| T O P I C R E V I E W |
| Anonymous Poster8169 |
Posted - January 26 2004 : 4:36:21 PM
quote:
Originally posted by ABridgeTooFar
ANONYMOUS POSTER 8169 "You don't know what Custer's logic was..."
REPLY : Custer said that Major Reno's charge would be "supported by the WHOLE outfit (not PART OF the outfit", and Martin heard him say to his whole column "WE (not SOME OF US) will go down and make a crossing and capture the village".
This evidence reveals Custer's plan and upholds the conclusion that all five of the companies of Custer's column went to Ford B.
Several assumptions here, none warranted. You assume that for Custer to support Reno, he had to attack with all five companies at one spot. You assume that the phrase "whole outfit" excludes different actions by the two battalions directly under Custer; if Benteen, who was also part of the "whole outfit," was free to operate independently, I don't see how that would have kept Yates and Keogh from doing so either. You assume that Custer learned nothing new about the situation over the next few hours, and that he couldn't be acting differently in the face of a different situation. You assume that Custer was unaware of Reno's retreat when he went to the ford, and therefore ignore any impact this may have had on his decision-making. You assume that Martin's quote (dredged up by him decades after the battle) is accurate historically, and that it "reveals Custer's plan". You assume that if Custer had a plan when Martin left him, he couldn't have changed it in the relatively long interval afterwards. You assume that even if Custer had a plan when Martin was with him, it had to involve all five companies doing the same thing at once.
You assume too much.
quote:
ANONYMOUS POSTER 8169 : "Four flags could have meant as little as two companies and Custer's personal retinue"
REPLY : It's very unlikely Custer would move his headquartes with the smallest of the regiment's four (Reno, Benteen, Keogh, Yates) ad hoc battalions.
It's neither likely nor unlikely. His staff, in fact, all ended up dying in the north, with the officers and men of E and F companies. The other three --- C, I, and L, Keogh's battalion --- got smashed in the south.
quote:
ANONYMOUS POSTER 8169 : "(Martin claimed that Benteen sent him to the pack train in) his Reno Court testimony."
REPLY : In his Graham interview, Martin stated that Benteen did not send him back to the pack train. He said that the transcript misquoted him due to language difficulties.
He wasn't misquoted. Martin's English was just that bad ("I didn't speak English so good then"), which is another reason why using him or Curley to reveal Custer's thinking is a dubious endeavor.
quote:
ANONYMOUS POSTER 8169 : "(Edgerly's testimony) doesn't confrim Benteen on Martin's precise choice of words ['skedaddeling']...the substance of Martin's bombast remains the same --doing total damage to the idea that Martin saw Custer withdrawing from the river under Indian attack."
REPLY : In the Graham interview, Martin said that when he was with the Benteen column, he wondered if Reno's charge had gone right through the village yet. This is consistent with Edgerly's testimony, that Martin said that Reno had "charged in and killed everybody", but not with Benteen's claim that Martin said the Indians were skiddaddling.
In that very same Graham interview, Martin says that when Benteen asked him where Custer was, he (Martin) told him "that the Indians were running".
quote:
The Graham interview,and Edgerly's testimony, casts grave doubts on the notion that Martin saw Reno retreating. How could Martin have seen Reno retreating when he wondered whether Reno had gone right through he village, and when he said Reno had charged in and killed everybody? This alleged statement that Martin saw Major Reno's column in retreat could well have been placed in error in the transcript because of language problems.
I think you misread the testimony. Martin only saw Reno in retreat when he came to the hill with Benteen's company.
quote:
ANONYMOUS POSTER 8169 : "Martin has no information relevant to how Custer came to Ford B."
REPLY : Martin left Custer's column about 600 yards from the river and saw them "galloping down the ravine, the gray horse troop in the middle". How long does it take to gallop 600 yards? At most a couple of minutes.
Martin rode to Benteen, joined him, then arrived on Reno Hill in time to see the tail-end of Reno's retreating soldiers .... harassed by Indian warriors who soon left upon becoming aware that more soldiers were making a demonstration at the ford. George Herendeen, who was left behind in the timber, first heard firing downstream "some time" after Reno left, within a half-hour. And yet you believe that Martin --- who saw Reno still in action in the valley ---- left "AT MOST a couple of minutes" before Custer opened his part of the fight? Ridiculous. Martin was never near Ford B. He probably left near Cedar Coulee, as Gray has him.
R. Larsen
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| 25 L A T E S T R E P L I E S (Newest First) |
| Anonymous Poster8169 |
Posted - February 15 2004 : 12:42:36 PM
quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
I was thinking of Graham's endnote to Kanipe's 1924 piece: "The many inaccuracies of Sgt. Kanipe's story...." When was this letter to Camp?
August 4, 1908. Graham was only noting that Kanipe's 1924 article contains mistakes which are "characteristic of the accounts of most of the enlisted survivors recounted during the '20s," which is easily demonstrated; besides the ones you mentioned, he forgot the presence of Co. L, misrembered the name of Sgt. Curtiss of the "breadbox" incident as Sgt. Hearst, and placed Bloody Knife with Custer's command. Kanipe was over 70 years old when he wrote that piece.
quote:
And while,yes, he surely saw Custer after Godfrey that day, I think Godfrey's account entered the record before Kanipe, who was older when his story was requested and not as reliable. None of which proves anything, of course, to unravel this major mystery.
Sure, it's only a sidenote, though one where we have conflicting witnesses. It's not possible to say categorically that one or the other was wrong; and no matter who entered the record first, both are coming 20 years or more after the battle, which allows plenty of time for the memory to get fuzzed. Godfrey, for example, in the same memo appears to think that Calhoun died near Custer Hill.
I do think that Kanipe is more likely to have been right about this particular issue than Godfrey, for the reasons I stated; I don't pretend to be able to take it any further.
R. Larsen
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| Dark Cloud |
Posted - February 14 2004 : 10:47:25 PM
I was thinking of Graham's endnote to Kanipe's 1924 piece: "The many inaccuracies of Sgt. Kanipe's story...." When was this letter to Camp?
Kamipe says Custer was shot through the heart and lay with Tom and Calhoun, that Terry had seen 200 bodies "in the valley below", that Indians never hurt a dead man but just the wounded, and only one horse survived. Not deliberately misleading, perhaps, but just wrong.
And while,yes, he surely saw Custer after Godfrey that day, I think Godfrey's account entered the record before Kanipe, who was older when his story was requested and not as reliable. None of which proves anything, of course, to unravel this major mystery. |
| Anonymous Poster8169 |
Posted - February 14 2004 : 9:55:08 PM
quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
I don't think it matters, particularly, but has Kanipe undergone a rehab of reputation as happened to Curley that I've missed?
Skipped over this in my last post, but I wasn't aware at all that Kanipe was in need of a rehab of reputation. Could you be thinking of Peter Thompson?
R. Larsen
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| Anonymous Poster8169 |
Posted - February 14 2004 : 9:37:54 PM
quote:
Originally posted by Dark Cloud
Knew him personally like General Godfrey, the one who used to swim with TWC, and who recognized 'the form' and the skin graphics? Why in the world would Kanipe, whose recollections are often savaged by others, have more weight than Godfrey on this or anything?
Because he was a member of C Company and his last sighting of Tom Custer was closer to the end than Godfrey's.
R. Larsen
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| Dark Cloud |
Posted - February 14 2004 : 4:29:38 PM
Knew him personally like General Godfrey, the one who used to swim with TWC, and who recognized 'the form' and the skin graphics? Why in the world would Kanipe, whose recollections are often savaged by others, have more weight than Godfrey on this or anything?
I don't think it matters, particularly, but has Kanipe undergone a rehab of reputation as happened to Curley that I've missed? |
| Anonymous Poster8169 |
Posted - February 13 2004 : 9:39:29 PM
quote:
Originally posted by BJMarkland
Question to any and all. I keep reading the speculation that Custer was wounded or killed at MTC which is based upon the Indian report of a, and I paraphrase, "man in buckskin" being shot at the crossing. Help me on this. I remember reading, in the distant past, an author who supposedly debunked the whole idea that this man was Custer.
To the best of my knowledge the story of the man in buckskin comes from David Humphrey Miller's book, "Custer's Fall". The book is imaginative, pulpish, and dissonant with other evidence. I think the man you're thinking of is Gregory Michno, who drilled into Miller in his book "Lakota Noon". I have my disagreements with Michno, but when it comes to Miller I think he is dead on.
quote:
I seem to recall that this author (Gray?) stated Custer was wearing what was known as a "duster". I will look in Graham's book tonight if possible to see if there is any reference GAC's garb supported by eye-witnesses. I did find this doing a Web search. It shows Custer & Clan with Custer wearing what looks to be a white leather jacket. At least the sleeves seem to have fringe.
Godfrey wrote in a memo (reprinted in "The Custer Myth") what he remembered of the officers' dress. Most of it is non-regulation. The only officers whom he thought wore the uniform were Lord, Sturgis, and Reily.
However, Godfrey added the caveat that he was only describing what the officers "generally" wore, and he couldn't say for certain if they were actually wearing these clothes when killed. He seems to have been wrong about Tom Custer, for instance.
Although Godfrey thought Tom was dressed the same as his brother (buckskin suit, fringed trousers etc), he was probably mistaken. Daniel Kanipe, whose opinion on this I would think has more weight, told Walter Camp in a letter that "Tom Custer wore soldier pants, the same size stripe as a sergeant, blue flannel shirt, on June 25th, just like all the rest of the soldiers, and you could not have told him from any other soldier, unless you knew him personally".
R. Larsen
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| Dark Cloud |
Posted - February 13 2004 : 6:30:06 PM
Regarding the articles, Whitaker is rather icky even by the standards of the John Brown's School Days era. This is a chapter from that godawful bio he wrote.
Custer's article I'd read elsewhere, but I hadn't really noticed that what he did that day is exactly what Reno did at LBH, right down to the woods. Reno knew that what solace was coming was not enough, and he - as Custer did here - knew his men had blown their ammo pretty well. At any rate, Reno can no longer be castigated because he did what his commander did previously and with - even accepting Custer's numbers of Sioux - much greater odds against him.
If however, you offer this as an explanation of the dismounting of Custer's men at LBH, I disagree. At the Yellowstone, he didn't know the size of his enemy till too late. At the LBH, he saw it early enough and yet still went north and to MTC. At the Yellowstone, there was cover, water, and overwhelming help coming soon. At the Yellowstone he had few options. At LBH he had many, and of those chose badly. |
| Dark Cloud |
Posted - February 13 2004 : 2:07:31 PM
As with all topics things tend to get rediscussed, which is what happens when new people join. And new people is the goal of every forum host. But as this thread just proved, a statement about succession to command was wrong and nobody corrected it till now. I also recall quotes from a book bolstering that position, so I'm puzzled by the top of the head remark, but my memory isn't great. I do know I was slapped for saying Keogh was next in command back then and recently in this thread. So, I don't find that talking in circles.
Custer's orders were to be ready to move at 8AM, not move. And both Reno and Benteen were surprised that the regiment started moving, as no orders had been given, at least not by Reno. Or Benteen. Or Custer.
But of course, I'm referring to the complaint of Custer to his brother and Calhoun around 10:30. This is when Custer remonstrated with Tom.
So whatever is happening in the 7th, it isn't by the book. And you can't just ignore these people inserted above or outside the command structure by Custer. Doesn't matter who was nepotistic, what matters is whoever gave them power accepts responsibility for their actions.
And no, my shared theory that Custer was wounded early on, probably at MTC and environs, isn't based upon the alleged testimony of a Sioux. It's based upon the counterproductive actions of the companies in Custer's command from Weir Point on. He neither gave support to Reno in anything approaching a timely way, nor charged into the village although what evidence there is suggests the relatively wide crossing was lightly defended.
If he was going to corral hostages - a dubious assumption, this of Reno's, but possible - his best bet is to still take the crossing, because the more time he gives his enemies, the worse for him, and it's the shortest distance. I find the convoluted explanations for this, and the retreat to way east of the river where the ground is clearly and visibly terrible and then go north makes no sense when you mouth that theory to yourself on the field and can see it. I don't think ANY cavalryman would willingly do that.
And I don't think any cavalryman did. So what would mandate a move to the east and north rather than a sensible retreat south to unite the command? Confusion.
A wounded Custer in a nepotistic outfit that wouldn't want to have to explain to him why his last orders were not obeyed explains a lot and is consistent with the companies and bodies.
That there are reports of a man in buckskin being shot and falling and his command pulling up around him is convenient but not compelling. What the command did is, though. |
| BJMarkland |
Posted - February 13 2004 : 12:04:01 PM
D.C. wrote:
quote:
"...Tom Custer had told the regiment to mount and ride forward that morning uncontested by the numerous people who outranked him and throughly annoying his brother, who did not punish him, for raising all that dust to no purpose by the Crow's Nest."
From the "Did Custer Go To Medicine Tail Coulee" thread, by Alfuso, 9/30/2003 at 05:33:19:
"That is because GAC hadn't rescinded the "move out at 8 a.m." orders when he ran off for the Crow's nest. So Tom and the other officers, brought the regiment forward to where their commander was, according to his own orders.
Certainly, Benteen and Reno would have balked at a TWC "taking command" like that. But they moved out because those were GAC's orders."
quote:
"...Boston deserted his assigned position and just did what he pleased anyway. Nobody stopped him, which speaks either to his general pointlessnes, OR to the fact that the Custer family was in command, whatever the manual said."
The following quote, again from Alfuso, same thread, post of 9/30/2003 at 05:16:19 in my opinion puts it in a nutshell:
"Custer was a nepotist in an age of nepotists. He carried it to an art form, but he had a good example in Grant."
EDITORIAL COMMENT FOLLOWS:
We seem to be involved in a loop here. Everything that I see argued on this current thread was discussed last fall. Mostly the same participants, arguments and point of view. It is as if no one is listening to the other except in a seemingly macabre effort to score debating points. Maybe Custer's ghost is keeping score, because quite honestly, every action between Martini's departure and the finding of the bodies will be based upon conjecture or opinion. Some theories on various actions have empirical observations to back them, others have only speculative logic. And a few, damned few, have incontrovertible fact as a buttress. Not saying one is totally right or wrong, it is just the way it is. The only way a cohesive, understandable, realistic theory may be devised is if we all put aside our individual blinders and to paraphrase the old refrain, "walk a mile in the other's shoes." And having said that, the minute after we all agree to a unified theory; some one, somewhere will blow it out of the water with a new fact or discovery.
END EDITORIAL COMMENT
Question to any and all. I keep reading the speculation that Custer was wounded or killed at MTC which is based upon the Indian report of a, and I paraphrase, "man in buckskin" being shot at the crossing. Help me on this. I remember reading, in the distant past, an author who supposedly debunked the whole idea that this man was Custer. I seem to recall that this author (Gray?) stated Custer was wearing what was known as a "duster". I will look in Graham's book tonight if possible to see if there is any reference GAC's garb supported by eye-witnesses. I did find this doing a Web search. It shows Custer & Clan with Custer wearing what looks to be a white leather jacket. At least the sleeves seem to have fringe.
http://photoswest.org/cgi-bin/imager?00100424 B-424
While trying to find the above referenced photo again (at the Denver Public Library), I found this very interesting article by GAC regarding a fight on the Yellowstone during Stanley's expedition. It is well worth reading with many parallels to the LBH fight. BTW, GAC in the article did mention wearing a buckskin jacket.
http://cdl.library.cornell.edu/cgi-bin/moa/pageviewer?coll=moa&root=/moa/gala/gala0022/&tif=00093.TIF&view=50&frames=1
The LOC American Memories search page is where I found the above article and photo. It has plenty of related Custer information. The URL for the search page is:
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/mdbquery.html
Another good article, from the Galaxy, by Frederick Whittaker offering a thumbnail of Custer's career and the legend of Cuser's Luck:
http://cdl.library.cornell.edu/cgi-bin/moa/pageviewer?coll=moa&root=/moa/gala/gala0022/&tif=00366.TIF&view=50&frames=1
Best of wishes,
Billy |
| El Crab |
Posted - February 13 2004 : 06:42:38 AM
http://www.mohicanpress.com/messageboard2/topic.asp?TOPIC_ID=102&SearchTerms=,yates,senior
I erred when I said we determined Yates was senior. I had it backwards. Forgive me, I was posting that off the top of my head. A simple search would have been better the first time.
But the point still stands. No one claimed anything on the Yates/Keogh Seniority issue, they only offered information from the records. |
| Dark Cloud |
Posted - February 12 2004 : 7:04:43 PM
I'm not confused, although I could be totally wrong. We've been provided with statements from other books that show Yates was senior to Keogh. One of the sources has to be bogus, right? Perhaps he who provided that info would resubmit it? I think it was Crab. But, as evidenced by the examples that day, I don't think it mattered.
Custer, convicted once of desertion and allowing his own men to be shot without trial, in direct contradiction of Sherman's orders through Sheridan, brought Kellog along. It was not normal for the commander of only 210 men to have two brothers, a nephew, a brother in law under him, and it cannot be true that there were not better qualified men about for those positions than Reed and Boston. In the event, Boston deserted his assigned position and just did what he pleased anyway. Nobody stopped him, which speaks either to his general pointlessnes, OR to the fact that the Custer family was in command, whatever the manual said.
The Civil War was eleven years in the past, and in fact there were many uniforms about, and new ones, but in a nod to reality apparently nobody enforced the apparel code on the march, although it was not the manuals' regulation dress. If you've read Custer's books and his wife's, you know that this was a standard practical joke played on rookies reporting to duty at the various Camp Ringworms and Ft. Scurvy's, and make them dress in accord with the book. Because it WAS on the books what soldiers were to wear.
If I'm wrong - I often am - please point out where the proper care for buckskin ensembles is located in the cavalry manual. For either officers or men. No doubt Custer, that hard-assed by-the-book guy, followed it.
I don't know where Custer was hurt, and neither does anyone, but the early wounding theory has logical merit.
If Custer was wounded, you say Cooke would have deserted him and run to Keogh? Really. Not a courier, but the adjutant himself? And if Custer belayed that and continued in charge, what then? Who decides when Custer's mind is not functioning well if he's still giving orders? Just curious.....
Your faith in the 7th as a well-oiled machine is touching, given they'd never been in a fight as a complete regiment before and Tom Custer had told the regiment to mount and ride forward that morning uncontested by the numerous people who outranked him and throughly annoying his brother, who did not punish him, for raising all that dust to no purpose by the Crow's Nest.
And yet, surprised that an attack is rebuffed, or that the Indians are not only standing but attacking, and with no evidence anything he'd done had worked thus far, we're to believe Custer, wounded or not, decides to further divide his command, void any advantage of cavalry and make them infantry plus horseholders and wait for help on high ground with no protection for man or beast?
I don't see Custer doing that if he's in the saddle.
You say "... there would be recriminations for any abject disregard for Army SOP" and I say 'maybe,' but there certainly would be more than mere recriminations if people hadn't follwed through on Custer's wishes while he lived, if the battle was won OR lost. |
| BJMarkland |
Posted - February 12 2004 : 6:56:23 PM
Dark Cloud wrote:
quote:
Or is this new information only reflective of a transfer and not an elevation in rank? Is this tempest over something silly, like longest time at that rank while in the 7th, rather than longest time at that rank?
Here is what the forward to Heitman's states about the origin of the records (Heitman, Introduction, pg. 9):
"5. All data relating to appointments or commissions has been obtained from original records of the War Department, supplemented from other authentic sources, or supplied by living officers or the families of those deceased."
"6. No record is herein given of appointments or commissions that were not accepted. Such as were declined, revoked, or canceled, and under which no service was rendered, have been omitted."
So, Keogh was senior to Yates. Doing a quick search, I found where Vet777a on Sept. 13, 2003 at 06:53 a.m. on the F Co. Again thread had written, "Author Brian Pohanka states that Keogh was the senior Captain among the 5 companies."
Per Heitman:
Keogh to Capt. 7/28/1866
Yates to Capt. 6/12/1867
Custer to Capt. 12/02/1875
T. H. French to Capt. 3/26/1868
Moylan to Capt. 3/01/1872
Benteen to Capt. 7/28/1866
Weir to Capt. 7/31/1867
McDougall to Capt. 12/15/1875 *Formerly with the 5th U.S. Volunteers. They were the Galvanized Yankees weren't they?
Calhoun to 1st Lt. 1/09/1871
Based upon the above, Benteen & Keogh were of equal seniority. All of the above officers, with the exception of Calhoun & McDougall, mustered out at the end of the Civil War and were reappointed. McDougall is a bit of a strange date. He was mustered out of the 5th U.S.V. 8/10/1866 but the records show that he was appointed 2d Lt. 14th Inf. 5/10/1866.
Anyway, I think that the customs of the service would indicate that if G.A.C. was incapacitated, the command would have fallen to Keogh. If Keogh was incapacitated, it would have gone to the next senior Captain, Yates.
Oh, to answer your question, read what Heitman's entries say. It is pretty clear to me that the dates are when they were promoted to Captain in the Regular Army, post-A.C.W.
Best of wishes,
Billy |
| pgb3 |
Posted - February 12 2004 : 4:17:23 PM
Now you have me confused. What is confusing here about their rank? Keogh is senior to Yates. Period. Very clear in fact. And I still think you are confused as to what happens in a military command situation. Personal preferences have nothing to do with it. As much as you seem to dislike the structure of the military, that is the nature of the beast. If GAC is wounded, then the procedures are in place to transfer command. This just did not happen at MTC because GAC was not wounded at MTC. Had he been, Cooke would have high-tailed it over to Keogh’s side. If GAC was wounded, the troops would have reacted far differently. Not dragged a dead or dying commander all the way to LSH. Bypassing Keogh for personal reasons. Remember, they did not know that no one would survive, therefore, there would be recriminations for any abject disregard for Army SOP.
BTW, you or someone listed a series of “violations” hat GAC had already committed, including something about dress or uniforms. What the heck do you mean? It was fairly standard to have a loose dress code in the field. In fact, uniforms standards were pretty loose all around in the frontier Army, and before. A great number of ACW troops were never even issued uniforms. Quite a few had gray uniforms, and then, quite a few of the militia just made up their own outlandish uniforms. I think they were pretty happy if you just showed up at muster each day.
BTW, this site is back to it's normal, long load standards today. So, when does this new server kick-in fully? Can't wait. |
| Dark Cloud |
Posted - February 12 2004 : 2:11:32 PM
Gee, there's a shocker. So the previous threads, wherein the original thought was that Keogh was senior, were correct? Or is this new information only reflective of a transfer and not an elevation in rank? Is this tempest over something silly, like longest time at that rank while in the 7th, rather than longest time at that rank? Which is to say, what the hey? I thought Crab or someone provided proof positive that Yates was senior and would take over.
There's an official manual involved somewhere, I know it.
In any case, if Custer is wounded in the 7th, who decides the command needs to be transfered? Cooke? And if Custer is wounded, surrounded by two brothers, an adjutant, a nephew, and doesn't WANT the command transferred, what happens?
In my view, what happens is June 25, 1876.
I don't think the issue is really important, because things happened too quickly for a command change to have kicked in, but it's nice to see official documentation is just as confused as ever. |
| BJMarkland |
Posted - February 12 2004 : 09:47:07 AM
From Heitman's Historical Register of the U.S. Army (relevent sections regarding post-war rank bold-faced by me):
Keogh, Myles W. Ireland. D C.
Capt aadc 9 Apr 1862; maj adc vols
7 Apr 1864; bvt lt co1 vols 13 Mar 1865
for uniform gallantry and good con dur
the war; hon must out 1 Sept 1866; 2 It
4 cav 4 Mav 1866: capt 7 cav 28 July 1866:
bvt maj 2 Mar 1867 for gal and mer ser
in the battle of Gettvsburg Pa and It co1
2 Mar 1867 for gal and mer ser in the
battle of Dallas Ga; killed 25 June 1876
in action with Sioux Inds at Little Big
Horn River Mont.
Yates, George W. N Y. N Y. Q
m sergt 4 Mich inf 20 June 1861; 1 It 26
Sept 1862.; hon must out 28 June 1864; 1
It 45 MO mf 24 Aug 1864; capt 13 MO cav
22 Sept 1864; bvt maj vols 13 Mar 1865
for gal and mer ser dur the war and lt co1
vols 13 Mar 1865 for conspicuous gallantry
at Fredericksburg and Beverly Ford Va
and at Gettysburg Pa; hon must out 11
Jan 1866; 2 lt 2 cav 26 Mar 1866; r q m
12 May to 28 Ott 1867; capt 7 cav 12 June
1867; killed 25 June 1876 in action with , Sioux Inds at the Little Big Horn River
Mont.
Thanks for the reminder to look in Heitman since while reading Cozzen's Eyewitness to the Indian Wars, 1865-1890: The Struggle for Apacheria I had run into a reference for a Lt. James Calhoun, 32d Inf. cited for "zeal and eagerness they evinced on all occasions towards the success of the expedition." Heitman does say that our Calhoun was a 2d Lt. in the 32d Inf. effective 31 July 1867 who transferred to the 21st Inf. 19 April 1869. The scout which I referenced began 5 July 1869. Calhoun is still cited as a Lt. in the 32d in the report but I believe Heitman went by the dates of the orders, not when they were received, and with the condition of mail service in AZ, it is not unlikely Calhoun had not received word of the transfer.
Sorry about the tangent.
Billy |
| El Crab |
Posted - February 11 2004 : 07:41:57 AM
Yates was senior based on military records, not because someone on here said so. |
| Dark Cloud |
Posted - February 11 2004 : 04:11:17 AM
I could be utterly bonkers, no doubt - and no evidence - but you have Custer passing by a great opening on cavalry ground into the village without using it, and none of the explanations for why this didn't happen make much sense.
The comparison to the Civil War is rather silly. Few Generals charged surrounded by family, nor was there a surety a captured officer would be disemboweled and gelded by the enemy.
To suggest that GAC was by the book on this or any march - start with regulation uniforms and weapons, Boston and Reed and Kellog... - defies comment.
Yates was senior to Keogh, apparently. According to this forum. It was news to me as well. |
| pgb3 |
Posted - February 11 2004 : 03:14:49 AM
BTW, I love this new server! But kill the flood control. |
| pgb3 |
Posted - February 11 2004 : 03:09:13 AM
And of Curley’s quite cogent description of the reunion at Calhoun, with an alive and active GAC? Your theory just does not hold water. And how did Yates become the next to command? All of GAC’s actions and assignments up to then had been by the book, SOP. What would change that now? GAC hit at the river? No way. Your scenario is one of the least plausible I have heard. And since when does a cavalry charge stop dead just because an officer is hit. Granted a commanding officer, but there were/are others who have their orders and must carry them forward. When in the ACW did that happen? |
| Dark Cloud |
Posted - February 08 2004 : 11:14:35 AM
It makes a certain sense; certainly as much as a further division of forces for an attack 'later.'
Well, he supposedly had a fatal wound to the head. Then one on the left side below the heart, not necessarily in the chest. The latter would not necessarily have killed him right off, and if obtained at MTC, would conveniently explain subsequent actions.
There is some story from the Sioux that a man in buckskin was shot and fell from his horse at MTC and others stopped and pulled up around him when apparently the dust clouded all else. That could be anyone, admittedly, but - if Custer - then this incident, in combination with an increasing fire from the Sioux, might have inspired the 7th to head for ground of some safety where the surgeon could go to work to save the General. Who, of the 7th's officers, would suggest otherwise?
Why would they drag him to Calhoun? Who says they did? The front company or two with Custer may just have run to LSH where they were snockered, and the back three in their own time. Secondly, the assumptions of the mortality of the body wound is questionable, given it was seen three bloated days later in an era of bad assumption and worse medicine. And people lied to protect the widow, and couldn't keep their story straight. Ryan has the wound on the right side, and he buried Custer.
You err if you think that visual communication between the companies would have been instant or even possible, or that officers would efficiently dispatch couriers to the other companies when under moving fire. If Custer were shot, it isn't like, osmotically, anyone would know right off except those around him, or that they would choose to broadcast it, or that another would take over from a wounded Custer, or that he would allow it.
Zero proof or even evidence on my end, but it makes more sense, consistent with the Custer hitherto known, that he would choose to strike asap with what he had, that he would lead, and that the limited targets first exposed would increase the chance he'd get hit. A Custer pulling a mile and half back to the East to engage in probing attacks while waiting for help is a new Custer hitherto unseen: tentative and moronic.
And while you brought it up, Keogh had no authority over any but his own company or 'wing.' Yates was next in command, we've been told here. Although this is notional, because Tom Custer had already demonstrated that day that he felt he spoke for his brother, and there was Cooke. This was a nepostistic outfit, and a hurt but conscious Custer was the worst of all possible things for it, because who would override Custer's expressed intent, if any? Who would stand up to his family, who would take command?
And if you forget for a moment all else and look at the map of the bodies, imagine my scenario. (Neither original nor particularly mine, actually) Two companies, one fighting a rear action, advance to LSH more or less directly from MTC, under attack and soon meeting the Crazy Horse Fun and Gun. The back three companies, seeing the advance down the coulee blunted for whatever reason, retreat in order to Calhoun and are soon under attack themselves. It pretty much fits the field. It violates no history of Custer's methods. It makes sense given what officers would have seen (high ground)and known (virtually nothing). It's simple and could entertain either a long or short fight.
It's my experience that the simplest explanations are often the truth. Not always, but often. |
| pgb3 |
Posted - February 08 2004 : 02:51:24 AM
And of the two wounds describe, which one would have left him "hurt, not dead"? Neither. They would not drag a wounded comamnader up to Calhoun, then over to LSH, then sit and wait to die. How stupid. Just could not have happened that way. Think about this. It is just not logical. Period. |
| Dark Cloud |
Posted - February 07 2004 : 01:27:57 AM
Yes. Well. There is an interval of time between Boston joining his brother and a possible advance down the MTC. If, say, the eighty odd men of the first two companies stopped and angled to the north while Custer was hustled to safety, one company providing delaying cover, the other three companies might have just pulled back to high ground covering Custer's advance up to Custer Hill. First, because they had no clue, and, second, seek high ground till you know what's happening. It was dry and must have been FAR dustier than paintings suggest, which all the Indians substantiate. Keogh might never have known Custer was hit and then had his own immediate concerns.
Again, no evidence on my part except I find it hard to believe Custer wouldn't have used MTC as the quickest way to attack while there was still time to benefit from Reno who, after an hour and without a train, could reasonably be assumed to be running low on ammo. I don't imagine Custer thought, as time and surprise left the divan, stretched, and exited a while ago with the Crow scouts, that current circumstances suggested a complicated series of feints and misdirection charges at that time of day on bad cavalry ground. Get on the flatland while Reno was there and get to shooting. All else, too late.
But he didn't. And a hurt, not dead Custer, would bring about the circumstances that finished them off as it happened in a manner consistent with the majority of assumed facts. It's undramatic, but really accounts for the way they were found reasonably. |
| pgb3 |
Posted - February 07 2004 : 12:33:24 AM
Both Boston C. and Martin made it back and forth over the back trail. There were no real threats to them if they retreated south. And if GAC was wounded, meaning almsot dead from the wounds that were reported, Keogh would have moved them back - to the south. |
| Dark Cloud |
Posted - February 01 2004 : 5:06:31 PM
What you state as fact is just assumption.
Technically, there is NO eyewitness Indian testimony whatsoever in existence. We have only hearsay claims that this and that was their testimony. We've gone from believing none of it to believing all of it, and neither is helpful.
Despite all the furrowed brow science, what few archaeological artifacts exist are simply evidence of archaeological artifacts. They may have nothing to do with the battle. There is nothing to prove they arrived where found in that key one hour period, June 25, 1876, or who used them, or in what purpose. As is reluctantly admitted here, there have been numerous and large violations of the 'crime' site almost since 1876.
We don't know captives were Custer's goal. Reno thought so.
Neither do we know that Custer could return south even if he wanted to after leaving MTC. We do know that heading north and east mandated dismounted fighting, and whatever edged them to where they fell, it was either very stupid or simply a rout. Custer wasn't stupid, and he generally was in the van of an attack.
That's why I think Custer was wounded early, which would explain a light fight and a retreat at MTC becoming a rush uphill to regroup that was not allowed - leaving Keogh and Calhoun to guess and deal with their own - makes the most sense. It's certainly the simplest, and consistent with the historical Custer who was unlikely to not utilize an open door lightly defended, or attack with less than what he had.
I have nothing worthy of being called evidence except that simplicity. |
| pgb3 |
Posted - February 01 2004 : 12:13:02 PM
Then how come we have Indian testimony and archaeological evidence of further maneuvers? And, in the case of Kellogg, and identifiable body that further helps establish this. And having Custer shot at the MTC ford would only mean that the rest fall back to the south—not north.
The Indians tell us only weak opposition at MTC, why not believe this? That can only mean there was no crossing planned here, or rather, none attempted. Custer was in search of hostages. These had already fled north, and the Indians facing Reno had not yet had time to arrive at MTC. The Cheyenne had not yet had time to get themselves together and arrive at the ford, so, Custer pulls back, reorganizes his troops, leaves C,L and I to hold open the trail for Benteen, and heads off to scout a northern crossing to capture hostages. What is so strange about this action? At this time, it appears that only L and some element of C were engaged, and that was the “long range” part of the battle—a defensive action that was fairly low-key in nature. I was in reserve across the ridge, and GAC had E. F and perhaps another portion of C with him on this scout to the north.
Perry
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