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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - November 14 2005 : 1:51:29 PM
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And then again volley firing was really a tactic employed by regular armies against massed attacks of enemy in ordered ranks and that was not the way the Indians fought. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 14 2005 : 2:13:45 PM
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Well, here's a good example of the pointlessness of these discussions. Did the 7th have 55 or 70 grain as Varnum claims his guys took and assumed others did? We don't know. In any case, the carbine was sighted to 1000 yards for whatever purpose: perhaps in case they did use the 70 grain cartridge, so there was an assumption there.
Varnum and others also said they heard heavy firing but NOT volleys, although some said they heard volleys down the pike. Since at that distance you can't distinguish carbine from Sharp amidst all the battle firing, it's a pointless quest, then or especially now. In any case, how would the listener be able to distinguish a volley fired because the enemy was out of range and therefore be a cry for help from one designed to extend the shooters' lives another five minutes?
Wild, the British were very big on independent rifle fire long distance accuracy, but like their love for the cavalry by WWI it was of small benefit bordering on pointless. But yes, the US was prone to call in air strikes and get the show on the road rather than engage in long range fire. Still, far more US soldiers grew up with rifles than Brits, and just as we have a nation of drivers we are a nation of riflemen far above the norm, and certainly far above Britain's. Brits have always had excellent shots, and so have we and everyone, but on average the US took in more soldiers who already knew how to shoot and well than others.
In most nations, like Russia till recently, the first vehicle a soldier ever drove themselves was a tank, and the first weapon they fired was their service rifle. In a huge draft army, hitting a human target at 600 feet is pretty good. I doubt the average soldier in the Afghanistan Army or French Army does better even today. Ironically, as our Army's mission becomes more police like and our police become more Army like with Swat teams and dramatic assaults on drug houses, long range accuracy has again become more and more essential. You can't call in air strikes as often in urban warfare, although we seem to do it a lot, and to questionable benefit when the dust settles. |
Dark Cloud copyright RL MacLeod darkcloud@darkendeavors.com www.darkendeavors.com www.boulderlout.com |
Edited by - Dark Cloud on November 14 2005 2:15:25 PM |
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Smcf
Captain
Status: offline |
Posted - November 15 2005 : 08:20:11 AM
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I don't agree that its pointless to discuss these things. I didn't know the ammo packs contained a variey of cartridges, for example, or when the cartidges were handed out they were all able to pick and choose. From articles I've seen, it would appear there was a large variety of private weapons in use - by officers at least. That would seem to indicate an associated private collection of cartridges. The packs, however - surely the ammo was uniform? or just 2 types for the carbine?
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 15 2005 : 11:06:50 AM
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SMCF:
You wrote "As regards range, a google search came up with a WildWest mag article stating the Springfield Carbine had an effective range of less than 300 yards, but significant hits for up to 600 yards. The total range was over 1000 yards (probably with a 45 degree aim and ending up with pea-shooter energy with the reduced charge/short barrel etc). The sights could be calibrated from 100 to 1000 yards." But if they use the rifle load, is this relevant?
It wasn't relevant for Custer. His rifle was (sometimes claimed as) .50, and his pistols took different ammo as well, didn't they? Another reason he'd be concerned about the train with all his spare ammo.
All I'm saying is that we don't know the load, so maybe 600 yards was a reasonable distance for an accurate shot with rifle load in the carbine. I don't know, but the detail of velocity and trajectory is pretty pointless unless you know the loads used, it's fair to say. And, we don't. |
Dark Cloud copyright RL MacLeod darkcloud@darkendeavors.com www.darkendeavors.com www.boulderlout.com |
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Smcf
Captain
Status: offline |
Posted - November 16 2005 : 04:56:00 AM
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But did they use the rifle load, as Varnum says? Although the actual cartridges and other artifacts found on NC/Luce/surrounding are no longer in evidence, the correspondence between the "archeologists" provides detailed inventories. As for the cartridges, 70 grain cartridges found (50/70) were very few. The number of 45/55 cartridges found were around 500 in total. I think that is evidence enough for me to conclude the packs contained this type of carbine ammo as the standard. Pehaps Varnum had his own private supply as did some of the other officers. At least one soldier carried the rifle rather than the carbine.
DC Wrote "Varnum and others also said they heard heavy firing but NOT volleys"
What Varnum said was "...heavy firing ... but not EXACTLY volleys". His use of the word volley further convinces me that the troopers were trained in volley fire, Varnum able to make the subtle distinction by ear, and from far away. This distinction was lost on Godfrey, McDougall and at least 2 others who stated that they heard 2 distinct volleys. Godfrey was among some who also stated that the volleys were followed by some scattering fire. Godfrey also wrote that he interpreted the volley fire as a signal to the troopers with Reno/Benteen as did Weir, apparently. What is also apparent is that they were all positive the heavy firing was from Custer and not the Indians.
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 16 2005 : 07:38:54 AM
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I don't know if they used the rifle load. Varnum says his guys did, and he assumed everyone else did as well. The only way to tell, we've been told, what the loading of a found Springfield casing was is to see if it has the discoloration indicative of a 55 grain load and its paper wadding, although I recall wadding isn't the right word. After a hundred years and decades in the ground, who knows? I don't know to what 50/70 refers. I think both loads were .45. In any case, all I'm saying is that maybe with the 70 load, volleys could be fired from a greater distance with intent to harm, rather than signal. Since we don't know, we shouldn't condemn anyone based on no knowledge. We don't even know if the casings were used in the battle, actually.
As for the 7th, what became apparent later when guilt and embarrassment sank in is not necessarily what was apparent on the field that day. I'm always suspicious of people who say their reactions and perceptions were always dead on, but they were prevented from heroic action from something or other, conveniently Reno. I tend to believe people whose actions were not perfect and admittedly so.
Of course they were trained firing in volleys. What they weren't trained in was listening to volleys as if they were signals, because they were useless as such. I'm hardly convinced it was their job to ride to the sound of firing at the expense of their mission anyway. We don't know what Reno's horse situation was, and what percentage of his men were then on foot.
Again, as I've said, if the roles were reversed, and Custer had led the charge at the village, and took to the trees as he had at the Yellowstone, and heroically led the break out attack through the Sioux to safety, and he had heard firing to the north, this story would have been spun ever so differently with no changes in testimony as we've heard it. Sad, pathetic Reno with delusions of grandeur failed, and the poor soul in his desperation fired volleys as signals ("...but how can you tell..")and rather than taking the rebuff and riding north or, better, returning South, had to lay in the bed he'd made for himself and his men. |
Dark Cloud copyright RL MacLeod darkcloud@darkendeavors.com www.darkendeavors.com www.boulderlout.com |
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Smcf
Captain
Status: offline |
Posted - November 16 2005 : 08:22:43 AM
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I certainly wouldn't be critical of the actions of Reno or anyone else faced with that situation. However, the "sounds of firing" statements don't appear to me to be CYA. The Benteen story of "I heard nothing and Weir rode off in a fit of bravado" (paraphrase) would more fit that type of scenario, although I'm not saying he or anyone else was lying. The ammo thing - surely some quartermaster record is available to check - no? |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 16 2005 : 09:46:06 AM
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No lo se. But given the guys who were seated on their butts listening north had different takes on it, and Benteen was running around seeing to things, he may have been truthful saying he heard no volleys but heard firing. But I've said before, having seen the Reno guys, I'd bet Benteen had a pretty good take on their future when he saw the size of the village and maybe and quite responsibly concluded this was not the unit to defeat the Sioux that day, and to whom and what was his responsibility?
Would Custer have risked the lives under his command to save another unit or, more likely, merely be seen as making the attempt? He left Reno under attack and failed to rush to the sound of firing. In Reno's command, it had been assumed Custer'd had a fight and gone North. It was stated aloud and accepted and absolutely nobody recalls anyone saying "Custer would never do that! He'd never leave us!" In a New York Minute he'd leave them, and they knew it. He'd done it before. |
Dark Cloud copyright RL MacLeod darkcloud@darkendeavors.com www.darkendeavors.com www.boulderlout.com |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 16 2005 : 5:27:12 PM
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The carbines were almost certainly using full-charge rifle ammo. At that time they were still using the original copper cartridges (which explains why cases stuck in the chamber.)
Their range was limited not only by ballistic factors, but also by the poor sights and lack of fire control.
Controlled vollies would increase the chance of hits (think of a vollie like a cloud of shot from a shotgun) but only if the officers or NCOs accurately estimated the range. (Think of Kipling's story "The Little Drummer Boys" and how the Afghans were not disturbed by "a quarter of a ton of lead buried in the ground a quarter mile in front of them.")
And certainly the men on Reno's Ridge were convinced Custer had run off and left them. He had done it before. |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - November 17 2005 : 4:35:58 PM
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And certainly the men on Reno's Ridge were convinced Custer had run off and left them. He had done it before. That might just be a little bit harsh Vern considering he had sent two messengers back to Benteen and the packs with orders to "join" him.Also if 7 troops were unable to fight their way through to Custer it must have been clear that Custer with 5 troops had no chance of breaking through to Reno. |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 17 2005 : 4:55:06 PM
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quote: That might just be a little bit harsh Vern considering he had sent two messengers back to Benteen and the packs with orders to "join" him.Also if 7 troops were unable to fight their way through to Custer it must have been clear that Custer with 5 troops had no chance of breaking through to Reno.
It's not my judgement, but theirs. Survivors felt he had left them, and gone on to join Gibbons and Terry who were marching up the Bighorn. His abandonment of Joel Elliot at the Wa$****a was part the reason they felt this way.
And, yes, he had sent couriers -- but when Reno was in desperate straits, he expected Custer to be following him, and got no support (as we now know, Custer had moved back and resumed the original line of march along the bluffs.) |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 17 2005 : 5:12:57 PM
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Wild,
The note doesn't mention "joining him", and what remarks he'd made hours before could be safely assumed to have been trumped by revealed events. Like, his failure to support a charge he'd ordered, his vanishing, his past that included leaving folks to their own.
We again need to explain this theory that Reno could/should have gone to Custer. This cannot be done until we configure:
a. The theory that Reno's obligation somehow ceased to be that of the campaign, but to risk all under him in a search for and rescue of Custer who probably didn't need it, and shouldn't have needed it, and had in any case promised support he had not given.
b. What percentage of Reno's unwounded men could still be mounted on horses for offensive action? How many all told?
c. What percentage of the able should be left with the wounded and packs, and where, so close to this village? Suggest the inspiring and comforting parting words Reno should tell those left on foot with wounded and mules in sight of a thousand village cooks revving up their manual Vege/Meatomatics (dinner is at Six; Tails and Horns). (Recall that when they did move towards Weir Point, it took four able soldiers on foot to carry an unambulatory wounded man in a blanket.) Since real military manuals suggest dividing in the face of a superior enemy is not a good idea, in virile military terms explain this puzzling suggestion. |
Dark Cloud copyright RL MacLeod darkcloud@darkendeavors.com www.darkendeavors.com www.boulderlout.com |
Edited by - Dark Cloud on November 17 2005 5:15:53 PM |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 17 2005 : 5:19:23 PM
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With the arrival of Benteen and the pack train, Reno had four unscathed companies, plus about two company-equivallents from the details with the pack train.
However, the idea that he could have somehow effectively rescued Custer is ludicrous. Custer and five companies had been wiped out. What could Reno have done with a similar force against the same enemy?
Very clearly, Reno and Benteen's duty was to preserve the rest of the regiment, care for the wounded, and keep the pack train from falling into the hands of the indians. They did that. |
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AZ Ranger
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 17 2005 : 10:17:52 PM
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Question- Does the Springfield Carbine get any increase in velocity by using 70 grains of black powder over 55 grains?
I believe that Benteen had a greater sense of duty to care for the wounded then Reno from what I have read, which certainly is not the same level as most of the posters that I have read during the last two days. |
“ An officer's first duty is to his horses.”
SEMPER FI |
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Smcf
Captain
Status: offline |
Posted - November 18 2005 : 07:23:47 AM
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AZ - most published sources on Carbine cartidges used that day point to 45/55. The 7th would most certainly have been issued with the cartridges to suit the weapon, especially it they were cheaper IMHO, and if not then it surely could be checked. A campaign like this would be costed centrally and documented up the line in terms of equipment, pay and rations. I quote from an article "Guns at the LBH" by Mark Gallear:
"The 1873 rifles and carbines were now purpose-made weapons and no longer Civil War conversions ... the rifle was to fire the new (my italics) .45-70-405 centre fire round, but the charge was reduced to .45-55 for the carbine as the rifle charge was considered too heavy for prolonged use in this weapon."
As for the actions of Benteen and Reno, they were officially exonerated, with Reno perhaps damned with faint praise. There is no doubt that Benteen emerged from the episode as the saviour of his and Reno's men. Two notable testimonials:
"Benteen was one of the best soldiers the United States Army has ever possessed.--W.A. Graham"
"I found my model early in Captain Benteen, the idol of the Seventh Cavalry on the upper Missouri in 1877.--Hugh L. Scott" |
Edited by - Smcf on November 18 2005 08:21:56 AM |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 18 2005 : 10:38:57 AM
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quote: "The 1873 rifles and carbines were now purpose-made weapons and no longer Civil War conversions ... the rifle was to fire the new (my italics) .45-70-405 centre fire round, but the charge was reduced to .45-55 for the carbine as the rifle charge was considered too heavy for prolonged use in this weapon."
But this doesn't prove the 7th was issued .45-55 ammunition. At that early date, the cartridges were not head-stamped separately, so you can't tell from finding a fired case. At least one officer testified that his company had .45-70 ammunition.
quote: As for the actions of Benteen and Reno, they were officially exonerated, with Reno perhaps damned with faint praise. There is no doubt that Benteen emerged from the episode as the saviour of his and Reno's men.
Benteen saved the 7th Cavalry -- and no accusation that he should have gone after Custer can change that. |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - November 18 2005 : 10:51:07 AM
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I would imagine that by now DC you would know my position on Reno and Benteen.I have spent a great deal of time and effort defending them against allcomers.But the issue here is that the men of Reno's command felt that Custer had deserted them and headed off to Terry and it appears that yourself and Vern would feel that they were justified in feeling that.This is unfortunately just applying one dimentional thinking to the issue. Custer was committed to attack.Fine, he knew Reno was defeated but with the arrival of Benteen and the ammo there was still a chance of retreiving victory from the jaws of defeat or so he thought.While that chance existed there was no turning the campaign into a Reno rescue mission.Perhaps the rescue of Reno was not on the agenda but neither was the unjustified claim by your good selves that he would have quit the battlefield.Can anyone imagine this dashing huzzar reporting to Terry with 7 of his troops and his baggage train missing not to mention his failure to attack the village ? I think DC you have often made the arguement that all officers of the 7th should be judged by the same criteria well let's be fair even to the villian of the piece. |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 18 2005 : 11:00:48 AM
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quote: I would imagine that by now DC you would know my position on Reno and Benteen.I have spent a great deal of time and effort defending them against allcomers.But the issue here is that the men of Reno's command felt that Custer had deserted them and headed off to Terry and it appears that yourself and Vern would feel that they were justified in feeling that.
Where do you get that? I have said they felt he had abandoned them -- and all eyewitness testimony agrees. What they felt and what they said is a fact, justified or not..
quote: This is unfortunately just applying one dimentional thinking to the issue.
Do you have to make this personal?
quote: Custer was committed to attack.Fine, he knew Reno was defeated but with the arrival of Benteen and the ammo there was still a chance of retreiving victory from the jaws of defeat or so he thought.
How do you know what he thought?
quote: While that chance existed there was no turning the campaign into a Reno rescue mission.Perhaps the rescue of Reno was not on the agenda but neither was the unjustified claim by your good selves that he would have quit the battlefield.
Who -- on this echo -- claimed he would have quit the battlefield?
The men with Reno and Benteen thought he had gone on to join Terry and Gibbon. That's a fact. None of us here said he did that.
[/quote]Can anyone imagine this dashing huzzar reporting to Terry with 7 of his troops and his baggage train missing not to mention his failure to attack the village ?[/quote]
Apparently the men with Reno and Benteen could imagine it. But none of us here said he did any such thing.
Your quarrel is with men who have been dead for at least three-quarters of a century, not with us.
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Smcf
Captain
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Posted - November 18 2005 : 11:45:50 AM
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Vern wrote "the cartridges were not head-stamped separately, so you can't tell from finding a fired case"
On the other hand, unfired rounds were discovered, examined and the publications I've read all seem pretty sure the ammo was 45/55. As I say, a bit of research into the provisioning of the campaign might settle this. Interesting theory, though. If they all used 45/70, they'd be guilty of a level of incompetence, given the known unsuitability of the heavier cartridge. |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 18 2005 : 11:57:39 AM
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quote: If they all used 45/70, they'd be guilty of a level of incompetence, given the known unsuitability of the heavier cartridge.
How can a private be guilty of incompetence for using the ammo that is issued to him?
I have fired both rifles and carbines in .45-70.
In fact, around the 100th anniversary of the Little Bighorn, a couple of firearms companies made replicas of the '73 Springfield -- and the carbine version was a best-seller. If you wanted to shoot your '73 Carbine, you had to use .45-70 ammunition (no one offered a down-loaded version.) Modern shooters did not find the '73 carbine unusable with full charge ammo. |
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Smcf
Captain
Status: offline |
Posted - November 18 2005 : 12:19:55 PM
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Those responsible for ordering and issuing unsuitable ammunition to the 7th, if that's what they did - just to clarify. What you did 100 years later is neither here nor there. Unusable doesn't mean unsuitable. Did you fire 200 rounds in anger? Don't get me wrong - this is all very interesting. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 18 2005 : 12:47:48 PM
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Well, it may be interesting or not, but it doesn't really edify anything. The 7th wasn't well trained with their firearms, and the Army of the West wasn't well trained, and the proof is the sobering and relatively tiny number of Indian dead from gunshot, even including women, children, cholera victims, aged in their lodges. If we believe, and I do not, that each month the soldiers were given their fifteen rounds, and they were divided between pistol and carbine, we now have to believe that the carbine had two types of rounds with very different characteristics, and even if this was done regularly, it still wouldn't give anyone much experience. We know, in contrast, that people shoved up the Big Muddy and were marched to various forts sometimes had never ridden a horse or fired a gun before, and they were to be trained on site. Even after a year in a fort of the training available, that could not have been an impressive bunch overall.
I'd think most rounds were 45/55 at the LBH, but some had the rifle rounds, and some carried additional or substituted for their personal weapons if, like Custer, they didn't use the same rounds. We really don't know, and seeing what the Army says they had (the same Army that assures us of burial info on the field that's been humiliating in its fabrications and lies) isn't conclusive.
And if they'd practiced enough, they'd have found these supposed deficiencies in the carbine after shooting a lot and sorrowfully brought this to the attention of the Army. Nobody would go to war with a firearm that jammed after five shots in haste (not uncommon in battle), and nobody seems to complain till after LBH, although there was periodic mention of possible issues. I suspect it was ill kept weapons by ill trained soldiers, and not a real deficiency. But either way, it doesn't look good. Given all that, I don't think the weapon or the ammo means anything at their level of training. And nothing from the Indians' stories suggests otherwise. Given, I think it fair to say, there was a lot of lead in the air from many directions and friendly or at least unintended fire must have taken a significant toll, and those casualties should not be credited to the Army.
Unsuitable doesn't mean unusable, necessarily, but the reverse does. |
Dark Cloud copyright RL MacLeod darkcloud@darkendeavors.com www.darkendeavors.com www.boulderlout.com |
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Vern Humphrey
Captain
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 18 2005 : 12:59:28 PM
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Regarding the stuck case problem:
quote: I suspect it was ill kept weapons by ill trained soldiers, and not a real deficiency.
The problem was metallurgical. The early cases were copper, which is softer than brass and doesn't spring back so well when pressure drops. Black powder fouling exacerbated the problem -- about 40% of the combustion products of black powder are solids. When the chambers fouled, the fouling provided a "grip" for the case walls. A hot chamber was also more likely to grip the case.
A small number of cases have been found on the battlefield that show signs of being pried out of the chamber. We also have testimony that Captain French (who carried a .50-70 infantry "long tom" rifle) passed his cleaning rod up and down the firing line so troopers could use it to knock stuck cases out.
There is no question that many troopers were green and poor shots. The old sharpshooter detatchment that Custer formed was no more. |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - November 18 2005 : 4:43:53 PM
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Where do you get that? From the following "Custer would never do that! He'd never leave us!" In a New York Minute he'd leave them, and they knew it. He'd done it before and And certainly the men on Reno's Ridge were convinced Custer had run off and left them. He had done it before.
Who -- on this echo -- claimed he would have quit the battlefield? See above
and all eyewitness testimony agrees. Not independent witnesses.They may have been feeling a little embarrassed at their inability to follow Custer's orders.Thus a story about being abandoned may have eased the conscience.
How do you know what he thought? By deduction.1 He ordered Benteen and the ammo forward.2 He did not adopt a defensive posture.He was maneuvering his forces into position to attack from the North of the village.Thus as I have said he thought he had a chance of victory.
The men with Reno and Benteen thought he had gone on to join Terry and Gibbon. That's a fact. None of us here said he did that.But you interpreted that as abandonment and running off which it is not.
Your quarrel is with men who have been dead for at least three-quarters of a century, not with us. No it is with those who would unquestioningly support the view that Custer would have abandoned his regiment on the field of battle.
Do you have to make this personal? Heavens no, just sometimes the debates get a little robust.
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - November 18 2005 : 5:19:57 PM
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Wild,
Benteen and others said they thought Custer had been rebuffed and headed north. Who in the Army rushed to his defense at that time and said "Custer would never do that!" Nobody defended him on that particular point, I don't think. He'd been convicted of leaving his men before, and if not "on a field of combat", on dangerous ground.
If he never went up Weir Point, but Sharpshooter, he may not have seen the size of the village, given Weir blocks much of it. And so he heads down MTC. I don't think anyone knows more than that, and I'm not willing to agree he headed north to LSH willingly. All of it is a construct to excuse Custer passing up a barely contested crossing into the village with some surprise and momentum if not numbers or remote chance. |
Dark Cloud copyright RL MacLeod darkcloud@darkendeavors.com www.darkendeavors.com www.boulderlout.com |
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