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benteens brother
Corporal
Australia
Status: offline |
 Posted - December 04 2003 : 6:11:08 PM
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Obviously in the long run the British were going to be victorious just as the United States was in the Indian wars for the reasons DC has nominated.
The interesting thing about Isandlwana is that it threw the British right off balance and paralysed the war effort for several months. It caused a great fuss in colonial South Africa and in Britain. Many saw it as an unneccessary war. Perhaps a heavy Zulu raid into Natal straight after Isandlwana (which many people feared was inevitable) may have made the British rethink their strategy and given the Zulu at least a few more years of breathing space. |
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El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
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Posted - December 04 2003 : 8:05:51 PM
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| No one credited victory to the square. A square would be better than a strung out, gap-filled line or series of lines trying to hold a concentrated, much larger force at bay. Especially considering the flanking and envelopment tactics employed by the Zulu. But at Isandlwhana, the tactic was already employed, and the only option for defense would have been trying to rally the soldiers into a compact mass. Not forming a square in the beginning was their downfall. After the lines broke and the gaps were exploited, reforming and rallying the soldiers would not really have been possible. |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
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Rich
Commander-in-Chief
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 05 2003 : 06:14:06 AM
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quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
What distinguishes industrial nations from hunter/gatherers is the ability to wage sustained war. Just like native Americans or Australian aborigines or Scottish Highlanders, it doesn't matter who wins the initial battles because, in the end, the crops have to be planted and/or the fish need to be caught and there was never any stockpile of food or weaponry or soldiers to draw from and the net result of sustained warfare was the same on the population win or lose.
You guys credit the victory to the square? I credit it to emotionally exhausted and perplexed Zulu who fought wars in season against people like themselves who had to retreat and heal after either massive losses or huge victories. From their point of view, they had one eye on the krall, which couldn't move, and absent instant victory had to get their families to safety.
It wasn't the tactics, it was 'here they are yet again.'
Definitely a factor over the long haul.
But, flushed with victory, and just hours later, the Zulu were defeated by a relative handful of Brits when sound defensive tactics were employed. Not a square, but the defenders at Rorke's Drift played it smart & consolidated. This had nothing to do with depleted warrior pools, families, or harvests.
Same probably would have happened at Isandhlawana. |
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El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 05 2003 : 6:51:08 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by Rich
quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
What distinguishes industrial nations from hunter/gatherers is the ability to wage sustained war. Just like native Americans or Australian aborigines or Scottish Highlanders, it doesn't matter who wins the initial battles because, in the end, the crops have to be planted and/or the fish need to be caught and there was never any stockpile of food or weaponry or soldiers to draw from and the net result of sustained warfare was the same on the population win or lose.
You guys credit the victory to the square? I credit it to emotionally exhausted and perplexed Zulu who fought wars in season against people like themselves who had to retreat and heal after either massive losses or huge victories. From their point of view, they had one eye on the krall, which couldn't move, and absent instant victory had to get their families to safety.
It wasn't the tactics, it was 'here they are yet again.'
Definitely a factor over the long haul.
But, flushed with victory, and just hours later, the Zulu were defeated by a relative handful of Brits when sound defensive tactics were employed. Not a square, but the defenders at Rorke's Drift played it smart & consolidated. This had nothing to do with depleted warrior pools, families, or harvests.
Same probably would have happened at Isandhlawana.
Against a mostly pugilistic fighting force, a consolidated force with telling firepower will withstand much larger numbers attacking them.
The defenders of Rorke's Drift faced an unused portion of the Zulus, they never got into the fight. And they went against orders in attacking. But they were as fresh as any force in the Zulu army, and they were not only flushed with their comrades' victory, but also flushed with a desire to spill blood in combat. Having been denied any action at Isandlwhana, they headed to Rorke's Drift. They were determined, strong in number, and thirsty for combat. And about 140 Brits fought them off by maintaining order, keeping together and fire discipline. |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
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benteens brother
Corporal
Australia
Status: offline |
Posted - December 05 2003 : 7:57:08 PM
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| The garrison at Rorke's Drift had time to fortify the post with mealie bags and biscuit boxes. It's doubtful they could have survived out in the open. That's why they chose to stay and fight rather than try to get the wounded to Pietermaritzburg because the Zulu's could have overhauled them and a slaughtered them in the open. |
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El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 05 2003 : 10:03:38 PM
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| Indeed. But if they had built a laager and/or fortified the camp at Isandlwhana, which was normal practice, they probably would have been fine. They neglected to do both, mostly due to the fact that it was dark and the camp wasn't going to be maintained for long. |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
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Brent
Lt. Colonel
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - December 08 2003 : 06:29:24 AM
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Well the key word is always "might".
A square such as a "Four "Feathers" square (A good movie, by the way. Not the remake, but the original) might stil have gotten overwhelmed--??
But backed up against the "mountain" at Isandlwana, it may well have worked. |
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Durnford
Private
South Africa
Status: offline |
Posted - January 02 2004 : 07:11:21 AM
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quote:
Originally posted by El Crab
Has anyone noticed the similarities between Little Big Horn and the battle of Isandlwana in Zululand, 1879? And of the similiarities between the 1879 Zulu campaign and the Sioux campaign of 1876? I've read a bit on the subject, and will soon offer up the similarities I've picked up on, but feel free to reply.
I read somwhere, many years ago, that neither George Armstrong nor Chelmsford availed themselves of the Gattling Gun which the Author believed would have been decisive. Certainly it was used during the last battle of the Zulu Campaign at the battle of Ulundi (though Its efficacy is debabtable) I know very little about the Little Bighorn (Isandlwana is a strong interest of mine)but both defeats (I believe) centre around the arrogance of the respective Commanders. I have briefly read everyones comments concerning Isandlwana and a common mistake is to underestimate Zulu tactics during this battle. I have been to the Battlefield twice. Certainly the position was defendable. The mistake of the British was to have extended their lines - which was (perhaps)a function of the size and extent of their camp. As I read and study more I am also struck by the lack of leadership exhibted by Pulleine (who was an Administrator )during the Battle (his presence once the Zulu attack was launched is difficult to account for)- but again, I stress that the Zulu leadership during crucial stages of the battle was exemplary. The ammunition shortage argument has been largely discounted. Also the lack of British front line survivors makes piecing things together very difficult. The Court of Enquiry conducted after the Battle was a sham. Certainly questions need to be asked also (my opinion) of certain British Officers deserting the battlefield early. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 02 2004 : 10:46:02 AM
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This follows the template. Rather than admit that the better army won, we have to endure the standard themes. Betrayal by money hungry material providers, betrayal by higher authority, grand stupidity by desk bound military men, finally cowardice and scapegoating of the dead. What were the percentages of officers killed? Did a higher percentage of officers escape?
The Zulu were motivated, angry, and drugged up. If they keep coming and race in to hand to hand range despite casualties, there was nothing to be done at twenty to one odds.
Further, if the Brits had held their ground, then what? The Zulu weren't about to wander off. With hundreds of casualties, a few hundred survivors could do what? Wait for help? Abandon the wounded? Charge? These aboriginal wars on all continents were of a piece: without a complete victory in the first large battle, the empire builders had to protect their wounded and somehow retreat. They could do it again the next year and simply wear down the support ability of the natives, sooner than later.
In the end, tactics and military genius were almost unimportant. The continual ability to put an army of any sort continually into the field won the wars. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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benteens brother
Corporal
Australia
Status: offline |
Posted - January 03 2004 : 10:27:50 PM
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| I think there is a tendency nowdays to overrate the performance of the Zulu army at Isandlwana. Yes they were disciplined and well led but their tactics were hopelessly obselete against a modern army. The 'brilliant' tactics of Isandlwana were hopelessly inadequate at Rorkes Drift, Khambula and other battles of the Zulu war. It was bad strategy, indecisive leadership, bad communication, arrogance and a little bad luck which all combined to produce the disaster. I think Zulu tactics were too inflexible and I don't think they ever understood their enemy or that a victory like Isandlwana would just make the British come back in bigger numbers. |
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Durnford
Private
South Africa
Status: offline |
Posted - January 05 2004 : 03:22:39 AM
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The Battle of Isandlwana is an interest of mine - and if you are intending to make the trip to South Africa I can assure you it is well worth it! There are at least 3 'locals' (I know of) whose knowledge of the Battle and Zulu culture and tradition are fantastic. Accomodation superb!
I know little of the Little Bighorn but it is not the first time I have heard of comparrisons made between the two Battles. One Author suggested (forgotten who) that both George Armstrong and Chelmsford erred in not 'waiting' for the Gattling Gun which he believes would have been decisive. Certainly the Gattling Gun was used later in the Zulu Campaign but it's efficacy was dubious. Kept on jamming by all accounts.
The 'impression' that I get is that both Generals were extremely arrogant and that both made the mistake of splitting forces in enemy territory without knowing the disposition of the enemy. Chelmsford on the day of the battle (and I stand to correction) had effectively split his force into at least twelve (12). His fear being that the Zulus would not fight him out in the open.
The biggest mistake one can make is to assume that the Zulus were an unsofisticated opponent - they were a warrior nation. Contray to the belief of many who have posted replies they did have a large number of 'guns' (20 000 or such had been 'imported' into the Kingdom before the Campaign started) though admittedly they were outdated. The Zulus also believed that by elevating the sights you gave the weapon more 'power' and as such there usage thereof was not as effective as it might have been.
There were British survivors of Isandlwana though piecing information together is extremely difficult. All who survived 'left' the field well before the end. The Britsh Court of Enquiry was a sham ( Chelmsford tried to blame Durnford , Pulleine and Clery) when quite clearly he was the catalyst of the disaster (disaster from a British perspective) which occured.
Zulu tactics were superb - it is believed they purposefully split the British force through a combined strategy of decoys and fake camp fires - which had Chelmsford with half the camp chasing shadows on the evening immediately preceding and on the day of the actual massacre.
For the Zulu it was a brilliant victory - though not regarded as their most famous in terms of their own military tradition.
Interesting fact that you might want to think about. The Battle by all accounts was over from start to finish in two and a half hours. In that time in the region of 4000 combatants lost their lives. Martini Henry rifles fired in the region of (in experienced hands) 12 rounds per minute. It is believed that at the height of the battle, when the Zulus entered the camp, that more troops were killed in that period than at the height of the battle of the Somme.
Unfortunately Isandlwana proved to be the death knell of the Zulu Kingdom. |
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Durnford
Private
South Africa
Status: offline |
Posted - January 05 2004 : 04:09:31 AM
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Sorry Dark Cloud & Benteen's Brother - I did not intend that I repeat myself I did not see that my origonal message had been posted.
In reply - there were more Officers killed at Isandlwana than at Waterloo.
Certainly, the bravery of the Officers of the '24th' cannot be doubted. However there were a number of Officers who did leave the field - Melvill, Coghill, Curling and a number of Special Service NNC Officers also. Court of Enquiry comments such as 'we couldn't find an Officer' suggest (perhaps) that efforts to save the 'Guns' or 'the Colours' were a guise to get the heck out of there once the writing was on the proverbial wall.
I agree that, regardless of your opinion of Zulu tactics, that better troop disposition would endoubetdly have staved off defeat. I would however like to comment on Rorkes Drift and Khambua. The attack on Rorkes Drift was not to have occurred on the express orders of Chetswayo who forbade his troops to cross into Natal. Little in the form of tactics occurred here. Khambula occured after Isandlwana and their laager tacticts was a consequence of this defeat. If you have opportunity look at the battle of Hlobane - good Zulu tactics here also.
I am not disagreeing that the British were always going to win this Campaign for the reasons cited - however not to accord the Zulu Generals credit I believe is a mistake. |
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Durnford
Private
South Africa
Status: offline |
Posted - January 05 2004 : 04:09:32 AM
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Sorry Dark Cloud & Benteen's Brother - I did not intend that I repeat myself I did not see that my origonal message had been posted.
In reply - there were more Officers killed at Isandlwana than at Waterloo.
Certainly, the bravery of the Officers of the '24th' cannot be doubted. However there were a number of Officers who did leave the field - Melvill, Coghill, Curling and a number of Special Service NNC Officers also. Court of Enquiry comments such as 'we couldn't find an Officer' suggest (perhaps) that efforts to save the 'Guns' or 'the Colours' were a guise to get the heck out of there once the writing was on the proverbial wall.
I agree that, regardless of your opinion of Zulu tactics, that better troop disposition would endoubetdly have staved off defeat. I would however like to comment on Rorkes Drift and Khambua. The attack on Rorkes Drift was not to have occurred on the express orders of Chetswayo who forbade his troops to cross into Natal. Little in the form of tactics occurred here. Khambula occured after Isandlwana and their laager tacticts was a consequence of this defeat. If you have opportunity look at the battle of Hlobane - good Zulu tactics here also.
I am not disagreeing that the British were always going to win this Campaign for the reasons cited - however not to accord the Zulu Generals credit I believe is a mistake. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 05 2004 : 09:18:27 AM
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But what I was trying to find out was if a higher percentage of officers escaped the Zulu than men. If thirty percent of the officers escaped and only 5% of the men, whoa there. That's a clue. Not necessarily proof, but a strong indication.
If the percentages were roughly the same or the officers took a beating, than all these accusations of cowardice and suspicious stuff ought to be withdrawn. The one thing that unites the 'study' of these two battles is the lust for scapegoats and the too-easy-to-the-lip and pen of word or implication of 'coward.' |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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Durnford
Private
South Africa
Status: offline |
Posted - January 05 2004 : 10:23:56 AM
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It is a really good question. In my opinion there were an abnormally high number of Officers that escaped (or tried too).
Melvill (an Officer of the 24th) - was apparently given orders by Pulleine to save the Colours. Cannot be verified because Pulleine is killed at Isandlwana and Melvill himself is killed at Fugitives Drift.
Coghill -(an Officer of the 24th) - left in camp with a bad knee injury - meets the same fate as Melvill. Weak theory that he was leaving the camp for reinforcements.
Both are awarded the VC posthumously but this was a particularly unpopular decision with General Wolseley. In fact the VC's are awarded some 20 years after the event.
Captain Essex - Special Service Officer.
Lt. Curling - Artillery
Lt. Horrace Smith Dorrien - Transport Officer
Lt. Higginson - NNC
Lt. Stafford - NNC
These are the ones I can remember from the top of my head - there are a number of others. The so called Colonial Officers you can perhaps understand because the NNC themselves bolted so they probably saw little point in sticking behind. This is out of 50 or so 'white' survivors. Remember also that many were killed in the 4 miles to Fugitives Drift (escaping)
I am reticent to use the word cowardice - there is so much uncertainty surrounding much of the latter stages of the battle -so one should guard against these conclusions. However Pulleine (effectively in charge of the Camp) is apparently killed sitting in his tent writing Reports. Durnford himself is out fighting in the line - and one gets the impression that there was no one person effectively 'leading' or directing operations. No one person trying to hold things together.
Under these circumstances it is easy to see why an exodus would have occured from the camp. Persons (Officers) who could effectively have held things together (such as making a stand at the wagon park where much of the ammunition was situated) just never happened.
My own personal belief is that an element of discipline broke down because of a lack of effective leadership - but we will never know this.
One last point - it is the opinion of some that the Zulus first entered the Camp from the rear. I can find no accounts of the particular point of entry being defended. Pulleine in my opinion is bewildered (not his fault - should never have been left in charge)- too much information at once it seems. He appears only to react to the information at hand i.e. he re-inforces his left flank, because it is here where he perceives the immediate threat. Not once does he seem to fully appreciate the Zulu tactic.
The old addage that men are led in battle - never managed. There was no one leading - and my point is no one Officer put up there hand to do so. Pulleine in my opinion became paralysed with the fear of uncertainty - and my theory being correct this must have been clear to persons such as Melvill, Coghill and Essex. Whether they believed this was a decision they could or should take I am not sure.
'We couldn't find an Officer' just keeps on ringing in my head. |
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
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Durnford
Private
South Africa
Status: offline |
Posted - January 06 2004 : 12:49:32 AM
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In answer to your question a large portion of the British force comprised Natal Native Contingent (NNC). The NNC were recruited from native tribes living in Natal including persons / clans who for one another reason fled into Natal to either escape from or after having being involved in some kind of dispute with the Zulu King. They received less than a months training, fell under Colonial Officers, were armed traditionally - with only one in ten being issued with a firearm (5 rounds ammunition).
Durnford had recruited and trained - I stand to correction about 250 mounted Native troops - who were both well trained and armed. This force was a far different proposition to the NNC.
The 'Natalese' casualties of 550 I think proximate. I went back to my Books last night and determined 81 so called 'white' survivors 24 of which were commissioned Officers. By far the majority of these were indeed Officers of the NNC who were recruited locally - and for want of a better description, could be best described, as Soldiers of Fortune.
Capt. Essex at the Court of Enquiry said that it was the collapse of the NNC line which first allowed the Zulus to penetrate the Camp Perimeter. In fact this was the Enquiry's findings also - but most of everyone now believes that the NNC were made scapegoats. Nobody had much respect for the NNC when they were first recruited, certainly there own Officers didn't - and there is nothing to suggest that anyone would have thought it necessary to count the survivors of this contingent. That is why I say 'proximate'
That the Officers of the NNC (all white) should then high tail it is not surprising - and the high proportion of surviving Officers can be attributed to this. That is not to suggest that not all the Colonial troops 'bolted' - many of them died on the line with Officers and Infantry of the 24th.
There is refeence made by one of the survivors - Brickhil (Interpreter) I believe - who said that Quatermaster James Pullen of the 24th (killed) tried to rally forces as they were escaping over the Nek (between Blacks Kopje and the mountain of Isandlwana) - but he was not successful. Would a Commissioned Officers attempts have been more successful?
Remember that many who tried to escape were killed on route. So a head count of the composition of the survivors may not neccesarily tell a true story. No 'white' survivor who was not mounted, escaped.
One final thought about leadership in this battle - and one must remember that this is based on Zulu oral tradition as it exists. I have commented on what I considered to be a lack of decisive and effective leadership on the part of the British Force. So far as the Zulu Generals were concerned they directed operations from the Nqutu Plateau or Heights overlooking the Battlefield (no more commanding place could they have chosen)and at a decisive point in the battle when one of the Zulu Impi's(Regiments) are being pinned down by accurate and sustained fire from the British firing line, a Zulu called Ndlaka descends from the Heights, walks in front of the Impi, and states 'The little branch of leaves who beats out the fire (one of Chetswayo's 'praise names) never ordered this' - and the Zulu's rise as one man, and charge and overcome the British position. Ndlaka himself is shot through the head immediately and killed.
The Zulu's regard Ndlaka's actions as being a decisive turning point in the battle.
Benteens Brother states that perhaps to much of late has been made of Zulu tactics - as it does not appear to exist during any later battle. He is not alone in this opinion. A couple of things need to be considered however. British tactics themselves changed after Isandlwana - in response to Zulu tactics. Hereafter the British only ever fought from 'a square' or at Khambula from a well chosen and laagered defensive position. Under these circumstances the Zulu position was hopeless.
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Durnford
Private
South Africa
Status: offline |
Posted - January 06 2004 : 06:18:11 AM
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| Correction - 19 Officers out of a total of approximately 81 white survivors. This is based on numbers from 'They Fell Like Stones'. Only book on the Zulu Campaign (which I know of) which lists casulaty figures. |
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El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 09 2004 : 12:55:21 AM
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A Gatling gun at LBH would have made no difference, except one: There would not have been a battle at the present location. They were cumbersome and drawn by condemned animals and prone to tipping over while marching (all drawn from Son of the Morning Star).
Zulu tactics never changed, and their success was greatly due to large numbers. If they were so successful due to leadership, explain why there was no course of action if defeated? From what I've read, when routed, they turned and ran and offered no resistance whatsoever. Brit cavalry could and did chase and kill them for miles without any risk, save from their own excited horses. |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
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Durnford
Private
South Africa
Status: offline |
Posted - January 09 2004 : 02:01:46 AM
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General
My contention is that British tactics were amended in response to the tactic which was employed by the Zulu's. Whenever, and this only happened in the opening stages of the Campaign the British were exposed and in the open, the Zulus were able to take advantage of this. Yes, it was largely by virtue of their numbers that they were able to exploit such a situation. But the fact is that they were adept at exploiting weakness. Only later in the Campaign did Chelmsford adhere to his own standing orders and not allow himself to be exposed as he did at Isandlwana, Hlobane and Nyezane (SIC?).
The question has been asked why the Zulu did not attack at night (did at Rorkes Drift - but the attack was actually launched in the afternoon)- and I believe that it would have been impossible for them to deploy the 'chest and horn' formation at night. Understand also that their tactics evolved from internecine type warfare - it had not evolved from fighting European armies. The Zulu tactic which evolved was sound given their traditional enemies, given the weapons which they had, and given that it played to their strength of being an extremely mobile force (they deployed formation at an unbelivable speed).
What needs to be guarded against is believing that Isandlwana was a British defeat rather than a Zulu victory. I, like you, believe that the British need not have been defeated at this Battle - and based on this view point we tend look at what the British failed to do rather than what the Zulu did. Weakness and arrogance is one thing - but a position of weakness still has to be exploited.
Why didn't the Zulu change tactic later in the war. This is I believe quite a complex argument - but given the relative shortness of the campaign it would have been difficult to change a tactic which was tried and tested for more than sixty years. Yes, they had weapons but their tradition and culture would not have allowed them to employ European Army tactics in their usage. Remember the British army 35 years later (despite repeated failure) remained convinced of the efficacy of Cavalry in WW1! Belief systems do not change over night.
Look, all I am suggesting is that we tend to read History from the perspective of the victors and that it would be incorrect to see the Zulu as a charging horde of fanatical sex crazed savages who mutilated the dead because of bloodlust. Nothing could be further from the truth!
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Anonymous Poster8169
Brigadier General
Status: offline |
Posted - January 10 2004 : 10:56:01 AM
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quote:
Originally posted by Durnford
Look, all I am suggesting is that we tend to read History from the perspective of the victors and that it would be incorrect to see the Zulu as a charging horde of fanatical sex crazed savages who mutilated the dead because of bloodlust. Nothing could be further from the truth!
Um, but isn't that *exactly* the truth? What distinguished the Zulu from other tribes across the world which modern armies had to deal with was that they *were* a charging horde. Their willingness to take casualties is really quite startling. They were like an electric wind-up toy: set it down and set it off. If, like at Isandhlwana, you were in a bad position, you got bowled over. If not, as at Rourke's drift, the attack would sort of bounce off.
As for mutilating the dead, it sounds naive to pretend that this was *not* an act of bloodlust. It's not a sober action to tear open a corpse's jaw.
R. Larsen
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Dark Cloud
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 10 2004 : 2:29:58 PM
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Their ability to take casualties could be lain at the feet of their medical procurement teams who apparently kept them chemically fired for combat. All armies and navies do this, either with liquor or speed or something, so there's no basis for anyone to get superior about it.
I don't get the sex-crazed reference, but if that's regarding rape by combat soldiers, you find that in every army as well, applying to both genders.
The Brits were smug, ignorant, unprepared, and outnumbered and had their butts handed to them on a platter. Absent well supplied M-60's and air support, stiff upper lips and phlegm weren't going to do it regardless of squares or duodecahedrons in dance mode. The Zulu were pissed and motivated. |
Dark Cloud
copyright RL MacLeod
darkcloud@darkendeavors.com
www.darkendeavors.com
www.boulderlout.com |
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El Crab
Brigadier General
USA
Status: offline |
Posted - January 10 2004 : 5:28:24 PM
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I agree with DC there. Its all about will, whether its free or induced by drugs or religious fervor or whatever. A force of 20k with spears can take out a force of 2k with rifles if they don't fear death.
A force of 2000 Sioux warriors could have wiped out Custer's entire regiment or pretty much another, if they didn't care about death. But they did, regardless of how "brave" revisionist history makes the Indian out to be. They were only "brave" in short bursts and generally exaggerated the danger. If there were 1000 warriors facing Custer at one point, how long would it take to overrun the battalion if casualties weren't an issue? Not very long. That's what made the Zulu so effective. They didn't seem to care about living or dying, for whatever reason.
The very idea of being the first rank is hard to fathom. Take, for example, Normandy and Saving Private Ryan. Who would honestly want to be the in the front of the transport that's arriving first on the beach? Or in the Civil War, standing in the front rank of a regiment leading an attack? You had to know your chance to survive was greatly decreased by where you were placed. And if you're part of the first row of Zulus charging a compact mass of Redcoats leveling rifles at you, I'd think drugs would be required. |
I came. I saw. I took 300 pictures. |
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benteens brother
Corporal
Australia
Status: offline |
Posted - January 11 2004 : 04:54:23 AM
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I think we may be understating the effects of training, discipline and esprit de corps. I think the Zulu fought the way he did because he was disciplined, aggressive and probably didn't want to let down the bloke next to him. There are examples of this all through history. The best armies have always been the same.
I read an interview with an Aussie soldier who fought at El Alamein. The Aussie Ninth division had a tremendous fight on the right flank of the allied line and this soldier stated that the only reason they kept advancing was that they were all scared of showing their mates that they were scared. Being part of a successful and confident fighting unit makes individuals find a lot more courage I'm sure. |
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Durnford
Private
South Africa
Status: offline |
Posted - January 12 2004 : 12:25:22 AM
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The issue of the 'doctoring' ceremonies before battle commenced has been blown way out of proportion - and again you have to some kind of basic understanding of the Zulu culture to understand its meaning and context. I watched, with some amusement, the same National Geographic / Discovery Channel programme from which your inferences are made - and I must be honest I thought it 'missed the point'
With reference to the term 'sex crazed' - in terms of Zulu tradition at that time the Zulu King would only give permission for a 'Regiment' to marry after they had 'washed the spears' (or after they had proved themselves in battle). Victorian England concluded from this that many of the warriors were motivated by 'sex' - and again nothing could be further from the truth. Their culture certainly permitted them to engage in sexual practice before marriage.
If you want to read a very good book on the topic of Zulu tactics at the battle - read 'Zulu Victory' - by Peter Quantrill and Ron Lock. Benteens Brother mentioned Ian Knight - who is also excellent.
When the 'chest and horns' formation was deployed at Isandlwana - the points of the two horns were more than 4km apart. The military co-ordination involved is quite astounding - and was a purposeful tactic to try and avoid detection until the very last moment. I have seen some 'tongue in cheek' comments made regrading this formation - and again, less attention should be paid to it's structure,but rather as to how it was actually deployed.
Sorry if I am missing the point entirely - but when the topic was first posted EL Crabb indicated that he would be particularly interested in the Brits perspective. What about a South African or a Zulu perspectice??? Everything I have read on this message board suggests British defeat rather than a Zulu Victory - and unfortunately much of the stuff written comes from this particular angle. Contentious issue - but it is this kind of writing and approach which has caused prejudiced type thinking on the subject - and often causes people like ourselves, to tackle the subject from a particular bias.
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Isandlwana/Isandlwhana Similiarities
