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El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
 Posted - June 18 2004 : 01:00:40 AM
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I meant to elaborate on Reno's lack of support. Was he a baby? He couldn't fight with 150+ soldiers for 30-45 minutes by himself? He didn't face the entire Sioux and Cheyenne force at any time. He did surprise the camp. He had favorable odds for awhile. Why did he need support? How many casualties did he take on the skirmish line? How many in the timber? He threw away all of those lives because he panicked. He had lost (maybe) five soldiers in the skirmish line and the timber portions of the fight. The rest were killed because he panicked.
Gray believes Custer knew, based on the time motion of various components of his battalion and those who arrived to it, that Reno had retreated. This would compromise Custer's attack on the village.
Its also possible, when told Reno stopped to form a line, that Custer slowed his command's movements. If Reno wasn't pressing his attack, then Custer might have decided it wasn't necessary to keep his pace. Its possible Reno's timidity threw Custer for a loop, and he had to adjust to not having 154 soldiers and 20+ scouts threatening the south end of the village. |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - June 18 2004 : 08:14:44 AM
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"Reno needed aid because he seemed to have no confidence in his own abilities." What in the world is the basis for that? If the point of Reno's charge and firing line was to absorb Indian attention while Custer made his attack, Reno succeeded: the warriors were with him till about 1630, and they were miles from Custer, who didn't attack.
Crab, stick to the timeline. Custer didn't get to MTC till around four, an hour after Reno went in. This is cavalry, unable to sustain a long offensive, and that's too late for support right there. If Reno were bulletproof and attacked and had run all the way through the village to the north, where would he be at 4PM and in what shape? It wasn't enemy pressure that had affected Custer's progress to that point. Further, if the village were empty or close to it with the warriors down south, wasn't the quickest way across MTC to the civvies with all five companies? He HAD a sure way then across, but you're saying he passed it up to find another, hypothetical crossing further north while visible to the camp that took longer?
Further, why would he think Reno or Benteen would join him in the world's worst cavalry ground to fight a defensive battle, the only option up there, mandating the loss of horses? And that this was preferencial to retreating south. And that it made sense to bring the train there? That's Custer? |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - June 18 2004 : 9:11:31 PM
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"Further, why would he think Reno or Benteen would join him in the world's worst cavalry ground to fight a defensive battle."
Let's see now, where shall we start? When did you have the time to inspect every "cavalry ground" in the world that would authorize you to conclude that this was the "worst" one. I bet that kept you busy for a time. (by the way, I won't call you a liar as you are so prone to do. I prefer to believe that you made an innocent error. I guess that's the difference between you and I)
Secondly, are you implying that Custer planned to attack the largest gathering of Indians ever know, without "thinking" that Reno and Benteen would joim him. Thirdly, Custer was not the idiot you appear to think he was. The "ground" that Reno made his approach towards the village was perfectly flat; excellent ground for a traditional cavalry charge. Custer antiscipated on meeting Reno by attacking the southern end of the village, another piece of ground that happened to also be great land for a cavalry charge. (The village was located in a valley remember) The "worst" grounds you have alluded to where located on the ridges and ravines on the west side of the river. While it is true that Custer met his demise upon a hill, it was not his original intent to fight nor die there. It was also not his intent to exclude two thirds of his forces in the attack. How do I know this as I was not there nor, did I see it? Because it would be sheer insanity to think so! |
Edited by - joseph wiggs on June 18 2004 9:14:39 PM |
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El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - June 19 2004 : 05:45:59 AM
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Cavalry were not designed to fight a defensive battle. Therefore, you think Custer cared what ground he was on? Do you really think he looked north and thought "well, that's just not preferable ground, so I give up"? He did not choose ground based on defense. He didn't even choose the ground itself. He moved on the ground that existed near the village. He wasn't thinking of forming a last stand at this point. He was thinking offensively. And for some reason, he decided to go north. It wasn't the best ground, but Custer was on the offensive. If he was hit at the ford, there's just no reason why they'd haul his dying ass all the way to LSH. Why would the company commanders, even if Custer was incapacitated or dead, be so far apart? These weren't stupid officers. Tom Custer, Keogh and Yates had ACW experience. Keogh served on Buford's staff, Yates and TWC served with Custer. You may not think the movement north makes sense, but neither does an embattled, leaderless battalion leaving companies in reserve and large amounts of space between their lines. And there's no way Custer would be found on the top of LSH, rather than in the middle of his men. If they were trying to form a defensive, and Custer was wounded, even mortally, why place him at the top or just below it on LSH? What's the safest portion of a circular position? The middle. The Sklenar thinks that there was a field hospital established on LSH, on the northwestern slope. Indians were on the east and west of the command, and when the right wing collapsed, on the south. The northwest slope was the only portion that doesn't seem to be harried by warriors. And there's no way the companies would be so far apart. They might have been confused, but the distance between commands do not make sense at all. If the situation was that dire (i.e. Custer dead or mortally wounded), why the spacing? Why move almost two miles to the north with a corpse or someone soon to be one, then dump him at the top of a hill? If he was dead, they may have wanted to retain his corpse. So why was not left at or near the top of a hill, when it appears E and possibly F maneuvered well below? Why was his corpse found at the top, and not in the middle of the LSH position? If he was wounded, this makes even less sense. Five companies on Calhoun Hill would probably be able to hold off the warriors present. But that still makes no sense. If Custer was hit, and there was confusion, why move several miles away from the bulk of the regiment and the 2nd in command? That makes absolutely no sense, even if ordered by a dying or wounded Custer. Why would capable, experienced officers such as Keogh or Yates keep moving north, away from help?
Nepotism, as your "proof" or possible cause, is not a very strong argument. So you say TWC ordered the regiment to move forward while Custer was at the Crow's Nest? Pg. 169 of Gray's Centennial Campaign states that "no one seemed to know who had ordered this march; Gerard testified that Custer had left orders for the command to remain in place until his return." Gray's other book, Custer's Last Campaign, pg. 235-236, says Godfrey mentioned in his 1892 narrative that Custer personally rode to several companies, informing them of his plans to march at 8:00 am. He then went to the Crow's Nest, and, according to Gray, the command moved out around 8:45 am. Gerard, on the same pages of Gray's book, was said to have stated that either TWC or Lt. Cooke asked if the command was to follow Custer. His reply was that they were to remain where they were until he (Custer) came back. In the same book, Varnum, who was with Custer at the Crow's Nest, that "Tom Custer and Calhoun came up to us and Gen. Custer was angry at their leaving the column and order them back (pg. 240-241)." Gerard told Elizabeth Custer (pg. 241) that Custer asked TWC "who in the devil ordered these troops forward?" Considering Reno and Benteen, 2nd and 3rd in command, claiming that they had not ordered this advance (pg. 236), where's the proof that Tom Custer is responsible for bringing the regiment up? Its just as possible (if not moreso) that the 8 am march order, given by Custer to several companies if not all of them, was observed, despite Custer telling TWC and/or Lt. Cooke otherwise, upon their asking. And when several companies started moving in Custer's absence, they all did. If Reno and Benteen say they didn't order it (and they could have lied, though to what end?), then who did? Why would Tom Custer or Lt. Cooke bring the regiment forward when Gerard stated Custer personally told them not to? It appears that the anger Custer displayed at Tom leaving the regiment, coupled with his asking TWC about who ordered the command forward have been combined into Custer being mad at his brother for ordering the advance of the regiment. Its altoghether possible that Lt. Cooke was informed of Custer's not wanting the regiment to move, but was not aware of Custer's previous 8 am march order to some or all of the company commanders. And when they started moving, what then? Ignore Custer's verbal order because Lt. Cooke says Custer rescinded it? And in the same book, pg. 240, Edgerly wrote (on July 4, of presumably 1876, that "while Custer was away, Cooke, Tom Custer, Calhoun, Moylan and myself went down in a ravine and smoked a cigarette together." So how did Tom Custer order this advance, if Edgerly says he was in a ravine, smoking a cig? Gray seems to think Tom and Cooke then heard about the hardtack/Sioux incident on the backtrail, and they then left to inform Custer. Maybe then the column moved because they saw Cooke heading towards the Crow's Nest? But I see nothing from Gray, in either book, stating that ANYONE said TWC ordered an advance. Godfrey, in Graham's The Custer Myth, pg. 295, states that "A number of us were already grouped when Keogh came up and told of the incident of Sergeant Curtis and the lost pack. Tom Custer jumped up and said that he was going to report to the General." Now, I can't check every book I own, but that's several of them. And so far, NO mention of Tom Custer ordering the advance. Not from Benteen, Reno, Godfrey, Edgerly, Varnum, Gerard, etc.
Its fairly obvious the battalion was caught in an offensive posture, and had no time to dig in nor choose the best defensive ground. If Custer was an hour behind, then he KNEW Reno had retreated and any plans he had had to be modified. Therefore, the hostage gambit. He had 210 or so soldiers. Crossing into the village might have cost him lives, moving away from the warriors at the ford would not be as dangerous to his command. They'd give chase, and he could undoubtedly beat the non-combatants while occupying the warriors coming from the south. Its also possible he saw the clouds to the north, figured they were the civilians, but wanted to remain on the east side because the ground was higher, giving him a better view of the valley. He could leave several companies (Keogh's wing) to stop the chasing warriors while he pushed on, trying to find a ford further north, while still having a view of the valley from the higher ground.
Joseph, you have it backwards. Your south is north, and your east is west.
To me, Custer disregarded the unfavorable ground for a different objective. The field was not to his liking (if he even noticed), but he wasn't seeking or anticipating a defensive fight. He dropped off the right wing to hold the warriors off, and headed north to either find a ford, stop the northern movement of the non-combatants, or both.
We all know the results, and we are trying to theorize the reasons behind it. Saying Custer was shot early doesn't explain anything but the rout itself. It doesn't explain the spacing between the companies, which appears to have been there BEFORE each company fell apart. It doesn't explain the separation between the left and right wings. The right wing commander (Keogh) was killed with a majority of the right wing, and the left wing commander (Yates) was killed with about half of the left wing. The only officer completely out of place is Tom Custer, and its just as likely he was either reporting to Custer when the right wing fell, wounded at some point and brought to Dr. Lord, or was one of the 20 or so thought to have made it to LSH from the right wing. A.E. Smith was found on LSH, while most of E was supposedly in a ravine. But his company operated in that area, according to Two Moons (I believe), who said the Gray Horse Troop had been on the same ground as the monument.
So let's say Custer was hit. And the company commanders argued over whom should be in charge. Did they all refuse to follow the senior captain, and just go their separate ways? Were they that inept and/or stupid? Custer's down, either incapacitated with a chest wound or dead, and they do what? Wish each other luck and fight it out with 40-odd soldiers each? Implausible. Or they, despite his probably mortal wounding, listened to Custer's every word, and enacted them to the letter? Were they mindless idiots? Custer tells them, with a nice, new hole punched in his torso, to head north, spread out the companies, hold off the warriors with L Company and maybe C, move E and F Company three quarters of a mile away from them, and they listen? I just don't buy it. Tom Custer won the Medal of Honor twice in the Civil War, Keogh fought for Garibaldi and then in the ACW as well, Yates fought with Custer on his staff, and they either took orders from a dying man or took their companies on their separate ways to fight alone, yet stayed within a mile of each other? |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
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lorenzo G.
Captain
Italy
Status: offline |
Posted - June 19 2004 : 07:47:06 AM
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Dear Crab,
I always proof a great delight when someone tell what I personally think wwhile I'm not able to write it for my poor english...thank you for your clear, right and circumstantiated post! |
If it is to be my lot to fall in the service of my country and my country's rights I will have no regrets.
Custer |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - June 19 2004 : 2:12:34 PM
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Wiggs, in your desperation to appear equal to the task, what is obvious hyperbole isn't a lie or intended as such. You, however, cluelessly follow this with "the largest gathering of Indians" which is highly unlikely, and in any case unproveable. I've never said Custer was an idiot, quite the opposite. I have said that what is implied for him by his Custerphiles would depend upon him being an idiot, and therefore unlikly to have happened, at least with Custer in command.
Lorenzo, you can't continue to hide behind poor English writing. There's now severe evidence of poor English reading and an illogic native solely to you in any language.
Crab, I think you err by crediting things not proven as true and proceding from there (I realize it could be true, but it's still theory only). I know the records of the officers, and they were all good. It's not relevant, because anyone at anytime for reasons unforeseen can fall apart or make bad mistakes. Or the opposite.
You assume wings, reserves, crisp command, units on the offensive, time for clear reorganizations. I assume chaos of battle, people taking the easiest land out of the problem they're immediately in, people shot in the back riding away uphill to the east and north, and inability to get it together again.
Spacing between the companies doesn't strike me as intentional, deliberate, or useful but a result of ground and localized horrors. Casings found indicate casings found, nothing more.
Who knows about Tom and his brother and the incidents? The thing is, Tom was well down the line of command and that he appears at all is an issue, and all the 'maybes' don't really conceal it. Imagine if Tom's last name were Jones, and this Captain keeps appearing above his station in all the books of the battle giving orders to couriers. In any case, Custer hurt with family there would not be treated as Custer hurt with no family there, safe to say.
I don't think it obvious at all the five companies were on the offensive, in posture or intent, when they got wiped out. Once cavalry is engaged, it has to pursue it or leave it. Custer's group, somehow, didn't do either. MTC was shortest route to civvies, if that was in any way his goal, which I don't concede. Neither do I grant a field hospital, but a command winging it and not knowing what to do as changes in commanders at various levels confuses everyone. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - June 19 2004 : 8:18:41 PM
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| El Crab, that was impressive!!! WOW! |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - June 19 2004 : 8:36:50 PM
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That's the problem, I didn't recognize your "Obviously Hyperbole" from anything else you write. Please forgive me. For future reference, perhaps you can place an-H for Hyperbole- after the next statement you don't mean.
Secondly, Mitch Boyer advised Custer that the village he was about to attack was the largest congregation of Indians he had ever seen in his 30 years of experience. This is not a hyperbole. |
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - June 19 2004 : 10:43:02 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by joseph wiggs
Secondly, Mitch Boyer advised Custer that the village he was about to attack was the largest congregation of Indians he had ever seen in his 30 years of experience. This is not a hyperbole.
Seeing as how Bouyer was only 39 years old and was counting his pre-pubescent years as "experience", it obviously was hyperbole. How, on the other hand, you're able to convert Bouyer's windy assertion into the bigger claim that the LBH village composed the "largest gathering of Indians ever know [sic]" is a mystery which I won't attempt to solve. That Bouyer knew maybe, though we don't have his written word for it. But you're taking a leap beyond what the evidence can justify.
R. Larsen
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - June 20 2004 : 03:44:49 AM
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Wiggs, you'd be the only one in such need of help with 'obvious hyperbole', a term you apparently had to look up. Further, you don't seem to understand that Boyeur saying that this was the largest village he'd ever seen (if he said it)is different from your statement "the largest gathering of Indians ever know" which probably upset the Chamber of Commerce for Mexico City, or the Inca capital or even those who recalled Chohokia here in the US. It might not even have been as large as the one that participated at Kildeer Mt. in 1864, composed of many of the same tribes.
And to drop kick you around again, your summations of what I say are now inferior to even Lorenzo's, who - if not actually a put on, as I sometimes suspect - doesn't speak, write, or read the language very well. But then, your summations of what you yourself have said are just as riddled with error. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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Brent
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - June 20 2004 : 07:34:17 AM
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El Crab:
Reno was no "baby"--but he was a perfectly ordinary cavalry commander. No doubt he could have continued his charge/trot/advance but when he saw the Indians gathering and no genuine sign of the promised support, he stopped and the rest is history. Had he continued--and as long as it took Custer to figure out exactly where he(Custer) was going to attack--he (Reno)probably would have been busted up badly. He must have realized early on that the "support" he was promised wasn't going to be direct and that Custer did intend to "support" him by way of attacking in another direction. BUT--it took too long. From Reno's point of view, Custer's movement was doing little or nothing to distract the Indians from "gathering" in front of him. And when he saw that, I guess he reacted as an ordinary cavalry commander might be expected to do--he prepared to defend himself.
If Reno's halt doomed Custer--Custer's lack of promt support contributed to that halt. And where oh where was Benteen?? Yep--off on a scout with 143 troops just to determine IF any Indians were in that part of the valley and IF they were there, prevent their escape. And IF they had been there, his command may have gotten all tied up anyway, rendering them useless to support anybody and in fact maybe needing support themselves.
So we have a good plan in theory (with suprise added ) rendered null and void by (essentially)lack of coordination. And maybe it couldn't have been coordinated anyway--it was all done on the spot and in quick fashion--sort of "winging it" based on how the situation was developing.
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El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - June 20 2004 : 9:57:33 PM
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| It wasn't the charge being ended that was the problem. It was the mistakes made despite very, very light casualties that led to heavy casualties. He seemed to have wilted in the face of questionable force. I'm sure the situation was extremely harrowing. But the losses just weren't there until Reno fled the valley. |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - June 20 2004 : 10:00:20 PM
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| DC, does the term, "playing with semantics(obstreperously) ring a bell?" |
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benteens brother
Corporal
Australia
Status: offline |
Posted - June 20 2004 : 10:30:08 PM
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| You can argue about Custer's intentions until the cows come home but the bottom line is that he made the wrong decisions after MTC. His actions resulted in his command being wiped out. He failed to read the intentions of the enemy and continued with a course of action that resulted in annihilation. If he knew Reno had retreated and was out of the game then you can't blame Reno anymore. If he knew that one element of his attack plan had failed then he should have consolidated the regiment and come up with something new. As it was he continued on and got whacked. No one to blame but himself. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
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dave
Captain
Australia
Status: offline |
Posted - June 21 2004 : 10:35:40 AM
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Dark Cloud
With all due respect, I have to disagree. To me, for Custer to have fallen where he did - Custer (or his proxy) can only have been on the offensive.
Ask yourself this. If Custer is dead, mortally wounded, whatever at the MTC crossing and you're in charge, where do you go?
Personally I'd head back to Reno Hill, or to the pack train. Failing that I might head diametrically away from the village. Anything except move north on path which parallels the village and exposes the column to any excited Indian.
You've pointed out on numerous occasions that the land around LSH (surely a misnomer) is unsuitable for defense, and from the pictures I've seen of the ground, I'd agree. So why would Custer or his captains choose this ground over Reno Hill?
If Custer wasn't on the offensive, then the only reasonable assumption would seem to be that he was driven there. Can you see a situation developing at the MTC ford where the Indians have outflanked Custer to the point where his only option is to retreat to the north. I can't, but feel free to suggest away. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - June 21 2004 : 11:58:45 AM
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If you're on the offensive, cross at MTC and hit hard and quick, as you'd intimated to Reno and which makes the most sense, since you're cavalry and you know once stopped in contact witht the enemy, you're rather cooked. You don't take cavalry on a visible journey as much to the east as north, away from the village, and irresponsibly onto bad ground visible as such from Weir Point. You especially don't do this to "wait" for Benteen or to put on a smoke and mirror program of light afternoon entertainment of military finesse for an enemy without central command that doesn't react as if it had central command anyway.
If, on the other hand, the crossing of all five was contested at MTC, Custer hurt, then all strategy becomes local; the three hindmost companies retreat in good order but under increasing attack to Calhoun to await devlopments, the first two deflected fight to LSH carrying wounded. Some don't know Custer is hurt, Custer hasn't relinquished command, Keogh and Calhoun responsibly deploy while awaiting orders that don't come. Messy moments of mounting hysteria and confusion.
Zero proof, except it fits the field and what Custer did not do and normally would have, is simple and fits the facts and timelines. Not much fun, though. The 101st Henry Division - where NA's fight in units based on similar weaponry - vanishes like all the casings from MTC where railroad picnics and search sessions enjoyed a vogue. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - June 21 2004 : 1:31:27 PM
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"If you'er on the offensive, cross at MTC and hit hard and quick."
Does one assume, from the above statement, that any other action other than crossing at MTC, constitutes a defensive maneuver? According to this logic, Custer did not attack(Offensive thrust)therefore he was in a denfensive mode. The words Cavalry and offensive are interchangleable; representing aggression and atacking.
Custer Attacking or not attacking at MYC are military options. The Cheyenne warriors spoke of appoximantly 10 or so of their people meeting a detachment of soldiers at Ford "B"/MTC. After exchanging numerous rounds, the detachment turned hard right and departed. Benteen concluded that a heavy engagement did not occur at this point due to the absence of fallen warriors or soldiers. Thus, evidence shows that Custer selected a the option of continuing north. Custer could have crossed, turned left and, attacked the warriors from the rear. Such an action would have enabled the non-combatants to escape. The military approach of soldiers at Ford "B" was a military "Feint" to draw away some of the Indian forces from Ren's front. It worked. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - June 21 2004 : 4:12:44 PM
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No, one does not assume that. Why would one, since it isn't said or implied?
But with only ten people there at MTC, you imply, the advantage of numbers and surprise and shortest distance to anything in the camp on cavalry ground was thrown away to continue north for what advantage or purpose in full view? |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - June 21 2004 : 10:20:46 PM
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| I believe, rightly or wrongly, that Custer's plans evolved as the circumstances dictated. Initially, he was convinced that the Indians would, "go on the Jump!" Reno's charge proved this not to be true. Thus, a change in plans. Is it possible that at Ford "B", he saw what appeared to be a vacant -warriors to the left, women and children to the right- actually the middle portion being vacant. Now, the plan changes again. Relieve Reno from the full blunt of the Indian attack while continuing to track the real prize, the women and children. I don't profess to know what actually happened but, speculation is interesting! |
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wILD I
Brigadier General
Ireland
Status: offline |
Posted - June 22 2004 : 04:44:48 AM
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Various points
Crab What's the safest portion of a circular position? The middle.The middle is the most dangerious as most of the fire converges there.
Its fairly obvious the battalion was caught in an offensive posture, The command was not in an offensive posture it was strung out in column of march over 1/2 a mile
. Crossing into the village might have cost him lives.You don't cross into a village of 1500 warriors as if out for a day's stroll.
. He dropped off the right wing to hold the warriors off.He did no such thing.Custer hadn't a clue and was just hoping for something to turn up.
DC, I agree, and believe the decisions so off the wall that I don't think Custer made them.The only decision Custer made was to proceed northward looking for a favourable crossing point.Everything else was just a reaction
Dave Ask yourself this. If Custer is dead, mortally wounded, whatever at the MTC crossing and you're in charge, where do you go? You've pointed out on numerous occasions that the land around LSH (surely a misnomer) is unsuitable for defense, and from the pictures I've seen of the ground, I'd agree. So why would Custer or his captains choose this ground over Reno Hill?It was the only option they had
Can you see a situation developing at the MTC ford where the Indians have outflanked Custer to the point where his only option is to retreat to the north. I can't, but feel free to suggest away.He was hit so hard and quick that there was nothing else open to him
DC If you're on the offensive, cross at MTC and hit hard and quick.Now just how quick do you think a column of 5 troops streaching back 1/2 a mile could cross the river?Reno said it took him 15 minutes to form up his command to charge.
Cheers
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Brent
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - June 22 2004 : 06:28:40 AM
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Joe:
Could very well be that Custer's intent was to relieve pressure on Reno. But unfortunately, it came too late. Reno (who in his own mind was doubtless thinking right from the beginning "support" and "whole outfit") sees the continually gathering warriors and stops his "charge". Wrong move from Custer's point of view!! But from Reno's point of view, he sees no IMMEDIATE support and figures halting is better than getting drawn in and destroyed.
I guess |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - June 22 2004 : 12:28:38 PM
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Wild,
Forming three companies into a line takes time, is all. At 7 knots an attack with 10 (42 lines) across (it's broad enough) could get them across the river in ten minutes and immediately into the trees on the west bank. There was supposedly light fire only before them. To travel in full view to a hypothetical, broader crossing up north(where the water might be too deep or the banks too high or any number of things) where it would be guaranteed to be met by resistence of the sort that was less appealing, this makes small sense. They had a certain amount of surprise NOW and cover to get organized, take advantage of it.
Or, you know, if the village is too big, unite the regiment down south and make a go of it. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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joseph wiggs
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - June 22 2004 : 8:59:03 PM
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| Brent, you are right. It is a sad reality but, sometimes doing too little to late is as bad as doing nothing al all; regardless of intent. Hindsight being twenty/twenty, we can look back and see that many things went wrong for the troopers. Unexpected Indian resilience, misunderstood orders, failure of Gen. Crook to notify authorities of the Rosebud battle,(this alone would have made it clear that the warriors were prepared to fight and well armed) and, Indian firepower that exceeded all expectations. |
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
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Posted - June 22 2004 : 11:39:13 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by wILD I
Can you see a situation developing at the MTC ford where the Indians have outflanked Custer to the point where his only option is to retreat to the north. I can't, but feel free to suggest away.He was hit so hard and quick that there was nothing else open to him
Is that really true? After the battle the military saw little evidence of casualties between Ford B and the Calhoun position, and the Indian accounts, though some claim that they "drove" Custer from Ford B, also tend to suggest fairly desultory fighting at Ford B and its near vicinities. I just don't see how Custer was forced to head northwards.
R. Larsen
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Lt. Jesse M. Lee
