| T O P I C R E V I E W |
| dave |
Posted - January 07 2005 : 03:20:03 AM
Recently reading Graham's "The Story of the Little Bighorn" I came across the following description of the Indian losses
"After the hurried depature of the Sioux, two tepee's containing the dead bodies of some twenty two warriors were found standing in the village. The bodies were dressed as for burial, and the tepee's were surrounded by the bodies of ponies, arranged in accord with savage burial custom. Several more bodies were discovered along the trail taken by the Indians, these being supultured in trees and on scaffolds.
Altogether, about forty dead were thus accounted for"
I guess everyone here, excepting myself, already knew this. But a few questions.
Where I come from, 22 + a several wouldn't equal about forty. Typically in Australian usage the word "several" describes a number less than half-a-dozen. I assume that with the plurals of scaffolds and trees being used that Graham was using the word loosely.
But did he mean that about 18 bodies were observed along the Indian trail. Or did the Indians leave some of their dead on the battlefield?
The other question is, from that description, obviously some effort was made to follow the Indians track. How far did they follow the Indians, and was any contact made with the departing column?
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| 25 L A T E S T R E P L I E S (Newest First) |
| bhist |
Posted - January 28 2005 : 12:00:36 PM
quote:
Originally posted by BJMarkland
Someone, perhaps Wild, asked the question about ramrods. I picked this up in an article in The Custer Reader edited by Paul A. Hutton. The article, "The Cavalry Campaign Outfit", by James S. Hutchins states: "At this period it was customary to provide wooden ramrods with carbines, in the ratio of one to ten." His source is cited as:
"Endorsement by C. O. National Armory, August 8, 1876, on letter Chief Ord. Officer Mil. Div. of the Missouri, to Chief of Ord., August 2, 1876, National Archives."
Hmmm, doesn't give the record group but it would still be findable in the Military Division of the Missouri correspondence I suspect.
By the way, I have found Hutton's book to be an excellent overview of Custer's career, from the Civil War to his mythification after the LBH. It contains beyond Hutchin's article, Godfrey's article, originally published in 1892 but rewritten in 1908, entitled "Custer's Last Battle"; as well as the stories of Kate Bighead as told to Marquis, White Bull as told to Vestal (Campbell), King's "Custer's Last Battle", and also, a nice overview from Robert Utley.
Best of wishes,
Billy
Yes, Hutton's book is one of the very best on Custer and the LBH. It was out of print for a long time until very recently. "The Custer Reader" is really a must have for anyone interested in this subject. |
| BJMarkland |
Posted - January 28 2005 : 06:26:30 AM
Someone, perhaps Wild, asked the question about ramrods. I picked this up in an article in The Custer Reader edited by Paul A. Hutton. The article, "The Cavalry Campaign Outfit", by James S. Hutchins states: "At this period it was customary to provide wooden ramrods with carbines, in the ratio of one to ten." His source is cited as:
"Endorsement by C. O. National Armory, August 8, 1876, on letter Chief Ord. Officer Mil. Div. of the Missouri, to Chief of Ord., August 2, 1876, National Archives."
Hmmm, doesn't give the record group but it would still be findable in the Military Division of the Missouri correspondence I suspect.
By the way, I have found Hutton's book to be an excellent overview of Custer's career, from the Civil War to his mythification after the LBH. It contains beyond Hutchin's article, Godfrey's article, originally published in 1892 but rewritten in 1908, entitled "Custer's Last Battle"; as well as the stories of Kate Bighead as told to Marquis, White Bull as told to Vestal (Campbell), King's "Custer's Last Battle", and also, a nice overview from Robert Utley.
Best of wishes,
Billy
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| Dark Cloud |
Posted - January 27 2005 : 4:43:44 PM
Right. A government conspiracy. Well, you need proof of that. Since Godfrey eventually thought the weapons bad, and said so, and ended up a General, apparently there was no penalty to be paid for holding that position. How 'bout that?
Further, Bourke and Crooke would love to have a defective weapon to blame, since Crook could use that as further reason for his retreat. It's highly unlikely Bourke wouldn't have torn the Army a new one over a crappy weapon in his books. He did on other issues, like the Ghost Dance fiascos.
We have no testimony from an actual soldier that his weapon fouled in some way, do we? Only observations that other's seemed to have fouled, and the French story, and all this through Godfrey and Reno and involving the 7th. What problems arose at Slim Buttes or in any other battle with the Springfield due to bad design or manufacture? Just the 7th, and just that day. Not to say there weren't issues, but not of any significant nature. |
| Dark Cloud |
Posted - January 27 2005 : 1:36:05 PM
I don't recall that. I recall there was mention of indications of paper wadding in some of those found, which might be part of the battle or later, but not in all and in any case there is Varnum's testimony. I think it was just sort of left on the table because we didn't have any way of figuring it out.
If there were a defect - be it metal fatigue or bad design - surely a variance of more than 20% in powder would be an issue. |
| dave |
Posted - January 27 2005 : 11:47:55 AM
We both lost the .45-70 argument to bhist, remember those 31 .45-55 rounds? At least thats why I shut up, although I live in hope (ok not really) that they'll find some .45-70 ammo somewhere. |
| Dark Cloud |
Posted - January 27 2005 : 11:40:00 AM
Supposedly, they fired off 25k rounds of ammo, surely enough to have revealed some problems.
Also, at the LBH, we - by which I mean you and those who know these things - haven't discovered the answer to the 55 70 grain issue either. You'd need to know what ammo was being fired, I'd guess. |
| dave |
Posted - January 27 2005 : 11:33:35 AM
I'm not ignoring the battle of the Rosebud at all, I just haven't commented mainly because I know so little of the battle. It sounds like a fascinating battle - 1000 soldiers verses a large number of Indians. If any of the plains war skirmishes can lay claim to being a full size battle - its the Rosebud, despite the apparently light casulties.
From the little I understand the battle began with a full scale attack by the Indians, which degenerated after some time into a series of protracted skirmishes which lasted all, or most of the day.
Without knowing at what range Cook's troopers engaged the Indians, whether they were in sustained combat for significant periods of times, you really can't comment intelligently. For all I know, Cook's men might have suffered as higher a rate, if not more stoppages than Custer's. But had time to clear the stoppages because they were at longer range, or they had time during lulls in the battle. Or maybe it was the fact that they didn't lose the battle, which allowed the Springfield to escape a more exacting scrutiny.
I really don't know what the answer is. Maybe one day I'll find a good website on the battle, read it up, and let you know what I think. |
| Dark Cloud |
Posted - January 27 2005 : 10:57:12 AM
David,
Not for me; that post cleared a lot up at my end. I may have penalized myself by reading your earlier posts with the same every sixth word skim forumula I apply to some here with no downside. Which makes it even worse for me, but nonetheless:
I had read Reno had been part of some gun review but that's about all I knew of it. But concerns of being held up as a coward or combat incompetent - after his certainly adequate record in the CW - would likely trump concerns over an arguably bad group decision to buy a carbine. 'Yes, it turned out to be a bad buy but look who else thought it okay...." Of course, no clue if true.
And I'm again puzzled that a battle a little over a week previous with the same Indians using the same weapon produced no such complaints of which I am aware, and that while we chat about the Red River War and, previously, other episodes, the proponents of the Springfield's deficiencies playing a meaningful role in Custer's demise don't discuss the Rosebud. Surely that is the syllogistic event, and surely it does not seem to support the contentions. I have no doubt some carbines fouled in some way, for some reasons, but despite the prolonged fire fights, the evidence isn't there, is it?
Despite newer insights, the officers who saw the LBH battle site right after did not suggest anything approaching a prolonged battle occured with Custer. I'd contend we have to go with their first hand accounts till actual proof emerges to suggest otherwise. In a short battle on a hot day with significant proportions of soldiers neither particularly adept with the weapon nor experienced in Indian or any combat, I have a difficult time thinking weapon failure was key and more trouble mouthing the words "metal fatigue" as a cause of failure in weapons that apparently weren't fired all that much anyway. And again, how much older were they than those at the Rosebud, which fired more and longer? |
| dave |
Posted - January 27 2005 : 10:13:00 AM
DC I think we've reached the point of diminishing returns, as you seem as welded to your opinion as I am set in mine, but in reply to your last posting
1.) Of course I agree.
4.) I have no idea if the rod was a cosmetic or not. Regardless of how well it worked it seems a cheap solution to me, as they were treating the symptom rather than the cause.
3.) I wouldn't view Reno as objective either. But my take is 180 degrees from yours. Imagine you are Reno, you're under a barrage of criticism for your conduct at the LBH. Why heap more coals upon your head by the admission that you were part of a board which recommended the adoption of a defective weapon
So I would expect Reno to admit some of the less serious problems, but downplay any major ones. Of course, thats pure speculation on my part.
2.) Despite my comments in the sentences immediately above, I don't believe that the 1873 Springfield was ever a chronically flawed weapon. The data simply doesn't exist to suggest this. What I believe, and what I argue for, is that the early Springfields suffered a higher than acceptable stoppage rate, which was probably ironed out in later models with improved quality control in both the rifle and its ammunition.
If anything I think that quality control with ammunition may have been more at fault. I thought it significant that Reno fingered rim thickness as being one of the causes of failure.
It doesn't take much imagination to visualise the result of thinly rimmed copper cartridge combined with a overly sharp extractor, further combined with dusty verdigris coated casing, being fired from a hot rifle on a hot day - and you have a perfect recipe for disaster.
A few other general thoughts DC, maybe I should have mentioned these before.
1) I think we have to remember that the Sioux War was perhaps the Springfields baptism of fire. We know the Springfield was used in conjunction with other rifles during the Red River War. We really don't know how well it performed, or even how extensively it was used. Seemingly the Red River cavalry units were less standardised in their equipment during 1874, carrying a mixture of Spencer's, Sharp's and Springfields.
2) The Red River war also signalled the demise of the Spencer. We know that Colonel Merritt condemned the Spencer for its failings during the plains wars. Do we know what these failings were? if we don't - then how can we authoritively comment on the failings, alleged or otherwise, of the Springfield just a few years later?
3) As with other re-armaments, adoption of the Springfield across the board did not take place overnight. Some units were still being re-armed with the Springfield as late as 1876. Some faults with firearms won't manifest themselves for years. Problems arising from metal fatigue, for instance, may take years to surface. Perhaps the this was reason why any faults with the Springfield hadn't been obvious in training during the preceding years. |
| prolar |
Posted - January 26 2005 : 11:31:58 AM
Warlord: I don't doubt that they lost sleep and were tired.I know that there are references to a forced march and the killing pace.Still, they traveled at a pack train pace until they reached the divide. Varnum mentioned how exhaused he was, but he also said that as commander of scouts he spent twice as much time in the saddle as most others.Gatlings might have been of some use if they could have gotten them there.I don't see sabers as being of much use, but you know what opinions are like. |
| dave |
Posted - January 25 2005 : 11:11:15 PM
No apologies needed or expected Prolar. I just wanted to have a bit more fun castigating DC for failing to differentiate between M1 carbines and rifles. |
| Dark Cloud |
Posted - January 25 2005 : 11:10:08 PM
No defense, that posting was a dumb ass disaster, I admit it. I've said previously I make sloppy errors, including spelling, and it's a way to distinguish me from Larsen. We might disagree on how often. On the upside, I'm now statistically invulnerable to error for another six years.
My points would have been better if I'd just said, again:
1.Whatever the problems or strengths of one weapon does not in any way reflect on another. Because the atmosphere, political and otherwise, within the Army and with the public, is always different, how the Army reacts to these problems at different times can't be comparable either.
2.If there were actual chronic problems with the Springfield carbine, they would have appeared with sufficient training in the weapon. Absent that training, problems cannot be immediately ascribed to the weapon over human error, of which there is always some. There would be reports from other units - like Crook - of this issue at the same volume. I haven't seen any indication that French spent untold amount of time fixing weapons that had jammed beyond the reasonable percentage of human error. Archaeology doesn't support it, insofar as that means anything at all.
3.Reno was certainly interested in deflecting attention away from decisions made and I don't consider him a coldly objective source on that issue and can't believe anyone does. Is there any existing evidence, from any source, where an actual soldier stood up and said/wrote his weapon jammed? If so, how much of this can be ascribed to proud soldiers exaggerating minor and infrequent problems to exculpate the unit from condemnation?
4. We don't know if that Army added the rod as a cosmetic device to tamp down the public discussion or soldier paranoia or if it was actually necessary. Although, I'd have thought it a good idea anyway. But we have no evidence whatever from any other unit than the 7th, and only after this battle, that would support jamming or fouling as a significant issue beyond human error.
Don't know guns, but I know how western armies have reacted to their disasters for quite a while, and there are startling similarities through the centuries. Institutional scapegoating (not multiple decisions in aggregate; only one guy can be seen to have made the key dumb/cowardly/misleading move - if that story doesn't fly, make it two guys...), weapon failure (those damned civvies), betrayal from above. It may be I see it too often, but I surely see it here. |
| prolar |
Posted - January 25 2005 : 11:01:31 PM
Dave: It is a pity, I should have left it for you. My apologies. |
| dave |
Posted - January 25 2005 : 9:42:07 PM
*Sigh* DC, you've managed to compact so many unwarranted assumptions and fundamental mistakes into your posting, I'm not sure where to begin. Nevermind
quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
So, you most definitely say that you're comparing the Lancaster to the Springfield. You say "...they {referring to the weapons you later identify as Lancasters} must have suffered extraordinary numbers of misfires in just about every battle they fought.
For starters, this is utterly wrong and bares no ressemblance to what I actually wrote. I said (go and re-read my postings) that Lancasters were a reliable firearm, which hardly ever jammed, and which was issued to sappers and other second line troops who needed a weapon which was less problematic to reload than the standard 1853 Enfield.
The quote about huge numbers of misfires refers to flintlock muskets, which I clearly stated. There is no connection between Lancaster carbines and flintlocks, I never said there was any, you just wrongly assumed there was. And had you read my posting more carefully you would have noted that I refer to the Lancaster carbine as being produced in the mid 1850's, and the arms trials as being conducted in the early 1840's. That alone should have told you there wasn't a connection, and that I was merely drawing another parallel.
In fact had you bothered to use google, as I invited Wild to do then you would have found in less than 5 minutes this webpage
http://riv.co.nz/rnza/hist/arm/arm1.htm
which tells you that the Lancaster system was not patented until 1850, which makes it somewhat late to have participated in arms trials of the early 1840's.
quote:
So if we read some reports of Springfield's jamming, then doubtless there were many, many more incidents which went unreported." So if, then doubtless. That doesn't follow, of course,
Of course it follows.
Unless you think that every single misfire, hangfire, jam and broken part with an 1873 Springfield was dutifully reported and recorded. Even the times when they were being used by a civilian or an Indian.
Or unless you think that Springfields never once jammed, fouled, never broke and were the perfect weapon. In which case the US army should bring the Trapdoor Springfield back tomorrow, as no other firearm in history has obtained a perfect reliability record.
quote:
but you did indeed say that because we have information about the Lancasters failing, it must be true of the Springfield. I distorted nothing.
Again I said nothing of the sort. I said very clearly that old firearms suffered many problems, problems which us modern people are frequently not aware of, and don't stop to think about. I cited (as a specific example) the production the Lancaster as being a solution to a problem suffered by the 1853 Enfield which was an extremely popular weapon of the mid 19th century (it was the standard longarm of the Confederate armies in 1865 for instance).
DC, I take a good deal of care to try ascertain my facts before I post. In regarding the 1873 Springfield, I've read a number of criticisms in both books and on the internet. Now admittedly some of this criticism comes from basically ignorant people, riding on the back of less than reliable information. That said, some criticism is both reliable and informed.
Just on this forum we have
An anecdotal report from Billy Markland to the effect that Captain French had to clear jammed cartridges from apparently a number of carbines
A weblink to the 1877 model Springfield carbine which superceded the 1873 Springfield carbine which specifically states that a hole was added in the stock for a cleaning rod which could be used to remove jammed cartridges
A posting from Larsen quoting some of Major Reno's reservations regarding the Springfield.
Just the fact that a revised version of the Springfield carbine was brought out in response to the disaster tells me that there was a widely acknowledged view (within the military) that the problem of jamming with carbines needed addressing.
I won't go on an address your comments about the M1 Garand, unfortunately Prolar's already stolen my thunder. Which is a pity, because I was looking forward to shredding you post some more.
You know DC, I frequently enjoy reading your posts. As Joseph Wigg's once said, you're an exquisite writer, and to a large extent your talents are wasted on this forum. You should be off writing a book. But you're also careless and sloppy. And I afraid that your error ridden response here is just symptomatic of that sloppy attitude.
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| prolar |
Posted - January 25 2005 : 9:19:43 PM
Warlord: Of course the slow rate of fire of the trapdoor was a factor inthe defeat. I suppose DC is refering to extraction failure, which he doesn't consider a problem. It would have been a huge problem to the troopers it happened to, but I won't go into that again. Extaction failure was a known weakness in the trapdoor. Not a stoppage that couldn't be fixed given time. Unlike Reno's command on the hill, Custer's command didn't have time. I don't think the refusal of the Gatlings was a mistake. They would have done well to keep up with the pack train and wouldn't have been effective against Indians anyway. Warriors armed with rifles would not have allowed soldiers close enough to use sabers.I'm not sure what forced march you refer to. Custer maintained the standard cavalry pace of 30 mile per day until near the village. Once he started his approach, he had to continue. |
| Dark Cloud |
Posted - January 25 2005 : 09:58:20 AM
So, knowing that, where do we get off saying or suggesting the Springfield is in any way responsible for Custer's defeat? And again, why didn't Crook have similar problems? |
| wILD I |
Posted - January 25 2005 : 07:47:42 AM
DC
When we win the battles, how many of the same weapons failed under similar conditions?
Victory has many fathers.Defeat is an orphan.
The defeat of the British and Commonwealth forces at Dieppe was attributed to the armour becoming bogged down on the beaches.
On D-Day the armour never made it to the beaches.Every tank sank like a stone.But it was a victory.All was forgiven and whereas the desaster with the armour at Dieppe is well known ,it is only from such sources as the secret history of WW2 will you find mention of the D-Day tanks.
The British defeat at Arhnem was attributed the fact that the troops were dropped too far from their objectives.On D-Day the 82nd were scattered all over the place.But no big deal.The day was a success so all was forgiven.
Defeats always have postmortems.Victories have celebrations.We pickover every possible fault of Custer's actions at the LBH but his actions at the Wa****a we use only as a reference.
Weapons and systems fail both in victory or defeat.We only take notice in defeat
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| wILD I |
Posted - January 25 2005 : 03:24:28 AM
The RUC were issued with the M1 carbine as recently as 10 years ago. |
| Dark Cloud |
Posted - January 24 2005 : 11:53:56 PM
I stand corrected. Stupid and lazy error.
However: "The simple fact was that the M1 carbine was never designed to be a front-line battle weapon, but it was used as such anyway for logistical (as opposed to practical) reasons. Although the M1 Garand was the US military's standard-issue battle rifle, as with all weapons systems the supply never really caught up with the demand."
That doesn't sound like the Army/Marines wanted to send it into Korea, but
had to.
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| prolar |
Posted - January 24 2005 : 10:52:01 PM
DC; The M1 Garand rifle is not the M1/M2 carbine that Dave was writing about. |
| Dark Cloud |
Posted - January 24 2005 : 10:26:04 PM
David,
Your post goes in toto:
In reading about trials conducted by the British army during the early 1840's on the suitability of percussion based firearms over flintlocks, I was staggered to learn that on average a flintlock suffered a misfire or a hangfire once every six shots.
What relevance does this have to the Springfield's jamming.
Just this. No one thinks of lines of British redcoats or Blue coated Continental Army soldiers suffering huge numbers of misfires every time they went into battle (at least I don't). Yet according to that statistic they must have suffered extraordinary numbers of misfires in just about every battle they fought. So if we read some reports of Springfield's jamming, then doubtless there were many, many more incidents which went unreported.
So, you most definitely say that you're comparing the Lancaster to the Springfield. You say "...they {referring to the weapons you later identify as Lancasters} must have suffered extraordinary numbers of misfires in just about every battle they fought. So if we read some reports of Springfield's jamming, then doubtless there were many, many more incidents which went unreported." So if, then doubtless. That doesn't follow, of course, but you did indeed say that because we have information about the Lancasters failing, it must be true of the Springfield. I distorted nothing.
As to Chosin Reservoir, how many M1's froze and had to be thrown away? What percentage of the whole? How many, in fact, were thrown away in terror or depression by retreating Marines? How many failed due to bad service by the Marine or soldier or just worn out weapons? When we win the battles, how many of the same weapons failed under similar conditions?
How many froze at the Bulge necessitating their being thrown away? Or in the mountains of Italy with the 10th Mountain Division? The soldiers at the point of the SS attack at the Bulge were a bad outfit, led by social officers and was chosen for its incompetence by the Germans to receive that attack. Yet I haven't read of them blaming the M1, even though they got wiped. Was it that much colder at Chosin?
Are there any other cases of the M1 being thrown away because of design flaw? I've read it was a most reliable weapon. General MacArthur reported to the Ordnance Department during heavy fighting on Bataan that: "Under combat conditions it operated with no mechanical defects and when used in foxholes did not develop stoppages from dust or dirt. It has been in almost constant action for as much as a week without cleaning or lubrication." Of course, that was in hot Asia. What about in cold weather? General Patton, who fought in Europe, reported to the Ordnance Department on January 26, 1945 (after the Bulge, which was frosty going): "In my opinion, the M1 Rifle is the greatest battle implement ever devised." No mention of frozen weapons. Were both of these guys lying, Dave, victim of indebtedness to the armory or something? Patton? MacArthur?
http://www.olive-drab.com/od_other_firearms_rifle_m1garand.php3
Are there any examples of our soldiers throwing away frozen weapons as we attack and win in cold weather, or is this failure of bad design something that only appears, as it does with the Springfield, after humiliating defeats like Chosin against an enemy primarily of a different race which we preferred to think inferior, coincidently providing a fallback for public consumption? We didn't get walloped, see, our weapons failed. |
| Aolain |
Posted - January 24 2005 : 10:25:23 PM
Warlord:
On one hand, I am sympathetic to your basic argument. It does seem to me that 30 Indian dead for the Battle of the Little Big Horn is alarmingly low. With that said, and on the other hand:
1) You weaken your arguement by wild-eyed ranting (sorry about that observation)
2) When military units fall apart, it is entirely possible that the unit can be wiped out and only impose minor casualties on the enemy.
Whatever the case, calm down Warlord. Make your points with logic and reason. Calling Dark Cloud names and ranting does your position no good. And, again, for what it is worth, it seems to me that Indian casualties must have been more that the oft quoted 30. |
| joseph wiggs |
Posted - January 24 2005 : 9:33:23 PM
Dave, a belated comment from someone who just had the opportunity to read your thread, excellente mi amigo!!! |
| BJMarkland |
Posted - January 20 2005 : 11:27:58 PM
Dave,
quote:
Pretending that such problems didn't exist when in all likelyhood they did, is as much an attempt to mythologize the battle, as if we were to pretend that every soldier was Wyatt Earp.
They weren't Wyatt, Annie Oakley, and Quick Draw McGraw wrapped up in one? *sigh* Another legend bites the dust.
Great recognition of the importance of that diagram! Now I know who to go to with arms questions in research!
Best of wishes,
Billy |
| prolar |
Posted - January 20 2005 : 9:55:26 PM
Dave: Great post. Iwish I could have said it as well. |
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