![The Mohican Board! [Bumppo's Redux!]](images/wwwboard.gif "The Mohican Board! [Bumppo's Redux!]") |
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Bill R
Colonial Militia
USA
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 Posted - November 01 2003 : 8:02:22 PM
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| Let's simplify it. Can you stand there and tell me that the situation at Black Kettle's village tactically was the SAME as at the Big Horn? If so, then his tactics should have worked. If not, they why didn't he KNOW there was the HUGE difference between those two attacks, and situations? INTELLIGENCE! That's my point. Not IQ intelligence....military intelligence. The who, what, where, when AND HOW FIGGIN MANY of the enemy type intelligence. I'll be stressing this again in my response to your main post. |
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richfed
Sachem
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Posted - November 02 2003 : 05:37:55 AM
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No, tactically not the same, but similar. In point of fact, he probably had more intelligence at LBH! Things just didn't evolve the same. There were intangibles ... the Indians' unexpected demeanor the primary one. Poor performace from the other battallion leaders [Reno, and especially, Benteen] another.
I will say this ... in neither instance was the terrain surveyed adequately. Not a factor at Washita, a big one at LBH. But, there were reasons ... |
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Bill R
Colonial Militia
USA
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Posted - November 02 2003 : 1:14:02 PM
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Well, given your post about your need to do that project of yours on the guidebook, we can put this on hold until you can devote the time you'd like on continuing the debate. I'll look forward to when we pick it up again.
By the way, I think I have just placed that icon of yours. Isn't that Edward Longshanks from Braveheart? The one who, upon seeing the Irish mercs and the Scottish meet in the field and welcome each other? "sigh. The Irishhhhhhhhhhh." (said with disappointment and contempt). Yup. You just never know which-a-way we Irish will jump! |
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alikws
Colonial Settler
USA
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Posted - November 05 2003 : 11:06:42 AM
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one other thing that kept old yellow-hair from acomplishing his objective was that he attacked during sundance.. this ment that there were more then the expected 500 non-reservation individuals in family groups, and they did not break camp and scatter when it was discovered that soldiers were in the area...
custer was not stupid, and his actions were are understandible based on his previous encounters... this situation was different...
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Highlander
Colonial Militia
USA
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February 04 2003
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Posted - November 05 2003 : 3:29:24 PM
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quote:
Originally posted by Bill R
Well, given your post about your need to do that project of yours on the guidebook, we can put this on hold until you can devote the time you'd like on continuing the debate. I'll look forward to when we pick it up again.
By the way, I think I have just placed that icon of yours. Isn't that Edward Longshanks from Braveheart? The one who, upon seeing the Irish mercs and the Scottish meet in the field and welcome each other? "sigh. The Irishhhhhhhhhhh." (said with disappointment and contempt). Yup. You just never know which-a-way we Irish will jump!
That looks like LongShanks to me.I especially liked the scene where he gives the command for the archers.When his aide states"Sir,won't we hit our own men?"He replies"Yes,but we'll probably hit some of theirs as well." |
Highlander |
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Bill R
Colonial Militia
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Posted - November 05 2003 : 10:16:58 PM
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| Yeah, that was pretty cold - and cool. Struck me as what a typical monarch would have done and said. |
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Highlander
Colonial Militia
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Posted - November 06 2003 : 02:27:53 AM
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quote:
Originally posted by Bill R
Yeah, that was pretty cold - and cool. Struck me as what a typical monarch would have done and said.
Most definitely. |
Highlander |
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Highlander
Colonial Militia
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Posted - November 06 2003 : 12:52:49 PM
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Another thing that hurt Custer was that he left his Gatling guns behind. |
Highlander |
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richfed
Sachem
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Posted - November 06 2003 : 1:35:32 PM
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| Undoubtedly ... assuming, of course, that that they didn't jam - something they seemed to have a knack for - and that he could have moved at the same rate of speed [doubtful] ... they would have been very useful sitting there at the Reno skirmish line area at the Hunkpapa circle. |
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SgtMunro
Soldier of the King
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Posted - November 07 2003 : 4:02:16 PM
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You're opinion of the effectiveness of the Gattling Gun weapon system is very well founded. The jamming problem, which was due to a flaw in the feed tray, would not be absolutely fixed until the adoption of the M-1886 Gattling Gun. By that time another American, Hiram Maxim, was hard at work perfecting the first truly automatic machine gun.
The carriage on which the M-1873 Gattling (Which is what was detatched to Custer's command) was a varitation of the M-1841 Mountain Howitzer (6-Pounder). This carriage was designed to be broken down and transported on pack horses or mules. The rough terrain in the area of operation, and the cavalry tactical doctrine of the late 19th century, mitagated against the effective deployment of such a carriage. The irony is that the Department of the Navy adopted a tripod mount for their Gattling Guns, in 1870. The Army would not adopt this more effective way of mounting the Gattling, for cavalry operations, until the M-1886 variant.
I still believe he would have been better off with them, then without them. It would have slowed his advance, but also forced him to check his route of approach better and might have prevented him from dividing his command. Not to mention the effect of that weapon system on the Natives, "Ugh, fire-waggons spit many bullets, braves litter ground like autumn leaves!"
Your Most Humble Servant,
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Serjeant-Major Duncan Munro
Capt. Thos. Graham's Coy.
42nd Royal Highland Regiment of Foote
(The Black Sheep of the Black Watch)
"Nemo Me Impune Lacessit"
-Or-
"Recruit locally, fight globally." |
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richfed
Sachem
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Posted - November 08 2003 : 3:16:27 PM
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It's been well over 10 years since I've really immersed myself in the Plains Indian Wars - got sidetracked here [in Mohicanland!] - but now that we mention it, off the top of my head, I cannot recall an instance where Gatling guns were used against them. It certainly wasn't often. Interesting.
Anyway, in my previous posts, I have tried to succinctly display other, less-thought-of, sides to Custer's character. I also attempted to shed just a little light on his previous experience fighting Indians & to demonstrate what he is known to have done when faced with insurmountable odds. In addition, I wanted to clarify who invented "total war" - as it relates here - what the Army's plan was, others' lack of communicating very important information to anyone, and what Custer's orders were.
All of that is very relevant when affixing blame on what happened at Little Bighorn. It should all be kept in mind when considering the event.
The plan - a very unrealistic one - was for Custer to strike the village & then drive it northward to the Terry/Gibbon "blocking" force. The plan reeks of insincerity. When Indians fled, they tended to scatter, not move, en masse, into the waiting arms of ... of ... immobile infantry? I think not. I believe this "plan" was a bogus convenience. Terry, along with his oft-repeated June 26th target date, used this as an excuse - at least to some degree - to fix blame solely on Custer's alleged "disobedience". Why do I think this? Well, for one thing, Terry dilly-dallied crossing the Yellowstone & moved very much like someone hoping the fight would be over by the time he got there. When did he "get there"? June 27th! Yet, he accuses Custer, after the fact, of attacking too early. Had Custer attacked on the 26th, what would have been different? And could mostly infantry block anything anyway?
Let's back up a bit. Custer, with no knowledge of the all-important Rosebud battle, had planned to reenact the Washita affair by striking the unsuspecting village at dawn on the 26th. Based on past performance, we can imagine him dividing his force into positions by which a multi-directional, simultaneous attack would have taken place. The surprise would have been total, avenues of escape truly blocked, and the whole event may very well have played out much differently. We'll never know ...
But, the 7th was discovered ... the Indians were aware of his presence, and there were even indications that the village was fleeing. It wasn't, of course, and in fact, incredibly, word never was given to the main village of the approach. Custer couldn't know any of this ... it was broad daylight, a day before he wanted to act - after a forced march - but the Indians were on the verge of escaping his - and the Army's - grasp. Given the Army's thoughts on this, he had to act - and quickly - and he did. He was the only one of all the bunch in the field this campaign that did, and it cost him his life. No one else in the field carried out the mission as drawn out by HQ's. Only Custer. The others complete lack of action & communication were more to blame than anything Custer may have done.
Much has been made of the Indian's numbers. The Army pretty much figured on 1500 warriors ... and 1500 warriors is pretty much what they got. Conventional thought was that any of the 3 columns could handle that number of rear-guard fighting warriors. Custer didn't invent the thought process. It was there ... shared by all. Or so they said. Their actions make me wonder if they truly believed it.
What no one bargained for was the nature of these Indians. The only one who knew was now fishing down in Wyoming. 
The debacle didn't end with Crook, or Terry, or Gibbon, though. It continued within Custer's own command.
Custer, it would appear, turned a failing overall strategy involving 3, widely scattered prongs, into the 7th's own mini-version. He sent Benteen with orders to scout to the left & |
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SgtMunro
Soldier of the King
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Posted - November 09 2003 : 02:58:13 AM
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The Sachem asks:
quote:
I cannot recall an instance where Gatling guns were used against them. It certainly wasn't often. Interesting.
You are right, the effective deployment (during the Western Indian Campaigns) of the Gatling Gun was relatively rare. As opposed to the greater use of those weapons by the British Army & Royal Navy, in their own colonial campaigns. I shall check my own personal library for dates/engagements in North America, where the Gatling Gun was used. I will post my findings, at a later date.
Your Most Humble Servant,
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Serjeant-Major Duncan Munro
Capt. Thos. Graham's Coy.
42nd Royal Highland Regiment of Foote
(The Black Sheep of the Black Watch)
"Nemo Me Impune Lacessit"
-Or-
"Recruit locally, fight globally." |
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SgtMunro
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Posted - November 13 2003 : 6:40:44 PM
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Well Sachem, I found the largest use of Gattling Guns was by General Miles' Expedition during the Red River War (1874-1875) against the Comanches and Kiowas. Most notibly , the Battle of Staked Plains on 30 August 1874, where M-1873 Gattling Guns were used in conjuction with M-1841 Mountain Howitzers during a combined infantry & cavalry assault on the escarpment. General Miles' had the combined Comanche/Kiowa Army 'on the ropes', when he had to pull back due to exhausted supplies and to reinforce his line of communication.
Your Most Humble Servant,
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Serjeant-Major Duncan Munro
Capt. Thos. Graham's Coy.
42nd Royal Highland Regiment of Foote
(The Black Sheep of the Black Watch)
"Nemo Me Impune Lacessit"
-Or-
"Recruit locally, fight globally." |
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richfed
Sachem
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Posted - November 14 2003 : 06:04:06 AM
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Good shew ... really good shew, Sarge!
That was a desperate time for a loose confederation of southern plains Indians - Comanche, Kiowa, Kiowa-Apache, Arapaho, & southern Cheyenne. Better known as the Buffalo Wars, it was a last ditch attempt to stop the slaughter of buffalo & preserve their way of life. Comanche Quannah Parker was a fixture during this period, leading an unheard of assault [failed assault] against a fortified position - Adobe Walls. Desperation is a powerful motivator.
Anyway, regarding those Gatling guns - were they actually used? In a quick [very] look through my library, I found no reference to this. |
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SgtMunro
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Posted - November 14 2003 : 08:36:02 AM
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quote:
Anyway, regarding those Gatling guns - were they actually used?
As far as the Miles Campaign of August 1874, the documentation stating specifically the use of the Gatling Gun can be found within the following work:
Utley, Robert M. Frontier Regulars; The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891. University of Nebraska Press, 1973. (Page 223)
Other instances of its use during the Western Plains Wars, can also be found within the above mentioned work. Like the accidental engagement with the Cheyenne Camp near Darlington on 6 April 1875. You will also find its sucessful use during the Nez Perce War of 1877, specifically the engagement near Clearwater on 11 July (Ibid,Pages 302-303).
Now, there were other campaigns, during other wars of this period, that the Gatling Gun is mentioned as part of the train of artillery. In these instances its actual use is not mentioned, but it does not mean that they spent the whole campaign silent. Any good commander will use all assets at his disposal during an engagement, to carry out his mission (As all cadets are taught at West Point, from the time of the founding of that service academy).
Either way, you should check out Mr. Utley's book, it is the companion volume to his first work; Frontiersmen in Blue; The United States Army and the Indian, 1848-1865. It is a work that should be read before Froniter Regulars, since both volumes complement each other. Mr. Utley gives the reader, in these two books, a good overview of a very turbulent and misunderstood time of our nation's history.
Your Most Humble Servant,
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Serjeant-Major Duncan Munro
Capt. Thos. Graham's Coy.
42nd Royal Highland Regiment of Foote
(The Black Sheep of the Black Watch)
"Nemo Me Impune Lacessit"
-Or-
"Recruit locally, fight globally." |
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SgtMunro
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Posted - November 14 2003 : 09:16:05 AM
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P.S. - Thank you for the compliments, Sachem. The history of the Western Plains Wars have always interested me, but they are not my forte. Perhaps a section in the "Against All Odds" Section on the Wars of the British Empire (1661-1914)? Okay, not a brilliant idea, but one to think about?
Your Most Humble Servant,
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Serjeant-Major Duncan Munro
Capt. Thos. Graham's Coy.
42nd Royal Highland Regiment of Foote
(The Black Sheep of the Black Watch)
"Nemo Me Impune Lacessit"
-Or-
"Recruit locally, fight globally." |
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richfed
Sachem
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Posted - November 14 2003 : 1:04:22 PM
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Ok - I have that book - been a very time time since I read it! Will check that out.
As for the forum you request, your wish is [probably] my command!!! Could we talk about the Zulu Wars in there?  |
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SgtMunro
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Posted - November 14 2003 : 3:52:57 PM
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quote:
Could we talk about the Zulu Wars in there?
You bet we can, Sachem. That is one of my favorites. We can discuss campaigns, battles, politics, leaders, weapons and equipment. There is alot of 'wiggle room' on the Zulu War of 1879 alone, not to mention some of the other ones we can go into like:
The Sikh Wars
The Sepoy Mutiny of 1857
The Opium Wars
The Northwest Frontier & 'The Great Game'
The Transvaal & Boer Wars
The Sudanese Campaigns
The Egyptian Campaign
The Absynian & Xhosa Campaigns
The Maori Campaigns
The Boxer Rebellion
There was always enough action 'East of the Suez' to keep Tommy Atkins and Jack Tarr busy during the reign of Queen Victoria, but we are not just limited there. Lets not forget some of the other colonial campaigns of the 17th and 18th centuries, like the Tangier Garrison of the Restoration Period of King Charles II. I like to think of that as the birth of the British Empire, since it was the first colony not to be founded as a business venture by the private sector. This could be the start of something different, e-mail me if you want some help setting it up.
Your Most Humble Servant,
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Serjeant-Major Duncan Munro
Capt. Thos. Graham's Coy.
42nd Royal Highland Regiment of Foote
(The Black Sheep of the Black Watch)
"Nemo Me Impune Lacessit"
-Or-
"Recruit locally, fight globally." |
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richfed
Sachem
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Posted - November 16 2003 : 04:17:18 AM
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So, anyway ... Gatling guns, for better or worse, never made it to the field. Perhaps, Custer's first tactical error.
The below aerial photo first appeared in National Geographic magazine back in the mid-80s sometime. It was taken shortly after the grass fires had burned off most all the vegetation. The markings on the photo were done by me to better illustrate the course of action. They are not exact - simply rough representations I hastily sketched in there. The view is looking southward. Thus, you - the viewer - are at the northern end of the battlefield. The Little Bighorn river is to the west [right] of the photo ... you can see it, and where you don't, you can tell its course from the growth of trees. Not so obvious from the picture is the lay of the land. You really need to walk the field to fully appreciate the nuances of it. It is "folded" land, is the best I can describe it. A few steps here or there, and the view completely changes. Ravines & gullies abound.
About this photo: Off to the far south, the light blue "V," is the path of Reno's battalion - 3 companies plus 40-45 Indian scouts, mostly Arikara, a few Crows. He attacked the southern extremity of the Indian Village, near the Hunkpapa Sioux circle, fell back to the timber near the river, and, after some time, retreated [he used the word "charged"  ] to the high bluffs across the Little Bighorn.
The Indian village spread for a mile and a half, up to Medicine Tail Coulée ford [point A]. Conventional knowledge used to declare the village stretching for 3 miles, all the way to the foreground of the photo. It is now known that this is incorrect. After the first day's fighting, the village relocated a bit to the north. The camp circles from the abandoned adjacent village sites gave the impression of a 3 mile long village, when in actuality, it was 2 separate sites. Still, a mile and a half is a pretty big village!
The dark blue line is the path that Custer's battalion - 5 companies - traversed. I will reference it as I describe what occurred. The Custer battalion moved toward you in the photo.
For more photos of the terrain & sites, see my Little Bighorn Photo Gallery. They may help you visualize the events better.
Benteen's battalion - another 3 companies - had scouted off to the south west; found nothing; and returned to the main trail. They made it as far as the bluffs to which Reno retreated. Ditto for the pack train - one company, plus 6 soldiers from each of the other 11 companies that comprised the 7th Cavalry. The slow moving "train" moved arrived a bit later, even though it came straight on following the Reno/Custer trail.
Custer viewed the initial charge made by Reno from those bluffs. What he saw was a completely surprised village under attack with non-combatants fleeing to the north. Pretty much what he had hoped to see. This, along with Cooke's intelligence, caused him to move to the north looking for a suitable ford from which to block the exodus. He sent Daniel Kanipe back to hurry on the pack train.
As Custer entered the "dark blue line" area in the photo, the true size of the village became apparent. It is at that point that he hurried off Giovanni Martini with the famous "Bring packs" note to Benteen. At the time that message was sent, Custer had no way of knowing that Benteen was already on his trail, having given up his mission as futile. So, Benteen was actually closer at hand than he knew. A bit later, Boston Custer rode up from the pack train, having passed Benteen on the trail, and undoubtedly conveyed that important bit of news to his brother.
The Custer battalion was divided into two wings, the right, L [Calhoun], I [Keogh], and C [Tom Custer, although he personally rode with HQs this day], and the lef |
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richfed
Sachem
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Posted - November 16 2003 : 06:02:07 AM
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Ahhhh ... coffee ... indispensable! 
In succinct & straightforward form:
The right wing was left at Calhoun Hill. Company L formed in a skirmish line, facing south, to hold off any warriors encroaching from that direction. There were very few, and they approached with utmost caution. Certainly, at this point, there was nothing ominous going on. I & C companies were held in reserve just over the ridge on the eastern slope. With Benteen & the pack train certainly on their way, they would hold this high ground for the eventual link up.
Meanwhile, the right wing continued on the blue line, northward. They reached point C - near the eventual "last stand" site - and headed down to the river to find a ford. They did so at point D - just off the photo to the west. Faced again with very light, but stiff, resistance, they pulled back to await a reinforced 7th. Moving along the river, they found still another ford, then headed up just a bit - back toward the ridge - to a place called "the flats." There they waited, for 20-30 minutes. Nothing was happening. Or so it seemed.
No sign of Benteen. No word from him or Reno. Everything, to this point, was still an offensive action on Custer's part.
Meanwhile, Crazy Horse led a strong force of warriors around the northern end of the village to attempt to flank the right wing, spotted on Calhoun Hill. Traditionally, this was portrayed as the maneuver that finished off Custer. The problem is with the words "northern end." The northern end was far more south than originally thought, for the reason described above. Crazy Horse was not even aware of the Custer wing, nor they of him. Such was this terrain!
Calhoun was busy skirmishing, and the warrior numbers continued to grow as Custer paused, awaiting forces that were not going to come. Company C charged down a ravine [perpendicular to point B] to disperse the threat to Calhoun. Indians reared back; the cavalry pursued; the Indians struck. About half of C company were casualties. The remainder fell back. L company formed a new line to face west to hold back these emboldened warriors & cover the retreat of the decimated remnants of C. Their left flank now exposed, heavy fire from a point now known as Henryville [seen just to the left of point B], due to the large number of casings from Henry repeating rifles found there, began to take its toll on L. I, still in reserve, was fell upon by Crazy Horse's flanking maneuver from the east. Chaos. Everything collapsed at once.
What of the left wing?
After pausing in the flats, E company dismounted, and in the fashion of their counterparts in the other wing, deployed as skirmishers to hold off weak threats coming from the river area - company F in reserve near point E.
Both wings had made fairly identical, and prescribed, deployments for the situation as they knew it.
Indian warriors at both areas made it a priority to scare off horses. One in every 4 troopers, once dismounted, had to serve as horse holders while the others skirmished. The warriors succeeded at both wings. Most of E company lost their mounts. F moved up to near point F, covering E's retreat. E moved about halfway up the slope & then took prone firing positions, successfully checking the warriors advance. By this time, though, very little was left of their brother-wing.
The rout of the right wing was complete. Stragglers, maybe 20, made it to join F company at point F. However, Indian pressure was extreme now from both flanks, particularly coming from the direction of point B. The panic of the survivors of that disintegration spread to the other wing. Company E, only a few of whom still had mounts, charged - or fled - toward the river. Most ended up killed in or about Deep Ravine, which you can see just to the right of point E, near the end of the foot path.
The last stand, that of most of company F, HQs, and the disorganized remnant |
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Bill R
Colonial Militia
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Posted - November 16 2003 : 1:53:03 PM
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Very good and detailed synopsis of the battle Rich! It's plain you have spent much time on composing that and laying out the events.
I will admit, things definitely went wrong from the get-go. The first of which as I understand it, was the sighting of several warriors which led Custer to believe his column had been sighted.
Wasn't it true though, that the warriors were just scavaging packs or something dropped on the trail, and were seen riding in the opposite direction - diametrically AWAY from the direction the large camp was expected (known) to be? That they were not of the group he was looking for? Possibly if he had sent a scout to trail them (or at least to silence them) he would have known he had NOT been discovered as yet and may have layed his plans differently? At least attacked when he had originally planned?
I agree there was cowardice and hesitation shown by his subordinates, but might they not have been right in their belief their help would have been futile? And was not Reno pinned down pretty thoroughly? I think it probably right that he lost all stomach for glory when his scouts brains and blood spattered him further throwing him into confusion...and most certainly weakening his resolve or perhaps even his courage. Movement would have been suicidal or impossible for him once he was beseiged on the hill he had retreated to. Benteen, well, he was sent off on a scout that proved to be useless, delaying his arrival and help, and by then was not the mess pretty well underway? Likewise he might have felt it more prudent to stay with Reno in that seige situation? Not sure about that part of it.
I still say misassumptions made by Custer, less than noble subordinates (probably even insubordinate and hateful toward Custer....but again that is the Commander's responsibility to resolve it - win them over or fire their asses), personality of Custer, and other motivations that can only be speculated upon had a big part in the debacle. I have absolutely NO criticism of the troopers themselves. They had pride in their unit, went where they were led, and fought well under the circumstances of overwhelming odds and vacillating leadership.
Thanks for taking the time to review the battle. Was Custer a hero? Was he a martinet filled with arrogance, ambition and self-importance? Was he just a good soldier doing his duty and a pawn of higher powers and agendas? Had he lost a lot of respect and support among the officer corps and just trying to redeem himself perhaps a little recklessly and foolishly? There are still a lot of sides to the issue which leads me to believe there is some truth to all of it perhaps. Very interesting and complex topic, and certainly one designed to fire up emotions at times.
All I can speak for certainty is that in our tactical and managerial courses in officer basic he was held as an example of what not to do.
Bravery was never an issue. Commitment was never an issue. Tactics and leadership style WERE. |
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SgtMunro
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Posted - November 16 2003 : 8:21:04 PM
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An excellent presentation of the battle, Sachem Rich. Good show!!!! I'll have to read it more in depth, before contributing my thoughts to your questions. Till then...
Your Most Humbe Servant,
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Serjeant-Major Duncan Munro
Capt. Thos. Graham's Coy.
42nd Royal Highland Regiment of Foote
(The Black Sheep of the Black Watch)
"Nemo Me Impune Lacessit"
-Or-
"Recruit locally, fight globally." |
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richfed
Sachem
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Posted - November 17 2003 : 06:05:44 AM
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Hey, thanks, guys! 
quote:
Originally posted by Bill R
Very good and detailed synopsis of the battle Rich! It's plain you have spent much time on composing that and laying out the events.
Actually, it's off the top of my head. It's been composing in my little brain since I was in the 7th grade.
quote:
I will admit, things definitely went wrong from the get-go. The first of which as I understand it, was the sighting of several warriors which led Custer to believe his column had been sighted.
Wasn't it true though, that the warriors were just scavaging packs or something dropped on the trail, and were seen riding in the opposite direction - diametrically AWAY from the direction the large camp was expected (known) to be? That they were not of the group he was looking for? Possibly if he had sent a scout to trail them (or at least to silence them) he would have known he had NOT been discovered as yet and may have layed his plans differently? At least attacked when he had originally planned?
Yes, true. Those who found the pack & were rummaging through it never did go to the village. However, there were other bands of Indians spotted after this. Most notably, near the Lone Tipi site - 40 or so, galloping off. There is no question that the column was spotted. There is no question that preliminary signs were that Indians were fleeing. There is also no question that the village was never alarmed by all of this. Custer couldn't know.
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I agree there was cowardice and hesitation shown by his subordinates, but might they not have been right in their belief their help would have been futile? And was not Reno pinned down pretty thoroughly? I think it probably right that he lost all stomach for glory when his scouts brains and blood spattered him further throwing him into confusion...and most certainly weakening his resolve or perhaps even his courage. Movement would have been suicidal or impossible for him once he was beseiged on the hill he had retreated to. Benteen, well, he was sent off on a scout that proved to be useless, delaying his arrival and help, and by then was not the mess pretty well underway? Likewise he might have felt it more prudent to stay with Reno in that seige situation? Not sure about that part of it.
"Ride to the sound of the guns." Can't help but to agree with that philosophy. Reno was battered, mostly due due his own ineptness. Benteen took his time, for reasons only he knows. We can guess. It seems pretty obvious. Had he rushed forward when first informed - and remember, he was already on the trail by the time the messenger found him AND Boston Custer, who was even further behind with the pack train, passed him - he could have been on the scene. Nobody knows if that would have helped or not. As it was, by the time he arrived at Reno Hill, Reno's men were just arriving themselves and the warriors were withdrawing en masse to go meet a new threat [Custer]. Reno should have set up a defensive perimeter with his battalion, set up hospital area for his wounded, reported to the pack train to move up with all haste, and allowed Benteen to follow his orders. At the very least, sent a scout forward to see what was going on. None of that was done. There was no siege at this juncture. Reno was a mess; Benteen was lackadaisical. No questioning his courage, though. He was instrumental in the ensuing defense.
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Bill R
Colonial Militia
USA
Bumppo's Patron since [at least]:
July 03 2002
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Posted - November 17 2003 : 12:28:14 PM
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"Lt. Edgerly [regarding what might have happened if Reno pressed his attack] ... I believe that we would have captured and destroyed the village and won a costly victory. "
That could well be. If it had been better coordinated, more reliable subordinates, all attacking with vigor and according to plan, and better communications Custer might well have won a victory. Maybe very costly, but he might have done it even outnumbered as he was. The gods of war are so fickle though. Even if everything had gone as Lt. Edgerly thought they might have, what if Custer had been killed early on? Without the glue, the same confusion and vacillating attitudes might have caused it to fall apart just as it did. Is there any indications that maybe Custer was hit, disabled, or killed early in the battle at his first contact with the enemy?
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richfed
Sachem
USA
Bumppo's Patron since [at least]:
May 13 2002
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Posted - November 17 2003 : 7:31:30 PM
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Yes, as a matter of fact ... though it's pretty much discounted [not entirely, though!!!]. A Cheyenne reported a man in buckskins fell in - or near - the river at Medicine Tail Coulée Ford. Was it Custer? I doubt it very much for two main reasons.
1 - I would speculate that the command would have behaved much differently if it were true. Continuing on the offensive is hard to imagine. I would think withdrawing back toward Reno the more likely scenario.
2 - The Crow scout, Curly, released from "duty" after the two split wings briefly rejoined at Calhoun Hill, surely would have mentioned that fact.
Yet, the story occasionally circulates. Almost as if to explain the defeat, as in "Surely Custer couldn't be beaten by Indians. He must have been killed early on." Much like the "Sitting Bull was a white man who fought with Napoleon theory - I kid you not!!!
More likely, he was hit at the northern most-ford - if indeed he fell at the river at all. No definitive reason to think so; his body was found on Custer Hill, so I figure that's where he was killed.
To me - and I don't mean to dismiss all the reasons I mentioned above as contributing, in most cases mightily, to the defeat of Custer - it's really fairly clear & simple ... Custer's battalion never ceased in their attempt to fulfill their mission and continued on the offensive until they physically could not any longer. When all is said & done, they were whipped by Indians who swarmed about them like angry hornets. There was no reason for Custer to have expected their change in tactics, and it wasn't till his command was so strung out as to be outside supporting distances of one another that the sting was felt. But, I don't feel he fought a bad fight ... too much was going against him this day. I know my previous two sentences will prompt someone to think, "Well, there you go. He didn't follow protocol. Units should be within supporting distance." If that's you, then I didn't say my piece clearly enough up above - back to the drawing board! |
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