| T O P I C R E V I E W |
| 7th Trumpeter |
Posted - September 22 2005 : 9:17:14 PM
How many of you own or have ever fired an original or replica of a Springfield Carbine? I have had the privilege of owning and shooting an original and a Harrington & Richardson replica. They are relativly light when you consider the 405 grain slug they fired with the load of 55 grains of black powder. I always wondered how bad the carbines were kicking by the time the troopers on top of Reno hill had probably fired at least 200 rounds with out having the proper tools for cleaning out the barrels. That black powder fouling builds up quick and the recoil builds up right along with it. I have always liked the Springfield. I firmly believe that had the troops been properly trained with the Springfield that the slaughter at LBH would have been less, and that there would have been surviving troopers on LSH!!! The army only allowed 20 rounds of ammo a YEAR for target practice! That was crazy!! I read that most of the troopers wouldn't fire all the ammo at practice so they had the chance of shooting wild game to supplement their Army chow. My son who joined the Army 2 weeks ago was told by a Sgt. that you would be suprised at how many recruits when in weapon training have no idea as to where the magazine was to go in the M-16 rifle! If that is the case 130 years after LBH, then we can only imagine what the sad state of affairs was back then. Had the poor souls on LSH been trained to be good shots with the Springfield I personally believe we would be reading of personal accounts from LSH. Our government still is laying an occasional "goose egg" when it comes to military matters. Case and point; unarmored Humvees. All just my opionions. What do you think? |
| 25 L A T E S T R E P L I E S (Newest First) |
| AZ Ranger |
Posted - June 05 2008 : 10:35:40 PM
Finished that book yet? |
| Sgtmajor109th |
Posted - December 23 2007 : 5:57:34 PM
DC, I went to my book dealer yesterday, and reviewed some comments on
the book, however you can't go by them. However I did order the book,
one reason you convinced me and also Brian Pohanka. I knew him and
chatted with him several times at Gettysburg some years ago. Looking
forward to reading it. You have a Marry Christmas and everyone else as
well. |
| Dark Cloud |
Posted - December 19 2007 : 8:30:35 PM
Where Custer Fell is an important book, because it demolishes a lot of long time assumptions, like moved markers and lowered LSH.
I'm always cynical when people say something like what you have here: "When it
comes to what happened to Custer's command once he crossed MTC is for the most
part guess work, on my part or anybody else. But we have to have a starting
point." First, it's not 'for the most part' guess work. It's totally guess work.
And starting point for what? If we bemoan the lack of answers, we should probably ask specific questions. |
| Sgtmajor109th |
Posted - December 15 2007 : 4:45:42 PM
DC, I should have not used the word testimony wrong word. Nor I should also
state here that I was not saying there was anthing wrong with your findings
about the markers. Many good men have written about what indians have told
and said about the LBH battle. How do we judge if it is true or not, can we
honestly say that all of what Michno, Hammer and Hardorff say is not true or
unbelieveable. In Michno's book "Lakota Moon" writes that White Bull, tells
of beinging driven back from Calhoun by heavy firing, are we not to believe
it. Now as for the markers on Calhoun Hill. I was not aware that any photo's
had been conpared to see if any markers had been moved.
The only information I have on that respect is from Dougles Scott's book "They
Died with Custer". I have said it before and I will say it again. When it
comes to what happened to Custer's command once he crossed MTC is for the most
part guess work, on my part or anybody else. But we have to have a starting
point. And that only comes from those who do so much research and write about it
We would all like it to come out the way we want, but it will never happen.
It will always be just what it is. But maybe one of these days as we debate
here on the forum we may hit on something new. |
| Dark Cloud |
Posted - December 15 2007 : 1:33:22 PM
There is no Indian testimony, never was. We have accounts that purport to be the words of the Indian participants, but none of them spoke English nor could write. You, Sgtmajor, cannot tell us who the intermediaries are, if they actually spoke the languages needed, were smart and objective, made no errors themselves, or weren't recording the lucubrations of old men in the lodge trading stories. Neither can anyone, by the way, so please don't take that personally. That said, though, we are probably better off throwing them all out RATHER than allowing them ALL in or allowing some in by unvetted criteria.
You're saying the sworn testimony under powerful sanctions of 7th officers is no better than 6th hand accounts that have verbal tenses the original language did not, references geographic locations by names unknown to the account giver, and knowledge of name, rank, and unit of soldiers they'd never seen in an army whose divisions they didn't understand? I cannot do that.
Indians are just as honest or not as anyone, but Black Elk's tale is about 6th hand when we read it. Because it's in the first person we assume those are his words. Highly dubious.
I'd assume most of the spurious markers made the shortest journey remotely defensible by Sweet, but the fact is we do NOT know which are spurious, the testimony and recorded fact is that NONE of the markers were moved for the road (entirely proven by the photographs before and after in Where Custer Fell) and we really have no clue at all what really happened after Custer crossed MTC.
There were accepted literary templates for the recording of these events, and they were forced upon the LBH. Most people these days are ignorant of those templates, don't recognize them, and approach it as truth. That's silly. |
| Sgtmajor109th |
Posted - December 15 2007 : 12:59:54 PM
One of the reasons I believe Custer did it better is indian testimony as
to the actions that took place that day. Now we have a choice you either
believe them or you throw them out. The other is Custer himself. He was
in what one may call a Deciscve Engagement. When a unit or command is fully
committed and cannot maneuver or extricate itself in the abesence of out
side assistance, the action must be fought to a conclusion and either won
or lost with the forces at hand. Custer found hisself in just this kind of
action. As to the weaspon used by Custer, as far as the battle goes it has
little or no importence to the battle itself.
It has been said that several carried their own weapons. As for Dark Cloud
and his post about the markers, he is correct, but if anybody who made any
kind of study about the LBH would know that, but these extra markers had
nothing to do with Jun 25, and most of them were in the Custer area of the
battlefield, and had nothing to do with the Keogh sector or Calhoun Hill.
There were a few spurious markers there, but most feel they were moved when
the road was put in.
Calhoun did establish a skirmish line and by indian testimony it was very
effective as their attacks in this area were repulsed. It was only after
they were able to close on there flanks were they able to make any progress.
It did not endure long, and the line began to disintegrate, which means
that those men began to group into small coponents, or small fragments of
troopers and moving to Keogh's area. None of this is imaginary, the events
of that day did take place, to say it was inmaginary says it never happened
and only takes place in ones mind. Which brings me to another point, if this
is so, we can't believe anything that was ever wrote, believe any of those
statements made by those who were there,or indian testimony.
We can only go by facts that have been written, or told by others, and by
those who were there. You either believe them or come up with some facts
that proves them to be wrong |
| AZ Ranger |
Posted - December 13 2007 : 06:26:04 AM
I will provide a quote from another board to assist in calculating that number.
quote:
As darkcloud has pointed out, and as I have several times remarked myself, there are far too many markers on the field. darkcloud says to reduce the number by 20%, and he is very nearly correct, so far as he goes. Without digging out my research papers, I think the number currently on the battlefield is something like 256. Considering the men who were killed and buried outside the battlefield fence, the number should be about 197 [Custer's 210 less about 13]. Whether or not one accepts the various accounts of 28 bodies in a ravine, that is a hell of a difference - 256 to 197. And if you do accept that 28 should have been in Deep Ravine, then that reduces the number in other areas to 169 [197 less 28]. That is about one third less than what are currently used to analyze the progress of the fight. Don't call me a liar for one or two, please.
So every time you use the markers to make a point, remember that there should be a third less, and in whatever specific area you are talking about, the disparity might be lesser or greater.
|
| AZ Ranger |
Posted - December 12 2007 : 01:05:36 AM
The spurious markers are not necessarily the scattered ones they are ones that do not represent anyone that died on the Custer battalion part of the battlefield. You must remove them before you can discuss what the remaining markers would indicate.
Do you know how many spurious markers are mixed into the Custer portion of the battlefield? |
| AZ Ranger |
Posted - December 12 2007 : 12:56:34 AM
Of course Custer didn't use the 45-70 Springfield. He had brass cases in his .50-70. Its not called disintegration if the markers are spurious. It called imaginary.
The .45-70 carbine was hindered because of the terrain and the way Indians fight. A skirmish line was not very effective against them unless you were running which causes them to chase and then you stop and form a skirmish line such as the retreat from Weir. |
| Sgtmajor109th |
Posted - December 07 2007 : 8:35:22 PM
It has been interesting to find the number of those at the LBH that have
said the same thing I have been saying and that is fire control, inadeguate
training in marksmanship, and fire discipline. Once again it was not the
weapon, but the fact is that weapons are no better then the men who use them.
In a book written by Larry D. Underwood. how the indians met Reno's charge
some on horses and most on foot. he states the line was under a hail of heavy
fire from bullets and arrows. The officers and NCO's dashing up and down the
line shouting orders. Those indians on horses dashed in and out. Those on foot
knelt and fired ran forward and fired again, much to the surprise of the troop
ers the first wave from the hugh camp was replused so that does show for a
short period of time there was fire control.
|
| chasber |
Posted - December 07 2007 : 4:12:51 PM
I don't know if it was the numbers, I think it well may have been more the time. The Springfield was capable of keeping the Indians well back. The Indian wouldn't risk the casualties of an overwhelming charge even though they did have the numbers to pull one off. With time though the Indians could slink within range of their own weapons at less risk to themselves. I think it is safe to say that the Springfield was very effective during the valley and hilltop fight and for Custer's battle it was equally so, for a time.
|
| Sgtmajor109th |
Posted - December 03 2007 : 8:55:52 PM
As to the first part of question, I would think the answer rather simply.
I don't know if Custer did it any better. But the indians say he did. As
for the scattered markers, it is called disintegration of the lines.
As for the Springfield I am sure that Custer used very effectively. How
good or bad it was I can't say, I wasn't there. But it is very simple to
understand. Custer and his command was out numbered and out gunned, and the
indians showed better genearalship. No matter what is said about the Spring-
field, by me or anybody else, on even terms the soldiers most likely would
have won the day, but the odds was against them, and I don't think anyone
is blameing the Springfield. Would better and more effective training with
the weapon have made a difference, I don't think so. And you just can't
put Custer in the mix, Crook wasn't very effective either and he is claimed
to have fired 25,000 rds, doing very little damage to the indians. |
| AZ Ranger |
Posted - December 03 2007 : 8:10:58 PM
I find it strange you think Custer did it better. How can one be sure of all those formations you describe? From the markers and spurious markers? Isn't it always better to make the other side die in combat? The Springfield could not work miracles.
As far as the Springfield being sufficient for a large number of Indians, again Custer proves it not to be true. There is a limit of enemy numbers that any number of troops can stand against regardless of weapon system. Since the Army recognized that marksmanship was a problem which is not the fault of the weapon maybe the quality of training and practical applications are issues.
Since this the Springfield thread I would hope posts reflect the Weapon and its effectiveness or not regarding LBH.
AZ Ranger |
| Sgtmajor109th |
Posted - November 28 2007 : 3:19:10 PM
Having not read Upton's cavalry tactics, I have read Casey's, almost the
same, except that Upton had made some changes. In both cases I am sure
that neither had a blue print for fighting indians. From what you can
gather, operations against the indians was and improvised affair. And as
far as I know there was no official doctrine to cover it.
Custer had done a better job of going by the book then his subordinates.
He did set up wings as called for in the book. He had Co's C,L,and I, in
the right wing and F, and E. in the left. He used company "I" which was
Keogh's company in reserve when the skirmish was placed on Calhoun ridge.
This by the book. At this point Capt Keogh is 2nd in command
Now when Reno charged down the valley, he then called to fight on foot
he by the book in his charge, he had 2 company's in front and 1 company
behind. When he halted and set up his skirmish line, company "G" should
have been so many paces behind the skirmish line and in the center to
support the skirmish line. Company "G" would not support the skirmish
but is also used to protect the flacks of the line.
As you know company "G" went into the woods, leaving Reno's left flack
open to the indians. According to the book it is the job of the officer's
and NCO's to keep the men calm and to direct fire. However sense there
was poor leadership shown by Reno, that the skirmish fell apart. And once
again the book also says, if for any reason you should have to retreat
the commander should establish a rear guard to protect the retreat from
the rear and flacks. I also may add here, it is still used to this day.
In my opinion, for some I think Upton's tactics was used in the same
manner as the Sears catalog. |
| Sgtmajor109th |
Posted - November 28 2007 : 12:45:33 PM
Thanks Brent, looking forward to that big X |
| Brent |
Posted - November 28 2007 : 05:33:15 AM
Chasber: Wish we all knew who said what to whom!! That seems to be a recurring problem at LBH--seems nobody really knew what they were expected to do.
I agree about the dividing of the unit. Tho done by the manual (which manual probably wasn't written and designed to fight Indians)and technically correct, the actual dividing was a poor tactic given the circumstances.
And I know Custer thought he'd find a running village, but to simply think the Indians would flee for their lives at the mere sight of the 7th was a gross underestimation of the enemy.
SGtmajor: I'll sign with an extra large "X" just for you! |
| Sgtmajor109th |
Posted - November 27 2007 : 3:44:44 PM
Chasber, I don't think how the regiment divided was the problem. The problem
was dividing the regiment before you knew what was ahead of you and to set
yous plans to how to attack. Keep in mind that Benteen had mentioned to Custer
that should he not keep the regiment together, Custer brushed him aside by
telling him he had his orders. Perhaps Custer may have been wise to have taken
the suggestion.
However you have to keep in mind, although I have not read Upton's manuel, but
I do not feel it would suggest dividing your command as Custer did. Keep in
mind once he crossed MTC, he divided his command again, which also they were
not in supprting distance of each other except for Keogh and Calhoun. Custer
then left them and moved further north, over half maile and dropped off another
company on cemetery ridge while he went down to find a place to cross the river.
By the time he got back up on the hill Keogh and Calhoun were hotly engadged
and the indians had gotten between him and Calhoun and Keogh was being driven
to Custers position on the hill. He split his command to many times. He could
not support any of them because of distance, and the indians taking advantage
of the of openings in his lines. He made know effort to block any avenues of
approch to the indians. He moved over 4 miles from any kind of support from
Reno or Bentten. The way was open for the indians to block any support of get-
ting through to him. The books tell you how to fight on foot, how to fight in
skirmish line, how to make a charge, how to retreat. Those books were not
written to fight indians. |
| chasber |
Posted - November 27 2007 : 1:12:12 PM
It is not widespread in LBH literature but there is evidence that Custer and Reno rode alone together for some time prior to Reno's advance. What was said is known only to them and I don't think Reno ever alluded to it having taking place. If you look at Upton's cavalry manual on how to divide a regiment into battalions you will find that the 7th was divided just like the manual says it should be. |
| Sgtmajor109th |
Posted - November 27 2007 : 12:50:08 PM
Brent, Keep me in mind, I would like a signed copy. |
| Brent |
Posted - November 27 2007 : 10:48:01 AM
Thanks!!
Would make a rather short book though |
| Sgtmajor109th |
Posted - November 27 2007 : 10:38:17 AM
Brent, you hit the nail on the head. |
| Brent |
Posted - November 27 2007 : 08:39:52 AM
Chasbar: I imagine there was a lot of guilt and finger pointing all around after LBH. I also imagine there were a few folks squirming a bit when Reno asked for his court of inquiry. But no official action was ever taken against anyone, so --??
And then you have General Miles who comments later that Custer's LBH battle plan was one of the most brilliant he'd ever seen. Go figure.
Here's my tidy summation of the battle:
Custer fumbles
Reno falters
Benteen dawdles
Battle lost. |
| Sgtmajor109th |
Posted - November 26 2007 : 11:56:17 PM
Custer could divide his regiment any he had wished. He is the commander in
the field and therefore he is responsible for any assignments or plan that
he may put into motion. I do not think in any shape or form that Custer would
worry about insulting Reno. As the commander if he had formed any kind of plan
which he didn't, he would use who ever he felt could accomplish his plan. That
would include using Benteen where ever he planned to put him in the attack.
Other then those in charge of Companies, there was only one commander on the
ground and that was Custer. I do not think that Custer ever thought of Reno
as 2nd in command. If he had done so he would have spent more time conferring
with Reno, and keeping him up to speed as to what was taking place. Custer had
no more use for Reno then he did Benteen. And when he was sent on his scout
prior to the LBH, and returned Custer wanted to bring him up on charges for
disobeying orders.
Custer knew that Benteen was better qaulified to fighting the indians the Reno
but Custer sent him to the left as a way of getting back at Benteen. But in the
end Benteen pulled one better, when Custer needed him, he didn't responed. If
Reno was 2nd in command, he proved to be a complete failure. Custer did as
Custer wanted to do, and with Custer there was only one book and that was his. |
| chasber |
Posted - November 26 2007 : 10:22:08 PM
To assign that task to anyone other than the regiments second ranking field grade officer would have been a humiliating insult to Reno and an affront to established military protocol. This also challenges talk of Custer's nepotism as on the day of his greatest battle with the American Indian his regiment was divided and assigned strictly by the book. |
| Sgtmajor109th |
Posted - November 26 2007 : 6:09:22 PM
Good point, you would also have to wonder why Custer would chose a man to
make an attack that had no experience fighting indians. |
|
|
