add up to battle readiness?
2. How do we measure training? Hours spent? Rounds fired? Miles marched?
3. How do we measure the effectiveness of the unit, as opposed to the individual soldier? |
|
|
|
Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 19 2006 : 12:15:09 PM
|
How to judge training? I'd suspect field result would be a clue. This could be the liquor talking. The U.S. Army seems to have ignored everything since the CW, apparently hoping they were training the Sioux by inspiring pageant to fight correctly like civilized people rather than training their own men for efficiency or at least meaningful effect.
And a civvie assumption with possible merit? Grotesquely insufficient training - so bad that an alleged loosening up after five rounds came as a shock - or theater inappropriate training - you can supply the examples - rather than reflective of the warfare they could expect, probably isn't the winning ticket.
I point again to Crook and his attitude towards pack mules vs. the unrelenting incompetence of the 7th with their own. That's institutional moronics. It required no insight, no genius. It's obvious, and had to be done and eventually was. But it wasn't dashing cavalry to run the mules, so it was treated as a punishment: your company's turn in the apple barrel. How stupid is that? |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
|
|
|
Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 19 2006 : 12:24:29 PM
|
quote:
How to judge training? I'd suspect field result would be a clue.
What does that mean? Do you mean battle results? If so, then every time you want to evaluate training, you have to arrange to fight a battle.
quote:
And a civvie assumption with possible merit? Grotesquely insufficient training - so bad that an alleged loosening up after five rounds came as a shock - or theater inappropriate training - you can supply the examples - rather than reflective of the warfare they could expect, probably isn't the winning ticket.
But what's the point? The question was, how did the Army train in those days. The answer was there really was no system -- and even today it is difficult to measure training.
quote:
I point again to Crook and his attitude towards pack mules vs. the unrelenting incompetence of the 7th with their own. That's institutional moronics. It required no insight, no genius. It's obvious, and had to be done and eventually was. But it wasn't dashing cavalry to run the mules, so it was treated as a punishment: your company's turn in the apple barrel. How stupid is that?
What's your alternative? |
|
|
|
Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 19 2006 : 1:09:18 PM
|
1. No you don't. You're having battles whether you can fit them in to the weekly schedule of band practice, horse brushing, and sing-a-longs whether you want them or not. Absent any other basis for judging the effectiveness of the training, there's that handy tool for conversation......and apparently the Army didn't really use it.
2. Reno provides an example from an official inquest that suggests soldiers and officers alike were not aware that about five quick shots - which could be assumed, even predicted, to be a likely occurence in battle - 'loosened up' the weapon. The 7th had had the carbines, according to Sgt. Ryan, since 1874. Apparently in those two years nobody had opportunity, motivation, or ammo to practice five quick shots to reveal this alleged flaw. That strikes me as clear evidence that hardly any meaningful training occured at all.
3. You're a soldier. Here's a continuing problem of your unit. Fix it. Learn how to pack and effectively run the mules carrying your lifeline of ammo, food, and medicine (such as it was). Crook didn't use a mule train. He - brace yourself - made his mule skinners and packers actually practice the best ways to pack to get efficiency and actual assistance from the mules, which he did not view as a handicap. His mules could travel quickly with his cavalry by unit, not in a separate train, and the chronically sloppy packing and dropped boxes that bedevilled the 7th are absent from Crook's travails.
In fact, this was the first mule train with the military in that Department's history, I read. Previous, there were wagons. So, this was earn while you learn in your dice with death under Custer. Good idea, what?
Imagine the LBH under Crook's system. The hundred odd men assigned to the train are now in their units and available for offensive combat. Each company has its mules with them always. The mules do not carry crap: officer's books, dress uniforms, unique ammo for specific guns, but only what is needed for the mission. Suddenly, there are three and not four units that day. Suddenly, Reno isn't worried so much about what happens after dark when they run out of ammo. Benteen isn't to be concerned with a train.
Of course, anything that well done would a unit so different from the 7th in actuality, that much else would be different as well. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
|
|
|
Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 19 2006 : 1:21:53 PM
|
quote:
1. No you don't. You're having battles whether you can fit them in to the weekly schedule of band practice, horse brushing, and sing-a-longs whether you want them or not. Absent any other basis for judging the effectiveness of the training, there's that handy tool for conversation......and apparently the Army didn't really use it.
How would you get the indians to cooperate with you in these battles? You'd have to get them to move to Dakota and camp outside the fort so they'd be available for the weekly battle.
quote:
2. Reno provides an example from an official inquest that suggests soldiers and officers alike were not aware that about five quick shots - which could be assumed, even predicted, to be a likely occurence in battle - 'loosened up' the weapon. The 7th had had the carbines, according to Sgt. Ryan, since 1874. Apparently in those two years nobody had opportunity, motivation, or ammo to practice five quick shots to reveal this alleged flaw. That strikes me as clear evidence that hardly any meaningful training occured at all.
Given the amount of ammunition allowed, probably not.
quote:
3. You're a soldier. Here's a continuing problem of your unit. Fix it. Learn how to pack and effectively run the mules carrying your lifeline of ammo, food, and medicine (such as it was). Crook didn't use a mule train. He - brace yourself - made his mule skinners and packers actually practice the best ways to pack to get efficiency and actual assistance from the mules, which he did not view as a handicap. His mules could travel quickly with his cavalry by unit, not in a separate train, and the chronically sloppy packing and dropped boxes that bedevilled the 7th are absent from Crook's travails.
The Seventh had packed all the way from Fort Abraham Lincoln, and by that time had all the field experience with the pack mules anyone could ask for. It would appear that training was not the problem -- something else was.
quote:
In fact, this was the first mule train with the military in that Department's history, I read. Previous, there were wagons. So, this was earn while you learn in your dice with death under Custer. Good idea, what?
I'm not sure what you mean by that. There was plenty of time to learn on the approach march ot the Yellowstone.
quote:
Imagine the LBH under Crook's system. The hundred odd men assigned to the train are now in their units and available for offensive combat. Each company has its mules with them always. The mules do not carry crap: officer's books, dress uniforms, unique ammo for specific guns, but only what is needed for the mission. Suddenly, there are three and not four units that day. Suddenly, Reno isn't worried so much about what happens after dark when they run out of ammo. Benteen isn't to be concerned with a train.
This is a management and logistics issue, not a training issue.
|
|
|
|
Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 19 2006 : 4:09:36 PM
|
1. Come on, Mr. Humphrey. All I'm saying is that if there exists no other measure for value of the training, past battles where troopers utillized that training would provide some. They ignored Kildeer Mt., assumed villages of immensely different sizes would react the same, still credited Indians with "chiefs" that corresponded to the Army's hierarchy, and held vague notions that hostages of one tribe's civvies would somehow prevent attack by another's warriors.
2. If for no other reason.
3. On the contrary. The mules weren't packed for most of that trip, but pulled wagons, as I read it. The 7th hadn't learned squat, and spoke of the mules as immoveable objects and that was simply the way it had to be, alas, alackaday.
4. And yet they did not......
5. Right, not my chob, man. If they'd had meaningful training - say, learning how to utilize pack mules as efficiently as possible - then management and logistics is so much easier. Crook did it, so it's not hypothetical. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
|
|
|
Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 19 2006 : 4:25:36 PM
|
quote:
1. Come on, Mr. Humphrey. All I'm saying is that if there exists no other measure for value of the training, past battles where troopers utillized that training would provide some.
Some what? How can looking at one unit in battle tell me the state of training in a wholly different unit?
How do I know the training of the unit that fought the battle? There were no records kept at the time.
How do I know the training of the unit being evaluated? There were no records kept at the time?
And finally, how do I measure the quality of the training?
They ignored Kildeer Mt., assumed villages of immensely different sizes would react the same, still credited Indians with "chiefs" that corresponded to the Army's hierarchy, and held vague notions that hostages of one tribe's civvies would somehow prevent attack by another's warriors.
And what's that got to do with training?
quote:
2. If for no other reason.
For no other reason that what?
quote:
3. On the contrary. The mules weren't packed for most of that trip, but pulled wagons, as I read it. The 7th hadn't learned squat, and spoke of the mules as immoveable objects and that was simply the way it had to be, alas, alackaday.
Nevertheless, they did work with the mules.
Let me point out most of your objections to the use of mules is not related to training but to logistics and management.
quote:
4. And yet they did not......[/quote]
Did not what?
quote:
5. Right, not my chob, man. If they'd had meaningful training - say, learning how to utilize pack mules as efficiently as possible - then management and logistics is so much easier. Crook did it, so it's not hypothetical.[/quote]
It's not training, either.
Let me explain -- many a man on the assembly line knows a better way to do his job. But the boss says, "Do it my way."
Training privates and NCOs (who were the ones who handled the mules) would have done nothing to change the management and logistics policies of the regiment. |
|
|
|
Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 19 2006 : 4:46:31 PM
|
1. Supposing you want to learn something about the value of training and no other method is available, how did units with much the same training do in similar circumstances? Bout the best you can do, and if it isn't exact, I contend there is benefit. If there were no records kept than how do we know there was training at all? What, in any case, was the alternative? Guess?
2. "And what's that got to do with training?" Assuming training should be based on reality and likelihood, everything.
3. If for no other reason than lack of ammunition.
4. I have no objections to mules; I have objections to the negligent way they were used in the 7th. Working with the mules enroute, in whatever form, did not seem to provide remotely adequate packing skills to the needs of the regiment. And, I'm sorry: are you in any way saying that training in packing and maintanance of dray animals wasn't important? It's nearly as important to the regiment's survival as knowing how to ride and be in control of your mount - also iffy - and how to shoot accurately. It's just as important to any proposed mission success.
5. Isn't "logistics" and "management" deciding what preparation needs to be done for mission success? Crook understood what training was needed and did it. Custer and most others did not. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
|
|
|
Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 19 2006 : 5:03:30 PM
|
quote:
1. Supposing you want to learn something about the value of training and no other method is available, how did units with much the same training do in similar circumstances?
First of all, knowing the value of training is one thing, measuring the quality is another.
Secondly how do we know how the successful units trained? What records did they keep? There was not a systematic training reporting system in those days -- and there would not be a meaningful one for more than a century.
quote:
Bout the best you can do, and if it isn't exact, I contend there is benefit. If there were no records kept than how do we know there was training at all? What, in any case, was the alternative? Guess?
You don't have an answer?
quote:
2. "And what's that got to do with training?" Assuming training should be based on reality and likelihood, everything.
Big assumption. How do you achieve realistic training? What system did they use in those days (hint, they didn't have any.)
quote:
3. If for no other reason than lack of ammunition.
Lack of ammunition would have an impact on training. But in the absense of a system of records and reports, we have no way of knowing how they used the available ammunition.
quote:
4. I have no objections to mules; I have objections to the negligent way they were used in the 7th. Working with the mules enroute, in whatever form, did not seem to provide remotely adequate packing skills to the needs of the regiment. And, I'm sorry: are you in any way saying that training in packing and maintanance of dray animals wasn't important? It's nearly as important to the regiment's survival as knowing how to ride and be in control of your mount - also iffy - and how to shoot accurately. It's just as important to any proposed mission success.
Tell me how the lack of skill in packing affected the outcome?
quote:
5. Isn't "logistics" and "management" deciding what preparation needs to be done for mission success? Crook understood what training was needed and did it. Custer and most others did not.
It may well be that Custer didn't understand the management of a pack train as well as Crook. But teaching the privates to throw a diamond hitch wouldn't solve that problem. |
|
|
|
Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 19 2006 : 7:05:59 PM
|
Mr. Humphrey,
You're being picky to no point. Training is only of value if it's of good quality and relevant to the mission of the unit. You also insert "successful", which I did not. But it would be handy to know how the unsuccessful units trained as well, and not pointlessly repeat it just because it's in the manual. And at the level of the Indian Wars, you're being silly, given we're dealing with almost no training vs. training in something relevant to the tasks at hand.
Not a big assumption. Realistic training would start by acknowledging how the enemy fought and preparing for it, and discussing why battles had been lost and how to not repeat the errors. That would be realistic. Training to combat Jeb Stuart or the Gordon Highlanders would be unrealistic and a waste of time, energy, and equipment. The Army apparently decided the best course of action was virtually no meaningful training at all.
We have the stories told by the men themselves (and some records says Markland) which is that training was often a joke and always insufficient.
Judas. Because they were tied to a 3 knot mule train, it affected everything the 7th did. I never said it affected the outcome, but it certainly could have, I suppose. Crook's mules travelled the speed of his cavalry for the most part, and with them. That has to be handy.
If they packed realistically, tighter, and didn't have to spend hours a day retrieving boxes, soldiers and mounts would be sleeping, Indians wouldn't find the boxes, more than a hundred men and spare ammo would have been with Custer, Reno, and Benteen. If nothing else were changed, that would have made a large difference. For good or ill, no way to know for sure. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
|
|
|
prolar
Major
Status: offline |
Posted - January 19 2006 : 8:38:33 PM
|
| Well gee Mr Cloud, are you going to tell us about the great victory Crook won at the Rosebud or did he turn tail and leave his fellow soldiers to complete the mission? Seems you are a great admirer of commanders who lead retreats. |
|
|
|
Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 19 2006 : 9:46:10 PM
|
That's not untrue, Prolar. I do admire commanders who lead retreats, especially those who can turn and fight again and win. You know, I still think Napoleon was probably, overall, a marginally good soldier even though he led retreats, and Robert Lee was, you know, considered passable, and Joe Johnson - who Grant and Sherman thought the best rebel commander - seemingly did nothing but retreat, taking a heavy toll of the Union. They much preferred to face idiots like Hood. And Joffre and Moltke before and after the Marne did pretty well, and Foch later. It's a lot harder to keep up morale and keep alert for the chance when retreating, I'd imagine. Houston faked out Santa Anna after a long retreat.
We were talking about training and Crook's attitude towards the train was good evidence. He won far more Indian fights than anyone else, so even if everything bad said about him for the Rosebud were true, he'd still be on top. Nobody looked good that Sioux War in 76. Some less good than others.
You're so quick to demean people for arguably turning tail, or to accuse people of definitely turning tail and military incompetence that you must have been quite the soldier yourself to feel qualified to do so. Just imagine if Crook had sent Guy Henry and the rest of the wounded with a small escort away and these were slaughtered while he advanced "to glory" with weak ammo supplies. That was a valid concern, since well over a thousand Indians were confident enought to have attacked his 1500 or so men, which had never happened before out there.
The same people who accuse Crook of failure to pursue would then accuse him of insufficient concern, and starting with most of his own officers. Once you had the fight against Indians, absent sufficient protection or clear and safe passage for the wounded you HAD to retreat. It's safely distant in time chest thumping to claim otherwise. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
|
|
|
prolar
Major
Status: offline |
Posted - January 19 2006 : 10:30:03 PM
|
| Well no Dc, I have said before and will say again , that my service was strictly peacetime, and I have great admiration for those such as Vern and Ranger who saw actually saw combat. However I believe these forums are for everyone, even draft dodgers such as you.' |
|
|
|
Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
|
|
prolar
Major
Status: offline |
Posted - January 19 2006 : 11:55:08 PM
|
| DC: I didn't call Crook anything, I'm sure he served honarably in the Civil War, though his performance in 1876 was lacking. My apoligies to you if yoy were unable to serve, though your posts give the impressions that you were unwilling. For several years I have tried to carry on honest conversations with you, but I will not make it a matter of personal insults. I am happy to join better posters who have left this forum because of you.Good bye. |
|
|
|
Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
|
|
Topic |
|
|
|
Springfield Carbine
