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BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
 Posted - January 20 2005 : 11:50:13 PM
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WB, I hope I am wrong, if so, my apologies.
You stated,
quote:
Like it or not, there is one common thread running through this forum and that is the "fascination with Custer and this battle."
I beg to disagree somewhat with you on that. I think most began with the "fascination" of the fate of GAC and his troopers but I think that as you get more and more into the story, you find yourself encompassing a much larger view, perhaps as large as the Indian Wars in general. As an example, look at this forum. Here, in purportedly a Custer-holic oriented forum, we have discussed: the Zulu War, the Crimean War, the Bozeman Trail era, Wa****a, Sand Creek, Springfield rifles and cartridges, manufacturers of same, Army & Indian tactics and when all else fails, we fall back to the Burmese mule.
I originally came here, not because of a fascination with LBH but simply this was were the more literate and informed students of the Indian Wars werre to be found. In case you didn't know, my particular focus is 1866-1868, the Bozeman Trail era, including the Fetterman fight. But, I will give you this, it is curious to see how many contradicting stories are told of the prelude to the LBH encounters and the encounters themselves.
Best of wishes,
Billy |
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - January 21 2005 : 05:30:12 AM
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quote:
Originally posted by wILD I
There was no logic in sending 2 columns into the valley of the LBH and having them act independently.
Of course not. It was hoped that in the best possible scenario, they would be able to work together, smash the Indians between them, etc. etc. But with the Indian village's location uncertain, as well as what obstacles both commands might across in their march, you couldn't arrange such an outcome. You'd have to work based upon what circumstances arise.
quote:
It was the intention of Terry to have both forces converging in the LBH valley on the 26th.At the planning meeting distances and timings were worked out.Terry sets this out in his report of the action and this is confirmed by Gibbon who states that Terry strongly emphasised to Custer the importance of continuing South before crossing the devide.
It was his intention, but not one that was rigidly imposed upon Custer. He recognized that planning out distances and times on a map ain't exactly the same thing as doing it, and in fact the Gibbon/Terry column would arrive a day later than calculated. Custer arrived a day early; he actually would have made the attack on the 26th, as Terry had hoped, had Indians not discovered them and Custer felt compelled to make the attack now or risk losing any opportunity. Again, regardless of the wisdom of the act (which is another issue) I think it was within his discretion, as Terry had pointedly refused "to impose upon [Custer] precise orders which might hamper your action when nearly in contact with the enemy" (Overfield 23). I'd say Terry gave him enough allowances to absolve him of any charge of disobeying orders, but I also think Custer took every allowance offered him.
R. Larsen |
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whistlingboy
Lieutenant
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 21 2005 : 6:29:38 PM
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| BJMarkland: No apology needed. Thanks. The Fetterman fight is very interesting in its scope and similarities to Mr. Custer's dilemma. At least there seems to be agreement on the number of soldiers killed although the Indian numbers fluctuate like the other battles. How did so many Indians amass so close to the fort undetected? One would think regular Army patrol recon jaunts would have picked up something. |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - January 21 2005 : 9:23:51 PM
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In a previous post, someone commented, and I paraphrase, most of us are here to find a hero. That statement, in my mind, is the epitome of egotistical presumption as no man can know the motivations of a group, let alone an individual. I do not wish to make the same mistake by assuming to know why each of you are here on this forum. However, I can speak for myself. A hero, to me, is the school teacher who molds our very fiber, a fireman who risks his life to pull a victim from a flaming inferno, a cop who places his life on the line to succor the life of another. I can only assume that the vast majority of us have had ample years to established our "Hero's" and do not need this forum for that purpose. Secondly, like the man said who placed his foot upon the first rung of a 200 ft. ladder, "Hey, it's a start."
A critical start in analyzing this battle is understanding that preconceived ideas based on incomplete information may be incorrect. In other words, the moment you hang an albatross of responsibility upon the neck of any one participate of this battle, you lose sight of a myriad of "cause and effect" that produce the final results in any confrontation. To select any one individual as the scapegoat reduces the possibility of discerning the true reality of what occurred. It reduces all hope of establishing truth to its most common denominator. Reality is condensed to a basic format that excludes many other variables and options of what actually occurred. Such a mind set is simplicity at its peak and negates the need to debate.
Although many people will "concede" that Custer had vast discretion in his orders, an equal amount of individuals are convinced of the contrary. General Terry was a lawyer who possessed a prodigious command of the English language; enough so to make even D.c. green with envy. Did he not have the ability to create an iron clad, no nonsense, irreproachable, and definitive set of orders if he so desired? Of course!
General Terry placed vast discretion in Custer's orders because that was the only possible way to track, corral, and herd a vast number of aboriginals back to the reservation. Terry, a competent General, was perfectedly aware of this. A popular misconception is that Terry and Gibbon were to meet with Custer's command on a specific date, converge, then attack a common enemy. I can not find a single shred of evidence to support that claim. John S. Gray analyzed the evidence regarding Terry's plan and summarized it as follows:
"It is now apparent that our projections from available Indian intelligence, all our inferences from actions taken and all the statements made at the time of the conference about the new plan converge on the same pattern. Custer's column, stronger, more mobile better provided with scouts and longer rationed, was expected to overtake the village where ever it might go, the probabilities being judged to favor the upper Little Big Horn. He was to strike the village, PROBABLY WHILE STILL UNSUPPORTED, AND FROM A DIRECTION THAT WOULD DRIVE IT NORTHWARD."
(Page 203)
Terry wa expected to reach a blocking station at the mouth of the Little Big Horn on June 26. In other words, Custer was to strike the village (which he did) and either effect a capture or drive them north towards Terry and Gibbons.
Col Brisbin insisted that Custer "turned off the path" twenty miles to soon, against Terry's wishes.
Connell gives us an unpleasant scenario (much like the one proffered by Whistlingboy's perception of what may have happened) should Custer had ridden further south rather then following the Indian trail.
"Only a few days earlier the Indians had defeated Crook and they knew he retreated southward-a victory that excited them, gave them confidence. They did not expect Crook to try again, but he might. Which is to say, a column of bluecoats approaching from the south would quickly be detected. If the Indians then moved to attack, the battle would take place a number of miles up the valley and by the time General Terry arrived it is quite possible that all twelve companies of the seventh Cavaaalry would have been destroyed. If, instead, the Indians retreated from Custer they would have met Terry's relatively weak force and without doubt could have annihilated it. Then as Mr. Ege suggests, the dreadful news might read: TERRY-GIBBON COLUMN FALLS TO SAVAGES AS CUSTER SEARCHES BIG HORN MOUNTAINS.
(Son of the Morning Star, page 261)
In summation, erroneous myths are dispelled "one rung at a time." You can be capable of understanding Custer's decisions with out being an idioctic, hero worshipper as some would have you to believe. You may hold other participates of this battle accountable for their actions without being guilty of "demonizing" them. We can proceed to the next level of this investigation without preconcieved notions that have nothing to do with truth. |
Edited by - joseph wiggs on January 21 2005 9:55:29 PM |
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BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 21 2005 : 9:49:18 PM
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WB, for one thing, feel free to call me Billy.
As far as your question, inserted next;
quote:
One would think regular Army patrol recon jaunts would have picked up something.
At Ft. Phil Kearny, they had no regular recon patrols. It was totally a reactionary type situation, in other words, the Indians would attack and the mounted infantry initially and, later, the 2d Cav. company would react.
I will find it in Carrington's testimony but basically, there were barely enough horses to support the mail runs and the reaction force. The saying, "With 80 men I can ride through the whole Sioux Nation" has its roots in that desparity.
Best of wishes,
Billy |
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - January 21 2005 : 10:15:47 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by BJMarkland
At Ft. Phil Kearny, they had no regular recon patrols. It was totally a reactionary type situation, in other words, the Indians would attack and the mounted infantry initially and, later, the 2d Cav. company would react.
Do you know if it was handled the same way at the other forts along the Bozeman Trail? i.e., no patrols, just get hit and react?
R. Larsen |
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alfuso
Corporal
Status: offline |
Posted - January 22 2005 : 11:00:09 AM
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"Well, I guess I agree, except for that last part, since his public image was pretty good up until the debunking biographies of the 1930s. Most criticism during that time was restrained, or done in private, as in Brisbin's letter. But even then, I don't think the criticisms of the last few decades have much focused on whether he disobeyed Terry. What's been controversial is his handling of the battle, and really, that has always been the main issue.
R. Larsen"
But it is those criticisms of the last 6 decades that ae so often used to justify trashing Custer's decisions and actions that day.
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Prepare to Panic |
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alfuso
Corporal
Status: offline |
Posted - January 22 2005 : 11:17:32 AM
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quote:
Originally posted by joseph wiggs
Although many people will "concede" that Custer had vast discretion in his orders, an equal amount of individuals are convinced of the contrary. General Terry was a lawyer who possessed a prodigious command of the English language; enough so to make even D.c. green with envy. Did he not have the ability to create an iron clad, no nonsense, irreproachable, and definitive set of orders if he so desired? Of course!
General Terry placed vast discretion in Custer's orders because that was the only possible way to track, corral, and herd a vast number of aboriginals back to the reservation. Terry, a competent General, was perfectedly aware of this. A popular misconception is that Terry and Gibbon were to meet with Custer's command on a specific date, converge, then attack a common enemy. I can not find a single shred of evidence to support that claim. John S. Gray analyzed the evidence regarding Terry's plan and summarized it as follows:
Add to this that Terry/Gibbon had less men than Custer had with him.
And does anyone read the last sentence in Custer's orders? This one line sets it all into perspective. To report To Terry in 2 weeks or whatever time Custer had rations for. Custer set out with rations for 15 days. That brings us to about July 6.
There is no meeting date in GAC;s orders.
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Prepare to Panic |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - January 22 2005 : 12:03:18 PM
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If the Indians then moved to attack, the battle would take place a number of miles up the valley and by the time General Terry arrived it is quite possible that all twelve companies of the seventh Cavaaalry would have been destroyed.
This is of course is hind sight and is just as useless in defending Custers reasoning as preconceived notions are in condemning it
should Custer had ridden further south rather then following the Indian trail.
That was the agreed manoeuver unless circumstances dictated otherwise.I have discovered none unless Custer placed more importance on the risk of being discovered than on attacking without the stratigic support of Terry and having deviated from the agreed plan was in fact discovered setting in motion the chain of events which had such a catastrophic outcome.
If, instead, the Indians retreated from Custer they would have met Terry's relatively weak force and without doubt could have annihilated it. Then as Mr. Ege suggests, the dreadful news might read: TERRY-GIBBON COLUMN FALLS TO SAVAGES AS CUSTER SEARCHES BIG HORN MOUNTAINS.
Once again you spoil a good post by lacing it with useless hindsight or are you now telling us that even before Custer set out to cross the "divide" he knew the strenght of the Indians? |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - January 22 2005 : 1:19:09 PM
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A historical event wherein all witnessess were either killed, less than truthful, prompted to withhold information for fear of retaliation, or resorted to out and out prevarication, leaves us with very little "facts" to ascertain what may have happened. Hind sight in this case, as well as others, constitutes conjecture based on know facts of what MAY have occurred. The operative word here is "MAY." I do not suggest that the conjectures posted were indeed facts.
I do not doubt your sincerity when you state that "hind sight" is useless. However, your absolute conviction of this perception is limited to your reality only. I would venture to guess that their are some who would disagree with you. Normally, I find Monday Morning Quater-backing absolutely annoying, particularly so after the USC-Oklahona debacle.
When discussing this battle, however, we sometimes speculate for the sake of debate.
General Terry emphasized a movement southward to ensure that the village did not escape in that direction. His fear was that his approach from the north could cause a stampeded of Indians southward. Every white participant in this battle was certain that the Indians would stampede at the first sight of the troopers. This is a critical point that I think is sometimes over looked when discussing this battle. After the grisly results, and in hind sight, we now know that assumption to be incorrect.
When Custer discovered the massive and fresh Indian trail, he correctly realized that the option to go further south was no longer feasible. Fearing to be redundant, that is why Terry allotted Custer so much discretion. No one knew the exact location of the village. Some believe that Custer gained this critical information while at the Crow's Nest. There is reason to suspect that simply is not true. When hunting individuals who are capable of placing their ears to the ground and determine your direction and rate of approach, and approximate strength size, discretion regarding military manoeuvring is important.
Custer was no fool and was aware that Indian agents falsified their Indian roll call sheets to reflect a larger number of residents than there actually were. He estimated that his command would face at least 1500 warriors. He was pretty close don't you think?
Thanks for you post. |
Edited by - joseph wiggs on January 22 2005 1:26:43 PM |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - January 22 2005 : 5:10:30 PM
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General Terry emphasized a movement southward to ensure that the village did not escape in that direction.
And
When Custer discovered the massive and fresh Indian trail, he correctly realized that the option to go further south was no longer feasible.
Wrong Wiggs it reinforced Terry's advice that Custer continue South.It was possible that the trail when it reached the LBH river turned South so only by swinging further South could Custer guarantee that he kept to the timetable and kept the Indians between him and Terry.
When hunting individuals who are capable of placing their ears to the ground and determine your direction and rate of approach, and approximate strength size, discretion regarding military manoeuvring is important.
I guess nobody had their ear to the ground for Reno so?
A historical event wherein all witnessess were either killed, less than truthful, prompted to withhold information for fear of retaliation, or resorted to out and out prevarication, leaves us with very little "facts" to ascertain what may have happened. Hind sight in this case, as well as others, constitutes conjecture based on know facts of what MAY have occurred. The operative word here is "MAY." I do not suggest that the conjectures posted were indeed facts.
That Wiggs is pioshious contradictory waffle.It is no substitute for a little applied logic.
Thank you .You are always most courteous.
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - January 22 2005 : 8:30:05 PM
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"pioshious contradictory waffle!" Now that's not bad. I have no idea what it means but, feel like I've been coronated. I hope that the following passage may shed further light on Custer's change in route:
"That Terry was acting on this suggestion is fairly clear, as it is indicated in the kind of instructions he issued to Custer emphasizing the importance of guarding against escape of the Indians around his left flank. To this general, overall conception Terry added the idea that the Indians might be cornered somewhere along the Little Big Horn. This was not a bad idea, and the attempt might have succeeded had not the INDIANS UNWITTINGLY SPOILED IT BY DEPARTING FROM THEIR USUAL ROUTE up the the Little Big Horn and on to their usual hunting grounds on the well-watered plateau at the headwaters of the Tounge. But, as the Cheyennes later explained to Dr. Marquis, this year the Indians turned downstream for the purpose of hunting antelope on the benchlands opposite the mouth of the Little Big Horn. It was this unexpected move that upset Terry's applecart and was, at the same time, the reason Custer did not continue his march up the Rosebud."
Kuhlman,page 302-Did Custer Disobey Orders At The Little Big Horn?
It was at that point, the discovery of the Indian trail that I referred to earlier, that Custer made his valid decision.
Some of us assume that the basic battle plan was to bring the three military columns together in a gigantic battle of annihilation against the Indians. This perception encourages us to believe that the plans for a precise date of mutual encounter was destroyed by Custer's appaling and egocentric early arrival. In actuality, I believe that not to be so. Rather, it was hoped to draw the armies around the Indians so they could not escape and then force them to the reservation. Many prominant, eastern politicians were dead set against any act that could be perceived to be genocide. Sherman and Sheridan were aware of this notion. While a pitch battle was always an option (as it truned out the only one left) it was not the primary solution. On May 29th., 1876, General Sheridan wrote General Sherman:
"I presume the following will occur: General Terry will drive the the Indians toward the Big Horn Valley and General Crook will drive them back towards Terry; Col. Gibbon moving down on the north side of the Yellowstone, to intercept if possible such as may want to go north of the Missouri to Milk River. The result of of these three columns may force many of the hostile Indians BACK TO THE AGENCIES."
It seems clear that Terry issued orders that coincided with the wishes of his superior, and emphasized the need to exclude the Indians from escaping Custer's left flank. This concern became moot when the Indians turned to the headwaters of the Rosebud and the Little Big Horn.
I enjoy the fact that you and I can agree to disagree. However, I looked up the word "pioshious" and, I'm sincere, could not find it. I pretty much comprehend "contradictory" and "waffle." |
Edited by - joseph wiggs on January 22 2005 8:38:05 PM |
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whistlingboy
Lieutenant
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 22 2005 : 10:55:23 PM
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Yesterday past, I received an email from 'staff' of this site, I guess, that stressed that I should try to 'get along.' So 'get along' is what I have decided to do.
I have been in Custer's 'company' a long time and, happening upon this site, found it intriguing in the treatment of many of the threads permeating its existence. And of course, I am speaking of "Against All Odds." Although I have taught college, I did not teach History. But our country's history in general and the period of expansion to include, in particular, the army's clashs with the Indians, has always captivated my curiosity. A country must have its heroes and heroines to inspire its future generations. Each of us may have a different idea of what a hero might be; each of you are probably a 'hero' to somebody. But a national hero is a symbol to be protected just like the flag and that is where Mr. Custer comes into my life.
Some, undefineable, moment in my youth, I, somehow, became acquainted with and established an image of Custer on Last Stand Hill. Until the 60's it was a pleasant hero I talked about all the time. Ever since, however, and since I've been researching the battle aspects, his image has clouded over. Throughout this land, there are numerous statues to this national 'hero.' There are streets, subdivisions, forests, parks, schools (one close to me, Custer-Reed HS) cities, and the list goes on and on. And so I must ask, What is Custer to me? He is the embodiment of the American spirit--that intangible feeling and energy source that raises your head, toughens your mind, readies the blood, straightens your 'gaze' and gives you focus and impetus to mount the charge to your destiny. American spirit--that homerun in the bottom of the ninth, that last second run over the goal line, that last charge up Mt. Suribachi, etc.
That defining moment when he is all alone with himself "against all odds" is when I recognize General Custer as a national hero doing what he has to do--that moment of utter emptiness between the 'ethers.'
I wish you all luck as you pursue the discovery of the truth at LSH and leave you with these words a great philosopher once said, "The greatest obstacle to discovery is not ignorance--it is the illusion of knowledge."
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bhist
Lt. Colonel
Status: offline |
Posted - January 23 2005 : 01:00:57 AM
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quote:
Originally posted by whistlingboy
Yesterday past, I received an email from 'staff' of this site, I guess, that stressed that I should try to 'get along.' So 'get along' is what I have decided to do.
I wish you all luck as you pursue the discovery of the truth at LSH and leave you with these words a great philosopher once said, "The greatest obstacle to discovery is not ignorance--it is the illusion of knowledge."
WB: From the sound of your post it appears that you are leaving us, or have I misunderstood? |
Warmest Regards,
Bob
www.vonsworks.com
www.friendslittlebighorn.com
www.friendsnezpercebattlefields.org |
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BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 23 2005 : 02:05:51 AM
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quote:
From the books I have read, they had lookouts at Ft. Phil Kearney that basically watched the wood cutting wagon trains that daily traveled to the 'pineries" and back slowly. They knew if there were indians about if they attacked the wood train. It seems a strange way to maintain a forts presence in a hostile area. They were basically holed up in the stockade.
Exactly. They had a lookout post, I believe without looking at the map, due south of the fort from which they could see almost everything. I say almost because I read somewhere (and too lazy to go digging for the reference) that there was one blind spot. The Indians tried several times to knock out the lookout post but the men were able to detect their approach each time. Oh, and the lookout post could not see over Lodge Trail Ridge...but I wonder if they could see the approaches? Hmmm, I will have to ask the guys at FPK about that one because it they could, it seems someone dropped the ball when they did not get their testimony when attempting to determine Fetterman's path.
Yeah, I think those guys were on an island without a boat and the waters around filled with hungry sharks.
Hey, have you read the testimony yet? Drop me a line with your take on what happened or post it to the Fetterman thread. The similarities between the Fetterman fight and LBH are striking, IMHO. But then, I always read yesterday's paper the day after *grin*
Best of wishes,
Billy
P.S. Shameless plug for my site (sorry about the pop-ups, but with a free site, you have to put up with some pain):
http://freepages.history.rootsweb.com/~familyinformation/
By the way, while not trying to make an issue out of it, a picture of the body of Sgt. Wyllyams, 7th Cav, after the Indians got through with it is at this location (warning, it is graphic!):
http://freepages.history.rootsweb.com/~familyinformation/fpk/wyllyams.jpg |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - January 23 2005 : 10:44:44 AM
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| Whistlingboy, I too received an e-mail requesting that we "Get along." If I remember correctly, it was addressed to all members. My interpretation of the message is that all of us need to focus on the basic ideology that brought us here in the first place, an open and honest discussion of TLBH battle. I belive that e-mail was sent to everyone. I do not belive you were singled out. I know that your posts were always informative, interesting, and fair. I think the forum will suffer for the lost of your input. The "illusion of knowledge," what a wonderful quote. |
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lorenzo G.
Captain
Italy
Status: offline |
Posted - January 23 2005 : 11:30:33 AM
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| Completely agreeding with Joe. Don't leave WB! |
If it is to be my lot to fall in the service of my country and my country's rights I will have no regrets.
Custer |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - January 23 2005 : 12:30:56 PM
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Wiggs
I looked up the word "pioshious" and, I'm sincere, could not find it.
Denotes a class of convoluted pontification of such labyrinthine proportions as to render the meaning indecipherable.
This concern became moot when the Indians turned to the headwaters of the Rosebud and the Little Big Horn.
I'm sorry but that's the only substantive point I have found in your post.
And if the Indians turned away from the Tongue and headed for the LBH Custer had no idea where they would hit it or what direction they turn when they did.So once again to comply with Terry's plan he should have gone further South. |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - January 23 2005 : 1:23:16 PM
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Wild, I believe you. I guess I need a better dictionary. I still could not find that descriptive word! Que Sera Sera.
No one could have possibly know where the Indians were specifically heading unless they traveled with them. Void of electronic surveilance equipment, Indian tracking was haphazard at best, and totally befuddling at worst. I agree when you say that no one had any idea in which way the Indians may turn or strike. That is the precise reason General Custer chose to followed a visible, recent, fresh, and massive Indian trail when he did. That he was correct in his assumption is proven by his subsequent meeting with them in which he, and his command, were wiped out.
Again, had he continued south after discovering the Indian trail the known results would have turned out differently. No one can possibly know for a certainty in which way but, different results would have occurred.
Last but not least, I wish to commend you for your ability to DESCIPHER "a thread that was convoluted pontification of such labyrinthine proportions as to render the meaning INDECIPHABLE."
By the by, do you have a degree in linguistics to have successfully accomplish the herculean task of translating my post or, did you just luck up. Maybe you exaggerated the un-readibility of my thread just a tad? |
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BJMarkland
Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 23 2005 : 2:43:11 PM
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quote:
Last but not least, I wish to commend you for your ability to DESCIPHER "a thread that was convoluted pontification of such labyrinthine proportions as to render the meaning INDECIPHABLE."
Uh, guys, a good on-line dictionary can be found at http://dictionary.reference.com/
Thanks for the laugh,
Billy |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - January 23 2005 : 3:16:41 PM
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That he was correct in his assumption is proven by his subsequent meeting with them in which he, and his command, were wiped out.
Are there any soldiers on this board who might be able to explain to the poets here just what the navigation term "aiming off"means?
By the by, do you have a degree in linguistics to have successfully accomplish the herculean task of translating my post or, did you just luck up.
No not in linguistics but in bull****e recognition.[no offence just to keep BJ amused]
Regards |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - January 23 2005 : 3:24:00 PM
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| Touche (acknowledge a clever retort) Wild, Touche. (LOL) |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - January 26 2005 : 07:44:01 AM
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Just say "Okay, you win." "Okay, you win."Just say "Okay, you win."go on Just say "Okay, you win."
Sure DC whatever you say if only to spare the board a repeat of your childishness and need to descend into crass vulgarity to express yourself.
The Sioux didn't understand the value of the Black Hills, they were told that the whites wanted it.
This is a classic.DC I don't have the time or inclination to go through the basics of economics with you suffice to say that value is determined by want/need.And the Indians knew that the US wanted the Black hill more than the rent of 400000$ a year indicated.
When men make a pointless stand 'against all odds' (what a brown nose you are)they don't have much sense, no.
What kind of men would acquiesce in their own genocide?
We're doing a special in genocide today Mr. Bull it come with or without wrath.
What are you talking about our history is never say die? You're trying to find refuge in vague myth.
Take a compliment there's few enought going around for the US these days.
2. Coincidence. They were coincidently informed of Crook and coincidently enough people cared enough to hit him before he got closer.
In the same way the tribe is informed of grazing, water, Buffalo,enemies etc.You can describe it as a system of "coincidence"but it worked more efficently than Custer's system "Benteen come on"
No, you're blathering Wild. Read Gray's chapters again, it's in there. Scouts saw Indians other than the breadbox crew.
As I said you grossly overstated the case.Gray dismisses most of these sightings as Sioux returning to the Agency
this same cast of Sioux Ultra operatives somehow missed Custer heading south? (Did the 7th use Stealth tech?)
Yes of course ,speed and stealth .
Now, Wild, who in the world will think that a witty retort? No one on this board. It's also rather silly.
I doubt if you speak for many on this board
"Straining for any shred of argument....", "Posing ludicrous images unrelated to contention...."
They counter attack and defeat Reynolds,suprise and defeat Crook,cut Custer to pieces and leave Terry to clean up.And these Indians you describe as being innocent of stratigic thought?
They had a reputation of being an elusive foe,difficult to bring to battle and only fighting on their own terms.If faced with overwhelming odds what better strategy to employ?
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - January 26 2005 : 1:26:08 PM
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 26 2005 : 4:36:21 PM
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Wild, by paragraph.
1. Good. Oddly, perhaps, my sense of self isn't derived from this board, but I still say absolutely nobody was offended by "urination." Come on.
2. Yes, it is classic. And true. The Sioux didn't understand the value of the Black Hills because they couldn't understand how the white man valued anything. Metals had no value to them since they couldn't work them and relied upon white men for arrow heads and hatchets. They had no money, only occasional gold from other sources, they were economic infants that dealt in barter, as was any nomadic stone age group. All they knew is that the white man routinely robbed them, so turning down offers seemed wise. Further, no combination of them had any authority to sell the land, and there was a good chance he who did would be killed.
3. The sort who'd want to provide for and improve the lot of his children, family, and people. There was no genicide, Wild, we went through that.
4. All nations hype that blather. This would only be relevant if significant numbers had a motto of "Reasonably interested in Surviving" or "Always willing to talk."
5. A system of coincidence is an oxymoron, and I don't claim such a system. Coincidently, they survived the battle and actually won it, but it wasn't due to strategy.
6. "That is a gross overstatement verging on being untrue. Why then the panic when they dropped a box of goodies?" "As I said you grossly overstated the case.Gray dismisses most of these sightings as Sioux returning to the Agency." That's a non sequitor, Wild. My contention was that the Indians that saw soldiers may or may not have kept the Sioux informed. You start by saying I'm verging on lying, then when you reread Gray you use my point as evidence for yourself. Lots of Indians saw the 7th and not one of them - not one - roused the camp agains them as they had against Crook. Situational coincidence illustrated.
7. Missed it.
8. Another non sequitor. I don't claim to speak for anyone but myself, but it's an accurate observation whatever the lap dogs arf.
9. Yes, Wild. Totally. Reaction is not strategy. Coincidence of situational convenience is not strategy. Having no long term goal isn't strategy. And, even had they a "strategy", they had no ability to sustain themselves in the field anyway. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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Custer's Orders
